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Abstract 
 
Since nearly two decades threats to public security through events such as 9/11, the 
Madrid (2004) and London (2005) bombings and more recently the Paris attacks 
(2015) resulted in the adoption of a plethora of national and EU measures aiming at 
fighting terrorism and serious crime. In addition, the Snowden revelations brought the 
privacy and data protection implications of these public security measures into the 
spotlight. In this highly contentious context, three EU data retention and access 
measures have been introduced for the purpose of fighting serious crime and 
terrorism: The Data Retention Directive (DRD), the EU-US PNR Agreement and the 
EU-US SWIFT Agreement. All three regimes went through several revisions 
(SWIFT, PNR) or have been annulled (DRD) exemplifying the difficulty of 
determining how privacy and data protection ought to be protected in the context of 
public security. The trigger for this research is to understand the underlying causes of 
these difficulties by examining the problem from different angles. 
The thesis applies the theory of ‘New Institutionalism’ (NI) which allows both 
a political and legal analysis of privacy and data protection in the public security 
context. According to NI, ‘institutions’ are defined as the operational framework in 
which actors interact and they steer the behaviours of the latter in the policy-making 
cycle. By focusing on the three data retention and access regimes, the aim of this 
thesis is to examine how the EU ‘institutional framework’ shapes data protection and 
privacy in regard to data retention and access measures in the public security context. 
Answering this research question the thesis puts forward three main hypotheses: (i) 
privacy and data protection in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ) is an 
institutional framework in transition where historic and new features determine how 
Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union 
(CFREU) are shaped; (ii) policy outcomes on Articles 7 and 8 CFREU are influenced 
by actors’ strategic preferences pursued in the legislation-making process; and (iii) 
privacy and data protection are framed by the evolution of the Court of Justice of the 
European Union (CJEU) from a ‘legal basis arbiter’ to a political actor in its own right 
as a result of the constitutional changes brought by the Lisbon Treaty. 
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CHAPTER 1 – INTRODUCTION 
 
1. Objective(s) of the thesis 
 
The aim of this thesis is to analyse how the EU institutional framework shapes data 
protection and privacy in regard to data retention and access measures for public 
security purposes. By following this overarching objective the thesis examines three 
data retention regimes in the EU that have been adopted for the purpose of fighting 
serious crime and terrorism: the Data Retention Directive (DRD), the EU-US SWIFT 
Agreement and the EU-US PNR Agreement. While two of those regimes have an 
external dimension, it has to be noted that the thesis assessed them mainly from an 
EU perspective rather than adopting a comparative approach. The reason for choosing 
those three case studies is their similarity in terms of the political and institutional 
context leading to their adoption, the nature of the legislation and the similarity in 
regard to the nature of safeguards on the rights to privacy and data protection. Besides 
the similarity they are also marked by differences. First, they concern different sets of 
data namely traffic, location, passenger and financial messaging data. Second, they 
combine an EU internal (DRD) and EU external (PNR, SWIFT) perspective. Third, 
the regimes have different levels of maturity. In Digital Rights Ireland, the Court of 
Justice of the European Union (CJEU) annulled the DRD for its disproportionate 
interference with Articles 7 and 8 CFREU. The other two regimes are still in force but 
there is no consensus among politicians, practitioners, academics and civil society on 
whether they are proportionate.1 Fourth, while all three regimes are examples of 
where data is retained for public security purposes the nature of retention varies. In 
regard to the DRD, service providers need to indiscriminately retain data for a certain 
period of time while subsequent law enforcement access to the data is not regulated 
by the measure. In contrast, the PNR and SWIFT Agreements both regulate in the 
first instance transfer and access to data while laying down retention conditions after 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Note that Joined Cases C-203/15 and C-698/15 Tele2 Sverige AB v. Post- och telestyrelsen and 
Secretary of State for the Home Department v. Tom Watson, Peter Brice and Geoffrey Lewis of 21 
December 2016 (hereinafter Tele2 Sverige) provide further clarity in regard to the legality of general 
data retention requirements while Opinion 1/15 Request for an Opinion submitted by the European 
Parliament on the Draft Agreement between Canada and the European Union on the Transfer and 
Processing of Passenger Name Record data, forthcoming (hereinafter Opinion 1/15) will provide 
insights into the proportionality of the EU-Canada PNR Agreement. This will also have implications 
for the EU-US PNR Agreement.   
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the authorities obtained the data. Minding the common and distinct features of the 
three regimes, the relevance of the institutional framework and institutional actors in 
shaping data protection and private life is the subject of this thesis. Accordingly, the 
thesis is structured around the subsequent three hypotheses: 
• Hypothesis 1: ‘Privacy and Data Protection in AFSJ’ is an institutional 
framework in transition implying that both established as well as new 
institutional features co-exist and commonly determine how data protection 
and privacy is shaped in relation to public security.  
• Hypothesis 2: The EU institutional framework enables EU legislative actors 
to pursue strategic preferences in the legislation-making process and thereby 
influences the way privacy and data protection is shaped in the public security 
context.           
• Hypothesis 3: The transitional nature of the EU institutional framework 
contributed to the CJEU’s evolution from a ‘legal basis arbiter’ to a political 
actor in its own right that increasingly determines substantial aspects relating 
to privacy and data protection in the public security context. 
2. Methodological approach  
 
While being guided by the overarching research question and the related hypotheses, 
the thesis applies three main research methodologies. First, primary sources will be 
examined. Primary sources are defined in this thesis as any source deriving directly 
from the EU institutional actors.2 This includes the examination of EU and former EC 
Treaties as well as an analysis of secondary legislation such as the DRD, the various 
versions of the PNR and SWIFT Agreements and EU data protection legislation such 
as the Data Protection Directive, the e-privacy Directive, the Framework Decision 
2008/977/JHA and the new data protection package.3 It also includes the analysis of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Note that since the thesis applies an approach accounting for political and legal assessments, primary 
sources are not only legally binding materials but also policy documents.  
3 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the 
protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement 
of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation) OJ 2016, L 119 
(hereinafter GDPR) and Directive (EU) 2016/680 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 
April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data by 
competent authorities for the purposes of the prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of 
criminal offences or the execution of criminal penalties, and on the free movement of such data, and 
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ECtHR and CJEU jurisprudence most notably Digital Rights Ireland, Schrems, Tele2 
Sverige, Opinion 1/154 as well as other relevant CJEU as well as ECtHR cases. While 
a more detailed assessment of the relationship between the ECtHR and CJEU will 
follow in Chapter 3 it has to be noted from the outset that ECtHR case law is relevant 
for the purposes of the thesis since the ECHR is constitutionally enshrined in EU law5 
resulting in cross-fertilisation between ECtHR and CJEU jurisprudence. In addition to 
legislation and case law, policy documents of the European Council, the European 
Commission and the European Parliament will be assessed such as Commission 
Communications, EP Resolutions and Motions as well as Council Positions and 
reports. Not only official documentation but also informal and/or confidential 
documents are scrutinised such as letters exchanges between the institutional actors or 
recommendations of the institutional legal services. Most of the restricted material 
derives from ‘Statewatch observatories’ which are online collections of restricted 
policy documents in relation to EU Justice and Home Affairs Policy which have been 
leaked.6  
Second, secondary sources will be assessed which are defined as any source 
which does not immediately derive from EU institutional actors but which assesses 
the latter or any results thereof. This includes the review of academic literature both 
on theoretical aspects and on policy outcomes and their legality. Due to the relevance 
of both legal and political analysis the literature reviewed includes a wide range of 
topics and includes works of political scientists and legal academics. In addition to 
academic literature, secondary sources also include the views of relevant stakeholders 
such as opinions or recommendations of the European Data Protection Supervisor and 
opinions of the Article 29 Working Party. While those actors are positioned within the 
EU institutional setting, they are independent of the EU institutional actors and 
provide independent advice on policies and their legality. Assessment of other bodies 
also play a role, for example literature of UN bodies or NGO’s have been accounted 
for to some extent. On certain occasions journalistic sources were used. For example, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
repealing Council Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA OJ 2016, L 119 (hereinafter Police and 
Criminal Justice Data Protection Directive). 
4 Note that according to Article 218 (11) TFEU the EP, the Commission or the Council may request an 
opinion of the CJEU on the legality of an international agreement. The CJEU opinion is binding and an 
agreement may not enter into force in case the CJEU opinion is negative unless the Agreement itself or 
the Treaties are amended. Only the AG Opinion has been published before the thesis has been 
finalised.      
5 Article 6 TEU and Article 52 (3) CFREU. Note however that the EU did not yet accede to the ECHR.   
6 The Statewatch observatories can be accessed via: http://www.statewatch.org/. 
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the information relating to the Snowden leaks or the SWIFT leaks were in the first 
instance analysed in journalistic publications.  
Third, to a limited extent qualitative interviews have been conducted to gain 
an understanding of information not publicly available and to obtain views of 
stakeholders that are or were directly involved in the process of policy formation or 
review. The added value of the interviews is that they allow one to gain first hand 
information and interpretations of the emergence and legality of policies. In total, 14 
interviews have been conducted mostly with EU Commission officials, current and 
former European Parliament officials and an official at the CJEU. Some interviews 
were also conducted with employees from the EDPS. In addition, one conversation 
has been held with an US representative and one of the interviewees was an 
investigative journalist specialising on surveillance measures. When references to 
interviews are made in the thesis, only the role of the interviewee will be mentioned 
while refraining from providing names since some interviewees wished to remain 
anonymous.  
The thesis acknowledges that in order to answer the research question both 
political and legal considerations need to be accounted for. The approach of ‘New 
institutionalism’ (NI) facilitates such a dual assessment. Weiler argued that in order to 
understand constitutional development in the European Union the relationship 
between political power and legal norms is key.7 NI defines institutions as the legal 
and normative frameworks guiding actions of political actors.8 NI has been chosen 
since it allows the amalgamation of political science-based and legal analysis and it is 
able to unravel the complex interaction between political and legal processes. On the 
one hand NI emphasises the importance of ‘institutions’ allowing an in-depth analysis 
of the EU legal order relating to AFSJ and privacy/data protection. On the other hand, 
by arguing that institutions shape strategic preferences, NI helps to understand the 
behaviour of different EU institutional actors and thereby assesses why the three data 
retention regimes emerged and why institutional actors shaped privacy and data 
protection in a certain way. NI can be applied to understand the role of both the 
traditional legislation-making actors as well as the CJEU (as emerging political actor) 
in shaping certain policy outcomes ex-ante and ex-post. While the role of the CJEU in 
shaping political developments in regard to the three case studies will be assessed, it 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Weiler, J.H.H. (2001). The Transformation of Europe. Yale Law Journal, vol. 100 (8), p. 2408.   
8 The main features of NI theory are explained in Chapter 2 of this thesis.  
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is beyond the scope of the thesis to assess whether this potential role is intentional or 
unintentional. The latter would require a detailed assessment of preferences and the 
formation thereof of the single judges and the dynamics between the judges in respect 
to each ruling, which goes beyond the scope of the thesis.    
 
3. Terminology  
 
While a detailed account of terminology used in this thesis is available in the table of 
abbreviations, it is important to point out several key issues. First, key legislation and 
international agreements are labelled in the following way. Directive 2006/24/EC9 is 
mostly referred to as the ‘Data Retention Directive’ or ‘DRD’.  Furthermore, the term 
‘SWIFT Agreement’ refers to the ‘Agreement between the European Union and the 
United States of America on the processing and transfer of Financial Messaging Data 
from the European Union to the United States for purposes of the Terrorist Finance 
Tracking Program.’ It has to be noted that there two versions of the SWIFT 
Agreement. While the term ‘SWIFT I’10 refers to the Agreement reached in 2009, the 
term ‘SWIFT II’11 refers to the Agreement of 2010. The thesis at hand does in almost 
all cases refer to the SWIFT II Agreement unless specified. It has to be noted that 
secondary literature either uses the term “TFTP Agreement” or “SWIFT Agreement”. 
The reason for adopting the latter title is to avoid confusion between the US internal 
TFTP programme and the programme subject to the EU-US agreement. The term 
‘PNR Agreement’ refers to the ‘Agreement between the United States of America and 
the European Union on the use and transfer of passenger name records to the United 
States Department of Homeland Security’.12 It has to be noted that there are four 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Directive 2006/24/EC on the retention of data generated or processed in connection with the 
provision of publicly available electronic communications services or of public communications 
networks and amending Directive 2002/58/EC OJ 2006, L 105 (hereinafter Data Retention Directive or 
DRD).  
10 Agreement between the European Union and the United States of America on the processing and 
transfer of Financial Messaging Data from the European Union to the United States for purposes of the 
Terrorist Finance Tracking Program OJ 2010 L 8/11, (hereinafter: “SWIFT I”). 
11 Agreement between the European Union and the United States of America on the processing and 
transfer of Financial Messaging Data from the European Union to the United States for purposes of the 
Terrorist Finance Tracking Program OJ 2010 L 195/5, (hereinafter: “SWIFT Agreement” or “SWIFT 
II”).  
12 Agreement between the United States of America and the European Union on the use and transfer of 
passenger name records to the United States Department of Homeland Security OJ 2012 L 215.  
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different versions of the PNR Agreement: 2004 PNR Agreement,13 2006 PNR 
Agreement,14 2007 PNR Agreement15 and 2012 PNR Agreement.16 If not further 
specified, reference is always made to the 2012 PNR Agreement. When referring to 
all three instruments commonly (i.e. the SWIFT and PNR Agreements and the DRD), 
reference is made to ‘data retention and access regimes’. It has to be noted that while 
in all regimes access and retention for public security purposes takes place, there are 
differences regarding the timing and nature.17  
Second, since the aim of this thesis is to assess data retention and access 
measures in the context of public security it is crucial to have an understanding of the 
latter concept. EU legislation and case law refers to various dimensions of security, 
such as ‘international security’18, ‘national security’19, ‘internal security’20 and ‘public 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Agreement between the European Community and the United States of America on the processing 
and transfer of PNR data by air carriers to the United States Department of Homeland Security, Bureau 
of Customs and Border Protection, CE/USA/en 1. See also: Commission Decision of 14 May 2004 on 
the adequate protection of personal data contained in the Passenger Name Record of air passengers 
transferred to the United States’ Bureau of Customs and Border Protection, (notified under document 
number C(2004) 1914), OJ 2004 L 235; Council Decision of 17 May 2004 on the conclusion of an 
Agreement between the European Community and the United States of America on the processing and 
transfer of PNR data by Air Carriers to the United States Department of Homeland Security, Bureau of 
Customs and Border Protection, OJ L 2004 183. 
14 Council Decision 2006/729/CFSP/JHA of 16 October 2006 on the signing, on behalf of the European 
Union, of an Agreement between the European Union and the United States of America on the 
processing and transfer of passenger name record (PNR) data by air carriers to the United States 
Department of Homeland Security (annexed Agreement between the European Union and the United 
States of America on the processing and transfer of passenger name record (PNR) data by air carriers 
to the United States Department of Homeland Security) OJ 2006 L 298. See also the letter exchange in 
relation to Agreement between the Council Presidency and the Commission and the Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS) of the United States of America, OJ C 259. 
15 Council Decision 2007/551/CFSP/JHA of 23 July 2007 on the signing, on behalf of the European 
Union, of an Agreement between the European Union and the United States of America on the 
processing and transfer of Passenger Name Record (PNR) data by air carriers to the United States 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) (2007 PNR Agreement) (Annexed Agreement between the 
European Union and the United States of America on the processing and transfer of Passenger Name 
Record (PNR) data by air carriers to the United States Department of Homeland Security (DHS) (2007 
PNR Agreement), OJ 2007 L 204. 
16 Agreement between the United States of America and the European Union on the use and transfer of 
passenger name records to the United States Department of Homeland Security OJ 2012 L 215. See 
also: Council Decision of 26 April 2012 on the conclusion of the Agreement between the United States 
of America and the European Union on the use and transfer of passenger name records to the United 
States Department of Homeland Security, OJ 2012 L 215. 
17 See section 1 of this chapter and introduction to Part III. 
18 Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C‑415/05 P Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v Council 
and Commission of 3 September 2008, para. 363; and Joined Cases C‑539/10 P and C-550/10 P Al-
Aqsa v Council of 15 November 2012, para. 130. 
19 The ECHR and ECtHR case law consider national security as legitimate ground for interfering with 
Article 8 (1) ECHR. For example, in Klass and others v. Germany, Application no. 5029/71, judgment 
of 6 September 1978 the ECtHR accepts terrorism as threat to national security. Under EU law 
‘national security’ is considered to be at the heart of national sovereignty and beyond EU competence. 
Respectively, Article 4 (2) TEU states that national security is an essential state function and thus it 
remains the sole responsibility of the Member States. 
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security.’21. It is important to acknowledge the differences between these different 
concepts as they trigger different legal frameworks and justify different types of legal 
actions. For example, national security and internal security lie beyond the 
competences of the EU and they can thus not be used as justification for EU action.22 
Furthermore, ‘international security’ implies security on the international level but it 
can only be a justification for EU action if it serves security within Europe.23 Minding 
these significant differences, all dimensions of security overlap in one point by 
referring to a status where ‘harm or threat to the well-being of persons’ is absent. The 
thesis understands and uses the term ‘public security’ in the latter way by 
understanding it as a desirable status in any democratic society where threats to life 
and well-being of persons are absent. All three case studies under scrutiny in the three 
case study chapters are measures that strive for maintaining or achieving a state of 
public security by preventing, detecting, investigating and prosecuting serious crime 
and terrorism.24     
It is worth pointing out that ‘security’ has the status of a fundamental right. 
Both ECHR and CFREU stipulate that “[e]veryone has the right to liberty and 
security of person.”25 While both ECtHR and CJEU jurisprudence on those articles 
refer mostly to liberty, the CJEU has acknowledged that “Article 6 of the Charter lays 
down the right of any person not only to liberty, but also to security.”26 Apart from 
this statement, ECtHR and CJEU jurisprudence does not further elaborate on the 
security dimension of Articles 6 CFREU and 5 ECHR27 and instead treats public 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 The TFEU refers to internal security on some occasions, which essentially means national security 
(see Articles 71, 72 and 276 TFEU). In EU external relations discourse, ‘internal security’ refers to the 
security within the EU vis-à-vis third countries. See for instance: Report of the Council submitted to 
the European Council. European Union Priorities and Objectives for External Relations in the Field of 
Justice and Home Affairs. Council Doc. 7653/00, Brussels, 6 June 2000. 
21 Joined Cases C-293/12 and C-594/12 Digital Rights Ireland and Seitlinger and Others v. Ireland of 
8 April 2014, (hereinafter Digital Rights Ireland or DRI), para. 41 
22 Article 4 (2) TEU 
23 This has been called “internal-external security nexus”. See for instance: Eriksson, J. & Rhinard, M. 
(2009) The Internal External Security Nexus: Notes on an Emerging Research Agenda, Cooperation 
and Conflict, vol. 44 (3), pp. 243–267.  
24 The meaning of terrorism and serious crime is often not clear. The early PNR and SWIFT 
Agreements and the DRD do not specify the definition of terrorism and/or serious crime. In later 
agreements this has been rectified. For example, Article 4 (1) (a) of the 2012 PNR Agreement lays 
down guidelines on what counts as terrorist offence while in Article 4 (1) (b) other crimes covered by 
the Agreement are considered to be those that are transnational and lead to a sentence of imprisonment 
for at least three years.     
25 Article 6 CFREU and Article 5 (1) ECHR.  
26 DRI, para. 42. See also AG Opinion on Tele 2 Sverige, para. 163.   
27 Neither the explanatory memorandum to CFREU, nor academic literature seems to acknowledge the 
existence of the security dimension of Articles 6 CFREU and 5 ECHR. See: Explanations relating to 
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security as legitimate ground to limit the rights to privacy and data protection. 
Although taking note of the fundamental rights dimension, the thesis adopts the same 
approach as the CJEU by regarding public security as ground for limiting privacy and 
data protection.28  
 Third, in the thesis the word ‘indiscriminate’ is used multiple times. 
‘Indiscriminate’ can be simply defined as a situation where discrimination of any sort 
is not used or exercised. In the case of data processing for public security purposes the 
term seems however to carry a tripartite meaning. First, the term ‘indiscriminate’ can 
be interpreted to show that all data is processed without discriminating against the 
amount of data that can hypothetically and which is actually processed under a given 
legal measure. The core of this meaning is to identify whether data processing 
happens on a large scale. Second, ‘indiscriminate’ can also refer to a situation where 
data processing is not limited according to its usefulness for the purpose of fighting 
crime. This interpretation keeps the concept very broad and blurred as multiple 
arguments can show that data is chosen in a ‘sufficiently discriminate’ way to ensure 
usefulness. A third interpretation of indiscriminate refers to a situation where ‘there is 
no evidence capable of suggesting’ a link to serious crime.29 This implies a narrower 
interpretation of the term where ‘indiscriminate’ refers to a situation where one does 
not distinguish between two groups of data subjects namely those of suspected 
criminals and innocent individuals. In this thesis both the first and third meaning of 
‘indiscriminate’ are applied. While the second meaning is also important this aspect is 
mainly discussed when assessing whether data processing is justified and 
proportionate.        
 Fourth, whenever reference is made to the ‘Court of Justice of the European 
Union’ the change in terminology from pre- to post-Lisbon has to be minded. While 
pre-Lisbon the Court was labelled ‘Court of Justice’, post-Lisbon, the Court as a 
whole was renamed to ‘Court of Justice of the European Union’ while the term ‘Court 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
the Charter of Fundamental Rights, 2007/C 303/02, OJ 2007, C 303/17; Guide on Article 5 of the 
Convention Right to Liberty and Security, retrieved 04.01.2017 from 
http://www.echr.coe.int/documents/guide_art_5_eng.pdf; see also: Peers, S. et al (2014) The EU 
Charter of Fundamental Rights: A Commentary. Hart Publishing.  
28 This approach is aligned to the overarching focus of the thesis on the rights to privacy and data 
protection. Consequently these two rights are perceived as the starting point of the legality assessment. 
In case it is decided to treat security and privacy/data protection as competing fundamental rights a 
different outcome of the proportionality assessment might be conceivable. As far as the author of this 
thesis is aware, this has not been done in respect to the three case studies and should therefore be 
subject to further research.  
29 DRI, para. 58.  
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of Justice’ is reserved for the supreme body of the Court. While this thesis refers to 
rulings that have been issued both pre- and post-Lisbon, the term ‘CJEU’ is used 
consistently throughout the thesis. Fifth, on multiple occasions, the interaction of 
institutional actors during the legislation making procedure is assessed. Most of the 
times, reference is made to the ‘co-decision procedure’ and/or ‘ordinary legislation 
making procedure’. It needs to be noted that those two procedures are equivalent, 
which is the reason why both terms are used interchangeably. However, the Lisbon 
Treaty officially replaced the name from ‘co-decision’ to ‘ordinary’ legislation-
making procedure.  
 Sixth, another important point is the use of the term ‘institution’. As 
explained earlier, the thesis makes use of ‘New institutionalism’ which is a theoretical 
approach where the term ‘institution’ refers to the operating framework in which 
institutional actors interact. In the EU context, ‘institution’ is used to refer to the main 
policy-making bodies such as the EP, the Commission and the Council. In order to 
avoid confusion the thesis refers to (i) ‘institutions’ or ‘institutional framework’ when 
discussing the operating framework in which EU actors interact with each other, and 
(ii) ‘EU institutional actors or player(s)’, ‘actor’ or ‘player’ when referring to one, to 
all or to several actors such as the European Council, the Commission, the European 
Parliament and the CJEU. Further details on the meaning of ‘institution’ in the 
framework of this thesis are provided in Chapters 2 and 3.   
Ultimately, the term ‘political actorness’ or ‘CJEU as political actor’ is used to 
assess the CJEU’s influence on policy outputs beyond the influence in the specific 
case at hand. As explained further in Chapter 2, political actorness is used to elaborate 
on the extent and the conditions under which Court-generated principles, reasoning 
and interpretation impact the range of policy options, political agendas, and policy 
outputs. This is not to be confused with branches of judicial activism scrutinising 
whether the outcome of a judgment has been influenced by political rather than legal 
considerations. 30 In other words, ‘political actorness’ focuses on the political and/or 
legislative consequences of a judgment whereas some strands of judicial activism 
focus on analysing the driving force or motivation leading to a judgment. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 For an explanation of different dimensions of judicial activism, see: Canon, B.C. (1983) Defining the 
Dimensions of Judicial Activism, Judicature, vol. 66 (6), pp. 236, 239; or: Kmiec, K. (2004) The 
Origin and Current Meanings of Judicial Activism. California Law Review, vol. 92, p. 1441.  
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4. Structure  
 
The first chapter provides an introduction to the thesis. This includes a discussion of 
the objectives, relevance and structure of the thesis. The second chapter explains 
‘New institutionalism’ as the theoretical framework applied to this thesis. It provides 
an overview of the key features of institutionalism and how this is relevant for this 
thesis. The chapter also explains the theoretical foundation of the three hypotheses 
that seek to answer the overall research question. 
Chapter three focuses on examining the institutional framework of privacy and 
data protection in AFSJ. More specifically privacy and data protection in AFSJ is 
analysed from a historical institutionalist perspective. It is shown that the institutional 
framework is marked by incremental transformation since some aspects of the 
institutional framework exhibit features of ‘old paths’ while others exhibit new 
structures. Turning points or so-called ‘critical junctures’ have contributed to the 
transitional character of the institution while path-dependence led to the stickiness to 
former institutional habits. The transitional nature of privacy and data protection in 
AFSJ is relevant for understanding the second and third hypothesis and the case study 
chapters since it shapes the evolution of all three regimes. In addition, Chapter three 
also establishes a framework to analyse the legality of the DRD, SWIFT and PNR 
Agreements.  
Chapters four, five and six analyse the three data retention and access regimes 
–the Data Retention Directive, the SWIFT and the PNR Agreements- against the 
overarching research question on how the EU institutional framework shapes data 
protection and privacy in the public security context. More specifically, each of those 
chapters assesses whether and to which extent the second and third hypothesis is 
confirmed. Ultimately, chapter seven draws general conclusions from the single case 
study chapters and provides some future perspectives.      
 
5. Why is this thesis relevant? 
5.1 The increase of ‘data driven’ law enforcement practices and the effects  
 
Throughout the last two decades the European Council adopted four roadmap policy 
programmes which set out the policy priorities in AFSJ. All of those programmes 
stress that any action undertaken by EU authorities has to be fundamental rights 
	   20 
compliant. The Tampere Programme mentioned that “[f]rom its very beginning 
European integration has been firmly rooted in a shared commitment to freedom 
based on human rights, democratic institutions and the rule of law.”31 This has been 
reiterated throughout the years in many different policy documents. Furthermore, also 
the latest roadmap programme mentions that “one of the key objectives of the Union 
is to build an area of freedom, security and justice (…) with full respect for 
fundamental rights”32 Nevertheless, particularly since the Stockholm Programme 
policy makers have expressed the concern that it will become more challenging to 
“(…) ensure respect for fundamental rights and freedoms and integrity of the person 
while guaranteeing security in Europe.”33 This challenge particularly refers to the 
right to privacy and data protection as stipulated by the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the EU (CFREU) due to the increasing data-driven approach used by law 
enforcement authorities. 
The omnipresence of personal data, which is an inherent feature of the 
information society, does neither spare criminals nor the law enforcement sector. 
Thus, public authorities were required to adapt to 21st century criminal challenges by 
adjusting investigative techniques. Data became a key to law enforcement activities 
since it offers as many or even more insights than for example traditional tapping or 
surveillance methods. At the same time, it is however significantly cheaper – a 
consideration which is particularly important in an era of economic austerity. This is 
even more so because data generated in the private sector can be misappropriated 
easily for law enforcement purposes. For instance, contractual relations of potential 
suspects34 with online service providers can generate vast amounts of valuable data 
without necessarily generating costs to public authorities.35 The cooperation between 
law enforcement agencies and the private sector was already observed by Garland in 
1996.36 He described this as ‘responsibilization strategy’ where acting upon crime is 
not done in a direct fashion through state agencies but indirectly by activating non-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 Tampere European Council Presidency Conclusions of 15 and 16 October 1999, para. 1.  
32 Council Conclusions of the European Council, Council doc. EUCO 79/14 of the 27 June 2014, point 
4, p.19. 
33 Stockholm Programme, Council doc. 17024/09 of 2 December 2009, p. 4.  
34 It has to be noted though that not all useful data generated online needs to be necessarily derived 
from contractual relationships (e.g. collection of IP addresses in relation to internet searches). 
35 In some cases, LEAs may however be required to pay for data access. Furthermore, costs of data 
retention systems may need to be partially or completely borne by public authorities.  
36 Garland, D. (1996). The Limits of the Sovereign State: Strategies of Crime Control in Contemporary 
Society. British Journal of Criminology, vol. 36, pp. 445-71. 
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state agencies and organizations.”37 While Garland focuses on occasional requests, 
nowadays the dimensions have changed from occasional requests to constant reliance 
on data both via formal and informal channels. 
 There are various effects of ‘data-driven’ law enforcement activities. First, it 
may lead to the blurring of the boundaries between the public and private sector since 
law enforcement authorities make increasingly use of data held by companies. This 
has been described as the ‘long arm’ of law enforcement agents reaching out to 
privately held data in the fight against crime.38 As shown later this is not only 
problematic for matters relating to the legitimacy/accountability of law enforcement 
activities but it also leads to regulatory challenges in a fragmented EU legal order. 
Second, in certain instances law enforcement agencies go beyond what is necessary 
for the sake of investigating a crime and instead make use of personal data to prevent 
crimes that may happen in the future.39 This practice, which has been called 
‘speculative security practice’,40 is arguably fuelled both by mere technological 
possibilities41 as well as by increasingly unpredictable threats and threat perceptions 
such as large-scale terrorism. Third and related to the previous point, another threat of 
‘data driven’ law enforcement activities refers to de facto and in abstracto mass 
surveillance.42 On the one hand, abuse of powers could lead to de facto mass 
surveillance where data is used excessively and indiscriminately for public security 
purposes or control purposes more generally. On the other hand, in abstracto mass 
surveillance is also concerning since the feeling of being under surveillance can have 
a chilling effect on data subjects both on privacy and other rights such as freedom of 
expression.43 Fourth, the increasingly borderless nature of both data and criminal 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 Ibid., p. 452. Note that the responsibilization strategy does not imply off-loading of state function or 
the ‘privatisation of crime control’ instead it represents a form of governing crime where the state 
retains its traditional functions but increases efficiency and output by developing new cooperation 
mechanisms with the private sector (see p. 454).  
38 Term used in relation to law enforcement access to data in the cloud: Walden, I. (2011). Accessing 
Data in the Cloud: The Long Arm of the Law Enforcement Agent. Queen Mary School of Law Legal 
Research Paper, No. 74/2011. Retrieved 25.05.2016 from: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1781067   
39 It has to be noted that the boundary between ‘investigating’ and ‘preventing’ crime may be blurred in 
practice since sometimes the successful investigation of a crime is also the reason for preventing other 
crimes from happening.  
40 De Goede, M. (2012). Speculative Security. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.  
41 Rosenbach, M. and Stark, H. (2015). Der NSA Komplex. Edward Snowden und der Weg in die totale 
Überwachung, Spiegel Buchverlag, p. 12.  
42 For an assessment of the relationship between privacy and surveillance see: Goold, J. (2009) 
Surveillance and the Political Value of Privacy. Amsterdam Law Forum. 
43 For example, the CJEU granted a prominent role to the perception of being under surveillance rather 
than surveillance per se: DRI, para. 37. 
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activity require an increased cooperation across borders. While on the EU level this 
amongst others impacts the degree of European integration in the AFSJ field, 
cooperation with non-EU countries has proven to trigger other concerns. As shown 
later, particularly law enforcement cooperation with the US is fraught with difficulties 
in regard to proportionality of security measures in light of fundamental rights. This 
was most prominently revealed with the Snowden leaks in 2013 which illustrated the 
wide-ranging nature of surveillance measures for security purposes adopted in the US. 
As shown the transformation to an increasingly data-driven society has an 
impact on the way public security agencies operate. While this is necessary to keep 
pace with the transformation of society and thus crime itself it also led to challenges 
in regard to compliance with the rights to data protection and privacy. The thesis 
discusses this challenge by analysing the blurred boundary between on the one hand 
adequate adaptation of law enforcement practices in the information society and on 
the other hand new forms of fighting crime that are disproportionate in light of 
privacy and data protection.  
5.2 The fluctuating nature of threat perception and the effects on EU cooperation 
in the public security context 
 
In order to fully understand why certain public security measures are introduced on 
the EU level it is important to understand what is commonly perceived as a threat to 
public security.44 In most cases, threat perception is in the first instance formed by 
events. For instance, it can be observed that in the Tampere Programme the fight 
against terrorism only plays a marginal role while it was lifted to a matter of ‘new 
urgency’ in the Hague Programme which was adopted shortly after 9/11. Thus, a 
large-scale terror event obviously leads to a different threat perception of terrorism. 
Nonetheless, the persistence and intensity of that threat perception largely depends on 
discourse of so-called ‘securitizing actors’ who are mostly the political leaders in a 
given nation-state45 and the acceptance of such discourse by society.46 The 
intersection of real threats and threat discourse can in a further step translate into 
legislative outcomes. It can often be observed that legislation in such a context 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 For an overview of the perception of threat and security, see: Balzacq, T. (2005). The Three Faces of 
Securitisation: Political Agency, Audience and Context, European Journal of International Relations 
11 (2), pp. 171 -201.   
45 Buzan, B. et al. (1998). Security: A New Framework for Analysis. Lynne Rienner Publishers, p. 21. 
46 Rieker, P. (2006). Europeanization of National Security Identity: The EU and the Changing Security 
Identities of the Nordic States. Routledge, p. 9 
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‘securitises’ more aspects than originally perceived as threat47 and often fewer 
safeguards to individuals are granted. There are various examples for such a situation. 
For instance, when the Data Retention Directive was adopted in 2006 it can be argued 
that this was facilitated by the terror attacks in London and Madrid in the two 
previous years. Interestingly instead of being limited in scope to terrorism the 
Directive also applied to other forms of serious crimes. Another example is the PNR 
Directive, which was on the agenda for a long time but only the Paris attacks in 2015 
facilitated its entry into force.48 Similarly to the DRD it also covers serious crimes and 
thus goes beyond the very reason triggering its existence.49  
As soon as the ‘threat memory’ and thus the discourse abates, new securitised 
legislation is less likely to be implemented and existing legislation is increasingly 
criticised due to a lack of necessity and fundamental rights compliance. The latter 
developments are also often steered by specific events. Accordingly, threat perception 
can be directed towards the government authorities where authorities themselves are 
considered to be a threat to civil liberty of the society. Major events triggering the 
emergence of this threat perception can for instance be leaks about secret 
governmental measures that have a negative impact on fundamental rights. 
‘Securitizing actors’ who lead the discourse in this case are mainly civil society 
organisations, the media and to a lesser extent parts of the government apparatus 
(with an exception of Parliaments). For example a large-scale event raising concerns 
about government actions are the Snowden revelations about global surveillance 
regimes in 2013. The scandal and the discourse had a long-term impact on public 
security legislation that was in place. Arguably it had some impact on why and how 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 In those instances, security develops to a type of ‘universal good’ implying that it can lead to state 
mobilization on a wide range of issues. See: Wæver, O. (1995). Identity, Integration and Security: 
Solving the Sovereignty Puzzle in EU Studies. Journal of International Affairs, vol. 48 (2), pp. 46-86. 
48 Apart from fighting crime, PNR data has also been considered to be useful for border control leading 
to the securitisation of migration. Further details, see for example: Huysmans, J. (2000) The European 
Union and the Securitization of Migration. Journal of Common Market Studies, vol. 38, pp. 751–777. 
See also: Marin, L. and Spena, A. (2016) Introduction: The Criminalization of Migration and European 
Dis(Integration), European Journal of Migration and Law, vol. 18 (2), pp. 147-156. 
49 It has to be noted that terrorism is regarded as distinct from other serious offences since terrorism 
mostly attempts to undermine the structure of a nation-state and thus threatens national security. Thus, 
the legitimacy of adopting measures for the purpose of safeguarding the security of a nation state may 
differ from measures concerning other forms of crime. The difference is evidenced by the fact that the 
EU has competence to act when serious crime is at stake but in relation to terrorism the situation is 
more blurred since Article 4 (2) TEU mentions that national security is the sole responsibility of the 
Member States. Apart from the distinctiveness of terrorism and serious crime, in practice the offences 
often overlap.   
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the CJEU annulled the DRD, which in turn might also influence future and existing 
laws.  
It can thus be argued that political reality and public security priorities in the 
EU are steered by opposing threat perceptions that are in turn fuelled by events and 
respective discourse. Over the years, priorities and the nature of legislation thus 
swings like a pendulum between two opposing poles of (perceived) threats.50  
The thesis spans several peaks of this securitisation cycle since the PNR and 
SWIFT Agreements originated after the 9/11 terror attacks while the DRD was 
adopted in the aftermath of the London and Madrid bombings. On the other side of 
the pendulum the Snowden revelations, and the CJEUs annulments of the DRD and 
the Safe Harbour Agreement are counter movements to the previous securitisation 
trend. The thesis aims to analyse how privacy and data protection are shaped in the 
public security context by acknowledging the securitisation cycles but by going 
beyond them when analysing proportionality.      
5.3 The added value of the thesis  
	  
Many scholars have found an interest in studying the Data Retention Directive, the 
PNR Agreements, the SWIFT Agreements as well as AFSJ in general resulting in the 
publication of a plethora of articles, reports, case comments and books.51 The large 
volume of academic literature shows on the one hand that those regimes are of a 
particularly interesting nature. On the other hand, this shows that they provide ample 
opportunity to study different angles of those regimes rendering each of those 
publications an original contribution in its own right. For example, while some 
scholars focused on assessing the legality of the regimes both from a procedural and 
substantial point of view, others have specialised on the interplay between policy 
actors during the legislation making procedures. The PNR and SWIFT regimes also 
feature in EU external relations literature, both from a legal and political science point 
of view.  
 By taking into account a large proportion of the relevant literature on those 
regimes the originality of this thesis lies in the holistic approach taken to analyse the 
impact of those regimes on privacy and data protection. The thesis does not only 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 Interview with EDPS official 
51 A substantial part of this literature has been reviewed in this thesis. An overview can be found in the 
annex.  
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assess the purely legal implications of those regimes due to the author’s belief that 
law cannot be understood as an ‘independent organism’ but instead it has to be 
regarded as integral part of the social system.52 Thus, political and legal dynamics as 
well as the overall institutional framework that embraces privacy and data protection 
in the public security context are assessed. 
Furthermore, a large proportion of existing literature does not take the latest 
developments into account (particularly recent CJEU case law). These new 
developments are crucial in changing the narrative and adding novel considerations. 
Most importantly, the recent developments shift the focus on the role of the CJEU in 
substantially influencing privacy and data protection in relation to data retention and 
access regimes. This adds an interesting aspect to the debate by addressing the 
political actorness of the CJEU and thus the balance of power between legislators and 
courts.  	  
6. Limitations  
 
It has to be noted that the thesis is subject to certain limitations. First of all it only 
focuses on a limited sample of data retention and access regimes for public security 
purposes in the EU, namely the DRD, the PNR and SWIFT Agreements. While the 
reasons for choosing those three case studies have been outlined earlier one has to 
acknowledge that also other large scale data retention and access regimes could have 
been interesting to assess such as SIS II, VIS, EURODAC, or the EU-Canada and 
EU-Australia PNR Agreements. Therefore, the findings only apply to the three case 
studies and generalisations of the findings to other regimes may not always be 
appropriate. Second, the thesis is limited ratione temporis to December 2016. This is 
important to acknowledge since both CJEU judgments as well as political 
developments continue to have a significant impact on the further development of EU 
public security legislation (e.g. current discussions on the e-privacy Directive) as well 
as the legality of various instruments (e.g. a legal challenge in Ireland of the Privacy 
Shield). It can be expected that this trend will continue and additional legislative 
instruments and case law in the near future will emerge, which cannot be taken into 
consideration.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 Term used by Shapiro, M. (2002). Judicial Jusrisprudence. In: Shapiro, M. & Stone Sweet, A. 
(2002). On Law, Politics & Judicialization. Oxford University Press, p. 1.  
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 Ultimately, the theoretical approach applied to this thesis is also subject to 
certain limitations. While a more detailed overview of all limitations of NI is provided 
in chapter two, it suffices here to mention that the application of each theoretical 
approach involves certain limitations and can never explain each single aspect of legal 
and/or political realities. 














PART I - NEW INSTITUTIONALISM, AND THE 
COMPLEXITY OF THE EU INSTITUTIONAL 
FRAMEWORK   
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CHAPTER 2 – NEW INSTITUTIONALISM: A HOLISTIC APPROACH 




The aim of this chapter is to provide an overview of ‘New Institutionalism’ being the 
theoretical approach applied in this thesis. More specifically, the three core 
hypotheses seeking to answer the overall research question are based on some 
underlying assumptions of NI. Thus it is necessary to set out the key features of NI as 
they structure the research in the subsequent chapters. It has to be noted that New 
Institutionalism has been mainly applied to assess policy outcomes by focusing on the 
interaction of legislators with given institutions before policies are adopted. However, 
in this thesis, NI is not only applied to analyse the behaviour of legislators but also to 
assess the role of the CJEU. This is important since in regard to all three case studies 
the CJEU’s role is crucial in determining the legislative development.        
The first part of this chapter provides an overview of the ‘theoretical 
environment’ in which New Institutionalism is situated. Furthermore, it explains why 
NI was chosen over other approaches. The second section provides an overview of the 
three branches of institutionalism and explains their relevance for the thesis. Fourth, 
limitations of NI are examined and ways are suggested to mitigate those limitations. 
Ultimately, three hypotheses in accordance with NI will be presented offering a 
structural framework for the assessment of privacy and data protection in AFSJ and 
the analysis of the three case studies.      
 
1. Embedding New Institutionalism in a wider context 
1.1 An overview of the theoretical landscape 
	  
There are various ways to conceptualise why certain policy outcomes are preferred 
over others, why they took a specific form and why they persist over time. In this 
thesis policy outcome refers to the way privacy and data protection is shaped in the 
public security context. Since this thesis deals with three EU data retention and access 
regimes an obvious choice is to assess the emergence of those legal instruments 
through European integration theory. This theory is not a single conceptualisation but 
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rather an umbrella concept for multiple different approaches aiming to assess how and 
why EU integration took place. More specifically, European integration theory has 
been defined as a “ (…) field of systematic reflection on the process of intensifying 
political cooperation in Europe and the development of common political institutions, 
as well as on its outcome. It also includes the theorization of changing constructions 
of identities and interests of social actors in the context of this process.”53 The 
traditional and most renowned branches of European integration theory are 
neofunctionalism54 and the opposing theory of (liberal) intergovernmentalism55. These 
two approaches emerged during the early days of the existence of the EU and focus 
mainly on assessing how and why EU Member States give up sovereignty to the EU 
as supranational actor. 
Neofunctionalism developed shortly after the formation of the European Coal 
and Steel Community where various policy decisions of Member State authorities 
provided successively more competences to the EU level.56 In this context, 
neofunctionalism argues that European integration started from modest sectoral 
beginnings and then gained momentum resulting in more ambitious integration in 
other areas. In other words, neofunctionalists ascribe a snowball-effect to EU 
integration where integration ‘spills over’ from one policy field to another. In 
contrast, intergovernmentalism developed as a response to the 1965 “empty chair 
crisis”57 which questioned the stability and continuation of European integration. 
Intergovernmentalism criticises the neofunctionalist assumption that autonomous 
‘spill over’ determines EU integration. Instead, intergovernmentalists assume that 
Member State authorities remain in control over which competencies are rendered to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 Wiener, A. & Diez, T. (2009) Introducing the Mosaic of Integration Theory. In: Wiener, A. & Diez, 
T. (eds.). European Integration Theory. OUP, p. 4 
54 For an overview of the theory and the most important literature, see: Niemann, A. & Schmitter, P. 
(2009). Neofunctionalism. In: Wiener, A. & Diez, T. (eds.). European Integration Theory. Oxford 
University Press; See also: Pollack, M. (2014) Theorising EU Policy-Making. In: Wallace, H., 
Wallace, W. & Pollack, M. (2014). Policy-making in the European Union. OUP.    
55 For an overview of the theory and the most important literature, see: Moravcsik, A. & 
Schimmelfennig, F. (2009). Liberal Intergovernmentalism. In: Wiener, A. & Diez, T. (eds.). European 
Integration Theory. Oxford University Press; See also: Pollack, M. (2014). op. cit.   
56 One of the first writings on neofunctionalism is: Haas, E. B.(1958) The Uniting of Europe.  Stanford 
University Press (reprinted 2004 by University of Notre Dame Press). See also: Haas, E.B. (1961). 
European Integration: The European and Universal Process, International Organization, vol. 4, pp. 
607–46.  
57 The period from July 1965 to January 1966 has been considered as a halt of European integration 
and was labelled the “empty-chair crisis”. See: Ludlow, N. P. (2006) De-commissioning the empty 
chair crisis: The community institutions and the crisis of 1965-6. In: Wallace, H., Winand, P. and 
Palayret, J.M., (eds.) Visions, Votes and Vetoes: the Empty Chair Crisis and the Luxembourg 
Compromise Forty Years On. Peter Lang.  
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the EU level and which are not. Some theorist even pointed out that EU Member State 
governments do not only remain in control but also that they are strengthened through 
the negotiations triggering the integration process.58 In the 1980s, Andrew Moravcsik 
further developed intergovernmentalism into a fully-fledged theory known as ‘liberal 
governmentalism’.59 Both neo-functionalism and (liberal) intergovernmentalism are 
often-used theories explaining the process of integration either by focusing on the role 
of national governments and domestically grown interests in driving integration or the 
role of spill over in intensifying integration. They are thus useful to understand why a 
specific policy field is regulated on the EU level and whether/which national interests 
are most prevalent in driving this process.60 In this way these two branches of 
European integration theory explain European integration from an overarching 
perspective and are particularly useful in assessing the formation of policy fields in 
the initial stages of the formation of the EU. 61 By focusing on causes as to why and 
whether Member States give up sovereignty they do not account for some EU level 
governance processes which developed throughout the years and are unique to EU 
legislation-making. Since the aim of this thesis is to understand the way privacy and 
data protection is framed in respect to data retention and access regimes on EU level 
this theory thus seems to be too one-dimensional.  
 Besides neofunctionalism and (liberal) intergovernmentalism, the boost of EU 
integration through the Single Market Act in the 1980s triggered the emergence of 
other approaches that have been classified as being part of European integration 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58 Milward, A.S. (2000), The European Rescue of the Nation-State, Routledge; Milward, A.S. & 
Lynch, F. M. B. (1993) The Frontiers of National Sovereignty: History and Theory 1945–1992. 
Routledge. 
59 In contrast to intergovernmentalism, liberal intergovernmentalism sets out three main elements: (i) a 
notion of national preference formation where national preferences are formed domestically including 
national and personal interests of chiefs of states, (ii) an intergovernmental model of EU-level 
bargaining where agreements reflect the relative power of each Member State, and (iii) a model of 
institutional preferences stressing the role of EU institutional actors in offering credible commitments 
for member state governments. For more details, see: Moravcsik, A. (1993). Preferences and Power in 
the European Community: A Liberal Intergovernmentalist Approach, Journal of Common Market 
Studies, vol. 31, pp. 473–524. See also: Moravcsik, A. (1998), The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose 
and State Power from Messina to Maastricht. Cornell University Press.  
60 In regard to Justice and Home Affairs, both neo-functionalist and intergovernmental interpretations 
can be found in: Bendel, P., Parkes, R. and Ette, A. (2011) The Europeanisation of Control: Venues 
and Outcomes of EU Justice and Home Affairs Cooperation.Lit Verlag. For an intergovernmental 
account of Justice and Home Affairs, see: Uçarer, E. M. (2013) Area of Freedom, Security, and Justice. 
In: Cini, M. &  Perez-Solorzano Barragán, N. (eds.) European Union Politics. Oxford University Press. 
Press. See also: Labayle, M. (2013). The New Commission’s Role in Freedom, Security and Justice in 
the Post-Lisbon Context. New Era or Missed Opportunity? In: Chang, M. & Monar, J. (eds.) The 
European Commission in the Post-Lisbon Era of Crises. College of Europe Studies No.16.   
61 Wiener, A. & Diez, T. (2009), op. cit., p. 4. 
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theory.62 The most relevant approaches that have been used to explain policy 
outcomes are: the ‘governance approach’, ‘policy network analysis’ and 
‘constructivism’. The first of these approaches aims to assess how governance 
functions in the EU. While doing so governance is conceptualized as an “(…) 
extremely complex process involving multiple actors pursuing a wide range of 
individual and organizational goals, as well as pursuing the collective goals of the 
society.”63 Minding this process, the governance approach is particularly concerned 
with assessing the cooperation between government and social actors and the impact 
of this cooperation on policy outcomes. ‘Policy outcomes’ in this context mainly 
refers to assessing which style of governance is preferred, (such as a strictly 
‘regulatory style of governing’64 or governance through softer means such as the Open 
Method of Coordination or other more voluntary mechanisms).65 Given that two of the 
case studies examined in this thesis (PNR and SWIFT) are international agreements, it 
is worth mentioning that in recent years the governance approach has also been used 
to conceptualise the EU’s external relations. This approach has been called ‘external 
governance’ and explains how the EU as an entity itself interacts with third parties 
and how the EU projects internal solutions to third parties.66 Respectively, some 
scholars have assessed how EU governance is exported to third countries67 while 
others concentrate on the form the ‘rule transfer’ takes and whether/how third 
countries adopt them. 68 While the external governance approach provides interesting 
insights, it seems not to be appropriate in the context of PNR and SWIFT. First, the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62 ibid.; In this thesis, only approaches assessing policy outcome are mentioned. For an overview of all 
European integration theories, see: Pollack, M. (2014). op. cit.   
63 Peters, G & Pierre, J. (2009). Governance Approaches. In: Wiener, A. & Diez, T. (eds.). European 
Integration Theory. OUP, p. 92. As noted by Peters and Pierre, not all governance scholars regard the 
process in this way. Some scholars only focus on the governance role of informal actors (e.g. NGOs, 
private sector individuals).  
64 This means that governance is taking place mainly by the introduction of binding legislation. 
65 The Open Method of Coordination is a soft governance tool aiming to spread best practice and 
achieve convergence towards EU goals. For more details, see for example: Szyszczak, E. (2006). 
Experimental Governance: The Open Method of Coordination. European Law Journal, vol. 12 (4), pp. 
486–502.  
66 Lavenex, S. (2004) EU external governance in 'wider Europe'. Journal of European Public Policy, 
vol. 11 (4), p. 695.  
67 Here the emphasis is on what is exported to third countries. In other words, the focus is on the 
‘substance of governance modes’, and the extent to which it affects policy-making processes in 
external states, see: Schimmelfennig, F. and Sedelmeier, U. (2004). Governance by Conditionality: EU 
Rule Transfer to the Candidate Countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Journal of European Public 
Policy, vol. 11 (4), p. 670. See also earlier literature, such as: Kohler-Koch, B. and Eising, R. (1999) 
The Transformation of Governance in the European Union, Routledge; Peters, G. (2000) Governance 
and comparative politics. In Pierre, J. (ed.), Debating Governance, Oxford University Press, pp. 36–53. 
68	  Here the focus is on how rule transfer takes place and more specifically which form it takes. See: 
Schimmelfennig, F. and Sedelmeier, U. (2004),	  op. cit.   
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approach assumes that the EU actively and consciously establishes a proactive foreign 
policy. However, as shown in the chapters on PNR and SWIFT, EU policy can be 
regarded as rather reactive in the first years of cooperation where the strategy is based 
exclusively on the actions of the US as a third country. Second, the approach mainly 
focuses on modes of interaction and thus does not provide sufficient instruments to 
understand how and why the rights to privacy and data protection are shaped in a 
specific way.69  
Another approach grouped under European integration theory is called ‘policy 
networks analysis’ connoting a “cluster of actors, each of which has an interest, or 
“stake” in a given (...) policy sector and the capacity to help determine policy success 
or failure.”70 Analysts adhering to this approach seek “(…) to explain policy outcomes 
by investigating how networks, which facilitate bargaining between stakeholders over 
policy design and detail, are structured in a particular sector.”71 While doing so, they 
follow three basic assumptions: (i) networks are frequently non-hierarchical since 
governance is based on mutuality and interdependence between public and non-public 
actors; (ii) the policy process is always dependent on the specific policy field and it 
can thus not be generalized; (iii) while governments remain ultimately in charge of 
governance, networks are able to influence the shaping of a specific policy area 
before decisions are taken.72 Ultimately, a further approach grouped under European 
integration theory is called ‘constructivism’ and it is considered to be a concept that is  
‘notoriously difficult’ to describe.73 Broadly speaking, constructivism is based on the 
assumption that “(…) human agents do not exist independently from their social 
environment and its collectively shared systems of meanings (‘culture’ in a broad 
sense).”74 Therefore, scholars applying a constructivist approach argue that 
institutions shape behaviours as well as preferences and identities of national actors 
and governments as a whole.75 This idea contradicts classical theories (such as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69 On the advantages and disadvantages of the governance approach, see Wolff, S. (2012) The 
Mediterranean Dimension of EU Internal Security. Palgrave, p. 24.  
70 Peterson, J. and Bamberg, E. (1999) Decision-making in the European Union. Palgrave, p.8. 
71 Peterson, P. (2009). Policy Networks. In: Wiener, A. & Diez, T. (eds.). European Integration 
Theory. OUP, p. 105. 
72 Ibid.  
73 Term used by: Pollack, M. (2014). Theorising EU Policy-Making. In: Wallace, H., Wallace, W. & 
Pollack, M. (2014). Policy-making in the European Union, Oxford University Press.    
74 Ibid.  
75 See, for example: Sandholtz, W. (1993) Choosing Union: Monetary Politics and Maastricht. 
International Organization, vol. 47 (1), pp. 1-39. Christiansen, T., Jørgensen, K.E. and Wiener, A. 
(eds) (2001) The Social Construction of Europe. Sage Publications; Lewis, J. (2005) The Janus face of 
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(liberal) intergovernmentalism and neofunctionlism), which follow a rationalist 
ontology and are agency focused.76 Apart from seeking to explain how preferences 
and identities of EU actors are shaped, constructivism has also been applied when 
examining the external relations of the EU.77 
All above-mentioned approaches are rather ‘meta-theoretical orientations’ 
than fully-fledged theories and have certain limitations.78 The governance approach is 
mostly focused on re-framing corporatism and other forms of interest 
intermediation.79 In this way it focuses mainly on the influence of non-state actors on 
policy outcomes. This is not only difficult to assess (as they are not part of the formal 
decision making procedure) but also provides only a very limited account of how 
policies emerge. In regard to policy network analysis, even its proponents 
acknowledge that the approach does not answer many important questions about 
European governance and policy formation.80 Ultimately, social constructivism is 
limited in scope since it does not produce a set of mid-range propositions when 
explaining policy outcomes.81 The fact that all three approaches focus on a particular 
aspect of policy formation does not render them meaningless. In fact, all three 
approaches are valuable tools providing a partial account of why a certain policy 
outcome materialized while other potential outcomes do not. At the same time, 
however, it needs to be acknowledged that these approaches are not sufficient to 
provide an all-encompassing account of policy outcomes and persistence. 
Consequently -while not being adequate as leading theories- these three approaches 
can usefully be combined with more mature theories. It has to be noted that aspects of 
the governance, policy network and constructivism approaches are all reflected in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Brussels: socialization and everyday decision making in the European union, International 
Organization, vol. 59 (4), pp. 937–72. 
76 Haas, E.B (2001). Does Constructivism Subsume Neofunctionalism? In: Christiansen, T. et al. 
(eds) The Social Construction of Europe. Sage, pp. 22-31. 
77 A constructivist account of EU external relations is: Manners, I. (2002) Normative Power Europe: A 
Contradiction in Terms? Journal of Common Market Studies, vol. 40, pp. 235–258. 
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79 See, for instance: Frederickson, H.G. (2006) Whatever Happened to Public Administration? 
Governance, Governance Everywhere. In: Ferlie, E., Lynn, L.E., and Pollitt, C. (eds) Oxford Handbook 
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1.2 Shifting the focus to institutions  
 
Having provided an overview of why certain branches of European integration theory 
are less appropriate to assess policy outcomes in the case of PNR, SWIFT and the 
DRD, in the following it will be explained why ‘New Institutionalism’83 –also being 
considered to be a branch of European Integration theory84- is applied in this thesis. 
While it has been argued that NI is not a fully-fledged theory –similar to the 
approaches mentioned above- the advantage of focusing on institutional aspects is that 
they offer tools to understand what mechanisms drive policy outcomes.85 Thus, NI 
helps to understand how privacy and data protection is shaped in the public security 
context. Peterson and Shackleton claim that understanding political dynamics always 
begins with the understanding of the involved institutions and the policy actors.86 This 
is even more relevant when assessing policies in the EU. Since the EU is neither a 
state nor a traditional international organisation, the institutional actors have a special 
status in a sense that a reciprocal relationship between a supranational body and 28 
individual national systems exists. Furthermore, the EU institutional actors are in 
several instances the link between its Member States and the wider international 
community. 
Therefore, it is relevant to assess their role in those international policy 
processes.87 This appraisal of the importance of both institutions and the behaviour of 
actors operating within institutions is an indication of the recent tendency to evaluate 
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and analyse EU political dynamics through the lens of institutionalism. According to 
NI, institutions and the interaction of supranational players such as the European 
Commission, the EP and the CJEU undeniably plays an important role for the 
formation of political debate, for the expectations of significant actors and for policy 
outcomes.88  
2. An overview of New Institutionalism and its three branches 
	  
2.1 The origin and key features of New Institutionalism  
 
Institutionalism mainly developed as a reaction to behavioural perspectives that were 
influential in political science during the 60s and 70s.89 Behaviouralism was not 
regarded as adequate because it was regarded as: (i) too contextual by perceiving 
social forces to be the only factor determining political life; (ii) too reductionist by 
regarding politics as the accumulation of individual decisions; (iii) utilitarian by 
ascribing calculated self-interest mainly to the agents making political decisions; and 
(iv) instrumentalist in assuming that decisions about allocating resources rather than 
decisions about the allocation of meaning is at stake in politics.90 In contrast to 
behaviouralism, the focus on institutions has been regarded as an attractive solution 
since it would: “deemphasize the dependence of the polity on society in favour of an 
interdependence between relatively autonomous social and political institutions; 
deemphasize the simple primacy of micro processes and efficient histories in favour 
of relatively complex processes and historical inefficiency; deemphasizes metaphors 
of choice and allocative outcomes in favour of other logics of action and the centrality 
of meaning and symbolic allocation.”91 While emerging from the same roots, there are 
three different branches of institutionalism. It has to be noted that in more recent 
years, there have been attempts to add a fourth institutionalism to the three original 
branches.92 For example, in order to account better for policy change, ‘discursive’ 
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Discussion Paper 96/6, p. 5 
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institutionalism has been developed.93 While acknowledging the existence and 
relevance of this new approach, the thesis only assesses the original three branches, as 
they are more appropriate to the interdisciplinary approach of this thesis attempting to 
reconcile legal and political research. In the following, the key aspects of 
institutionalism and their relevance for this thesis will be outlined. Afterwards, the 
distinct features of the three different branches of NI will be explained in the 
subsequent sections.  
 
2.1.1 How are ‘actors’ defined in the NI context?  
 
It is necessary to conceptualise the meaning of ‘institution’ and ‘actor’. Particularly, 
in the EU context, ‘actors’ are commonly referred to as EU institutions (i.e. the 
European Parliament, the European Commission, the European Court of Justice, the 
European Council) whereas NI uses the term ‘institution’ to refer to the ‘operating 
framework’ of those actors.94 As pointed out in Chapter 1, in order to avoid confusion 
the thesis refers to (i) ‘institutions’ or ‘institutional framework’ when discussing the 
operating framework in which EU actors interact with each other, and (ii) ‘EU 
institutional actors or player(s)’, ‘actor’ or ‘player’ when referring commonly to all or 
several actors such as the European Council, the Commission, the European 
Parliament and the CJEU.  
 
2.1.2 What does ‘institution’ mean? 
 
Institutionalists generally accept that institutions are ‘operating frameworks’ that 
organise actions of policy actors into predictable and reliable patterns.95 However, 
there is no generally accepted notion of what this ‘operating framework’ is comprised 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
93 See: Schmidt, V. A. (2008): Discursive Institutionalism: The Explanatory Power of Ideas and 
Discourse. Annual Review of Political Science, vol. 11, pp. 303-36; Hay, C. (2008) Constructivist 
institutionalism. In: Rockman, B, Rhodes, R. & Binder, S. (eds). The Oxford Handbook of Political 
Institutions, pp.56- 74. Oxford University Press.  
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of. Not only do different branches of institutionalism have different views on the 
precise meaning of an ‘institution’ but also within each branch academics have 
developed different understandings of the meaning of ‘institutions’. March and Olsen 
-who can be considered to have set the trend to analyse policy outcomes by applying 
NI – argued that institutions are “relatively stable collection of practices and rules 
defining appropriate behaviour for specific groups of actors in specific situations”.96 
Being an advocate of the sociological institutionalist (SI) branch, Bulmer argued that 
“beliefs, paradigms, codes, cultures and knowledge” are belonging to the concept of 
institution.97 From a historical institutionalist (HI) perspective, Thelen and Steinmo 
define institutions as “(…) formal or informal procedures, routines, norms and 
conventions embedded in the organisational structure of the polity or political 
economy. They can range from the rules of a constitutional order or the standard 
operating procedures of bureaucracy to the conventions governing trade union 
behaviour or bank-firm relations.”98  In HI terms it has also been argued that 
institutional rules encompass aspects such as institutional legacy and institutional 
culture.99 
This thesis defines the notion of ‘institution’ as the legal framework that 
structures legislation-making when privacy and data protection for public security 
purposes is at stake. Respectively, the thesis takes a holistic view by including 
constitutional rules on privacy and data protection; secondary legislation laying down 
more practice-oriented rules; procedural rules applicable to legislation-making when 
data protection and privacy for public security purposes is at stake; and CJEU and 
ECtHR case law. Streeck and Thelen share this understanding and mention that so-
called ‘formal institutions’ are ‘formalised rules that may be enforced by calling upon 
a third party.’100      
However, the thesis also acknowledges the importance of ‘derivatives’ of 
formal institutions. For example, ad hoc and informal modes of governance (such as 
the High-Level Contact Group on data protection between the EU and US 101) are not 
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formal institutions (in a sense that their outputs are enforceable) however since formal 
institutions grant spaces for the establishment of such frameworks they do play a role 
in shaping the behaviour of actors. Another example is the importance of normative 
paradigms and beliefs which derive from constitutional rights. In the context of the 
thesis two conflicting normative paradigms can be identified. On the one hand, the 
belief that ‘public security’ is of primary importance in a well-functioning democratic 
society is a normative paradigm often followed by the Council and partially by the 
Commission.102 On the other hand, the belief that civil liberties –including privacy and 
data protection- are pivotal in guaranteeing the rule of law in democratic societies is 
the normative paradigm to which the EP and other non-legislating actors (such as the 
Article 29 Working Party and the EDPS) are subjected to.103 It would be too simplistic 
to argue that actors are subject to either one or the other paradigm as in practice actors 
are subject to both but to varying degrees.  
 
2.1.3 The notion of ‘preference’ 
 
In NI literature the concept of ‘preference’ is important. On the one hand, there are 
‘fundamental preferences’ which are the foundation of any action and emerge from 
aspects such as wellbeing, utility and desire.104 On the other hand there are ‘strategic 
considerations’ which account for limitations posed by the institutional framework 
and the interaction between different actors.105 While the fundamental preferences are 
important to get an overarching view on how preferences are formed and pursued in 
the institutional context, the thesis exclusively focuses on strategic considerations. 
This is mainly since an analysis of the former requires an assessment of Member State 
or personal positions, which goes beyond the scope of this thesis. Furthermore, 
fundamental preferences are inherently difficult to detect and to prove.   
 
2.1.4 The key questions New Institutionalism seeks to answer 
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All branches of institutionalism research the same overarching questions while 
answering them in different ways: First, one question of NI relates to how the 
different actors behave. Depending on the branch of institutionalism, the answers to 
this range from instrumental human behaviour and strategic calculation to behaviour 
driven by familiar patterns.106 Second, another core research question concerns what 
institutions are and what they do. Depending on the branch, institutions are regarded 
to provide actors certainty about present and future behaviour of other actors or to 
provide moral and cognitive templates for the activities of the other actors.107 
Ultimately, a last research question of institutionalists relates to the question of why 
do institutions persist over time? While one branch argues that institutional patterns 
give individuals better results in contrast to acting alone, the other branch argues that 
institutions are resistant to change because actors internalise them and take them for 
granted.108 The three hypotheses set out later in this chapter and which guide the thesis 
focus on all three sub-question by focusing on the assessment of the complex 
institutional framework applicable to privacy and data protection in the public 
security context and by assessing how institutional actors interact with the 
institutional framework and with each other. 
 
2.2 Historical Institutionalism (HI) 
 
In contrast to the other branches, HI emphasises mainly the role of institutions and 
how they evolve over time instead of focusing on the actors within the institutions. 
The core research question of HI refers to why institutions persist over time and 
consequently assesses founding moments shaping policy and politics.109 The 
respective claim is that institutions are “(…) relatively persistent features of the 
historical landscape and one of the central factors pushing historical development 
along a set of paths.”110 Thus, early HI literature focuses mainly on explaining how 
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Euro-Mediterranean Partnership’. In: Adler, E. et al. (eds) The Convergence of Civilizations: 
Constructing a Mediterranean Region. Toronto. University of Toronto Press, pp. 51-82. 
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paths are produced. For instance, it has been emphasised that ‘state capacities’ and 
‘policy legacies’ have an impact on subsequent policy choices.111 In addition, it has 
also been argued that past lines of policy influence subsequent policy by mobilising 
societal forces to organise along some lines instead of others, to adopt particular 
identities, and to develop interests in policies that are costly to change.112 
Respectively, HI highlights “(…) unintended consequences and inefficiencies 
generated by existing institution in contrast to images of institutions as more 
purposive and efficient.”113    
To explain institutional persistence, HI employs a variety of concepts. Most 
prominently, HI introduced the concept of path-dependence suggesting that 
institutions are path-dependent since similar paths are reproduced over a period of 
time and due to the resistance towards institutional innovations or reform.114 For 
instance, the policy processes leading to the DRD reveal some features of path 
dependence since the paradigm related to data retention developed over a long period 
of time even before specific events triggered further intensifications of the policy 
discussions.115 Another example is the path-dependent CJEU interpretation of the 
correlation between privacy and data protection. By following the standards set by the 
ECtHR, the CJEU does not fully acknowledge the fundamental rights status of data 
protection and thus sticks to the “path” created by the ECtHR.116 HI however 
acknowledges that there are certain events that might have the potential to disrupt a 
policy path. HI argues that these events are in most cases not changing the policy path 
if a specific shock/event leaves the possibility open to stick to the ‘path’.117 This 
means that whenever the costs of change are higher than continuing the original path 
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the latter option is chosen; a process that has been labelled ‘increasing returns’.118 
Besides shocks/events another source of path-dependence is asymmetries of power. 
Respectively, “when certain actors are in a position to impose rules on others, the 
employment of power may be self-reinforcing.”119   
Nevertheless, the general adherence to the idea of institutional ‘stickiness’ raises 
problems in explaining why in certain situations institutions indeed change. 
Therefore, HI acknowledges that some events -either internal or external- can be 
significant enough to change the policy path. Such an institutional change has been 
called a ‘critical juncture’ or ‘branching point’ since it triggers the move from a 
historical development onto a new path.120A critical juncture requires certain criteria 
to be met such as particular timing, sequencing, small events and critical moments 
that produce distinct legacies.121 In regard to the latter, early institutionalists mainly 
refer to crucial events such as economic crisis or military conflict while others do not 
have a well-defined response.122 In regard to European integration, critical junctures 
can be intergovernmental conferences and summits as well as crises such as the 
current refugee crisis or the British referendum on Brexit. In regard to privacy and 
data protection in the public security context, the Snowden revelations or the terror 
attacks on 9/11 could be considered to be critical junctures in the form of events. In 
addition, the Lisbon Treaty as constitutional reform can be considered to be a critical 
juncture. 
More recently, HI scholars have also argued that not only external events can 
trigger change of institutional paths. Instead ‘institution-internal’ characteristics or 
parameters might also create the pre-conditions for institutional change. For example, 
when institutions are the outcome of compromises or when contested -yet durable- 
arrangements are based on specific coalitional dynamics, they are inherently 
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vulnerable to shifts.123 Furthermore, in other instances institutions also grant a certain 
amount of flexibility in the interpretation of particular rules or in the way the rules are 
instantiated in practice.124 This leeway provides room for institutional change.  
2.3 Rational-Choice Institutionalism (RCI) 
 
In contrast to HI, RCI mainly focuses on scrutinising the interaction between 
institutions and the actors operating within the institutions. Originally, RCI emerged 
from the study of US congressional behaviour, where RCI claims that congressional 
outcomes are stable because congressional institutions control and structure the policy 
options.125 Subsequently, RCI has been increasingly applied to assess policy outcomes 
in the EU.126 The strength/popularity of RCI can be explained with its ability to show 
the important role that information flows play for power relations and policy 
outcomes.127 Furthermore, it shows how actors’ strategic behaviours determine policy 
outcomes. This is an important development vis-à-vis behaviouralism since they only 
highlighted structural variables (i.e. socioeconomic development or material 
discontent) to explain policy outcomes.128  
RCI is marked by three characteristics which are relevant for this thesis. First 
of all, RCI employs a set of behavioural assumptions, including that relevant actors (i) 
have a stable set of preferences or tastes, (ii) behave instrumentally in order to achieve 
their preferences and (iii) behave strategically presupposing a high level of 
calculation.129 In regard to point (i) it has been argued that preferences are formed via 
a ‘two-level game’ where Member States define their national policy preferences that 
are subsequently translated into strategies on an international level.130 However, these 
strategies are not exclusively based on national preferences but factor in lack of 
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information about other actors as well as other considerations such as political 
feasibility.131 An example illustrating this point is the behaviour of the British 
Presidency during the DRD negotiations. While preferring a framework decision as 
the legal instrument it agreed to a Directive in order to avoid a legal challenge 
triggered by the European Commission.132 
Second, RCI regards politics as a ‘series of collective action dilemmas’. More 
specifically, since actors strive to attain their own preferences, policy outcomes are 
mostly collectively suboptimal (i.e. another outcome could have been achieved that 
would have at least made one actor better off without making any of the others worse 
off). What usually prevents actors from agreeing on collectively-superior outcomes is 
the lack of institutional arrangements that ensures complementary behaviour of 
others. Often used examples of this situation are the ‘prisoner’s dilemma’ or the 
‘tragedy of the commons’.133  Examples for sub-optimal outcomes are the early 
versions of the SWIFT and PNR agreements. In both cases, the agreements reflect the 
difficulty of the parties to find a compromise leading to texts which do not provide 
sufficient legal certainty. In this way, the agreements did not satisfy the needs of 
either party.134 
Third, RCI stresses the strategic interaction in the determination of political 
outcomes. This involves the belief that actor’s behaviour is driven by strategic 
calculus and that this calculus factors in assumptions of how other actors behave. 
Respectively, institutions structure this strategic interaction between actors “(…) by 
affecting the range and sequence of alternatives on the choice agenda or by providing 
information and enforcement mechanisms that reduce uncertainty about the 
corresponding behaviour of others and allow ‘gains from exchange’, thereby leading 
actors towards particular calculations and potentially better social outcomes.”135 An 
example of strategic behaviour is the EP’s decision to not agree to the SWIFT 
Agreement which has widely been regarded as turning point revealing the importance 
and power of the EP.  
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2.4 Sociological Institutionalism (SI) 
 
Similarly to RCI, Sociological Institutionalism (SI) is mainly concerned with 
assessing the relations between actors and between actors and institutions. It 
developed as a subfield of organisation theory and as a response to the Weber-based 
idea that institutions are the product of the aspiration to establish efficient structures 
that perform tasks associated with modern society. In contrast to the latter idea, SI 
seeks to explain institutions via culture. SI is marked by two main characteristics. 
First, SI theory tends to define institutions in a broader way than RCI or HI blurring 
the boundary between institution and culture. Accordingly, institutions include formal 
rules, procedures as well as ‘symbol systems, cognitive scripts, and moral templates’ 
providing the ‘frames of meaning’ that guide human action.136  Second, SI has a 
distinct view on the relationship between institutions and actors. An older approach 
regarded the institutional impact on actors by applying the normative lens. 
Respectively, institutions are seen as ‘roles’ enshrining ‘norms of behaviour’ while 
the actors who are socialised into those roles internalise the enshrined norms of 
behaviour. A more recent approach interprets the interaction between institutions and 
actors through the cognitive lens. The latter approach claims that institutions 
influence behaviour by providing ‘cognitive scripts, categories and models’ which are 
necessary to interpret the policy context and the behaviour of other actors.137 
Ultimately, self-images and identities of social actors are based on templates provided 
by institutions. According to SI, this cultural approach does not mean that actors are 
not able to act rationally. However, the action that the actor perceives to be rational is 
in itself socially constituted.138 It is difficult to gather evidence for SI and it is often 
used in circumstances where RCI fails to explain an actor’s behaviour. For example, 
when the EP challenged the PNR Agreement in front of the CJEU it argued that the 
Agreement was wrongly based on a first pillar basis. Since the Court accepted this 
argument, the EP effectively excluded itself from the subsequent policy-making 
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procedure. It has been argued that the moral aspirations of the EP trumped its strategic 
preferences.139     
 
2.5 Limitations of New Institutionalism and the need for a holistic approach 
 
While providing interesting views on institutions, actors and ultimately policy 
outcomes, institutionalism is subject to certain limitations. In regard to all three 
branches the most prominent limitation refers to its conceptualisation of institutional 
formation and change. Respectively, it has been argued that “[t]he need to appeal to 
two kinds of explanation, one for continuity and another for change, violates a rule of 
theoretical parsimony.”140 As a result, most efforts of institutionalist theorists were 
devoted to the analysis of change and persistence of institutions. This main challenge 
also triggered the suggestion to add a new form of institutionalism - discursive 
institutionalism- which focuses on the role of ideas and discourse in politics and in 
this way seems to provide a more dynamic approach to institutional change than the 
older three new institutionalisms.141 Turning to the limitations of the individual 
branches of institutionalism several comments can be made. First of all, by 
predominately focusing on institutions themselves HI does not sufficiently emphasise 
the relationship between institutions and actors. More specifically, HI has devoted 
less time to determine a precise causal chain through which the institutions affect the 
actor’s behaviour.142 In contrast, RCI provides a precise conception of the interaction 
between institutional actors and behaviour as well as a general set of concepts. 
Nevertheless, it has been argued that RCI conveys a rather simplistic image of human 
motivation that misses important dimensions that have been relevant to inform 
preference formation.143 Furthermore, RCI’s purely functionalist view of institutions 
does not explain the inefficiencies that often occur in institutions. Ultimately, SI can 
be regarded as filling the gap of RCI whenever a situation cannot purely be explained 
by rationale and strategy. The validity of this overarching SI argument has been 
exemplified with the instance where humans would stop at a red traffic light even if 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
139 For an assessment of this argument, see Chapter 6 (section 2.2) of this thesis.  
140 Reyners, J (2015), op. cit. 
141 For more details, see for example: Schmidt, V. A. (2008) op. cit. 
142 Hall, P. A. & Taylor, R. (1996), op. cit., p. 17. 
143	  See for instance: Cook, K. S. and Levi, M. (1990). The Limits of Rationality. University of Chicago 
Press. See also: Mansbridge, J. (1990). Beyond Self-Interest. University of Chicago Press.  
	   46 
there were no car in sight.144 However, SI can be criticised for not having a 
satisfactory explanation for why certain norms emerge in the first place and why they 
prevail over others. Furthermore, also from a methodological perspective, it is 
difficult to prove that actors’ behaviour are norm-driven especially since SI stresses 
subconscious norm-internalisation.  
A way to mitigate the limitations of each branch of institutionalism is to 
acknowledge their complementarity instead of regarding them as mutually exclusive. 
Respectively, there is a need for the interaction between the three branches since 
“(…) each of these literatures seems to reveal different and genuine dimensions of 
human behavior and of the effects institutions can have on behavior. None of these 
literatures appears to be wrong-headed or substantially untrue. More often, each 
seems to be providing a partial account of the forces at work in a given situation or 
capturing different dimensions of the human action and institutional impact present 
there.”145 Thus, the different branches of institutionalism are not mutually exclusive. 
Applied to this thesis, HI helps to gain a ‘macro-level’ understanding of all three 
cases studies by assessing how the institutional framework entraps all three regimes. 
In contrast, SI and RCI are used to assess the ‘micro-level’ by assessing how actors 
deal with the transformative institutional framework.146 While the behaviours of actors 
often reflect RCI assumptions, normative aspirations should not be completely ruled 
out. Adopting a holistic approach to the analysis by acknowledging the vivid interplay 
of all three branches helps to overcome the drawbacks of each single approach and 
thus makes the analysis more solid.  
2.6 Hypotheses 
	  
Having explained the background of NI, in the following three hypotheses will be 
presented which seek to answer the overarching research question of how the EU 
institutional framework shapes data protection and privacy in regard to data retention 
and access measures for public security purposes. Taken together the three hypotheses 
reflect that particularly HI and RCI assumptions of institutionalism are prevalent.  
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2.6.1 Hypothesis 1: ‘Privacy and Data Protection in AFSJ’ is an institutional 
framework in transition implying that both established as well as new institutional 
features co-exist and commonly determine how data protection and privacy is shaped 
in relation to public security. 
	  
Hypothesis 1 argues that ‘Privacy and Data Protection in AFSJ’ is an institutional 
framework in transition implying that old and new features coexist. This transitional 
nature can be ascribed both to external factors such as terror events and technological 
developments as well as internal factors mainly the changes through Lisbon and the 
adoption of CFREU. On the one hand, major changes to privacy and data protection 
in AFSJ are: the only recent constitutionalisation147 of data protection, the increasing 
role of the CJEU due to the adoption of CFREU, the recent adoption of the new data 
protection package and the adoption of more ‘privacy-friendly’ international 
agreements with the US. On the other hand, features of old paths can still be detected. 
For example, although CFREU includes a right to data protection, this has not yet 
been fully acknowledged due to CJEU’s path-dependence to ECtHR jurisprudence. 
Furthermore, although new EU data protection legislation emerged ‘old features’ still 
live on.  
HI theorists have explained that the development of AFSJ in general has been 
a cumbersome process whereas policies evolved gradually through a pluralistic and 
highly conflictual process into a ‘normalised’ policy area.148 While there were initial 
struggles and relapses, the overall trend to harmonisation reveals an incremental 
movement towards a new path.149 In the case of the research at hand, certain events 
like terror attacks, technological development, the Snowden revelations and the 
Lisbon Treaty have led to critical junctures leading to incremental policy change 
whereas stickiness to pre-defined habits prevents the move onto a new path.	  
Accordingly, HI helps to understand the overall institutional context in which all three 
data retention and access regimes emerged. Furthermore, it also allows making 
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predictions about a potentially more stable setting in the future where standards on 
data protection and privacy are more clear in respect to the competences, applicable 
regimes and the nature and extent of relevant safeguards.   
2.6.2 Hypothesis 2: The EU institutional framework enables EU legislative actors to 
pursue strategic preferences in the legislation-making process and thereby influences 
the way privacy and data protection is shaped in the public security context. 
 
When data retention and access regimes emerged in the pre-Lisbon Treaty, the pillar 
structure led to a two-tier system of legislative competences where both Council and 
EP shared legislative powers under the first pillar and where EP influence was limited 
under the third pillar. At the same time however, the boundary between the pillars 
was not always clear-cut offering policy-makers the opportunity to advocate for the 
legal basis granting them more influence. The concept of cross-pillarisation has been 
discussed in the Justice and Home Affairs field150 and refers to the complexity of 
AFSJ measures and the corresponding questions it raises about what constitutes an 
appropriate legal basis and what are the adequate decision-making procedures. It 
indicates the blurriness of the EU pillar structure since policies, actors and processes 
transcend the artificial borders between the pillars. This blurriness is evident in the 
behaviour of policy actors as well as CJEU rulings. In regard to the former, 
evaluations of annual policy statistics within the AFSJ field revealed that instead of 
systematically preferring intergovernmental non-binding instruments in the third 
pillar, national delegations in the Council are willing to disregard the pillar boundaries 
and adopt binding instruments according to their appropriateness.151 In regard to the 
CJEU, there are certain cases where the Court explicitly upholds the pillar structure, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
150 See for instance: Bendiek, A. (2006). Cross-pillar security regime building in the European Union: 
Effects of the European Security Strategy of December 2003. European Integration Online Papers; 
Cremona, M. (2006). External relations of the EU and the member states: Competence, mixed 
agreements, international responsibility, and effects of international law. EUI Working Papers Law No. 
2006/22; Stetter, S. (2004). Cross-pillar politics: functional unity and institutional fragmentation of EU 
foreign policies. Journal of European Public Policy, vo.11 (4), pp. 720–39; Trauner, F. (2005). 
External aspects of internal security: A research agenda. EU-Consent Project. 
151 Monar, J. (2010a). The Institutional Dimension of the AFSJ. In: Monar, J. (ed.). The Institutional 
Dimension of the European Union’s Area of Freedom, Security and Justice. College of Europe Studies, 
Peter Lang. See also: Monar, J. (2006). Specific factors, typology and development trends of modes of 
governance in the EU Justice and Home Affairs domain. NEWGOV Working Paper, No. 1/D17, 
European University Institute, Florence, 2006, pp. 17-18.  
	   49 
indirectly advanced the destruction of the artificial boundary, or locates policy areas 
within the pillar structure.152  
According to Hypothesis 2, pre-Lisbon policy actors framed the policy 
objectives of data retention and access regimes to match their strategic preferences. 
While pursuing strategic preferences –mainly in regard to the legal basis- legislators 
influenced the way privacy and data protection is shaped in the public security 
context. For instance, the legal basis determines not only the competences of different 
actors in the legislation-making procedure but also which data protection framework 
applies in the context of the measure. Notably before 2008 no legal measure on data 
protection in the third pillar existed which had an impact on the level of protection 
granted to data subjects.  
After Lisbon the ordinary legislation-making procedure became the relevant 
venue to influence policy outcomes since the abolition of the pillar structure implied 
that competences of different actors are distributed evenly across all policy fields. In 
the first instance the ordinary legislation-making procedure is a positive development 
since the EP has significant new powers and its views, which were originally often 
different from the Council, are now directly relevant in the legislation-making 
procedure. Thus, the Council deliberations should right from the beginning be marked 
by the need to come to an agreement with the Parliament. Thus, the main aspirations 
of the EP -traditionally the promotion of fundamental rights- can no longer be ignored 
by the Council.153 According to Hypothesis 2, however, it can be observed that after 
becoming a co-legislator, the European Parliament is increasingly willing to 
compromise in order to reach an agreement during the first reading. If an agreement is 
reached already during the first reading a ‘fast track’ procedure was chosen.154 
Statistics reveal that first reading agreements were reached in a majority of AFSJ 
acts.155 In the case studies scrutinised in this thesis, it can be observed that the EP has 
reached earlier conclusions and compromised its stance significantly in comparison to 
its previously strong views on data protection and privacy. This can for example be 
linked to the notion of ‘sensitivity of failure’ where a compromised policy outcome is 
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preferred over no policy outcome due to among others the integrationist preference of 
the EP. This explains why post-Lisbon expectations in respect to more solid 
safeguards on data protection and privacy were not always met.       
 
2.6.3 Hypothesis 3: The transitional nature of the EU institutional framework 
contributed to the CJEU’s evolution from a ‘legal basis arbiter’ to a political actor in 
its own right that increasingly determines substantial aspects relating to privacy and 
data protection in the public security context.  
 
For many years, scholars have been debating the role and influence of the CJEU and 
its jurisprudence beyond its direct impact on a law under scrutiny in a specific case.156 
More specifically it has been analysed how and under which circumstances judgments 
influence political outcomes in more general terms and whether one can thus regard 
the CJEU partially as political actor.157 In this thesis, the terms ‘political actorness’ or 
‘political actor’ are thus not used to imply that judgments are politically motivated. 
Instead they are used to assess the CJEU’s influence on policy outputs beyond the 
influence on the specific case at hand. In other words, political actorness assesses the 
extent and the conditions under which CJEU-generated principles, reasoning and 
interpretations impact the range of policy options, political agendas, and policy 
outputs.158 It has to be noted that this analysis is value-neutral since it will not be 
assessed whether this influence is intentional and whether it is positive or negative. 
Instead political actorness is regarded from the point of view of the CJEU as an 
institutional actor where institutional parameters (such as the competences granted to 
the court) as well as the overall strife for legitimacy and rule of law drive the degree 
of influence. The debate on the extent of political actorness has developed between 
‘dynamic’ and ‘constrained’ views of the judiciary. While the former camp claims 
that courts are powerful political actors in many contemporary democracies, the latter 
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camp argues that the societal impact of courts is limited and dependent on a large set 
of institutional, political, and cultural factors.159  
In regard to the constraint view, it has been argued that proponents of a high 
degree of political actorness of the CJEU often overlook the fact that on many 
occasions the CJEU has been ignored or constrained by both political and 
administrative counteractions.160 For example, adherents to the restrained view do not 
unconditionally regard the CJEU as motor of EU integration. Instead it is argued that 
the CJEU is aware that its decisions do not automatically lead to compliance by EU 
Member States. It can be assumed that the CJEU wants to avoid non-compliance 
since it encroaches on its own authority. Therefore, CJEU decisions are influenced by 
the risk of non-compliance of the litigant government.161 By turning the focus towards 
the way politics shapes court decisions instead of vice versa, adherents to the 
constraint view thus argue that the CJEU cannot uncritically be regarded as actor 
influencing policy outcomes. It is misleading and overlooks the highly complex 
interplay of law and politics.162 
More commonly scholars do however acknowledge a certain degree of 
political actorness of the CJEU. According to the dynamic view, the CJEU has often 
been regarded as a ‘master of integration’ due to its capacity to strengthen integration 
at EU level - occasionally even against the willingness of the Member States.163 In 
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more specific terms, the CJEU has often been ‘accused’ of political actorness in 
regard to fundamental rights for two reasons. On the one hand, the CJEU created the 
pre-conditions for enhancing its political reach in regard to fundamental rights in the 
founding years of the EU. While initially the ECSC or EEC Treaties did not stipulate 
the need for Community institutions to respect fundamental rights, the CJEU 
incrementally started to stress the constitutional importance of fundamental rights in 
the EU legal order against the original will of the Treaty makers.164 More specifically, 
the CJEU established the principle of supremacy in 1960 implying that Community 
acts prevail over national law, including national constitutional law. A logical 
conclusion of this CJEU principle is that judicial review can only be based on 
Community law itself.165 In this way, the Court shaped its institutional profile by 
confirming its position as a guardian of the ‘constitutionality’ of EU acts. 
Furthermore, the Court not only positioned itself within the EU legal order, it also 
asserted its centrality in a legal order marked by interactions with Member States, 
Third States and International Organizations.”166 This became evident with two CJEU 
opinions rejecting the EU’s accession to the ECHR.167 On the other hand, three more 
recent institutional developments facilitated political actorness of the CJEU in regard 
to fundamental rights: (i) A stronger ‘constitutional’ mandate was granted to the 
CJEU with the entry into force of Lisbon; (ii) the adoption of CFREU and thus the 
codification of the rights to be protected provided more coherence when adjudicating 
on fundamental rights; and (iii) a general trend of politicization of fundamental rights 
at EU level led to increased discussions on fundamental rights among legislators and 
thus put CJEU jurisprudence in the centre of political debates.168  
Under Hypothesis 3 a dynamic view of the CJEU is expected where the CJEU 
exhibits features of political actorness whilst shaping privacy and data protection in 
the public security context. However the type of ‘political actorness’ changed over 
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time. Traditionally, the CJEU has played a significant role in determining the 
relationship between the pillars. There are some cases where the Court explicitly 
upholds the pillar structure. For instance, in the Kadi case the Court claimed that the 
Union and the Community co-exist as integrated but separate legal orders.169 In other 
cases the Court indirectly advanced the destruction of the artificial boundary. In the 
famous Pupino case170 the Court used first pillar Community law principles for a third 
pillar framework decision resulting in the erosion of the pillar structure.171 Besides 
these two extremes, the Court rulings usually place policy areas within the pillar 
structure when the legal basis of a legal instrument is contested.172 As explained later 
in this thesis, these Court clarifications are not always uncontroversial. For instance 
while the Court argued that the PNR Agreement should be a third pillar measure173 in 
the similar case Ireland v. Parliament and Council174 the Court ruled exactly the 
opposite. Consequently, criticism was expressed in the academic community about 
the judgment as such and on the lack of the Court’s consistency.175 The cases 
mentioned above arguably176 reveal the lack of consistency and the weak and artificial 
boundary between the pillars.177 However, above all this shows that the pillar structure 
was an important institutional feature for the CJEU to play an active role in 
determining the nature of legislative instruments and the allocation of powers between 
the EP, the Commission and the Council.  
Post-Lisbon the pillar structure was abolished implying that the CJEU’s role 
as ‘legal basis arbiter’ ceased to exist. However, this did not diminish the importance 
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of the CJEU. Instead, the simultaneous adoption of the Charter provided the CJEU 
with the means to adjudicate on substantial instead of procedural matters in relation to 
privacy and data protection and thereby to increasingly exhibit features of ‘political 
actorness’. Recently the CJEU has delivered judgments that have two effects. On the 
one hand, they have implications for the legality of a particular data retention and 
access regime. On the other hand, they directly shape future legislative initiatives 
since legislators will factor in existing case law and anticipate future CJEU rulings. 
To analyse the CJEU’s political actorness, the thesis will first analyse the legality of 
the three regimes in the case study chapters in light of the framework established in 
Chapter 3.178 Subsequently it will be assessed whether and to which extent the CJEU 
reveals political actorness in respect to each regime.     
Conclusion 
 
The aim of this chapter was to provide an overview of the theoretical framework 
applied to assess the factors that influence how privacy and data protection is shaped 
in the public security context. The first part of the chapter provided an overview of 
‘European Integration Theory’ which is an umbrella term combining different 
approaches to analyse EU policy. Several approaches have been presented (i.e. 
intergovernmentalism, neofunctionalism, the governance approach, policy networks 
analysis and constructivism). It has been illustrated that in regard to all of these 
approaches there are some reservations regarding their use to assess policy outcomes 
and thus to analyse how privacy and data protection is shaped in the public security 
context. While intergovernmentalism and neofunctionalism is mainly concerned with 
assessing Member States’ interests regarding European integration, all the other 
approaches focus mainly on governance processes instead of concentrating on policy 
outcomes. It has thus been claimed that NI is better suited than the afore-mentioned 
approaches to assess data retention and access regimes since it offers tools to 
understand what mechanisms drive certain modes of governance as well as policy 
outcomes.  
Subsequently, the chapter provided an overview of the main features of NI and 
how it is relevant for the thesis. First, it has been shown that NI emerged as a reaction 
to behaviouralism which argues that social forces and individual decisions are the 
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only factors determining policy outcomes. Second, key notions of NI have been 
explained. More specifically, it has been explained that ‘actors’ are the EU legislators 
namely the Council, the Commission and the EP and the CJEU. Further, the terms 
‘institution’ or ‘institutional framework’ are considered to be the ‘operating 
framework’ for any actions taken by institutional actors. Since there is not one widely 
accepted definition of ‘institution’, the thesis adopts its own version by focusing on 
the ‘formal’ institutional aspects. In practical terms it thus refers to the constitutional 
and legal framework that structures legislation-making when privacy and data 
protection for public security purposes is at stake. Additionally, the notion of 
preference has been clarified by mentioning that the thesis focuses on strategic rather 
than fundamental preferences. 
 Third, the chapter provided an overview of the different branches of 
institutionalism. It has been shown that HI mainly emphasises the role of institutions 
and how they evolve over time. The main aim of HI is to assess why institutions 
persist over time and what triggers institutional change. Subsequently, RCI was 
presented as a branch of NI which focuses on scrutinising the interaction between 
institutions and the actors operating within these institutions. According to RCI, 
actors’ strategic behaviours determine policy outcomes. Ultimately, SI assesses the 
relation between actors and institutions but focuses on cultural aspects and norms 
which drive the behaviour of actors.  
In the last part of the chapter, three hypotheses -reflecting RCI and HI 
approaches- were presented as key factors shaping privacy and data protection in the 
public security context: (i) privacy and data protection in AFSJ’ is an institution in 
transition; (ii) EU legislative actors pursue strategic preferences in the legislation-
making process; (iii) CJEU evolved from a ‘legal basis arbiter’ to a political actor in 
its own right. This chapter is important because the three core hypotheses that intend 
to answer the core research question are based on NI notions. More specifically, 
Hypothesis 1 is based on HI elaborations of institutional persistency and change. 
Furthermore, Hypotheses 2 and 3 represent notions of RCI and HI where the strategic 
preference to maximise influence on policy outcomes as well as the empowerment 
through institutional change determines the actions of institutional actors. Thus, the 
analysis in the subsequent chapters will be based on NI accounts.  
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CHAPTER 3 – PRIVACY AND DATA PROTECTION IN THE ‘AREA 
OF FREEDOM SECURITY AND JUSTICE’: AN INSTITUTIONAL 




The relevant institutional framework for the purposes of this thesis is the legal and 
constitutional framework regulating privacy and data protection in the EU ‘Area of 
Freedom, Security and Justice’ (AFSJ). This is because all three case studies analysed 
in this thesis are concerned with the fight against terrorism and serious crime in order 
to safeguard public security while minding privacy and data protection. The purpose 
of this chapter is to assess this institutional framework in light of Hypothesis 1 from a 
historical institutionalist perspective.179  It is claimed that the institutional framework 
is an example of incremental transformation where both constitutional and policy 
levels exhibit features of ‘old paths’ while at the same time new paradigms evolve. 
Turning points or so-called ‘critical junctures’ and institution-internal uncertainty 
have led to the dynamic nature of the institutional framework. Most prominently the 
Lisbon Treaty and the adoption of CFREU have triggered the transformation. In 
addition, also events such as major terror attacks and the Snowden revelations as well 
as subtle processes such as the increasing use of technology for public security 
purposes lead to the flexibility of the institutional framework. Acknowledging the 
dynamic nature of privacy and data protection in AFSJ is important for the case study 
chapters as it determines the behaviours of institutional actors and thus the way 
privacy and data protection is shaped in the public security context. This chapter also 
provides a framework guiding the legal analysis of the DRD, the PNR and SWIFT 
Agreements.  
First, an overview of the concepts of privacy and data protection as 
fundamental rights in the EU legal order and their correlation is provided. Privacy and 
data protection are complex fundamental rights which are not easy to define and to 
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apply. Furthermore, the correlation of the two rights and the added value of data 
protection are marked by intricacies. This analysis is followed by an assessment of 
CJEU and ECtHR case law on data protection and privacy in the public security 
context. This provides a framework to analyse to what extent case law is applicable to 
the DRD, PNR and SWIFT Agreements.  
Second, the emergence and current state of privacy and data protection in 
AFSJ as laid down by the Treaties and secondary legislation is presented. AFSJ is a 
complex policy field since it covers a broad array of sensitive topics ranging from 
subjects such as migration to criminal law and policing. Respectively, it has been 
argued that “unlike many major domains in European law (…) subject matters 
assembled under AFSJ do not form a “natural” unity in terms of a clearly defined 
overall project.”180 Instead it seems to be rather a ‘network of articulated policies’181 or 
a ‘policy universe’.182 This lack of unity implies that also privacy and data protection 
are not addressed in a uniform manner across AFSJ. On a procedural level many 
inconsistencies existed pre-Lisbon. Since AFSJ matters are at the ‘heart of national 
sovereignty’183 Member States traditionally aim to reduce the influence of EU 
institutional actors which has however become unavoidable throughout the years. 
This dichotomy led to complex legislation-making rules marked by exceptions and 
non-transparency. The latter assessment helps to contextualise the emergence of the 
DRD, the PNR and SWIFT Agreements and is important to understand the behaviours 
of institutional actors when the three regimes were formed.     
Third, the external dimension of AFSJ is assessed. It is shown that external 
relations before Lisbon were –similarly to internal AFSJ arrangements- complex and 
marked by inconsistencies. This partially changed after the Lisbon Treaty where three 
main aspects contributed to the emergence of the EU as a stronger negotiator in EU-
US relations. This analysis is mainly relevant for the PNR and SWIFT regimes 
elaborated in chapters 5 and 6 by providing an understanding about external relations 
procedures and competences. 
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1. The rights to privacy and data protection as fundamental rights 
1.1 The right to private life 
	  
The right to private life is recognised as a human right in universal, regional and 
national fundamental rights legislation.184 In Europe, privacy is enshrined in Article 8 
of the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR):185  
1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his 
correspondence. 
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right 
except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society 
in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the 
country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or 
morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. 
Privacy is not an absolute right and interference is permissible if necessary in a 
democratic society for interests such as national security or for the prevention of 
disorder or crime. The generic notion of safeguarding ‘public security’ through 
prevention of disorder or crime is not only a legitimate ground to limit Article 8 (1) 
ECHR but it is also arguably stipulated as a fundamental right in the ECHR. 
Respectively, Article 5 ECHR stipulates that “[e]veryone has the right to liberty and 
security of person.”186 However, in this thesis ‘public security’ is treated as an 
exception of Article 8 (2) ECHR instead of its function under Article 5 ECHR.187   
While the ECHR is the oldest European initiative stipulating the right to 
privacy, the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (CFREU) 
replicates Article 8 (1) ECHR in Article 7 CFREU which became legally binding with 
the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009. Interestingly, CFREU differentiates 
between privacy in Article 7 (“Everyone has the right to respect for his or her private 
and family life, home and communications”) and data protection in Article 8. The 
rationale behind the differentiation and the relation between privacy and data 
protection will be elaborated in detail in subsequent sections of this chapter. Both 
Article 7 and Article 8 CFREU do not directly entail any limitations, as it is the case 
with the ECHR. Instead Article 52 (1) CFREU mentions that  
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“[a]ny limitation on the exercise of the rights and freedoms recognised by this 
Charter must be provided for by law and respect the essence of those rights and 
freedoms. Subject to the principle of proportionality, limitations may be made only if 
they are necessary and genuinely meet objectives of general interest recognised by 
the Union or the need to protect the rights and freedoms of others.”188  
While ‘public security’ is not explicitly mentioned as a ground justifying the 
interference with the right to privacy, the CJEU has acknowledged that the fight 
against terrorism in order to maintain international security constitutes an objective of 
general interest.189 Furthermore, the CJEU also stipulated that the fight against serious 
crime in order to ensure public security constitutes a matter of general interest.190 In 
addition, the fact that Article 52 (1) CFREU mentions that rights can be limited to 
protect the rights of others includes the option that the right to privacy can be limited 
to safeguard the right to security of person (i.e. public security) stipulated under 
Article 6 CFREU. However, both the CJEU as well as the thesis at hand regard 
‘public security’ as legitimate ground that limits privacy instead of its function of 
Article 6 CFREU.  
 
While privacy was originally seen as the ‘right to be left alone’191, subsequently 
scholars developed multiple conceptualisations leading to the conclusion that privacy 
is large and unwieldy and “(…) has become as nebulous a concept as ‘happiness’ or 
‘security’.”192 This is also reflected in case law since neither CJEU nor ECtHR 
provide an exhaustive definition of privacy. Instead the ECtHR developed the reach 
of privacy in a piecemeal fashion by adding certain aspects through case law. In P G 
and J H v United Kingdom the ECtHR expresses itself in the following way: 
Private life is a broad term not susceptible to exhaustive definition. The Court has 
already held that elements such as gender identification, name and sexual orientation 
and sexual life are important elements of the personal sphere protected by Article 8 
(…). Article 8 also protects a right to identity and personal development, and the right 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
188 Article 52 (1) CFREU. Emphasis added by author.  
189 Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v Council and 
Commission of 3 September 2008, para. 363, and Cases C-539/10 P and C-550/10 P Al 
Aqsa v Council of 15th November 2012, para. 130.  
190	  See for instance: C-145/09 Land Baden-Württemberg v Panagiotis Tsakouridis of 23 November 
2010.	   
191 Warren, S. & Brandeis, L, (1890). The Right to Privacy, Harvard Law Review, vol. 4(5). 
192 Wacks, R. (2000). Law, Morality, and the Private Domain. Hong Kong University Press, p. 222. 
See also other literature on the conceptualisation of privacy: Bennett, C. (1992) Regulating Privacy: 
Data Protection and Public Policy in Europe and the United States. Cornell University Press; Whitman, 
J. (2002). The Two Western Cultures of Privacy: Dignity versus Liberty. The Yale Law Journal, vol. 
113; Delany, H. & Carolan, E. (2008) The Right to Privacy – A Doctrinal and Comparative Analysis. 
Thomson Round Hall; Bennett, C. & Raab, C. (2006) The Governance of Privacy: Policy Instruments 
in Global Perspective. MIT Press. 
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to establish and develop relationships with other human beings and the outside world 
(…).	  It may include activities of a professional or business nature (…). There is 
therefore a zone of interaction of a person with others, even in a public context, which 
may fall within the scope of “private life”. 193 
The ECtHR added that the concept of private life expands to a person’s picture;194 and 
that privacy of individuals also exists in public spaces when videos of events 
occurring in public are permanently stored. 195 In addition to that, the ECtHR also 
stressed that privacy includes a person’s physical and psychological integrity by 
ensuring “(…) the development, without outside interference, of the personality of 
each individual in his relations with other human beings.”196 The ECtHR prefers a 
broad definition due to the difficulty of defining a one-size-fits-all approach to 
privacy acknowledging that an adequate definition and level of protection depends on 
the context and case facts.197  
 When defining privacy, the CJEU either directly refers to ECtHR case law or at 
least comes to the same conclusions as the ECtHR. The CJEU mentioned on several 
occasions that Article 7 CFREU “[…] contains rights which correspond to those 
guaranteed by Article 8(1) of the ECHR and that, in accordance with Article 52(3) of 
the Charter, Article 7 thereof is thus to be given the same meaning and the same scope 
as Article 8(1) of the ECHR, as interpreted by the case-law of the European Court of 
Human Rights.”198 This shows that particularly in regard to conceptual clarifications 
of privacy, CJEU jurisprudence follows the path laid down by the ECtHR. On other 
occasions, CJEU case law discusses more specific aspects of privacy by mentioning 
that a person’s name199, and a person’s sexual orientation200 are a “constituent element 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
193 P G and J H v United Kingdom, Application No. 44787/98 of 25 September 2001, para. 56. See 
also: Pretty v. United Kingdom, Application No. 2346/02 of 29 April 2002, para. 61; Evans v. United 
Kingdom, Application No. 6339/05 of 10 April 2007, para. 71 and Odièvre v. France Application No. 
42326/98 of 13 February 2003, para. 29.  
194 Schüssel v. Austria, Application No. 42409/98 of 21 February 2002, para. 2. 
195 Peck v United Kingdom, Application No 44647/98 of 28 January 2003, para. 58.  
196 Von Hannover v Germany, Application no. 59320/00 of 24 June 2004, para. 50. See also: Hatzis, N. 
(2005). Giving Privacy is Due: Private Activities of Public Figures in von Hannover v Germany. The 
King’s College Law Journal, vol. 16 (1), pp. 143-157 See also: P G and J H v United Kingdom, 
Application No. 44787/98 of 25 September 2001.  
197 For this argument (however not in relation to privacy): McHarg, A. (1999). Reconciling Human 
Rights and the Public Interest: Conceptual Problems and Doctrinal Uncertainty in the Jurisprudence of 
the European Court of Human Rights. The Modern Law Review, vol. 62(5), pp. 671-696. 
198 See: Case C-419/14 WebMindLicenses Kft of 17 December 2015, para. 70. See also: C-400/10 PPU 
J. McB. v L. E. of 5 October 2010, para. 53; and C-256/11 Murat Dereci and Others v 
Bundesministerium für Inneres of 15 November 2011, para. 70. 
199 C-208/09 Ilonka Sayn-Wittgenstein v Landeshauptmann von Wien of 22 December 2010, para. 52. 
Reference to: Burghartz v. Switzerland, Series A No 280-B, p. 28, of 22 February 1994, para. 24; 
and Stjerna v. Finland, Series A No 299-B, p. 60, of 25 November 1994, para. 37. 
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of his private life” instead of engaging in a more fundamental discussion of privacy. 
In contrast to the ECtHR, the CJEU also discusses the essence of privacy on some 
occasions. For instance, in both Digital Rights Ireland and Schrems the CJEU argues 
that the knowledge of the content of the electronic communications forms the essence 
of privacy.201 The concept of the ‘essence of a right’ –enshrined in Article 52 (1) 
CFREU- derives from older CJEU case law holding that the very substance of the 
rights should never be compromised.202 The concept’s usefulness is limited since the 
boundary between a right in general and its essence is not always clear-cut.203 This is 
also reflected in the CJEU approach since the Court does not generally engage in a 
detailed discussion on the essence of rights.  
 The fact that ECtHR as well as CJEU refrain from defining privacy in a narrow 
way has both negative and positive implications. On the one hand, being a nebulous 
concept makes privacy vulnerable to criticism that it is merely a conglomerate of 
other rights. Furthermore, it can be claimed that a lack of a precise definition hinders 
legal certainty.204 On the other hand, leaving privacy as a broad concept allows for 
flexibility. Flexibility of interpretation and scope is for example important to account 
for the dynamic nature of data-intrusive technology and practices. Moreover, 
flexibility of the concept helps to compensate for its large rhetorical counterclaims, 
namely freedom of inquiry, the right to know, freedom of expression and liberty of 
the press.205   
1.2 The right to data protection 
 
Article 8 CFREU stipulates that: 
“1. Everyone has the right to the protection of personal data concerning him or her.  
2. Such data must be processed fairly for specified purposes and on the basis of the 
consent of the person concerned or some other legitimate basis laid down by law. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
200 See for instance: Joined Cases C-148/13 to C-150/13 A and Others v Staatssecretaris van Veiligheid 
en Justitie of 2 December 2014, para. 64.  
201 DRI, para. 39 and C-362/14 Maximillian Schrems v Data Protection Commissioner of 6 October 
2015, para. 94. 
202 For example: Case C-5/88 Hubert Wachauf v Bundesamt für Ernährung und Forstwirtschaft of 13 
July 1989, para. 18; Case C-292/97 Karlson and others of 13 April 2000, para. 45.  
203 For instance in DRI, content data was regarded as “essence of the right” while traffic and location 
data was not considered to be the essence of the right. As shown in Chapter 4 (section 3) of this thesis 
in reality the boundary between traffic and location data is not always clear-cut.    
204 McCullagh, K. (2009). Protecting ‘privacy’ through control of ‘personal’ data processing: A flawed 
approach. International Review of Law, Computers and Technology, vol. 23 (1-2), p. 23.   
205 Bygrave, L.A. (2001). The Place of Privacy in Data Protection Law. UNSW Law Journal, vol. 24 
(1), p. 278. 
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Everyone has the right of access to data which has been collected concerning him or 
her, and the right to have it rectified.  
3. Compliance with these rules shall be subject to control by an independent 
authority.”206  
The multitude of aspects included in Article 8 CFREU shows that the right to data 
protection is a ‘cluster right’ in a sense that it entails a set of “fair information 
practices.”207 Its aim is to reconcile conflicting values such as business interests (free 
flow of information in the internal market), privacy rights (of individuals and 
businesses) and government interests (data processing for security or taxation 
purposes).  
 Data protection is a much more pragmatic and recent concept than privacy. In 
1965 “Moore’s law” predicted the continuous doubling of density of transistors on 
integrated circuits every 18-24 months.208 This prediction was confirmed and within a 
short period computer power as well as storage capacity and disk information density 
increased tremendously. This development decreased costs of storing and processing 
of data and facilitated the growing flow of information.209 Accordingly in the early 
70s, concerns about data privacy emerged leading to the first data protection law 
being adopted in the German Land Hessen which was followed by the enactment of 
similar laws in other European countries.210 While national legislation on transborder 
data exchange reveal the international dimension of data protection, international 
instruments were only adopted at a later stage.211 On the EU level, the regulatory 
efforts intensified during the 1980s and 1990s and culminated in the adoption of the 
DPD, which has recently been replaced by the General Data Protection Regulation 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
206 Article 8, CFREU. 
207 The DPD and the GDPR acknowledge at least eight different data protection principles: (1) Data has 
to be processed fairly and lawfully, (2) data shall be obtained only for specified and lawful purposes, 
(3) data shall be adequate, relevant and not excessive in relation to the purpose (4) data needs to be 
accurate and up-to-date,  (5) data shall not be kept for longer than necessary, (6) data needs to be 
processed in accordance with rights of data subjects,  (7) data access of unauthorized persons shall be 
prevented via adequate technical means and (8) when data is transferred outside the EU the third 
country needs to have adequate data protection standards. 
208 Moore, G. (1965) Cramming more components onto integrated circuits. Electronics Magazine, vol. 
38 (8). In: Brown, I. (2010). Data protection: the new technical and political environment. Computers 
& Law, vol. 21 (1). 
209 Ibid. See also: Greenleaf, G. (2012). Global data privacy in a networked world. In: Brown, I. (ed) 
Research Handbook on Governance of the Internet. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.   
210 Hessisches Datenschutzgesetz, 7 October 1970. 
211 Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), Guidelines Governing the 
Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flow of Personal Data, 23 September 1980 and updated in 
2013; Council of Europe (CoE), Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic 
Processing of Personal Data, 28 January 1981; United Nations (UN) Guidelines Concerning 
Computerized Personal Data Files.  
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2016/679.212  
 
1.2.1 Data protection and the reversed hierarchy of norms  
 
Data protection is an interesting example of a ‘reversed hierarchy of norms’ as it has 
been regulated via secondary legislation before it was granted the status of a 
fundamental right. 
 When the DPD was adopted in 1995 no constitutional right to data protection 
existed. Therefore, its legal basis	  was Article 100a TEC in conjunction with Article 
189b TEC relating to the functioning of the internal market. In this way, the main 
purpose of the directive was to facilitate the free movement of goods, persons, 
services and capital through the free flow of personal data.213 With the legal basis on 
the internal market, the Directive did however stress that the right to privacy as laid 
down by Article 8 ECHR shall be minded.214 Even without a tailor-made legal basis 
further data protection legislation emerged amounting to four crucial instruments.215 
The constitutionalisation of data protection only followed in 2009 with the adoption 
of the Lisbon Treaty. Article 16 TFEU enshrines that “everyone has the right to the 
protection of their personal data”. In this way data protection enjoys a constitutional 
status at EU level.216 Furthermore, CFREU –which became binding in 2009-
acknowledges data protection as a stand-alone right in Article 8 CFREU by 
distinguishing it from the right to private life.  
 The rationale as to why CFREU introduced retrospectively a separate right to 
data protection was not extensively discussed in the Charter’s explanatory 
memorandum. 217 The memorandum merely states that Article 8 CFREU is based on 
Article 286 TEC, the DPD, Article 8 ECHR, and on the Council of Europe 
Convention of 28 January 1981 for the Protection of Individuals with regard to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
212 Directive 95/46/EC, op. cit., and Regulation (EU) 2016/679, op. cit. 
213 Recital 3, DPD.  
214 Recitals 3 and 10, DPD.   
215 DPD, Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA, e-privacy Directive, and Regulation (EC) No 45/2001.  
216 This article is not entirely new but based on Article 286 TEC (General and Final Provisions) which 
was introduced with the Treaty of Nice in 2001.   
217 Anderson, D. & Murphy, C. (2011) The Charter of Fundamental Rights: History and Prospects in 
Post-Lisbon Europe. EUI Working Paper LAW 2011/08, p. 7. Arguably, Article 8 (1) ECHR is divided 
into three different articles in CFREU, namely the integrity of the person (Article 3), private and family 
life (Article 7) and data protection (Article 8).  
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Automatic Processing of Personal Data.218 Furthermore, the Article 29 WP argued that 
the constitutionalisation of data protection is a logical step to take since in some 
Member States the right to data protection is already constitutionalised or has gained 
this status through case law.219 Thus, it seems that Article 8 CFREU was mainly a 
reaction to national and international data protection instruments that had evolved 
over time. There are three other reasons that could explain the introduction of Article 
8 CFREU. 
 First, De Hert and Gutwirth argue that the aim of introducing Article 8 CFREU 
was to provide more legitimacy to the EU data protection framework by stressing the 
fundamental rights dimension of the DPD.220 This interpretation is plausible because 
the legal basis of the DPD only accounts for the internal market dimension of the 
Directive221 while case law rightly stresses the dual function of ensuring the 
functioning of the single market and the protection of fundamental rights.222 By 
introducing Article 8 CFREU the previously prevailing free movement of data 
objective of the DPD became more diluted with privacy considerations. However, if 
the purpose of introducing Article 8 CFREU was indeed to infuse privacy 
considerations to data protection, it is not clear why the right to privacy was not 
sufficient to be the appropriate fundamental rights foundation. Furthermore, 
establishing a retroactive legitimacy for a legislative framework seems intuitively 
unsatisfactory.223  
 Second, Walden provides a more extensive two-fold explanation for the 
necessity of constitutionalising data protection. He argues that on the one hand, 
constitutionalising data protection was necessary from an institutional perspective 
since the EU was not able to accede to the CoE Regime including its Convention 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
218 Draft Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union – Text of the explanations relating to 
the complete text of the Charter as set out in CHARTE 4487/00 CONVENT 50, CHARTE 4473/00, 11 
October 2000. 
219 Recommendation 4/99 of the Article 29 WP on the inclusion of the fundamental right to data 
protection in the European catalogue of fundamental rights, 5143 /99/EN, adopted on 7.09.1999.  
220 De Hert and Gutwirth, S. (2009) Data Protection in the Case Law of Strasbourg and Luxemburg: 
Constitutionalisation in Action. In: Gutwirth, S. et al. (eds.) Reinventing Data Protection? Springer, p. 
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221 Note however that while the legal basis purely focuses on the internal market dimension, Article 1 
(1) DPD mentions that its objective is to protect the right to privacy with respect to the processing of 
personal data. 
222 See: Case C-465/00 Rechnungshof v Österreichischer Rundfunk and Others of 20 May 2003. 
223 Lynsky, O. (2015) The Foundations of EU Data Protection Law. OUP, p. 92.  
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108.224 On the other hand, constitutionalising data protection was necessary from a 
substantive perspective since the emergence of communication technologies 
exponentially increased the automatic processing of personal data from both the 
public and private sectors. Therefore, Article 8 CFREU adds value because: (i) the 
right is applicable to all data independent of it being of a private or public nature; (ii) 
the right establishes a general obligation on the person processing personal data. In 
contrast, traditional privacy law focuses mainly on cases where an individuals’ private 
life is interfered with; (iii) the right to data protection lays down the obligation to 
establish an independent supervisory authority monitoring compliance with the rules. 
Particularly the latter two points legitimise data protection as an independent 
regulatory regime.225  
 Third, the aim of the introduction of Article 8 CFREU was arguably to achieve 
a spill-over effect. One the one hand, introducing Article 8 CFREU was considered to 
extend the main elements enshrined in the DPD to data processing under former 
pillars two and three.226 Article 29 WP also mentioned that a right to data protection 
has the potential to trigger harmonised legislation on data protection in pillars two and 
three.227 On the other hand, the introduction of Article 8 CFREU ensures the extended 
reach of EU data protection legislation in international relations. This is because 
secondary legislation is not binding when international agreements are concluded 
while the Charter is applicable. Nonetheless, after the abolition of the pillar structure 
there are still different standards in data protection regarding former pillar one and 
former pillars two and three.228 Furthermore, standards of EU instruments differ from 
those of international agreements.  
 Since the rationale for constitutionalising data protection was neither clarified 
by the drafters themselves nor have academic explanations fully resolved the issue, it 
is not surprising that it was also subject to criticism. For instance, Cuijpers argues that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
224 In Opinion 2/13 of 18 December 2014, the Court came to the same conclusions as in Opinion 2/94 
of 1996, by arguing that the EU could not accede to the ECHR.  
225 Walden, I. (2015) The right to privacy and its future. Retrieved 26.04.16 from: 
https://issuu.com/vpmarketing/docs/synergy_57_online_5e0911c1a89c2a  
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227 The Future of Privacy-Joint Contribution to the Consultation of the European Commission on the 
Legal Framework for the Fundamental Right to Protection of Personal Data, WP168, 01.12.2009, p. 7. 
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data protection infringements do not necessarily lead to a violation of privacy, hence 
less fundamental interests are at stake. Therefore, it is questionable “(…) whether it is 
necessary and even desirable to have mandatory rules of law governing the processing 
of personal data (…)”.229 This argument does however not account for the fact that 
protection is expanded to situations where privacy would not apply and in this way 
data protection effectively extends protection. The next section discusses in further 
detail the added value of data protection by discussing its relation to privacy. 
  
2. Conceptualising the correlation between the rights to privacy and data 
protection  
 
Having analysed potential reasons for introducing the right to data protection it is also 
relevant to assess the correlation of both rights. In the following four different 
approaches are presented: inherency approach, quasi-separatist approach, 
instrumentalist approach and assemblage approach.230 Furthermore, by applying the 
concept of path-dependence it will be explained why the CJEU has to date settled on 
the first approach in its case law.   
	  
2.1 Inherency approach: data protection as an aspect of privacy  
	  
A common approach reflected in public opinion,231 academic literature,232 and case 
law233 is to regard data protection as an inherent feature of privacy thus questioning 
the added-value of the constitutionalisation of data protection in CFREU. One 
proponent of the so-called ‘inherency approach’ is Daniel Solove. He suggests that 
privacy as such cannot be characterised with one notion and is rather a cluster of 
different concepts which are linked according to the notion of ‘family 
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233 As explained in section 3.1 in this Chapter.   
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resemblance’.234 As such, data protection is the most recent addition to the right to 
privacy ‘cluster’.235 This means that before the emergence of the informational age, 
privacy was mainly regarded as ‘seclusion’ and the ‘right to be let alone’. Nowadays, 
informational control had to be added to the notion of privacy due to the digitalisation 
and mass availability of information.236 As such, privacy and data protection cannot 
be regarded as distinct rights but they rather serve the same purpose and are supported 
by the same values. 
This conceptualisation is also based on the ECHR and related ECtHR case 
law. Since the ECHR does not grant data protection the status of an independent right, 
all aspects related to data protection obviously need to be grouped under privacy. 
More specifically the ECtHR brought multiple data protection principles/aspects 
under the scope of Article 8 ECHR including: (i) informational self-determination237 
such as claims to access personal files,238 claims to delete personal information from 
public files,239 and claims for data rectification;240 (ii) independent supervisory bodies 
to prevent abuse of state power especially if secret surveillance is carried out;241 (iii) 
the special status of sensitive data;242 (iv) the basic idea of purpose limitation because 
personal data shall not be processed when it goes beyond foreseeable use;243 (v), the 
principle of non-excessiveness since governmental authorities shall only collect data 
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that is relevant and based on concrete suspicions;244 (vi) financial compensation when 
data processing activities led to a breach of Article 8.245 While acknowledging those 
data protection principles, the ECtHR still regards them as aspects of privacy.  
While being a prominent model, the inherency approach raises multiple 
questions. For instance, in practice it is not entirely clear why data protection should 
follow exclusively the same purposes as privacy. Data protection tools do not only 
aim to ensure the right to privacy but also support the free flow of information in 
order to allow the smooth functioning of the internal market. Thus, it has an economic 
function which does not have any relevance for the right to privacy. In addition to 
that, some aspects that have been recognised as belonging to the right to private life, 
such as the sexual orientation and gender identification, do not necessarily have a data 
processing element. Therefore, regarding data protection merely as a facet of privacy 
is debatable. In fact, the notion of family resemblance as advocated by Solove can 
also be used to criticise the inherency approach as shown under 2.4 below in this 
chapter.    
 
2.2 Quasi-separatist approach: privacy as an opacity tool and data protection as a 
transparency tool 
 
According to Gutwirth and De Hert, privacy has an opacity function and data 
protection has a transparency function in the democratic constitutional state.246 By 
guaranteeing non-interference in individual matters, privacy is an opacity tool.247 The 
inviolability of the home is a good example of the latter since it illustrates the concern 
for respecting the boundary of the home. The fact that the sanctity of the home can 
only be upheld when the law is respected clearly shows that opacity tools always need 
to be balanced with considerations of the societal interest.248 In addition to being an 
opacity tool, privacy can similarly be regarded as a negative (prohibitive) right that 
protects individuals against interference by governments and private actors.249 
Nevertheless, privacy has also a positive function in that it ensures individuals their 
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freedom of self-determination and their autonomy to make choices and to engage in 
relationships.250 In sum, privacy can mostly be regarded as an opacity tool, however it 
still has a regulatory or transparency dimension.251  
 In contrast to opacity tools, transparency tools come into play after normative 
choices have been made in order to regulate the normatively accepted exercise of 
power.252 Accordingly, data protection is a tool of transparency (or a permissive 
tool).253 Assessing the formulation of data protection principles supports this 
categorisation. For instance, fairness, accountability, individual participation 
principles all rely on procedural justice instead of substantive or normative justice.254 
Furthermore, data protection is mostly not about prohibiting data processing but 
channelling and regulating it.255 By doing so, data protection laws contain certain 
conditions to ensure transparency of the processing and accountability mechanisms of 
the data controller.256 Besides being mainly a transparency tool, two characteristics of 
data protection regulation also reveal features of opacity. First, processing of data 
relating to ethic or racial origin or data revealing religious or philosophical beliefs 
(sensitive data) is in general prohibited. Second, decision-making exclusively on the 
basis of data profiles is also prohibited.257  
 By arguing that privacy is mainly an opacity tool while data protection is mostly 
a transparency tool, this approach provides an interesting account of the different 
functions of privacy and data protection as instruments of political control in 
democratic constitutional states.258 Nevertheless, the approach can also regarded as too 
simplistic to describe the complex and multi-layered interaction between privacy and 
data protection. First of all, as already rightly pointed out by the authors themselves 
the distinction between opacity and transparency tools is not clear-cut since both 
rights also reveal some features of the respective other category. This shows that 
privacy and data protection are not completely distinct. Respectively, instead of 
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pursuing two distinct objectives, data protection and privacy can be understood “(…) 
together as forming the evolving bundle of legal protections of the 
fundamental…value of the automatic capabilities of individuals in a free and 
democratic society.”259 A second shortcoming of this theory is that while 
acknowledging that inherent to both data protection and privacy are elements of 
opacity and transparency, the authors do not further develop the common overarching 
value of privacy and data protection. By regarding them as two separate instruments 
to limit control of the state, the authors disregard an important intermediate step -
namely the analysis of values pursued by both rights- which leads to the assumption 
that both rights are separate.  
2.3 Instrumentalist approach: data protection and privacy as instruments to protect 
the right to human dignity  
 
Rouvroy and Poullet establish a two- step argument where data protection and privacy 
are perceived as sharing the same goal of supporting individual self-development and 
the autonomous capacities of individuals to act and interact which are essential 
elements of human dignity.260 This approach has been described as a model where 
data protection and privacy are complementary tools.261 However, the focus of the 
theory is not on how privacy and data protection have distinct or complementary 
functions. Instead both privacy and data protection are considered to be instruments to 
safeguard the more upstream right to human dignity.262 Therefore, in this thesis this 
approach will be termed an ‘instrumentalist’ approach. One might wonder whether 
the instrumentalist approach is a sub-category of the inherency approach as both 
privacy and data protection are regarded as sharing the same overarching value. The 
reason for presenting it as independent approach is the rather ‘agnostic’ and 
incomplete view of the authors on the correlation of data protection and privacy. 
While the inherency approach actively tries to grasp the link between data protection 
and privacy in their own capacity, the instrumentalist approach regards this aspect as 
subordinate by primarily focusing on the ultimate goal that both rights pursue. 
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 In essence, Rouvroy and Poullet argue that both privacy and data protection 
have an ‘intermediate’ rather than final value since they are instrumental to the 
achievement of a more fundamental value, namely the right to human dignity. As 
human dignity is a broad concept with blurred boundaries,263 the authors point out that 
data protection and privacy are instrumental to the following two aspects of human 
dignity: informational self-determination and self-development of one’s personality. 
In developing this claim the authors particularly have recourse to the German 
Volkszählungsurteil of 1983. In the judgment the German Constitutional Court 
establishes that a cluster of rights (which nowadays form part of data protection) 
stems from the individual’s right to ‘informational self-determination’. The latter is 
itself derived from ‘the right to personality’ which stems from the right to human 
dignity264 and the right to free development of personality.265 Based on that, the 
authors argue that privacy and data protection are tools that foster the autonomic 
capabilities of individuals that are crucial to sustain a vivid democracy.266  
 While being an important approach that is rooted in German jurisprudence, 
there are some objections to this theory. First, human dignity is a very broad concept 
with multiple different meanings in EU Member States. Consequently, generalising a 
German approach to EU law might be problematic.267 Second, the EU Charter itself 
groups data protection and privacy under the heading ‘freedoms’ instead of grouping 
it together under the heading of ‘dignity’ (combining rights such as: right to live, right 
to integrity of person, prohibition of torture, etc.). While a draft version of the Charter 
did use a more dignity-based interpretation of data protection this was rejected in the 
final version - most likely because it did not represent the majority of national 
interpretations of the concept. 268 Third, human dignity has been used to express 
various different philosophical beliefs. In this respect one could argue that an 
underlying principle of dignity is giving data subjects the choice to waive their rights. 
If this were the case, all prohibitive aspects of data protection law would be a breach 
of human dignity.269 Ultimately, another criticism is that human dignity is an 
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inviolable right which excludes the possibility of limiting it due to other 
considerations. However, data protection also follows other objectives such as 
economic objectives (e.g. the free flow of information). 
 Besides the obvious focus on the link to human dignity and its orbiting values, 
Rouvoy and Poullet only marginally discuss the correlation of data protection and 
privacy. Thus, the authors miss the chance to elaborate more on the distinctiveness of 
privacy and data protection. Especially when regarding ‘consent’ as relevant aspect of 
informational self-determination differences between privacy and data protection 
could have been detected. Neither Article 8 ECHR nor Article 7 CFREU refer to the 
concept of consent as a legitimation for intrusion. Furthermore, in case law this point 
is often neglected when assessing the legality of Article 8 ECHR interferences.270 
Contrarily, the role of consent plays a significant role in the context of data 
protection. For instance, in the data protection directive consent is one of the grounds 
determining the legitimacy of data processing.271 In this regard, consent can empower 
the data subject if it is freely given, informed and specific.272  
     
2.4 Assemblage approach: data protection and privacy as part of the same 
conceptual network with intersecting and distinct nodes   
 
The three above-mentioned approaches illustrate the complexity of conceptualising 
the correlation of privacy and data protection. While none of the approaches should 
be rejected, all three have been subject to some criticism. The inherency approach has 
been criticised for not sufficiently accounting for the different goals pursued by 
privacy and data protection while the quasi-separatist approach has not sufficiently 
elaborated on the shared values of privacy and data protection. Ultimately while the 
instrumentalist approach argues that both privacy and data protection are instrumental 
in safeguarding informational self-determination and self-development of one’s 
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personality as aspects of human dignity, the correlation or added value of having two 
separate rights is not addressed.  
 In this context, what could an alternative approach look like? As argued by 
Lynsky273 the notion of family resemblance used by Solove to underpin the inherency 
approach can at the same time be used to support an alternative model. Solove 
explains that privacy is a pluralistic concept that offers a set of protections against a 
related cluster of problems. By offering protection to different problems privacy shall 
not be regarded as ‘one thing’ but a cluster of many distinct yet related things.274 To 
illustrate this, he makes use of Wittgenstein’s family resemblance theory. 
Wittgenstein argues that “(…) certain concepts might not share one common 
characteristic; rather, they draw from a common pool of similar characteristics – ‘a 
complicated network of similarities overlapping and criss-crossing: sometimes overall 
similarities and sometimes similarities of detail.’”275 Wittgenstein calls this 
observation ‘family resemblance’ since the detected overlapping and criss-crossing 
characteristics also exist between family members such as “build, features, colour of 
eyes, gait, temperament, etc.”276 Following Solove’s line of thought implies that data 
protection belongs to the conceptual cluster of privacy. Contrarily Lynsky argues that 
the family resemblance theory can also support the argument that data protection and 
privacy are distinct in the sense that data protection is a right that serves a number of 
purposes, including but not limited to privacy purposes. This is because “(…) data 
protection overlaps to a certain extent with other elements of privacy but also includes 
aspects which fall outside the scope of the right to privacy.”277  
 While the substance of Lynsky’s interpretation of the family resemblance 
approach is an attractive alternative model since it allows flexibility and accounts for 
different ways that privacy and data protection are related, the term ‘family 
resemblance’ may not be appropriate since ‘family’ implies derivative from one 
common origin. Logically ‘family’ also implies only one-directional causal links. In 
reality, there is not always the same causal relationship between the two concepts. For 
example, in some cases data protection is a tool to safeguard privacy while in other 
cases data protection is unrelated to protecting privacy. Furthermore, there is not one 
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overarching origin of both concepts as “family” implies: While the overarching 
objective of privacy originated from the goal to protect the individual against state 
intrusion, data protection emerged with the technological revolution and related 
internal market considerations.278 Taking this into account the neutral term 
“conceptual assemblage” to relate data protection and privacy seems more 
appropriate. Assemblage theory has been mainly developed to study the composition 
of the society. Nevertheless, the notion of “assemblage” can also provide useful 
insights when defining the correlation of privacy and data protection. An assemblage 
is a network of more or less heterogeneous components and their symbiotic 
relationship through which those single components are grouped into a co-functioning 
system.279 The single components forming the assemblage do not form an overarching 
unity. Instead the single elements establish a degree of consistency which can be 
analysed as an assemblage without however converging it into an independent 
system.280 While similar to the notion of family resemblance, this approach grants a 
slightly more independent status to both privacy and data protection. One can 
consider both privacy and data protection as elements of the same conceptual 
assemblage. Within the assemblage both elements are actively engaging with each 
other without loosing their status as an independent concept. In practice this means 
that while some aspects of privacy and data protection are intertwiningly linked others 
are inherently distinct from each other. Consequently a sphere exists where both 
concepts interact and diverge in a multi-layered, networked way.  
 Having explained the assemblage approach the question emerges what it can 
offer in contrast to the other three approaches. First and foremost, the theory accounts 
for the close connection between privacy and data protection while acknowledging 
that they are two separate rights as stipulated in the EU constitutional order. In 
addition acknowledging the clear distinction between data protection and privacy is 
also more respectful to different constitutional traditions in EU Member States, which 
are often used as benchmark by the CJEU in its jurisprudence.281 For instance in 
Germany data protection law is based on human dignity while in France data 
protection is anchored to the notion of individual liberty and in Belgium data 
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protection is rooted in privacy.282  
2.5 The CJEU adopts the inherency approach: an example of path-dependence? 
 
Having explained different approaches to the conceptual interdependence of data 
protection and privacy, the CJEU has adopted the inherency approach although the 
CFREU does acknowledge data protection as distinct fundamental right.283 More 
specifically, the CJEU has two ways to correlate the two rights. First, the CJEU 
considers data protection –embodied by the Data Protection Directive- as an ancillary, 
procedural tool that safeguards the right to privacy.284 Second, the CJEU also regards 
data protection merely as a facet of privacy.285 While the CJEU is required to take 
ECtHR case law into account when ruling on fundamental rights286 it is striking that 
the constitutional difference between CFREU and ECHR has not been acknowledged. 
Nevertheless, in the recent judgment Tele2 Sverige the CJEU for the first time 
explicitly mentions that “(…) Article 8 of the Charter concerns a fundamental right 
which is distinct from that enshrined in Article 7 of the Charter and which has no 
equivalent in the ECHR.”287 While this potentially signifies the move towards a 
different conceptualisation of the correlation of Articles 7 and 8 CFREU, in the 
substantial parts of Tele2 Sverige the CJEU does not distinguish between the two 
rights. This strong statement does thus not have any immediate effects on how the 
CJEU considers the correlation between Articles 7 and 8 CFREU. It is rather to be 
considered as attempt to stress the autonomy of EU fundamental rights vis-à-vis the 
ECHR. Nonetheless, the remarks on the clear distinction may be picked up and be 
subject to future case law. 
 The CJEU’s adoption of the ECtHR approach can be explained by applying a 
conceptual and/or institutional reasoning. In regard to the former the CJEU arguably 
adopts the ECtHR approach since this is how the two concepts de facto interact or 
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ought to interact. This would correspond to the arguments presented under the 
inherency approach.288 However, as pointed out earlier this conceptualisation can be 
challenged in multiple ways.  
 A second explanation as to why the CJEU adopts the inherency approach is 
based on an institutionalist assessment. More specifically, the concept of path-
dependence289 can help to explain why the CJEU follows the interpretation of the 
ECtHR. The cross-fertilisation between the two courts on the correlation of privacy 
and data protection is just one aspect of a special institutional relationship between the 
courts. On a purely formal level, the ECHR and the EU are unconnected since the EU 
did not accede to the ECHR.290 Therefore, neither does EU legislation fall within the 
jurisdiction of the Strasbourg court nor does the ECHR or related jurisprudence create 
direct obligations for the EU. This has been stressed in Tele2 Sverige where the CJEU 
stated that “(…) the ECHR does not constitute, as long as the European Union has not 
acceded to it, a legal instrument which has been formally incorporated in EU law.”291 
Besides the separation between the two courts a strong relationship based on judicial 
dialogue evolved over the years.292 Initially the CJEU did not deal with fundamental 
rights issues by understanding itself mainly as ‘internal market’ court. In the 1970s it 
then started to address fundamental rights by regarding it as general principle of 
Community law and by explicitly pointing to the ECHR.293 While Opinion 2/94, 
putting EU accession to the ECHR to a halt, implied a short ‘ice period’ in the 
relationship between the courts, the relationship quickly normalised again with the 
CJEU citing frequently and in greater depth ECtHR jurisprudence.294 Efforts were 
even made to rectify inconsistencies between CJEU and ECtHR judgments.295 The 
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293 See for instance: De Witte, B. (1991) Community Law and National Constitutional Values. Legal 
Issues of European Integration, vol. 18 (1), pp. 1-22. See also: Stone Sweet, A. (1998) Constitutional 
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“friendly interplay between the courts mirrored political developments” when the 
ECHR was “granted a prominent place in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights in 
2000”.296 Nevertheless, Opinion 2/13 again postulated the autonomy of the EU vis-à-
vis the ECHR. This has also been reiterated in case law where the CJEU mentions 
that interpretation of EU law must be ‘undertaken solely in light of the fundamental 
rights guaranteed by the Charter’297 and that consistency between the ECHR and 
CFREU shall not adversely affect the autonomy of Union law and the CJEU.298  All in 
all, one can conclude that over thirty years of interaction between the two courts is 
marked by the persistence of autonomy but extensive judicial dialogue and 
convergence in interpreting fundamental rights issues.299 While originally the CJEU 
rationale of using ECtHR as ‘source of inspiration’ was at least to a certain extent to 
underpin its own authority,300 the intertwined relationship continued even after 
CFREU was adopted.  
 The reason for being bound to earlier trajectories is related to both practical and 
abstract aspects. On the one hand, in relation to practical considerations the CJEU has 
an interest in preventing the emergence of two ‘branches’ of fundamental rights law 
which are too diverse in nature. Since EU Member States are bound by both regimes 
it would reduce legal certainty and ultimately undermine the CJEU’s own legitimacy 
if Member States had to ‘pick’ which fundamental rights regime to follow in case that 
inconsistencies emerge.301 Particularly deviation in terms of the conceptualisation of 
rights -such as the rights to data protection and privacy, and their correlation- could 
lead to variety and has the potential of substantial discrepancy to earlier paths. On the 
other hand, stickiness to established paths can also be explained in more abstract 
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ways. Firstly, sticking to previous paths is a result of a naturally limited ‘room for 
action’ created by legal frameworks which judges need to adhere to. Thus, adoption 
of similar interpretations like in previous rulings is more likely. Secondly, previous 
cases create an ‘argumentation framework’ which help judges to make analogies and 
frame topics in a certain way. ‘Argumentation frameworks’ not only help judges to 
apply certain problem-solving frameworks but also shape the way claimants pose 
their request to the court. Ultimately, sticking to previously developed paths leads to 
more legal certainty and provides more legitimacy to courts as they are considered to 
be less arbitrary and inspired by judicial instead of political considerations. While 
acknowledging that path-dependence is important to understand how the CJEU 
correlates privacy and data protection in some circumstance deviation from previous 
paths can take place as shown in the next section.  
   
3. CJEU and ECtHR jurisprudence on privacy and data protection in the public 
security context: the incremental move onto a new path?  
 
As mentioned in the previous section, the CJEU traditionally referred to ECtHR 
jurisprudence when adjudicating on fundamental rights rendering the ECtHR a 
standard-setter for the EU legal order. ECtHR case law not only played an important 
role in shaping fundamental rights in general terms but also in setting standards when 
assessing whether an interference with the right to private life on grounds of public 
security was proportionate. Various ECtHR cases concern the legality of measures 
that allow the collection, retention or access to personal data for the purposes of 
safeguarding national security and/or of preventing disorder and crime.  
Most ECtHR cases refer to surveillance measures governing the targeted 
access to individual communication. At the same time, in recent years an increasing 
blurriness between targeted and ‘wide-ranging’ retention and access regimes can be 
detected. The shift to wide-ranging measures can be explained by technological 
advancement. Due to big data analysis and the use of algorithms it has become 
increasingly necessary to ‘accumulate the haystack to find the needle.’302 In the 
context of the shifting nature of public security measures, existing standards as laid 
down by the ECtHR continue to play an important role for the assessment of their 
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legality. The ECtHR made this clear by stating that “(…) there is [not] any ground to 
apply different principles concerning the accessibility and clarity of the rules 
governing the interception of individual communications, on the one hand, and more 
general programmes of surveillance, on the other.”303  
In parallel to the ECtHR’s continuous role, one can however observe that the 
CJEU is gaining importance in setting standards in respect to wide-ranging data 
retention and access regimes. This increasing role is evidenced by the ECtHR’s recent 
references to Luxembourg judgements in the context of data access regimes.304 The 
intertwined relationship and relevance of both ECtHR and CJEU case law is outlined 
in 3.1 below. It is shown that both courts give a similar weight to privacy and data 
protection in the public security context. Section 3.2 will then show that due to 
institutional aspects a more prominent role for the CJEU can be detected in the post-
Lisbon context.305 The subsequent framework will serve as a model for the legal 
assessment in the case study chapters.    
3.1 The judicial dialogue between the ECtHR and CJEU in relation to data 
retention and access regimes    
 
3.1.1 Processing of data should be based on ‘accessible, foreseeable and precise rules’ 
and respect the essence of the right 
 
Any legislative measure must be in accordance with law meaning that it must be 
foreseeable (i.e. as to its effects for the individual) and accessible (i.e. public).306 On 
many occasions the ECtHR held that foreseeability in the context of public security 
measures cannot be the same as in other fields. More specifically, if a suspect was 
notified ex-ante about interception or if he/she was able to predict surveillance, he or 
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she could adapt the behaviour accordingly.307 Therefore, in the public security context, 
foreseeability means that laws must be sufficiently clear as to circumstances and 
conditions on which national authorities might engage in interception.308 In addition to 
the accordance with law requirement, laws must also be sufficiently precise by 
providing detailed provisions as further explained below.309  
 In contrast to the ECtHR, the CJEU requires not only that the interference is 
‘provided for by law’ but also that any interference respects the essence of privacy 
and data protection. For instance, in both Digital Rights Ireland and Schrems the 
CJEU argues that the content of electronic communications forms the essence of 
privacy.310 At the same time, the CJEU argues that certain principles of data security 
constitute the essence of Article 8 CFREU such as data quality, appropriate technical 
and organisational protection against data loss, mandatory destruction of data at the 
end of the retention period, etc.311 The concept of the ‘essence of a right’ derives from 
older CJEU case law holding that the very substance of the rights should never be 
compromised.312 The concept is not always clear since especially in the context of data 
protection and privacy the boundary between the periphery of a right and its essence 
is not always clear-cut.313 Furthermore, the CJEU does not usually discuss the essence 
of a right in detail. One reason may be that this would immediately lead to a breach of 
the Charter and thus the Court could not engage in a discussion of the various 
interests at stake.314  
 In sum, ECtHR jurisprudence provides a detailed framework to establish 
whether a measure is in accordance with the law or in CFREU terms ‘provided by 
law’. Instead the CJEU discusses these aspects often under the proportionality 
assessment and focuses on assessing whether the essence of the right to privacy and 
data protection has been infringed. In practice the discussion on the essence does not 
often go into depth and does not take the complexities of privacy and data protection 
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into account.315 Therefore, the CJEU does not often consider the essence of a right.316 
3.1.2 Proportionality in terms of necessity with regard to the legitimate objectives 
pursued  
 
There is no doubt that data retention and access regimes for public security purposes 
trigger an interference with the right to privacy and data protection.317 Since this 
interference is particularly serious318 it can only be considered to be legal if it is 
‘strictly necessary in a democratic society’319 and proportionate in relation to a 
legitimate objective. Proportionality in terms of necessity is however difficult to 
assess. It opens a debate on which values prevail in a democratic society and about 
what kind of society we wish to live in.320 In this value-driven discussion, it is 
necessary to discuss advantages and disadvantages of wide-ranging data retention and 
access measures for public security. On the positive side, in contrast to targeted 
surveillance, wide-ranging data retention and access measures allow law enforcement 
authorities to access past communications effected by persons before they have been 
identified.321 On a practical level, the usefulness of these regimes lies for example in 
preventing the recent phenomenon of ‘foreign fighters’ or in investigating terror 
attacks such as the 2015 terror attacks in France.322 This contributes to the overarching 
aim of maintaining public security by preventing and detecting crime and to the 
enforcement of the law by facilitating the investigation and prosecution of crime.    
On the negative side,  “(…) by contrast with targeted surveillance measures, a 
general data retention obligation is liable to facilitate considerably mass interference, 
that is to say interference affecting a substantial proportion or even all the relevant 
population.”323 A practical example of mass interference is where data retention 
measures could allow a person to easily extrapolate a list of persons who suffer from a 
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psychological disorder or of persons that oppose the incumbent government.324 It was 
mentioned that there is ‘nothing theoretical’ about abuse or illegal access given the 
extremely high numbers of requests for data.325  Another risk of wide ranging data 
retention and access regimes is that it “(…) is likely to generate in the minds of the 
persons concerned the feeling that their private lives are the subject of constant 
surveillance.”326 This is particularly concerning as it could inhibit the development of 
individual personalities and the establishment of relationships.327 
In general, case law does not go into great depth on the parameter on whether 
a measure is ‘necessary’ in regard to the legitimate objectives pursued. For instance, 
in DRI the CJEU differentiates between appropriateness of the DRD and ‘strict 
necessity’328. While the DRD was deemed appropriate due to its ability to shed light 
on serious crime, the ‘strict necessity’ criterion is intrinsically linked to the 
assessment of the existence of safeguards against abuse of powers.329 Thus, the 
CJEU’s elaborations focus more extensively on analysing the provisions of the 
respective measure instead of elaborating on the measure’s necessity in more abstract 
terms.330 Ultimately, assessing the strict necessity of data retention and access regimes 
is highly context dependent and is often based on hypothetical risks on both sides.331 




3.1.3 Proportionality in terms of existence of safeguards against ‘abuse of power’  
 
Both CJEU and the ECtHR have developed several safeguards to mitigate risks of 
‘abuse of power’ and which ought to be included in any data retention and access 
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legislation in the public security context.333 This is necessary ‘especially as the 
technology available for use is continually becoming more sophisticated’.334  In the 
following several safeguards on access, oversight of access, remedies, retention 
period, data security and onward transfer will be discussed.  
 
(i) Scope of application 
According to both ECtHR and CJEU case law the target group liable to interception 
needs to be defined by law and both courts express concerns in regard to measures 
facilitating mass surveillance.335 For example, in Szabó and Vissy, the ECtHR 
expressed its concerns with the legislation in question because “(…) it might include 
indeed any person and be interpreted as paving the way for unlimited surveillance of a 
large number of citizens.”336 The ECtHR further criticises that there is no need for 
authorities to demonstrate the actual or presumed relation between the persons 
concerned and the prevention of a terrorist threat.337 Similarly, in DRI the CJEU 
criticised the unlimited and indiscriminate scope of the DRD.338 It held that the scope 
of data retention measures must not be beyond a point where a connection between 
the data to be retained and the objective of fighting serious crime is evident.339 While 
this statement implies that indiscriminate data retention is illegal, the Court 
subsequently specifies that the link has to be ‘at least an indirect one’.340 Since this is 
just one example and the fact that ‘an indirect link’ is possible, the judgement as well 
as ECtHR judgments leave a margin to Member States in deciding the precise scope 
of retention and access regimes.  
	  
(ii) Grounds for access 
The courts put an emphasis on substantive and procedural conditions relating to 
access of competent authorities to data and their subsequent use.341 Four different 
aspects are worth pointing out in this respect: First, access to data should be strictly 
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limited to the purpose of preventing and detecting defined criminal offences.342 The 
CJEU mentions that in regard to data retention measures, access can only be granted 
if it is assumed that an individual is either himself suspected of having committed or 
planning a serious crime or if the individual can contribute to provide evidence on 
it.343 Furthermore, the CJEU also mentions that serious crimes need to be precisely 
defined.344 It has been suggested that this could be best achieved by providing a list of 
the offences that qualify as ‘serious crime’.345 An alternative approach has been 
adopted by other EU legislation where not only a list of serious crimes is considered 
as sufficiently precise but also the requirement that an offence leads to a minimum 
term of imprisonment of three years.346 The CJEU also held that access to data shall 
not only be limited to serious offences but also to a small number of authorised 
persons.347 
The ECtHR also argues that the crimes giving rise to surveillance need to be 
defined for the sake of foreseeability of the scope of the law. In Zakharov v. Russia 
the ECtHR criticises that a minor offence such as pickpocketing is sufficient to give 
raise to interception.348 At the same time however, the ECtHR seems to be more 
lenient since it mentions that conditions of foreseeability do not require states to set 
out exhaustively, by name, the specific offences which give rise to interception.349 
Furthermore, crimes of medium severity and serious offences seem to be sufficient for 
the ECtHR to justify surveillance measures.350 It has thus been argued that CJEU goes 
beyond the protection as established by the ECHR and ECtHR case law.351 However, 
shortly afterwards the ECtHR took the particular character of ‘cutting-edge 
surveillance technologies’ and its effects on privacy into account and argued that 
secret surveillance can only be regarded as compliant with the Convention if two 
conditions are met. First, it has to be strictly necessary for safeguarding democratic 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
342 ibid., Tele2 Sverige, para. 111, Kennedy v. UK, para. 159, Zakharov v. Russia, para. 244.   
343 Tele2 Sverige, para. 119.  
344 DRI, para. 60.   
345 AG Mengozzi on Opinion 1/15, para. 235.  
346 Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA of 13 June 2002 on the European Arrest Warrant and 
the Surrender Procedures between Member States, OJ 2002 L 190/1, Article 2 (2) of Directive 
2014/41/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 3 April 2014 regarding the European 
Investigation Order in Criminal Matters, OJ 2014 L 130, Article 11 (1) (g) and Annex D.  
347 DRI, para. 62 
348 Zakharov v. Russia, para. 244.  
349 Ibid; Kennedy v. United Kingdom, para. 159.  
350 Ibid.  
351 See: Secretary of State for the Home Department v. David Davis and others, [2015] EWCA Civ 
1185, para. 112.  
	   85 
institutions and, second, it has to be inevitable for intelligence in an individual 
operation.352 The ECtHR refered to the CJEU’s DRI judgment showing the reciprocal 
character of judicial dialogue between the two courts.   
 
(iii) Oversight on access 
An independent oversight mechanism should exist to monitor the access of public 
authorities to the data. In the ECtHR landmark ruling Klass v. Germany it was held 
that interference with Article 8 ECHR should be subject to oversight either by a judge 
or by another independent body.353 The CJEU shared this view when it ruled in DRI 
that the access by the competent national authority to the data retained should be 
dependent on ex-ante review carried out by a court or independent administrative 
authorities “(…) whose decision seeks to limit access to the data and their use to what 
is strictly necessary for the purpose of attaining the objective pursued and which 
intervenes following a reasoned request of those authorities submitted within the 
framework of procedures of prevention, detection or criminal prosecutions.”354 This 
was reiterated in Tele2 Sverige where it was held that “(…) it is essential that access 
of competent national authorities to retained data should, as a general rule, except in 
cases of validly established urgency, be subject to prior review carried out either by a 
court or by an independent administrative body.355  
The ECtHR expressed a preference for a judge or court as the best way to 
carry out the oversight since impartiality can be best guaranteed.356 The AG in Tele2 
Sverige makes an interesting observation regarding the reason for the importance of 
having independent oversight mechanisms in place. First, it facilitates the filtering of 
sensitive information (i.e. data subject to professional privilege) which can be 
technically difficult to filter out in advance. Second, because all other parties involved 
have either an own interest in the data overriding impartiality (i.e. law enforcement 
authorities) or are ignorant of important information underlying the investigation (i.e. 
service providers).357  
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Both the ECtHR and the CJEU acknowledge that there are instances where ex-
ante review needs to be replaced with ex-post review.358 For example, the ECtHR 
mentions that ex-ante authorisation “(…) is not an absolute requirement per se, 
because where there is extensive post factum judicial oversight, this may 
counterbalance the shortcomings of the authorisation”.359 While this seems to suggest 
that ex-post and ex-ante authorisations are interchangeable, the ECtHR has ruled on 
different occasions that in some cases ex-ante notification is necessary. For example, 
regarding surveillance of media, the ECtHR has emphasised the need for prior 
authorisation by an independent body, since ex post facto review cannot re-establish 
confidentiality.360	  Furthermore, in case of wide-ranging secret surveillance measures 
ex-ante review is also essential.361 The CJEU mentions that ex-ante review should be 
the rule but that in case of urgency ex-post review can replace ex-ante review.362  
Both courts also lay down several principles to analyse whether the oversight 
body qualifies as independent: (i) when adequate procedures of appointment are in 
place and independence of the members of the oversight committee can be 
guaranteed;363 (ii) no external influence exists even if the members are functionally 
independent;364  (iii) the level of access to all (including restricted) documents is 
ensured;365 and (iv) public scrutiny is in place.366 
 
(iv) Remedies 
Both courts stress that remedies shall be available to all individuals that are under the 
remit of any public security measure and who believe their rights have been infringed. 
It needs to be acknowledged that the system of remedies is a multi-layered one 
consisting of administrative and judicial remedies.367 According to CFREU 
independent supervisory authorities are tasked with reviewing whether personal data 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
358 However, regarding surveillance of media, the ECtHR has emphasised the need for prior 
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359 Szabó and Vissy v. Hungary, para. 77. See also: Kennedy v United Kingdom, para. 167.  
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has been processed in accordance with the law.368 Under this broad mandate, data 
subjects can lodge claims to the responsible DPA requesting access to data which has 
been collected concerning him or her, or to have it rectified.369 The importance of 
DPAs as a provider of administrative remedies has been acknowledged in recent case 
law. Most prominently, in Schrems the applicant asked the Irish DPA to exercise its 
statutory powers by prohibit Facebook from transferring his data to the US. The DPA 
refused his request arguing that it was unfounded and that processing was lawful 
under the Safe Harbour Agreement. The CJEU held that a Commission Decision 
(such as the Safe Harbour Decision) cannot prevent persons from lodging a claim 
with a DPA. Furthermore, it can neither eliminate nor reduce powers expressly 
accorded to DPAs under Article 8 (3) CFREU to examine related claims.370 If a DPA 
finds that a Commission Decision violates the rights to privacy or data protection of 
data subjects it must be able to engage in legal proceedings with the aim that the 
Commission Decision will be annulled.371 The ultimate power to annul any measure 
remains with the CJEU.372 The Schrems case stresses DPA powers to deal with claims 
lodged by data subjects and thus acknowledges their important role in offering 
effective remedies to individuals.  
The CJEU also held that data shall be retained in the EU because “(…) the 
control, explicitly required by Article 8 (3) of the Charter, by an independent 
authority of compliance with the requirements of protection and security (…) is not 
fully ensured. Such a control, carried out on the basis of EU law, is an essential 
component of the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal 
data.”373 This idea was reiterated in Tele2 Sverige where it was held that national data 
retention regimes shall ensure storage within their territories to facilitate that national 
supervisory authorities can review that rights of individuals are adequately 
protected.374 These examples show that DPAs are crucial for providing an appropriate 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
368 Article 8 (2) and 8 (3) CFREU.  
369 Ibid.   
370 Schrems, para. 53. 
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372 Schrems, para. 61.  
373 DRI, para. 68 and Tele2 Sverige, para. 123. See also: Case C-614/10 Commission v Austria, para. 
37.  
374 Tele2 Sverige, para. 122.  
	   88 
remedy375 provided that they have effective powers, especially access, and enjoy 
sufficient independence in the fulfilment of their duties.376 The CJEU’s emphasis on 
storage location also provides an interesting account of the Court’s EU-centric 
approach since some companies may need to re-locate data to the EU.  
  If administrative remedies have been exhausted, a data subject should in light 
of Article 47 CFREU be able to access judicial remedies enabling him/her to 
challenge an adverse decision before national courts.377 In respect to Articles 7 and 8 
CFREU, the CJEU held that “legislation not providing for any possibility for an 
individual to pursue legal remedies in order to have access to personal data relating to 
him, or to obtain the rectification or erasure of such data, does not respect the essence 
of the fundamental right to effective judicial protection, as enshrined in Article 47 of 
the Charter.”378 ECtHR jurisprudence on targeted surveillance mentions that ex-post 
notification is important to assess whether effective judicial remedies are available 
since the secrecy of the measure makes it difficult for an individual to understand 
whether his/her rights were breached.379 However, the ECtHR conceded that ex-post 
notification might not be necessary if “(…) any person who suspects that his or her 
communications are being or have been intercepted can apply to courts, so that the 
courts’ jurisdiction does not depend on notification to the interception subject that 
there has been an interception of his communications.”380 The CJEU has also 
expressed the view that those authorities that access data of an individual shall notify 
the person affected. However, the CJEU also mentioned that notification shall take 
place once it does not put the investigation at risk anymore.381  
Neither CFREU nor ECHR explicitly require that a court needs to review data 
subject’s claims.382 However, “in a field where abuse is potentially so easy in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
375 Explanatory Report to the Additional Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Individuals 
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518/07, Commission v. Germany, judgment of 9 March 2010; Case C-614/10 Commission v Austria of 
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377 Schrems, para. 64. 
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individual cases and could have such harmful consequences for democratic society as 
a whole, it is in principle desirable to entrust supervisory control to a judge.383 In the 
case that claims are dealt with by a non-judicial authority, the ECtHR has high 
expectations. A body is deemed to offer sufficient remedies if it is: (i) an independent 
and impartial body with internal rules of procedure and consisting of experienced 
lawyers; (ii) it has access to relevant information including restricted documents; and 
(iii) it has the power to remedy non-compliance.384  
 
(v) Data retention period 
Data retention periods shall be strictly limited according to the usefulness of the data 
for the purposes pursued. The CJEU held that the retention period of data retention 
and access measures should differentiate between the different categories of data or 
between the persons concerned and their respective usefulness for the purposes of the 
objective pursued.385 The CJEU also held that any data retention period “(…) must be 
based on objective criteria in order to ensure that it is limited to what is strictly 
necessary.”386 Ultimately, the CJEU mentions that irreversible destruction of the data 
at the end of the prescribed data retention period shall be ensured.387 The ECtHR also 
laid down that the duration of interception shall be limited. For example, laws 
allowing for a 90 days retention period with the possibility of renewal need to lay 
down how often the period can be renewed otherwise this provision is an ‘element 
prone to abuse’.388 On another occasion, a six months retention period was considered 
proportionate but the law has to establish that the data has to be destroyed 
immediately as soon as it is not relevant anymore to the purpose for which it have 
been obtained.389 In Tele2 Sverige, the AG refers to the ECtHR ruling in Zakharov v. 
Russia mentioning that any data shall be destroyed once it is no longer strictly 
necessary in the fight against serious crime.390 Furthermore, immediate deletion of 
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unnecessary data ought to apply both to data retained by service providers and data 
that has been accessed by state authorities.391   
 
(vi) Data security 
To ensure effective security of data several aspects have been identified by the CJEU. 
An adequate data security strategy needs to account for: (i) the vast quantity of data 
whose retention is required; (ii) the sensitivity of the data; (iii) the risk of unlawful 
access to data requiring data integrity and confidentiality.392 Furthermore, economic 
considerations shall not play a role when companies determine the level of security 
standards. This reasoning is derived from Article 4 (1) of the e-privacy Directive. It 
stipulates that when establishing data security standards, electronic communications 
service providers must take into account the state of the art and the cost of 
implementation. The level of security of adopted measures shall be appropriate to the 
risk presented.393 Since the CJEU evaluated the risk as extremely high, that costs shall 
not only be sub-ordinate but play no role at all. This reasoning can however be 
criticised. As argued earlier in this thesis, the objective of data protection is not solely 
to guard the privacy of individuals but also to ensure economic prosperity in the 
internal market. Furthermore, Directive 95/46/EC stipulates that “[h]aving regard to 
the state of the art and the cost of their implementation, such measures shall ensure a 
level of security appropriate to the risks represented by the processing and the nature 
of the data to be protected.394 In addition Article 52 (1) CFREU also argues that 
limitations to a right are possible if it is proportionate and meets a general interest. 
Respectively, Article 3 (3) TEU lists a highly competitive social market economy as a 
general interest within the EU and as such it seems logical to regard data security 
considerations in the context of economic feasibility.    
 
(vii) Onward transfer 
Without more detailed elaborations, the ECtHR held that precautions have to be taken 
when data is transferred to third parties. This safeguard stems from the Kruslin and 
Huvig v. France cases where French law was deemed to not provide sufficient 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
391 Ibid.  
392 DRI, para. 66. See also also: Tele2 Sverige, para. 122.  
393 Article 4 (1) e-privacy Directive; Tele2 Sverige, para. 122. 
394 Article 17, DPD. 
	   91 
safeguards against abuse of power when court material was sent to other parties.395 
While this finding refers to situations where data was communicated for purposes of 
court proceedings, in other cases this doctrine was phrased more generally. For 
instance, in Weber and Saravia v. Germany the ECtHR held that surveillance 
measures need to include precautions when data is transferred to third parties.396 The 
latter does then also apply when data is for instance shared between different law 
enforcement or intelligence agencies. More recently, the ECtHR also held that due to 
governments’ widespread practices of transferring and sharing intelligence, remedial 
measures and external supervision gained importance.397   
 
3.2 The increasing role of the CJEU due to institutional reasons 
 
As shown in 3.1, CJEU and ECtHR jurisprudence lays down similar criteria to assess 
the legality of data retention and access regimes for public security purposes. The 
interaction between the two courts is marked by judicial dialogue and mutual 
agreement on which safeguards need to be in place.  
Apart from the fairly congruent level of protection granted to privacy and data 
protection, the CJEU seems to have become increasingly important from an 
institutional perspective. The CJEU’s emancipation on fundamental rights matters -as 
evidenced in particular in Digital Rights Ireland, Tele2 Sverige and Schrems – can be 
directly linked to the fact that the Charter of Fundamental Rights acquired valeur 
juridique398 and thus provides the CJEU with a formal reference point when 
adjudicating on privacy and data protection.399 In an empirical study involving 
interviews with CJEU staff it was confirmed that the starting point of any legal 
assessment is now commonly the CFREU since it is the “most up-to-date fundamental 
rights catalogue.”400 Furthermore, it has also been confirmed that post-Lisbon formal 
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references to ECtHR jurisprudence decreased.401 However, a decrease in formal 
references does not mean that the CJEU is not informally inspired by ECtHR 
jurisprudence. The adoption of CFREU and the resulting fundamental rights mandate 
of CJEU increased CJEU’s role vis-à-vis the ECtHR in several ways.  
First, the CJEU became a more attractive venue to raise fundamental rights 
concerns. This is related to the fact that judgements will be delivered much quicker 
than it is usually the case in regard to the ECtHR. The reason for the inertia of the 
ECtHR is its extreme case overload resulting from the way the ECtHR operates as 
well as the vast number of applications it receives.402 While being more efficient, the 
CJEU’s level of scrutiny in respect to data protection and privacy, is equivalent if not 
higher compared to the ECtHR. In earlier days this would not have been conceivable 
as the CJEU was mainly an ‘economic court’ where fundamental rights played a 
subordinate role.403  
Second, the EU institutional framework provides more opportunities for the 
CJEU to adjudicate, namely via requests from EU institutional actors. In this way, it 
will potentially have more chances to rule on fundamental rights issues. For example, 
as shown in the case study chapters especially the strategic use of the CJEU by EU 
institutional actors triggers an increased relevance of the CJEU in respect to data 
retention and access measures in the public security context.404  
Third, another factor relates to the different focus of CJEU rulings. While 
ECtHR cases exclusively focus on ensuring the protection of individual rights in 
regard to very specific national legislation, the CJEU takes a more holistic approach 
as its main aim is to ensure uniformity, primacy and effectiveness of EU law. Hence, 
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it has a broader reach and its assessments are more general by scrutinising 
fundamental rights in the context of economic considerations.405  
A fourth institutional aspect favouring the increasing CJEU role relates to the 
spill-over effect of judgments. While recent judgments have had a substantial impact 
on the level of protection granted to privacy and data protection the CJEU often failed 
to provide an in-depth explanation on how and why certain conclusions have been 
reached.406 This in turn leads to uncertainty on the implications of judgments and thus 
to follow-up requests.407 One explanation for the CJEU’s tendency to deliver vague 
judgments relates to the set-up of the Court not allowing for dissenting opinions. The 
need to reconcile diverging opinions can thus negatively affect the quality and depth 
of the rulings.408  
Last, the increasing role of the CJEU vis-à-vis the ECtHR is related to a 
tendency of European integration in respect to public security measures. If more 
national measures result from the transposition of EU law, the influence of the ECtHR 
will shrink - at least until the EU accedes to the ECHR. The ECtHR has conditionally 
accepted the prevalence of the CJEU when fundamental rights concerns arise from 
national laws transposing EU law. In Bosphorus v. Ireland the ECtHR acknowledged 
the self-sufficiency of the EU legal system as long as the level of protection is at least 
equivalent to that of the Convention.409 While leaving the backdoor open for ruling on 
national laws transposing EU law, the ECtHR essentially accepted the CJEU’s 
exclusive role in adjudicating on fundamental rights within the EU context.410  Taken 
together, the institutionalisation of privacy and data protection through CFREU in 
conjunction with the structural set-up of the two courts potentially grants the CJEU 
more opportunities to pave the way in respect to fundamental rights in respect to 
privacy and data protection.    
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Turning to the causes for further EU integration in regard to public security 
measures, it is worth pointing out that the abolition of the pillar structure post-Lisbon 
as well as recent terror activities on EU soil facilitated the adoption of public security 
measures at EU level. As elaborated further in the case study chapters the ordinary 
legislation-making procedure applicable to AFSJ led to increased consensus between 
the different EU institutional actors which enables swift adoption of relevant 
measures.411 The CJEU can also be seen as a catalyst of EU integration.412 For 
example, in Tele2 Sverige the CJEU argued that not only retention of data for public 
security purposes but also access to this data falls under Article 15 (1) of the e-privacy 
Directive.413 The CJEU admitted that there is a fine line between measures falling 
beyond and within the scope of EU law. However, since data retention is explicitly 
mentioned in Article 15 (1) of the e-privacy Directive it is inevitable that data 
retention falls within the scope of EU law. Consequently any further national or EU-
wide regulation of data retention and access will be under the remit of EU law and 
thus within the CJEU’s jurisdiction. This is a good example of the CJEU’s attempt to 
close legal loopholes in the protection of individuals, which may arise from the 
national security exception and Member States’ attempts to make recourse to it.414 It 
also shows the CJEU’s impact on enhancing EU integration and thus grants less 
importance to Member States’ sovereignty concerns. In DRI, AG Cruz Villalón 
justified the integration bias by mentioning that if EU legislation has a ‘creating 
effect’ in the sense that it imposes obligations constituting serious interference with 
fundamental rights, it cannot be left entirely to the Member States to define the 
guarantees capable of justifying that interference.415 Consequently, by ruling on the 
reach of EU law and by making more detailed safeguards at EU level a precondition 
for legality of data retention, any future regulatory efforts on EU level imply 
increased harmonisation among Member States. Applied more generally, this 
tendency of EU integration implies that the remit of the CJEU is increasing while the 
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ECtHR is still not able to rule on EU legislation. This situation will obviously change 
if/when the EU accedes to the ECHR.416  
3.3 Summary 
	  
As shown the ECtHR and the CJEU share to a large extent the same views on how to 
protect privacy and data protection in the public security context. Standards and 
procedural safeguards mentioned by both courts largely coincide and direct and 
indirect judicial dialogue is taking place. It is interesting to note that initially the 
ECtHR was the trendsetter by introducing general principles and safeguards. While 
these standards still play an important role on a substantial level, CJEU jurisprudence 
is becoming more relevant due to institutional reasons. As has been shown the 
adoption of the CFREU and the resulting emancipation of the CJEU on fundamental 
rights triggers a shifting focus on CJEU jurisprudence in several ways. On the one 
hand the architecture of the CJEU leads to more efficiency in dealing with 
fundamental rights. On the other hand, the communitarisation of AFSJ post-Lisbon 
shifts a substantial part of relevant national activities under the remit of EU law and 
thus the CJEU. The prevalence of the CJEU triggered by the communitarisation of 
AFSJ might become less relevant once the EU accedes to the ECHR because the 
ECtHR will then be able to rule on EU legislation. Nonetheless, the more agile 
architecture of the CJEU would then still support a continuous prominent role for the 
CJEU vis-à-vis the ECtHR.      
4. The institutionalisation of privacy and data protection in AFSJ - A case of 
incremental EU integration? 
 
4.1 EU competences in AFSJ: An example of incremental EU integration 
	  
Since the early days of EU integration, the idea behind coordinating AFSJ on the EU 
level has been to react to the increased threat of cross-border criminal activities due to 
the facilitation of free movement. Despite of the need to harmonise AFSJ, European 
integration in those matters has been slow and non-linear.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
416 Note that at political and academic levels, it has been suggested that new accession negotiations are 
not likely to happen in the near future. See: Fabbrini, F. & Larik, J. (2016). The Past, Present, and 
Future of the Relation between the European Court of Human Rights. Yearbook of European Law, pp. 
1-35. For an assessment on a possible route to accession, see: Krenn, C. (2015) Autonomy and 
Effectiveness as Common Concerns: A Path to ECHR Accession After Opinion 2/13, German Law 
Journal, vol. 16, p. 147.  
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The disjointedness is a result of contradictory forces marked by disagreement 
on the fundamental question as to whether legislation should be adopted on an 
‘intergovernmental basis’ where all powers are reserved for national governments or 
on a ‘supranational basis’ where power is assumed by EU institutional actors. The 
persistence of intergovernmental considerations can be explained with the perception 
that security and criminal justice are at the ‘heartland of Member State authority’.417 
The occasional trump of supranational considerations can be ascribed to pragmatic 
considerations on the efficiency and effectiveness of centralised efforts. For example, 
after 9/11 and the London and Madrid bombings authorities became increasingly 
aware of the benefits of cooperation. Thus, these instances can be considered to be 
‘critical junctures’ which enable the institutional framework to incrementally move 
from previous intergovernmental practices to more supranational practices.    
 While there have been informal cooperation mechanisms on AFSJ matters 
since the early years of EU integration418 this was only formalised with the Maastricht 
Treaty. Interestingly, Title VI ‘Provisions on Cooperation in the Fields of Justice and 
Home Affairs’ did not mention that the purpose of cooperation is maintaining and 
safeguarding security in the EU. Instead it is stipulated that “[f]or the purposes of 
achieving the objectives of the Union, in particular the free movement of persons, and 
without prejudice to the powers of the European Community, Member States shall 
regard the following areas as matters of common interest.”419 The article goes then on 
by determining that issues such as criminal judicial cooperation and police 
cooperation fall under JHA and thus under the third pillar.420 There are four main 
aspects that differentiate policies adopted under the first and the third pillar. First, the 
power constellation between the EU institutional actors differs in terms of right of 
initiative and the applicable legislation-making procedure.421 Second, the legal 
instruments differ from the first to the third pillar.422 Third, while first pillar measures 
had direct effect implying that they could be directly invoked in front of a national 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
417 Anderson, D. & Eeckhout, P. (2011) Series Editors’ Foreword. In: Peers, S. (2011). Justice and 
Home Affairs Law, OUP, pp.vii-viii. 
418 For example in the 1970s the TREVI Group was a network of law enforcement officials who 
discussed on an informal basis counter-terror issues. See: Mitsilegas, V. (2009) EU Criminal Law. Hart 
Publishing, p. 6.  
419 Article K.1 TEU, Maastricht Treaty. 
420 Note that all JHA issues are grouped under Title VI apart from certain visa related issued.  
421 This is explained in more detail in Chapters 4, 5 and 6 of this thesis. 
422 The first pillar is regulated via Directives, Regulations and Decisions, (former Article 249 EC) 
while third pillar topics are regulated via Framework Decisions, Common Positions, Conventions 
(former Article 34 TEU).   
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court, third pillar measures do not have this same effect.423 Fourth, the Court of Justice 
has the competence to adjudicate on first pillar matters while its jurisdiction is limited 
in respect to the third pillar.424  As explained further in the case study chapters, the 
categorisation of a subject matter under one of the pillars was not always clear-cut. 
An example is the increasing importance of data held by the private sector for AFSJ 
purposes which blurs the boundary between internal market (first pillar) and security 
(third pillar) concerns. Besides the differences between the first and third pillar it is 
also necessary to point out that another important field that partially overlaps with 
AFSJ falls -since the early days of EU integration up until today- beyond the scope of 
EU action. Article K2 (2) of the TEU mentions that all provisions on cooperation in 
AFSJ “(…) shall not affect the exercise of the responsibilities incumbent upon 
Member States with regard to the maintenance of law and order and the safeguarding 
of internal security.”425  
The Treaty of Amsterdam introduced the policy field of the Area of Freedom 
Security and Justice and replaced earlier references to Justice and Home Affairs.426 By 
adhering to the pillar tradition of the Maastricht Treaty, the Amsterdam Treaty aimed 
to clarify the objectives and legal effects of AFSJ cooperation. Furthermore, by re-
phrasing JHA into AFSJ the security dimension was more clearly expressed in 
contrast to the Maastricht Treaty. Still caught in the old 
intergovernmental/supranational debate, Member States reached a complex agreement 
where on the one hand the Schengen acquis was adopted by allowing opt-outs to the 
UK, Ireland and Denmark while on the other hand issues related to migration were 
shifted from the third to the first pillar.427 Besides that, other relevant changes include 
that the EP had to be consulted before the Council could adopt a third pillar 
measure.428 Furthermore, Conventions ceased to exist under the Amsterdam Treaty 
meaning that Framework Decisions,429 Decisions,430 and Common Positions431 were 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
423 Peers, S. (2011). EU Justice and Home Affairs Law, OUP, p. 8. 
424 Ibid.  
425 Post-Lisbon this is regulated via Article 4 (2) TEU and Article 72 TFEU stipulating that 
responsibility for internal security remains for Member States. According to the AG Opinion in C-
145/09 Land of Baden-Württemberg v Panagiotis Tsakouridis, judgment of 23 November 2010, the 
terms ‘internal security’ and ‘national security’ can be used interchangeably and they cover both 
external and internal security of a state.  
426 Note, however, that the thesis always refers to AFSJ for the sake of consistency. 
427 See Articles 61-69 TEC. 
428 Article 39 TEU. 
429 Article 34 (2) (b) TEU. 
430 Article 34 (2) (c) TEU. 
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the three legislative measures to be adopted in the third pillar. It is also worth pointing 
out that the jurisdiction of CJEU was expanded post-Amsterdam by allowing the 
Court jurisdiction over the validity and interpretation of decisions and framework 
decisions.432 In addition to the formal Treaty amendments, the European Council 
started to adopt action plans and policy programmes as follow up to its regular 
meetings to set out broad objectives related to specific JHA matters.433 In addition, the 
European Commission decided to found a Directorate General for Justice and Home 
Affairs (DG JHA) in 2000. This means that although formally Member States were 
still in full control, the codification of political objectives via formal programmes and 
the foundation of DG JHA created new ‘supranational spaces’ which contributes to 
incremental EU integration.  
 
The Lisbon Treaty was a major supranational push for AFSJ cooperation mainly due 
to the abolition of the pillar structure. First of all, the abolition of the pillar structure 
led to the consolidation of all AFSJ matters under on single title (Title V) of the 
TFEU.434 There are various different protocols on AFSJ matters attached to the TFEU 
mainly relating to internal border controls and Schengen, and to opt-outs regarding 
UK, Ireland and Denmark. These protocols are remnants from the Treaty of 
Amsterdam but almost all of them have been substantially amended with the Lisbon 
Treaty.435 Other protocols relate to the CJEU’s jurisdiction over AFSJ measures.436  
Second, the legislation-making procedure changed significantly. While 
previously many AFSJ matters were still subject to unanimity voting, post-Lisbon 
most AFSJ subjects –such as most aspects of criminal law and police cooperation437 
are decided under the ordinary legislative procedure.438 In some cases QMV is applied 
but the Parliament is only consulted, such as the adoption of measures on 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
431 Article 34 TEU. 
432 Article 35 TEU. It needs to be noted that not all Member States opted in on granting the CJEU third 
pillar jurisdiction.  
433 Multiple action plans have been adopted since the entry into force of the Amsterdam Treaty and are 
usually named after the place in which they were concluded: Vienna Action Plan (1998), Tampere 
programme (1999), Laeken conclusions (2001), Hague programme (2004), Stockholm programme 
(2010). 
434 Title V, TFEU. 
435 Peers, S. (2011) Mission Accomplished? EU Justice And Home Affairs Law after the Treaty of 
Lisbon. Common Market Law Review vol. 48, pp. 661–693. 
436 Protocol on transitional provisions annexed to the Treaty of Lisbon, Articles 9 and 10. 
437 Articles 79, 82–85, 87 and 88 TFEU. 
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administrative cooperation in the fields of policing and criminal law.439 In few cases a 
‘special legislative procedure’ instead of the ordinary legislative procedure is applied 
where unanimity still applies and the Parliament is only consulted. Among other 
fields this is used when sensitive issues on policing and criminal law are at stake.440 
The general shift to QMV can be assessed as a positive development as it leads to 
more accountability and transparency. Furthermore, it provides more clarity in cases 
where AFSJ matters cannot sharply be distinguished from internal market aspects (as 
is the case in all three case study regimes). Nevertheless, the EU competence has also 
been limited more narrowly to certain crimes and types of criminal procedure that 
have a cross-border element.441 In other words, the ambitious goal mentioned in 
Article 3 (2) TEU442 is limited by Article 67 TFEU and subsequently also by different 
specific provisions.443 Furthermore, exceptions to the ordinary legislative procedure 
and the introduction of so-called ‘emergency brakes’ show that intergovernmental 
elements persisted and may lead to obstacles in harmonisation efforts.444    
Third, the CJEU’s competences were extended by the removal of restrictions 
in relation to migration, asylum and in regard to the former third pillar. There is only 
one exception in regard to policing and criminal law where the Court cannot “review 
the validity or proportionality of operations carried out by the police or other law-
enforcement services of a Member State or the exercise of the responsibilities 
incumbent upon Member States with regard to the maintenance of law and order and 
the safeguarding of internal security.”445 In addition, there are some transitional rules 
as regards pre-Lisbon Third Pillar measures.446  
 The above-mentioned changes introduced with the Lisbon Treaty tackled the 
lack of accountability and transparency and thus the approach to AFSJ can be 
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441 Peers, S. (2011). 
442 Article 3 (2) TEU: “The Union shall offer its citizens an area of freedom, security and justice 
without internal frontiers, in which free movement of person is ensured in conjunction with appropriate 
measures with respect to (…) the prevention and combatting of crime”.  
443 Wessel, R., Marin, L. & Matera, C. (2011). The External Dimension of the EU’s Area of Freedom, 
Security and Justice. In: Eckes, C & Konstadinidis, T. (eds.) (2011) Crime within the Area of Freedom, 
Security and Justice. Cambridge University Press, p. 275. 
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regarded as more rights-based, open and participatory.447 Due to these positive 
developments, the Lisbon Treaty provided the pre-conditions for a new paradigm of 
European criminal justice where fundamental rights instead of security is at its core.448 
At the same time it has to be noted that: (i) some intergovernmental features remain 
post-Lisbon; (ii) there is still a legacy of instruments that have been adopted under 
older Treaty provisions where ‘old standards’ live on in the post-Lisbon era; (iii) the 
effectiveness of a more ‘rights-based’ AFSJ framework is also determined by policy 
priorities and political realities.449 While a ‘rights-based AFSJ’ has often been 
stressed450 this has been put under pressure by several terror attacks on European soil 
as well as the refugee crisis.451 In this context, political realities might trump the 
fundamental rights discourse as exemplified by the adoption of the PNR Directive.452  
 Taken together it has been shown that AFSJ moved incrementally towards a 
‘normalised’ policy field. The incremental nature of these changes was both event-
driven and based on pragmatic considerations. Furthermore, the abolition of the pillar 
structure – an inherent pre-Lisbon feature- was a key driver for change.453 
Nonetheless, some institutional intricacies persist showing the co-existence of old and 
new paths.    
4.2 Regulatory framework of data protection and privacy in AFSJ: Persisting 
fragmentation?   
	  
The main data protection instruments that evolved in the EU in the late 90s explicitly 
excluded privacy and data protection in AFSJ matters from its remit.454 Only after 
9/11 was the importance of regulating data protection in this field acknowledged. The 
result was a patchwork of data protection rules enshrined in multiple different 
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448 See: Mitsilegas, V. (2016) EU Criminal Law after Lisbon. Rights, Trust and The Transformation of 
Justice in Europe. Hart Publishing.  
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regulatory instruments of varying legal status and binding power.455 For instance, 
distinct data protection regimes were established in the Europol, Schengen and 
Eurojust, Prüm, PNR and SWIFT Agreements.456 These instruments are only partially 
inspired by basic data protection principles and thus this means in each case the 
setting-up of separate regimes.457 Furthermore, due to the blurred boundary between 
the first and third pillar the DPD was occasionally applicable when processing was 
carried out by companies.458 Only in 2008 a first attempt to overcome this mosaic 
approach was made by adopting the 2008 Framework Decision.459 While aiming to 
replicate the provisions of the DPD for the AFSJ sector, it only had limited effect. For 
instance, it did not affect any of the separate data protection regimes mentioned 
earlier and its provisions were vague and allowed numerous exceptions. Furthermore, 
it exclusively applied to trans-border data flows between Member States and thus did 
not establish EU-wide standards.460  
The Lisbon Treaty and the abolition of the pillar structure provided the means 
for a new attempt to establish an AFSJ data protection regime. The rationale for 
amending the pre-Lisbon data protection regime was not only to strengthen its 
relevance for AFSJ but also to account for technological developments.461 The Data 
Protection Directive for police and criminal justice authorities was adopted in 2016 
after several years of negotiations.462 The Directive applies to:  
“[t]he processing of personal data by competent authorities for the purposes of the 
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prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal offences or the execution 
of criminal penalties, including the safeguarding against and the prevention of threats 
to public security, [and it] should cover any operation or set of operations which are 
performed upon personal data or sets of personal data for those purposes, whether by 
automated means or otherwise, such as collection, recording, organisation, structuring, 
storage, adaptation or alteration, retrieval, consultation, use, alignment or combination, 
restriction of processing, erasure or destruction.”463 
The Directive applies to all data processing in the law enforcement context. 
Therefore, the main achievement of the Directive in contrast to the Framework 
Decision is that it is also applicable if processing happens at national level and not 
only if data is transferred across borders. Unchanged is however that it does not apply 
to: aspects that fall outside the scope of EU law;464 data processing carried out by 
Union bodies and agencies;465 and data processing which is subject to specific 
regimes.466 On the latter point it needs to be mentioned that the Directive does require 
that data processing with third countries is based on an adequacy finding.467 However, 
agreements that already exist on exchange of data in the law enforcement field are 
unaffected by the Directive.468 In terms of substance, the Directive follows a similar 
structure as the GDPR and includes the same data protection principles. Nevertheless, 
the Directive accounts for the special nature of data processing in the criminal law 
context and challenges brought about by new technological developments which 
infuses more flexibility.469 For example, the right to information and access cannot be 
applied as strictly as under the GDPR since this would render targeted surveillance 
meaningless. Accordingly, the provisions on access and information are subject to 
certain limitations and flexibility.470 Furthermore, strict requirements on data quality 
may not be realistic since data in the law enforcement context is not only derived 
from facts but in some cases from unconfirmed intelligence. Respectively, Article 7 
points out that the latter two categories of data need to be distinguished and treated 
differently.471  
 As mentioned earlier, also the DPD was subject to major revisions in 2016 
leading to the adoption of the GDPR. Similarly to the DPD, the Regulation does not 
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apply to AFSJ processing.472 However, this exemption is not always clear-cut where 
processing is initially executed by private companies. For instance, in the annulled 
data retention directive it was stipulated that the DPD is ‘fully applicable’ to the data 
retained in accordance with the data retention directive since access to data was not 
subject to the Directive.473 Furthermore, also in the recently adopted PNR Directive it 
is mentioned that “this Directive is without prejudice to the applicability of Directive 
95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council to the processing of personal 
data by air carriers (…).”474 However, as soon as data is transferred to the competent 
authorities (i.e. PIU), the processing “should be subject to a standard of protection of 
personal data under national law in line with Council Framework Decision 
2008/977/JHA”475 These examples show that the provisions of the GDPR may still 
partially apply to data processing operations for public security purposes as long as 
the processing is executed by private entities.  
 Taken together, there have been attempts to elevate data protection and privacy 
in AFSJ to a less fragmented or more ‘normalised’ policy area. However, due to the 
only recent changes resulting in the GDPR and the Police and Criminal Justice Data 
Protection Directive it is difficult to conclude whether ‘normalisation’ has indeed 
happened. The new data protection package has the potential to create a more uniform 
framework while some initial uncertainties are still likely to persist, particularly since 
various autonomous regimes continue to exist.    
 
5. The institutionalisation of EU-US relations on privacy and data protection in 
AFSJ  
 
5.1 Rationale and EU competence in the external dimension of AFSJ  
 
While AFSJ cooperation with third states or international organisations has been 
possible since the Treaty of Amsterdam, no indication on the specific external 
objectives in AFSJ were stated.476 Only during the 2000 Feira Council meeting it was 
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mentioned that the primary purpose of the external dimension of EU criminal matters 
is the contribution to internal AFSJ matters and not an objective in itself.477 Some 
scholars have called this reasoning the ‘internal-external security nexus’.478 This 
concept implies that in a globalised world, security on EU territory cannot be 
regarded in isolation from external threats and thus requires measures beyond the EU 
level. While this realisation did not mark the beginning of a comprehensive ‘global 
AFSJ strategy’, it provided a rationale for acting externally.  
Before the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty, it was debatable whether the EU 
was at all able to conclude international agreements since no treaty provision 
expressly conferred legal personality on the EU. In addition, no treaty provisions 
provided the EU competences to cooperate with third states on AFSJ matters either.479 
However, this was relaxed with the ratification of the Amsterdam Treaty in 1999.  
Article 24 TEU within the CFSP Title stipulated that if necessary international 
agreements can be concluded with third states or international organisations. 
Respectively, the Council may authorise the Presidency, assisted by the Commission 
as appropriate. Article 24 TEU could be read in conjunction with Article 38 TEU of 
the AFSJ Title	  stating that “[a]greements referred to in Article 24 may cover matters 
falling under this title.”480 The combination of these two articles was frequently used 
as the legal basis for agreements involving the third pillar.481 However, Article 24 (5) 
TEU stipulates that “[n]o agreement shall be binding on a Member State whose 
representative in the Council states that it has to comply with the requirements of its 
own constitutional procedure; the other members of the Council may agree that the 
agreement shall nevertheless apply provisionally.”482 This provision was in many 
cases invoked by Member States leading to complications and delays in the entry into 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
477 European Union Priorities and Objectives for External Relations in the Field of Justice and Home 
Affairs. Report of the Council submitted to the European Council. Council Doc. 7653/00, 6 June 2000. 
478	  Smith, K. (2003). European Union foreign policy in a changing world. Cambridge: Polity Press; 
Wolff, N. & Mounier, G. (2009) The External Dimension of Justice and Home Affairs: A Different 
Security Agenda for the EU? Journal of European Integration, vol. 31 (1), pp. 9-23; Eriksson, J. & 
Rhinard,  M. (2009) The Internal External Security Nexus: Notes on an Emerging Research Agenda 
Cooperation and Conflict, vol. 44 (3) pp. 243–267. 
479 Note that the only international aspect of AFSJ was that Common Positions within international 
organisations and at international conferences are defended (see Article K.5.).   
480 Article 38 TEU. Note that under the Amsterdam Treaty, AFSJ matters were labelled: “police and 
judicial cooperation in criminal matters”. 
481 For example: Wessel, R. A. (2010) Cross-Pillar Mixity: Combining Competences in the Conclusion 
of EU International Agreements. In: Hillion, C. and Koutrakos, P. (eds.) Mixed Agreements in EU Law 
Revisited. Hart Publishing.  
482 Article 24 (5) TEU. 
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force of agreements.483 When the Lisbon Treaty entered into force several third pillar 
Agreements were still provisional due to Article 24 (5) TEU. Since new rules apply 
immediately to ongoing legislative measures if not otherwise specified, all provisional 
Agreements had to be re-negotiated under post-Lisbon procedures.484 As shown in 
Chapters 5 and 6, this was the case for the PNR and SWIFT Agreements. 
Another pre-Lisbon complexity refers to situations where the legal basis of a 
measure cannot be clearly assigned to one of the three pillars. This resulted in 
situations where it was not clear which negotiation procedure should be applied. In 
those cases the CJEU was able to play a significant role in AFSJ external relations. A 
prominent case on cross-pillarisation in external AFSJ matters concerned the PNR 
case where the CJEU held that the Agreement was based wrongly on a first pillar 
legal basis instead of a third pillar basis.485 A more detailed elaboration of this case 
follows later in the thesis.486  
 Post-Lisbon, the pillar structure was abolished leading to the unification of 
former Title IV TEC and former Title VI TEU under the heading ‘Title V AFSJ’. The 
result was that international agreements in AFSJ have the same legal basis and are 
concluded under the same procedures as other policy fields. While no explicit 
reference is made to a Union competence in external AFSJ matters, a declaration 
attached to the TFEU details that treaty-making competence of the EU on AFSJ 
matters is possible in areas covered by chapters 3, 4 and 5 of Title V as long as such 
agreements comply with Union law.487  
The Lisbon Treaty also brought several other advantages when international 
agreements are concluded in the AFSJ area. First of all, the consolidation of the AFSJ 
policy field leads to increased consistency in regard to its external dimension. 
Furthermore, since Article 216 (2) TFEU stipulates that agreements need to be 
binding on institutions and Member States, ‘vertical’ consistency among different 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
483 For example, in regard to the EU-US PNR Agreement: Agreement between the European Union and 
the United States of America on the processing and transfer of passenger name record (PNR) data by 
air carriers to the United States Department of Homeland Security (DHS) – Declarations made in 
accordance with Article 24(5) TEU - State of Play, Council doc 5311/1/09, 19 March 2009.  
484 See: Peers, S. (2011), op. cit., p. 133.  
485 Joined Cases C-317/04 and C-318/04 European Parliament v Council, judgment of 30 May 2006. 
More details, see: Cremona, M. (2008) EU External Action in the JHA Domain: A Legal Perspective. 
EUI Working Papers, LAW No. 2008/24, p. 17. 
486 Chapter 6 of this thesis.  
487 Declaration on Article 218 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union concerning the 
negotiation and conclusion of international agreements by Member States relating to the area of 
freedom, security and justice. 
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levels of government is achieved.488 Moreover, the procedure laid down in Articles 
218 (2) and (3) TFEU in conjunction with the end of the division between the EC and 
EU will facilitate the negotiations of agreements. This does however not mean that 
competence struggles are completely eradicated. On the one hand, there might still be 
situations where it is not clear whether the EU has a competence to act. On the other 
hand, Article 218 (3) TFEU foresees that the negotiator will be appointed by the 
Council depending on the subject matter. On subject matters with ambiguous 
objectives, turf battles between different actors might still arise. Furthermore, it is not 
clear whether a consistent approach in determining a specific lead negotiator on all 
external AFSJ matters is favourable to maintaining consistency across the different 
AFSJ internal policies.489   
In sum, particularly before Lisbon the AFSJ external dimension was fraught 
with complexities and uncertainties as to whether and how the EU has a competence 
to act and if so in which areas. Post-Lisbon the unification of pillars led to more 
certainty but competence struggles may still occur.  
5.2 The nature and evolution of EU-US relations on privacy and data protection in 
ASFJ  
	  
The purpose of this section is to explain the origins and nature of EU-US relations on 
AFSJ matters. It will be shown that similarly to EU-internal AFSJ, the relationship 
between the EU and the US on AFSJ matters also underwent changes due to the 
transformative nature of the EU institutional framework. It is important to bear in 
mind the overarching dynamics of EU-US AFSJ cooperation when the three case 
studies in the next part of the thesis are presented.  
EU–US cooperation on AFSJ matters started in the 1970s via the informal 
Trevi Group. In 1995 the New Transatlantic Agenda was a further stepping-stone 
regarding this cooperation.490 The agenda was an attempt to strengthen cooperation 
between the EU and US in general. However, one of its goals was to respond to 
global challenges including ‘active, practical cooperation between the U.S’ in the 
‘common battle’ against crime, drug trafficking and terrorism.491 Only since the terror 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
488 Wessel, R., Marin, L. & Matera, C. (2011). The External Dimension of the EU’s Area of Freedom, 
Security and Justice. In: Eckes, C & Konstadinidis, T. (eds.) Crime within the Area of Freedom, 
Security and Justice. Cambridge University Press, p. 298.  
489 Ibid.  
490 New Transatlantic Agenda signed at EU-US summit in Madrid on 3 December 1995. 
491 ibid.   
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attacks of 9/11, did EU-US cooperation on public security become more 
institutionalised492 and start to address privacy and data protection issues.  
5.2.1 Five different cooperation mechanisms 
 
EU-US AFSJ cooperation can be regarded as a “multi-layered and extensive 
framework” 493 containing different safeguard mechanisms for data protection and 
privacy. Within this framework, cooperation can be categorised according to five 
different instruments: (i) traditional agreements, (ii) agreements with AFSJ agencies, 
(iii) ‘executive’ or ‘operational’ agreements, (iv) informal cooperation, and (v) 
framework agreements. 
First, ‘traditional agreements’494 on criminal justice matters are the extradition 
and mutual legal assistance agreements between the US and the EU.495 Both 
agreements are noteworthy as they were among the first major steps in the EU-US 
relationship on AFSJ matters as well as the first international agreements that were 
negotiated under the third pillar.496 The second category of agreements consists of 
agreements with EU agencies that work on AFSJ matters. Worth mentioning is a 
cooperation agreement with Eurojust497 since it aims to facilitate the exchange of data 
between the EU agency Eurojust and US authorities. There are also agreements 
between the US and Europol and Frontex but these treaties only legitimise the 
exchange of strategic and technical information and not personal data.498  
The third category refers to ‘executive’ or ‘operational’ agreements, which are 
“(...) agreements that have been concluded as a response to US unilateral emergency 
security measures adopted post-9/11”.499 This includes the PNR and SWIFT 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
492 As stressed in: Conclusions and Plan of Action of the Extraordinary European Council Meeting on 
21 September 2001, SN 140/01. See: Gilmore, B. (2003). The Twin Towers and the Third Pillar: Some 
Security Agenda Developments. EUI Working Paper LAW No. 2003/7. 
493 Mitsilegas, V. (2014). Transatlantic counterterrorism cooperation and European Values. The elusive 
quest for coherence. In: Curtin, D. & Fahey, E. (eds.). A Transatlantic Community of Law Legal 
Perspectives on the Relationship between the EU and US Legal Orders. Cambridge University Press, 
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494 Mitsilegas, V. (2014), op. cit., p. 291. 
495 Agreement on extradition between the European Union and the United States of America, OJ 2003 
L181, p. 27; Agreement on mutual legal assistance between the European Union and the United States 
of America, OJ 2003 L 181, p. 34. Note that only the latter Agreement includes privacy safeguards. 
496 See: Mitsilegas, V. (2003) The New EU-US Cooperation on Extradition, Mutual Legal Assistance 
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497 Agreement between the United States of America and Eurojust of 6 November 2006.  
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the exchange of personal data shall be considered in future negotiations. 
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Agreements which concern the cooperation regarding aviation security and anti-
terrorist financing. As elaborated further in the case study chapters, both agreements 
establish a tailor-made data protection regime that was amended multiple times since 
the existence of the agreements.500 The fourth category consists of informal 
cooperation mechanisms aiming at the establishment of a forum to discuss practical 
issues related to AFSJ. For instance the ‘Transatlantic Legislators’ Dialogue’ aims to 
facilitate the dialogue between European and American legislators, the EP and the 
American Congress. Furthermore, the so-called ‘EU-US High Level Contact Groups’ 
have been formed as informal transatlantic high-level advisory groups to discuss 
specific issues arising from AFSJ cooperation. Examples are the EU-US High Level 
Contact Group on data protection and data sharing (HLCG) formed in 2006501 and the 
High Level Political Dialogue on Border and Transportation Security.502  
Finally, framework agreements are cooperation mechanisms which attracted 
attention especially in the post-Snowden era by addressing the legal differences 
between the EU and the US regarding the balance between security and fundamental 
rights. These agreements set out general rules for AFSJ cooperation. In this category 
the ‘Agreement on data protection relating to the prevention, investigation, detection, 
and prosecution of criminal offenses’ (Umbrella Agreement)503 is the most relevant. 
The Privacy Shield504 can also be categorised as a cooperation agreement between the 
EU and the US since it establishes common legal grounds to facilitate data flows 
between the EU and the US. While not primarily designed for AFSJ matters, the 
shield is nonetheless relevant for this thesis since parts of it deal with LEA access to 
data held by private companies. Both framework agreements are discussed under 
5.2.3 below since they are of a systemic nature illustrating the transformative nature 
of EU-US relations. Furthermore, they may be relevant for any future EU-US AFSJ 
initiative.    
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
500 See Chapters 5 and 6 of this thesis.  
501 See EU-US Summit, 12 June 2008 - Final Report by EU-US High Level Contact Group on 
information sharing and privacy and personal data protection of 12 June 2008, Council Document 
9831/08. 
502 Further details in: Pawlak, P. (2009b) Network Politics in Transatlantic Homeland Security 
Cooperation, Perspectives on European Politics and Society, vol. 10 (4), pp. 560-581.  
503 Proposal for a Council Decision on the conclusion, on behalf of the European Union, of an 
Agreement between the United States of America and the European Union on the protection of 
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5.2.2 The changing nature of EU-US cooperation: A shift from a US monologue 
towards a EU-US dialogue? 
 
In the period after 9/11 it has often been argued the US was setting the tone of EU-US 
relations whereas the EU had a rather reactionary role.505 However in subsequent 
years, the EU developed incrementally into an equal actor due to mainly three 
aspects: (i) the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty led to more consistency of the EU 
as international actor. Furthermore, the Treaty in conjunction with strategic EU policy 
objectives emphasised the fundamental rights dimension of AFSJ; (ii) the Snowden 
revelations led to an increased opposition of EU actors to unconditionally accepting 
security practices, and (iii) the CJEU started to play a more prominent role in 
stressing compliance with EU fundamental rights standards in international relations.  
 
(i) The role of the Lisbon Treaty 
The PNR and SWIFT Agreements were both examples of an US unilateral policy 
initiative that had extraterritorial effects on the EU.506 Thus, the EU was naturally in a 
reactionary position when the agreements were negotiated. In addition, the pillar 
structure led to confusion on which procedure to apply and the rather insignificant 
role of the EP implied that the participation of a strong fundamental rights advocate to 
the negotiations was missing. As a result the first versions of the PNR and SWIFT 
Agreements constituted the result of negotiations among ‘securocrats’ which was 
reflected in the nature of the agreements.507  
With the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty a “democratisation of foreign 
policy” took place since the EP was granted full co-legislative powers through the 
abolition of former second and third pillars.508 This had two main implications for EU-
US relations. First, it led to more coherence in foreign relations in general since no 
ambiguity on the right legal basis or turf battles between the institutional actors 
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obscured the negotiations.509 Thus, by decreasing the opportunities for power struggles 
between institutional actors the Lisbon Treaty contributed to more coherence and 
actorness of the EU in foreign relations.510 Second, mainly before but also right after 
the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty the EP presented itself as strong defender of 
fundamental rights. Accordingly, the Lisbon Treaty enabled the EP to advocate more 
effectively for the introduction of higher privacy and data protection safeguards in the 
PNR and SWIFT agreements. As will be shown in the case study chapters, there are 
still some concerns with both agreements. Nevertheless, a significant improvement 
has taken place which can be ascribed to post-Lisbon changes to the procedure on 
concluding external agreements. 
 
(ii) The NSA scandal as a turning point 
In 2013 the NSA scandal provided EU actors with a justification for a more 
uncompromising stance in EU-US negotiations. This becomes clear in several policy 
documents adopted in the aftermath of the Snowden revelations. For instance, the EP 
argues that the US adherence to principles of mutual trust and cooperation as well as 
fundamental rights and the rule of law can be doubted after the 2013 revelations.511 As 
a consequence, the EP suggested suspending the SWIFT Agreement.512 The 
Commission also expressed concerns on EU-US AFSJ cooperation but focused on 
elaborating ways to restore trust.513 In this context the Commission stressed the 
importance of the Umbrella Agreement. Negotiations on the Agreement had started 
already in 2010 and were still ongoing in 2013.514 The purpose of the Umbrella 
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Agreement was to enable even closer cooperation regarding the fight against crime 
and terrorism while affording a high level of privacy and data protection to EU and 
US citizens.515 Due to the Snowden revelations arguably more US concessions were 
achieved. For instance, two critical provisions in the negotiations concerned redress 
mechanisms and direct access of LEA to privately held data.516 On judicial redress, the 
EU-US negotiations triggered the adoption of the US Judicial Redress Act.517 In 
regard to LEA access to privately held data, the privacy shield also led to some 
improvements.518      
 
(iii) The role of the CJEU 
Apart from constitutional and political developments the case law of the CJEU also 
contributed to the shifting nature of AFSJ cooperation in mainly two ways: (i) by 
ruling on the legal basis of AFSJ instruments before the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty 
and (ii) by ruling on the legality of AFSJ instruments in light of fundamental rights 
compliance. In regard to the first point, the annulment of the PNR Agreement led to 
the re-negotiation of the agreement. As further elaborated in Chapter 6 the case 
concerned the CJEU’s assessment as to whether the first pillar was the correct legal 
basis for the PNR Agreement. The Court concluded that PNR data transfer to the US 
“(…) constitutes processing operations concerning public security and the activities of 
the State in areas of criminal law”.519 As a consequence the agreement did not fall 
within the scope of the DPD and had to be re-negotiated under third-pillar 
procedures.520 The latter procedures implied a different power constellation among EU 
institutional actors impacting on the nature of the agreement.521 It has often been 
argued that the deliberations in the PNR case contradict the judgment on the legal 
basis of the DRD.522 Thus, the Court did not seem to have a special preference for 
democratic legitimisation of external policies when ruling on the legal basis in the 
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PNR case. 523 By arguing in favour of a third pillar basis it deprived the EP of its co-
legislative power and its own competence to rule on the agreement in the future.524 In 
this way, the case led to a less democratic decision-making process. This approach 
contradicts the CJEU’s recent strong stance on privacy and data protection. The 
reason for the Court’s changed approach in the post-Lisbon context is related to the 
adoption of CFREU providing greater legitimacy to a stricter assessment of 
fundamental rights compliance.525 
The second way in which the Court exercised influence on EU-US relations 
refers to the Court’s analysis of substantial aspects. For example, in DRI it was 
criticised that the DRD does not require data to be stored in the EU with the result that 
it cannot be held that the control -required by Article 8(3) CFREU-  by an 
independent authority of compliance with the requirements of protection and security 
is complied with.526 Given that commercial data exchange at that time was still based 
on Safe Harbour certifying adequate standards, the mistrust of the CJEU towards the 
US was clearly visible and arguably was a result of the Snowden revelations. Apart 
from this, the significance of CJEU case law in shaping EU-US relations reached its 
height with the Schrems case in 2014 where the CJEU annulled the Safe Harbour 
Agreement since it did neither adequately protect individuals’ rights to data protection 
and privacy nor did it provide adequate redress mechanisms.527 The CJEU’s decision 
to invalidate the Safe Harbour Agreement with immediate effect can be criticised 
since not allowing for a transitional period had a negative effect on legal certainty 
although the role of the CJEU is to maintain the legal order.528 However, the fact that 
the CJEU took such drastic action is arguably related to the CJEU’s attempt to set a 
sign for “better law-making.”529 While a replacement for the Safe Harbour Agreement 
has been established in the meantime (EU-US Privacy Shield), the Article 29 WP has 
already criticised its provisions for being insufficient.530   
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In sum, it has been shown the CJEU plays a significant role in shaping AFSJ 
cooperation between the EU and the US.531 While pre-Lisbon its influence was limited 
to determining the legal basis of agreements, post-Lisbon the Court’s rulings on the 
substance have had a direct effect by increasingly postulating EU fundamental rights 
in EU-US relations.    
5.2.3 The Umbrella Agreement and the Privacy Shield: A more EU centric EU-US 
dialogue? 
 
The Privacy Shield and Umbrella Agreement can be regarded as an example of the 
increasing impact of the EU in US-EU relations since both were initiated by the EU. 
In the following it will be assessed in how far these two framework agreements in fact 
reflect EU standards in terms of increased transparency and fundamental rights 
compliance. It is shown that both agreements lead to a more rights-based approach in 
EU-US relation on AFSJ matters supporting the first hypothesis on the transitional 
character of the AFSJ institutional framework. However, there are still some concerns 
in regard to the extent to which those measures will in practice comply with CFREU.  
 
(i) Privacy Shield   
The Privacy Shield was adopted after the Schrems case annulled the Safe Harbour 
Agreement.532 Due to the immediate annulment, EU and US authorities were under 
pressure to swiftly adopt a new agreement which complied with Articles 7, 8 and 47 
CFREU and which assured that US data protection safeguards were essentially 
equivalent533 to EU standards. Against this background, the Privacy Shield is an 
ambitious attempt to establish a more rights based transatlantic data transfer 
framework in respect to data processing for commercial purposes. At the same time 
the Shield also has some implications on data processing for public security purposes.  
 First of all, any measure regulating access to data for public security purposes 
should be based on ‘accessible, foreseeable and precise rules’. In contrast to Safe 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
531 Also in other circumstances CJEU jurisdiction had extraterritorial implications on the US. In Case 
C-131/12 Google Spain SL, Google, Inc. v Agencia Española de Protección de Datos, Mario Costeja 
González of 13th May 2014 the CJEU established the ‘right to be forgotten’ with respect to search 
results of the US-based search engine Google. The judgment sparked wide-ranging discussions on the 
geographical reach of CJEU jurisprudence. See for instance: Van Alsenoy B. and Koekkoek M. (2015) 
Extra-Territorial Reach of the EU's Right to Be Forgotten. ICRI Research Paper 20.  
532 Schrems, para. 107. 
533 Schrems, paras. 73-74.   
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Harbour, the Privacy Shield includes key definitions such as ‘personal data’, 
‘processing’ and ‘controller’ and thus provides more legal certainty and clarity.534 
However, specifically in respect to law enforcement access to data for public security 
purposes the Privacy Shield seems to be less precise. Annex VII lists several 
paragraphs of different measures such as statutes, guidelines and policies all 
providing legitimisation for law enforcement agencies to access data. Furthermore, it 
also lists other laws that are relevant in this context without describing them further. 
The legal basis to any given data request might thus be different depending on the 
“(…) nature of the data sought, the nature of the company, the nature of the legal 
procedures (criminal, administrative, related to other public interest) and the nature of 
the entity requesting access.”535 While fragmentation of laws does not necessarily 
mean that they are not ‘accessible, clear and precise’, the existence of a multitude of 
different laws can lead to ambiguities depending on which law serves as the legal 
basis.  
 Second, safeguards to ‘avoid abuse of power’ need to exist in regard to access, 
oversight of access, remedies, retention period, data security and onward transfer.536 It 
was mentioned in Schrems that any measure needs to include rules limiting the access 
of the public authorities to the data, and its subsequent use.537 While the Safe Harbour 
Agreement did not contain any information on the existence of US rules limiting 
interference538 the Privacy Shield explains the different tools available for law 
enforcement authorities to access data such as Grand Jury or Trial Subpoenas, and 
Administrative Subpoenas.539 On the positive side, most tools described in Annex VII 
require a court decision before data can be accessed. Examples are: court orders for 
Pen Register and Trap and Traces, court orders for surveillance pursuant to the 
Federal Wiretap Law, and search warrants. In other situations an administrative 
subpoena may be sufficient but in those cases there is the possibility for the recipient 
of a subpoena to challenge the latter in Court “by presenting evidence that the agency 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
534 Privacy Shield, op. cit., Annex II, para. 8.  
535 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party Opinion 01/2016 on the EU – U.S. Privacy Shield draft 
adequacy decision of 13 April 2016, p. 53. 
536 Schrems, para. 91; DRI, para. 54; Klass and Others v. Germany, para. 50; Weber and Saravia v. 
Germany, para. 95; Liberty v. UK, para. 62; Zakharov v. Russia, para. 231 and Szabó and Vissy v. 
Hungary, para. 56. 
537 Schrems, para. 93. 
538 Schrems, paras. 87-88.   
539 Privacy Shield, Annex VII. 
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has not acted in accordance with basic standards of reasonableness”.540 These 
safeguards seem to be fairly robust as independent oversight mechanism regulating 
access.541 However, it is unclear whether other laws could also provide a justification 
for access since the Privacy Shield only refers to ‘primary investigative tools’542 
implying that there are also others available not listed in the Shield. Another concern 
refers to the provisions of the US Presidential Policy Directive 28 (PPD-28) quoted in 
the Shield providing that signals intelligence collected in bulk can be used for six 
specific purposes including the detection and countering of certain activities of 
foreign powers and combating transnational criminal threats. Neither the precise 
meaning of ‘signal intelligence’ nor the previously mentioned purposes are clear.543 
Further PPD-28 specifies that bulk collection is temporarily possible if it facilitates 
targeted collection.544 Particularly the latter point leaves room for mass surveillance 
which was the very reason for replacing Safe Harbour with the Privacy Shield.   
Another safeguard against abuse of power is the availability of effective 
remedies when public authorities access data. In the first place, the Privacy Shield 
establishes an Ombudsperson which can be approached by individuals to request 
information of whether data has been used by US state authorities. This is a step 
forward in terms of offering individuals administrative redress, but its effectiveness 
can be doubted. In Annex A point 4 (e) it is stated that the Ombudsperson only reacts 
to requests by mentioning that complaints have been properly investigated and by 
informing the individual whether potential non-compliance has been remedied. Thus, 
individuals will never be informed whether he or she has been subject to surveillance 
and if it was the case which remedial actions have been taken (not even when this 
does not harm the investigation at stake).545 The Privacy Shield also mentions several 
laws that are available to all individuals when seeking judicial redress independent of 
their nationality.546 These are the Administrative Procedure Act, the Freedom of 
Information Act and the Electronic Communications Privacy Act. Furthermore, the 
Judicial Redress Act entered into force in 2015 granting non-US citizens rights to 
judicial redress. These rights are however focused on a limited amount of actions such 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
540 Ibid., Annex VII, p. 103.  
541 Article 29 WP Opinion 01/2016, p. 55. 
542 Privacy Shield, Annex VII, p. 100.  
543 Ibid., Annex VI, p. 80.  
544 US Presidential Policy Directive 28 (PPD-28) of 17 January 2017, sec. 2, fn.5.  
545 Privacy Shield, Annex A, point 4 (3), p. 55. 
546 Ibid., recital 130 to 134.  
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as the right to access and correction of data and the right to obtain civil remedies in 
cases of disclosures of data “intentionally or wilfully made.547 It is also unclear 
whether EU citizens could in fact challenge access under the Fourth Amendment as it 
only applies to US citizens.548 Even if EU citizens could benefit from it, the fact that 
laws apply in the first place to companies holding data, individuals seem not to be in a 
position to challenge access to their data.549 In sum, more laws and mechanisms 
offering remedies are available to individuals than under the Safe Harbour Agreement 
but their effectiveness is questionable. 
 
(ii) Umbrella Agreement 
The purpose of the Umbrella Agreement is to enable even closer cooperation 
regarding the fight against crime and terrorism while affording a high level of privacy 
and data protection to EU and US citizens.550 The ultimate goal is to facilitate the 
adoption of subsequent EU-US Agreements on AFSJ matters. While being of a 
similar nature as the Privacy Shield, the Umbrella Agreement is not an adequacy 
decision but an international agreement that applies when data is processed by or 
among law enforcement authorities.551 In the following an analysis of the Agreement 
is provided.  
First of all, from the EU point of view it is positive that concepts such as 
‘personal information’, ‘processing of personal information’ and ‘competent 
authority’ are defined in a similar way as in the Police and Criminal Justice Data 
Protection Directive.552 This common terminology will facilitate negotiations on any 
future initiative and establish legal certainty. Furthermore, the agreement requires 
both parties to inform each other –if possible in advance- of any measure adopted that 
affects the Agreement.553 This is particularly an improvement considering that for 
instance SWIFT was first executed in secret and PNR was initiated without 
immediately informing the EU in advance. The requirement to keep an open dialogue 
will facilitate negotiations on both sides.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
547 Judicial Redress Act of 2015, H.R. 1428.   
548 Privacy Shield, para. 127.  
549 Ibid.  
550 Article 1 (1), Umbrella Agreement. 
551 Article 5 (3) of the Umbrella Agreement shows that the effect of the Agreement resembles that of an 
adequacy decision.  
552 Article 2, Umbrella Agreement and Article 3 of Directive 2016/680. 
553 Article 24, Umbrella Agreement.  
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Second, in regard to ‘access’ to data, the agreement provides some minimum 
safeguards. Article 6 lays down that the transfer of personal data shall be “(…) for 
specific purposes authorised by the legal basis for the transfer as set forth in Article 
1.”554 Furthermore, any further processing of data shall not be incompatible with the 
purposes for which it was originally transferred. While this limitation is an important 
safeguard the article further stipulates that ‘compatible processing’ includes 
processing according to any international agreement or written international 
framework that is concerned with the prevention, detection, investigation or 
prosecution of serious crime.555 In this way, further processing will not be limited to 
the purpose of a specific agreement but will remain broad. In regard to onward 
transfer the Agreement specifically sets out that the competent authority which 
originally transferred data has to consent to the transfer.556 However, entrusting a 
judicial or independent administrative authority with a review of onward transfer 
would have been a more solid safeguard.      
Third, the Umbrella Agreement mentions that retention periods shall be no 
longer than necessary and appropriate. Furthermore, retention periods shall account 
for “(…) the purposes of the processing, the nature of the data and the authority 
processing it, the impact on relevant rights and interests and other applicable legal 
considerations.”557 Furthermore, retention periods shall be specified in operational 
agreements and periodic review shall be carried out to assess whether the period is 
still appropriate.558 By laying down that retention periods shall depend on several 
criteria and that it should be regularly reviewed, arbitrarily long retention periods 
shall be avoided. It is also positive that retention periods shall not depend on technical 
feasibility of deletion, as is the case under SWIFT. However it is regrettable that it is 
not explicitly specified that retention periods shall take the usefulness of retention in 
light of the objectives pursued into account.559 Instead only the purposes of processing 
shall be accounted for without explicitly referring to the added value of this purpose.  
Fourth, the Agreement mentions that individuals shall have the right to access 
and obtain rectification of their data560 and that individuals of both parties are entitled 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
554 Ibid., Article 6 
555 Ibid., Article 6 (2). 
556 Ibid., Article 7 (1). 
557 Ibid., Article 12 (1). 
558 Ibid., Article 12 (2) and 12 (3). 
559 DRI, para. 63.   
560 Article 16 and 17, Umbrella Agreement.  
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to seek administrative and judicial redress.561 Article 21 lays down that oversight 
authorities shall exercise independent oversight and shall have the right to act upon 
complaints of individuals. It can however be criticised that it is not explicitly 
mentioned that in the US this authority has to be always independent of the authority 
processing the data or of authorities that can benefit from data processing.562 The 
broad formulation of the article might lead to a less effective oversight mechanism.  
 One major concern of the Agreement refers to the scope of redress 
mechanisms. Article 19 (1) of the Umbrella Agreement stipulates that “(…) subject to 
any requirements that administrative redress first be exhausted, any citizen of a Party 
is entitled to seek judicial review (…).”563 To ensure the effectiveness of this 
provision, the Judicial Redress Act was adopted in the US. While the adoption of the 
Redress Act is a noticeable achievement providing more legal certainty for EU 
citizens, a problem is that Article 19 precludes any non-EU citizen from seeking 
redress even though this person might be subject to Union law. The TFEU and 
CFREU stipulate that “Everyone has the right to the protection of personal data 
concerning them”564 implying that both citizens and non-citizens located in the EU 
territory are covered by this provision. The fact that non-EU citizens are not covered 
creates a loophole in legal protection and its legality is questionable in light of 
Schrems where it was held that “legislation not providing any possibility for an 
individual to pursue legal remedies in order to have access to personal data relating to 
him, or to obtain the rectification or erasure of such data, does not respect the essence 
of the fundamental right to effective judicial protection, as enshrined in Article 47 of 
the Charter.”565 
In sum, the Umbrella Agreement provides a solid foundation for any future 
agreements to be concluded between the EU and the US in the public security context. 
While there are still some critical aspects especially in relation to the accessibility of 
redress mechanisms, it is clear that EU fundamental rights standards are increasingly 
playing a role in EU-US relations. This confirms the first hypothesis, namely that 
privacy and data protection are shaped by the transformative character of the AFSJ 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
561 Ibid., Article 18 and 19. 
562 Ibid., Article 21 (3).  
563 Ibid., Article 19 (1). Emphasis added by author. 
564 Article 16 (1) TFEU and Article 8 (1) CFREU. Emphasis added by author. 
565 Schrems, para. 95.  
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institutional framework. This holds true also when considering the external dimension 
of AFSJ in general and the AFSJ cooperation with the US.  
Conclusion 
  
The purpose of this chapter was to examine the institutional framework on privacy 
and data protection in AFSJ from a historical institutionalist perspective. The findings 
confirm Hypothesis 1 stating that ‘the institutional framework of privacy and data 
protection in AFSJ is an institutional framework in transition implying that both 
established as well as new institutional features co-exist and commonly determine 
how data protection and privacy is shaped in relation to public security.’ Turning 
points or so-called ‘critical junctures’ as well as institution-internal uncertainties have 
contributed to the transitional character of the institution while simultaneously path-
dependence has led to the stickiness to former institutional habits. The two key 
‘critical junctures’ are the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty and the adoption of 
the CFREU. However, also the role of events and subtle processes in triggering 
institutional change are relevant. For example, the attacks on 9/11 and the Snowden 
revelations had an underlying impact on determining the paths of EU-US relations. In 
addition, technological change is considered to be an underlying process that led to 
change on constitutional and legislative levels.  
As stated above some features are locked into ‘old paths’ while others are 
moving ‘onto a new path’. On the constitutional level, a major change was the 
introduction of Article 8 CFREU. It was illustrated that by entering into judicial 
dialogue with the ECtHR, the CJEU adheres to the ECtHR conceptualisation of the 
correlation of privacy and data protection and reiterates many safeguards that were 
laid down by the ECtHR when reconciling public security with the right to privacy. 
However, it has been shown that recent CJEU jurisprudence seems to be the new 
trendsetter mainly due to its more efficient modus operandi, more venues for actors to 
file cases and due to EU integrationist tendencies of public security measures.  
On the legislative level, a major change was brought about by the destruction 
of the pillar structure. It has been shown that pre-Lisbon the institutional framework 
for AFSJ was unduly complex and had a convoluted relationship with other areas of 
EU law.566 In this environment data protection and privacy were mainly regulated in a 
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piece-meal fashion where single policies established autonomous data protection 
regimes. Post-Lisbon many regimes regulating privacy and data protection in AFSJ 
are still subject to autonomous rules on data protection and privacy. Nevertheless, 
particularly the GDPR and the Police and Criminal Justice Directive are promising 
tools to eradicate at least some fragmentation by providing a more solid foundation 
for more harmonised solutions.  
On the international legislative level particularly EU-US relations are relevant. 
In terms of institutional change, it has been shown that due to mainly three reasons 
(i.e. (i) more coherence in EU external relations through Lisbon; (ii) the Snowden 
revelations; (iii) and the increasing role of the CJEU) the EU became more 
emancipated in negotiations on data protection and privacy in the AFSJ context 
turning a US monologue incrementally into a dialogue. In terms of path- dependence, 
the two most recent agreements between the EU and the US addressing privacy and 
data protection in AFSJ (the Umbrella Agreement and the Privacy Shield) do still not 
completely live up to the strict EU standards.  
Acknowledging the transitional nature of ‘privacy and data protection in 
AFSJ’ on constitutional and legislative levels is important for the case study chapters. 
On the one hand, this chapter is important to set the strategic behaviours of policy 
actors into the context of the changing institutional framework (Hypothesis 2). On the 
other hand, the chapter also provided an evaluative framework for the legality 
assessment of the DRD, and the PNR and SWIFT Agreements (Hypothesis 3). 
Respectively, the chapter provided an overview of CJEU and ECtHR generated-
principles in relation to data retention and access regimes in the public security 
context. The principles have been structured according to three key criteria: (i) Is the 
measure accessible, foreseeable and does it respect the essence of the rights to privacy 
and data protection?; (ii) Is the measure proportionate in terms of necessity with 
regard to legitimate objectives pursued?; (iii) Is the measure proportionate in terms of 
laying down sufficient safeguards against the abuse of power? This three-step 
framework will be applied in the DRD, the PNR and SWIFT chapters to analyse the 
legality of each regime.  
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PART II – INSTITUTIONAL COMPLEXITY AND THE 
ROLE OF INSTITUTIONAL ACTORS 
 
Part II of the thesis deals with the analysis of three case studies in accordance with the 
theoretical approach developed in Part I. More specifically, all three case studies will 
be analysed in respect to Hypothesis 2 and 3. While a more detailed account of the 
background and nature of the case studies is included in each of the following three 
chapters, this short section aims to define the common ground of and differences 
between the three case studies. In regard to the common features, it has to be noted, 
that:  
• All regimes have been adopted in a similar political environment namely as a 
result of terror events in Europe and the US. The Data Retention Directive has 
been adopted in the aftermath of the London and Madrid bombings, while the 
SWIFT and PNR Agreements were adopted shortly after the 9/11 attacks.  
• All three case studies concern legislative initiatives emerging at a similar point 
in time and the pre- and post-Lisbon institutional framework shape the nature 
of the legislation.  
• In all three regimes data that was originally generated for private sector 
purposes (i.e. airline companies, telecommunication service providers and 
financial messaging service providers) but is used for public security purposes.  
There are also four crucial differences between the three regimes: 
• While the DRD is an EU internal legal instrument, both the SWIFT and PNR 
regimes are international agreements between the EU and the US, which were 
the result of US policy initiatives that had extraterritorial effects on the EU.567  
• While in all three case studies personal data is processed for public security 
purposes the type of processed data differs. Under the DRD, traffic and 
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location data is processed.568 In contrast, the SWIFT Agreement concerns 
personal data generated when bank transfers are made and the PNR 
Agreement concerns personal data generated when individuals engage in air 
travel. While traffic and location data is in any case a special or sensitive 
category of data as stipulated by the e-privacy Directive, in respect to SWIFT 
and PNR sensitive data may form part of the data sets. Each case study chapter 
will provide an explanation as to why and how sensitive data might be 
concerned.  
• All three case studies include provisions on data retention but differences in 
the data processing cycle need to be acknowledged. The DRD requires service 
providers to indiscriminately retain traffic and location data which has been 
collected for billing purposes and for providing the service.569 In contrast, the 
PNR and SWIFT Agreements require the transfer of personal data to US 
authorities while retention is then only regulated after data has been 
transferred. 
• Although the driving force behind all three case studies was terrorism, the 
SWIFT Agreement is the only measure where the purpose relates exclusively 
to “(…) the prevention, detection, investigation or prosecution of terrorism 
and its financing.”570 In contrast, the purpose of the other two measures is 
extended to the fight against other forms of serious crime.   
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On 14 December 2005 the EP adopted Directive 2006/24/EC (hereinafter Data 
Retention Directive or DRD) after the first reading under the co-decision procedure. 
The directive was adopted in the aftermath of the London and Madrid bombings with 
the aim to fight serious crime and terrorism through the retention of communication 
data. The DRD requires telecommunication companies to store traffic and location 
data of fixed, mobile and internet telephony, internet access and email for a period of 
a minimum of six months and a maximum of two years. This means that detailed 
information on passive and active telecommunication users is retained.571 Due to the 
extensive nature of the measure it was suggested that rather than talking about the 
retention of data one should refer to the creation of ‘digital dossiers’ of every 
telecommunications user.572 Apart from storage, the Directive also stipulates that data 
has to be made available to law enforcement agencies if a request has been issued.  
In the years subsequent to its adoption, the Directive has been criticised by 
academics573, politicians574 and civil rights organisations575 due to its disproportionate 
interference with Articles 7 and 8 CFREU and Article 8 ECHR. Furthermore, 
constitutional courts in multiple Member States found that the national laws 
transposing the Directive were unconstitutional.576 On 8th April 2014 the CJEU 
annulled the Directive in its entirety.577 	  The Court claims that the DRD satisfies an 
objective of general interest by pursuing the objective of fighting serious crime and by 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
571 Passive implies that also data of the receiver of the communication is captured.  
572 Solove, D. (2004) The Digital Person: Technology and Privacy in the Information Age. NYU Press 
573 For example: Beyer, P. (2005). Telecommunications Data Retention and Human Rights: The 
Compatibility of Blanket Traffic Data Retention with the ECHR. European Law Journal, vol. 11 (3), 
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Retrieved 09.01.2017 from http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/vorratsdatenspeicherung-eu-
kommission-verklagt-deutschland-a-836221.html. 
575 NGO Letter to the EU Commission rejecting the Directive on mandatory data retention. Signed by 
106 NGOs. Retrieved 09.01.2017 from: http://www.statewatch.org/news/2010/jun/ngo-dataret-
letter.pdf 
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attack on a publishing house in France in January 2015, politicians in Germany started to re-discuss the 
need for data retention. Retrieved 07. 01.2017 from http://www.spiegel.de/netzwelt/netzpolitik/charlie-
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maintaining public security. Nevertheless, it interferes in a particularly serious and 
disproportionate manner with Articles 7 and 8 CFREU and Article 8 ECHR.578  
 The aim of this chapter is to examine how the institutional framework has 
been shaping data protection and privacy in regard to the data retention directive. 
While doing so, it will be assessed whether Hypotheses 2 and 3 are confirmed. In 
terms of structure, this chapter is divided in five main sections: (i) the nature of the 
DRD and the agenda-setting period is analysed; (ii) the chapter analyses how the 
pillar structure – as essential feature of the pre-Lisbon era – shaped the interaction 
between institutional actors (i.e. policy makers and the CJEU); (iii) it will be assessed 
how the decision-making procedure shaped the policy outcome on data retention; (iv) 
the CJEU ruling on the DRD is analysed and its implications on the legality of 
indiscriminate data retention are assessed; (v) ultimately, the chapter assesses whether 
the CJEU’s DRI ruling exhibits features of ‘political actorness’.  
1. Key features of the DRD  
 
While a detailed analysis of the provisions and legality of the DRD is conducted in 
the third part of this chapter, in the following the aim is to illustrate that the DRD is 
formulated in broad terms leading to a lack of legal certainty. First, the aim of the 
DRD is to harmonise national data retention regimes to ensure that the data is 
available for “the investigation, detection and prosecution of serious crime as defined 
by each Member State in its national law”.579 Contrary to this provision, the preamble 
stresses the usefulness of data retention in regard to the “prevention, investigation, 
detection and prosecution of criminal offences.”580 This inconsistency between the 
preamble and main text of the directive leads to uncertainty regarding the Directive’s 
actual scope. Second, the Directive refrains from defining ‘serious crime’ and leaves 
it open to Member States to determine its meaning. This resulted in a considerable 
divergence of scope when the Directive was implemented at national level.581 Third, 
Article 1 (2) of the Directive limits the material scope of the directive to traffic and 
location data while explicitly excluding content data. Nevertheless, the privacy 
implications of processing traffic/location data can be similarly severe as those in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
578 DRI, para. 69.   
579 Article 1(1), DRD. 
580 Recital 7, DRD; emphasis added by author. 
581 During an interview with a Commission official it was mentioned that the Commission was often 
approached by service providers since they were uncertain about the DRD’s scope.  
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relation to content data since both types of data can provide a detailed picture about a 
person.582  
Fourth, Article 4 DRD stipulates that access shall only be granted to 
competent national authorities in specific cases and in accordance with the national 
law. The Member State can thus decide which authority or agency accesses data. 
While this may be necessary given the different legal systems in the Member States, it 
results in different standards in the Member States in terms of frequency of requests, 
use of data and the agency that accesses data.583 For instance, most Member States 
grant the police access to retained data while others grant access rights to secret 
services, the ministry of interior or the courts. In some Member States all of those 
actors can access retained data.584 Depending on the mandate of the national authority 
accessing data, the risk of illegitimate access might be higher in some Member States 
than in others. Article 4 DRD not only leaves discretion in terms of accessing data but 
also in regard to the applicable procedure. Consequently, not all Member States 
oblige the competent authorities to obtain a judicial authorisation to access data.585 
The failure to define what constitutes a competent authority and the failure to lay 
down a uniform procedure when access to data is sought can lead to discrepancies in 
Member States regarding the nature of requirements imposed on service providers. 
This contradicts the very reason of adopting the Directive (i.e. achieving 
harmonisation among Member States in regard to the legal requirements imposed on 
service providers). Fifth, the retention period of all data categories should be between 
six months and two years at the discretion of the Member States without specifying 
that the period shall be based on objective criteria.586 This also creates divergences 
between Member States and can lead to an asymmetric burden on service providers 
throughout the EU.   
The previously mentioned points illustrate that several concepts and aspects 
remain undefined and a wide discretion is granted to Member States despite of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
582 For instance: Constitutional Court of Romania, Decision No. 1258 of 8 October 2009, established 
that retained traffic and location data are interfering with the right to privacy similarly like the content 
of communications.  
583 Article 4, DRD.  
584 Report from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament - Evaluation Report on 
the Data Retention Directive (Directive 2006/24/EC), COM(2011) 225 final, p. 10. 
585 ibid. For example, in Ireland and Slovakia a request in writing is sufficient.  
586 Article 6, DRD. 
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‘creating effect’ of the Directive.587 This has an impact on legal certainty and 
undermines the objective of EU instruments of harmonising diverging provisions. The 
following sections provide an overview on how the Directive emerged and why it 
took its ultimate form. More specifically, it will be shown how the institutional 
framework and the way actors interacted with and through the institutional framework 
shaped privacy and data protection in relation to data retention.  
 
2. The role of the Council, Commission and EP in shaping privacy and data 
protection in the context of data retention 
 
2.1 The Madrid and London terror attacks: A window of opportunity?  
 
It has often been argued that the Madrid and London bombings in 2004 and 2005 
brought about significant changes both in terms of European threat perceptions and 
legislative initiatives.588 In this context, data retention was considered necessary to 
make law enforcement more effective and efficient.589 The DRD has thus been 
labelled “the misshapen child” of the terrorist attacks in Europe.590 While the attacks 
gave impetus to the swift adoption of the DRD, declaring the bombings in 2004 and 
2005 as the sole reason for establishing an EU-wide regulatory framework on data 
retention is misleading. It disregards the fact that data retention has already been 
discussed on the EU level well before 2004 while seizing the opportunity of certain 
events is a tool of policy makers to advocate for their strategic preferences as 
collectively superior outcomes.  
  As early as 1993 “International Law Enforcement and Telecommunications 
Seminars” (ILETS) were held at the FBI academy in the US. The objective was to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
587 The AG in DRI argues that since the Directive has a ‘creating effect’ (i.e. it obliges MS to impose 
requirements on service providers to collect and retain data) to ensure the proper functioning of the 
internal market the Directive also needs to provide specific guarantees accompanying this requirement 
(para. 123).  
588 Maras, M. (2011). While the European Union was Sleeping, the Data Retention Directive Was 
Passed: The Political Consequences of Mandatory Data Retention. Hamburg Review of Social 
Sciences, vol. 6 (1), pp. 1-30. See also: Ruiter, R. & Neuhold, C. (2012). Why is Fast Track the Way to 
Go? Justifications for Early Agreement in the Co-Decision Procedure and Their Effects. European Law 
Journal, vol. 18 (4), pp. 536-554.  
589 European Commission Evaluation Report on the Data Retention Directive, COM(2011) 225 final, 
p.1. 
590 Konstadinides, T. (2014) Mass Surveillance and Data Protection in EU Law: The Data Retention 
Directive Saga. In: Bergström, M. and Jonsson Cornell, A. (eds.) European Police and Criminal Law 
Co-Operation. Hart Publishing, pp. 69 – 84. 
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develop global interception requirements, in form of common “standards for 
telephone-tapping by police and security agencies to be provided in all telephone 
networks.”591 After the first ILETS meeting the EU Council of Justice and Home 
Affairs (JHA) adopted a secret resolution in November 1993592 stipulating that EU 
standards in regard to interception of telecommunications shall be comparable to 
those of the FBI. This was followed by another resolution in January 1995 regulating 
the obligations of telecommunications companies and law enforcement agencies when 
engaging in intercepting activities.593  
In the same context, Directive 97/66 was adopted in 1997 dealing with privacy 
in the telecommunications sector. In 2002, the e-Privacy Directive 2002/58/EC 
repealed and replaced Directive 97/66.594 Article 15 of Directive 2002/58/EC allows 
Member States to adopt legislative measures to restrict the scope of the rights and 
obligations provided for in the Directive if it “constitutes a necessary, appropriate and 
proportionate measure within a democratic society to safeguard national security (i.e. 
state security), defence, public security, and the prevention, investigation, detection 
and prosecution of criminal offences or of unauthorised use of the electronic 
communication system (…).”595Article 15 (1) of the e-privacy Directive has been 
criticised as a ‘legal loophole’ giving Member States a card blanche to adopt possibly 
intrusive legislation.596  
Based on Council discussions in 2001 on the usefulness of communications 
data in the fight against crime and terrorism, the Belgian government issued a 
confidential draft framework decision on approximating data retention 
requirements.597 After the document leaked, media across the EU heavily criticised the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
591 Jones, C & Hayes, B. (2013). The EU Data Retention Directive: a case study on the legitimacy and 
effectiveness of EU counter-terrorism policy. In: SECILE – Securing Europe through Counter-
Terrorism – Impact, Legitimacy & Effectiveness. A Project co-funded by the European Union within 
the 7th Framework Programme – SECURITY theme, p. 6.  
592 Council Justice and Home Affairs on Interception of telecommunications of 16 November 1993, 
Council doc. 10090/93. 
593 Council Resolution of 17 January 1995 on the lawful interception of telecommunications, OJ 1996 
C 329/01  
594 Article 19, e-privacy Directive. 
595 Article 15, e-privacy Directive.   
596 Peter Hustinx (2010) The moment of truth for the Data Retention Directive, Speech of 3 December 
2010, Retrieved 09.01.2017 from http://www.edps.europa.eu.  
597 Justice and Home Affairs Council Conclusions of 20 September 2001, SN 3926/6/01, p. 3; Belgian 
proposal for Third Pillar legislation Draft Framework Decision on the retention of traffic data and on 
access to this data in connection with criminal investigations and prosecutions. Retrieved 09.01.2017 
from: http://www.statewatch.org/news/2002/aug/05datafd.htm  
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secret proposal.598 The incumbent Danish Presidency subsequently stated that the 
secret proposal was only “a request that, within the very near future, binding rules 
should be established on the approximation of Member States’ rules on the obligation 
of telecommunications services providers to keep information (…) in order to ensure 
that such information is available when it is of significance for a criminal 
investigation.”599 The discussions on the confidential draft framework decisions 
abated in the following months and no actions have been taken.  
The discussions reawakened after the Madrid bombings when the European 
Council adopted a Declaration which stressed	  the importance of establishing rules on 
the retention of communications traffic data by service providers. 600 Consequently, 
France, Ireland, Sweden and the UK used the Madrid bombings in conjunction with 
the latter declaration as ‘window of opportunity’ to reawaken the confidential Belgian 
proposal on obligatory data retention. By relying on Article 34 (2) TEU -an 
exceptional rule granting the Council the right of initiative in AFSJ matters-601 they 
submitted a joint proposal for a framework decision on the retention of 
communication data to the EU Commission.602 In response, the Commission 
acknowledged the joint proposal and started a consultation on the matter resulting in a 
proposal for a Directive.603 After a rocky legislative path -which will be explained in 
the next section- the Data Retention Directive was adopted in 2006. 
In sum, data retention has been discussed already before 2004 on national,604 
EU, and international levels. It was even raised before the 9/11 terror attacks, which is 
often considered as turning point of the threat perception of terrorism and impacted 
policy making on a global scale. This suggests that the exceptional situation after the 
Madrid bombings was merely used as a window of opportunity to push through a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
598 Data retention report is wrong, says European Presidency. Retrieved 09.01.2017 from 
http://www.out-law.com/page-2883  
599 Ibid.  
600 European Council Declaration on Combatting Terrorism of 25 March 2004. Retrieved from 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/DECL-25.3.pdf , p. 4. 
601 The Council has only a right of initiative when Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters or Police 
Cooperation is at stake; Article 76 TFEU (ex-Article 34 (2) TEU).  
602 Draft Framework Decision on the retention of data processed and stored in connection with the 
provision of publicly available electronic communications services or data on public communications 
networks for the purpose of prevention, investigation, detection and prosecution of crime and criminal 
offences including terrorism of 28 April 2004, Council nr. 8958/04.  
603 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the retention of data 
processed in connection with the provision of public electronic communication services and amending 
Directive 2002/58/EC, COM(2005) 438 final.  
604 Examples of data retention on national level, see: UK Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000. 
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controversial legislative proposal instead of being the cause for data retention 
discussions.  
 
2.2 Data retention after London and Madrid: Seizing the moment to regulate data 
retention  
 
In accordance to NI, the following subsections illustrate how cross-pillarisation and 
the legislation-making procedure revealed that power aspirations of the EP and the 
Commission were the primary strategic preference while the Council’s preference 
was biased towards high security standards.   
 
2.2.1 Cross-pillarisation and power struggles before the adoption of the DRD 
 
A pre-condition for EU institutional actors to make use of cross-pillarisation is the 
ambiguity of whether a first or third pillar legal basis is more appropriate. Only if a 
topic is pursuing objectives of both pillars the involved actors can advocate for the 
policy solution that is in their favour. In the case of data retention there were clearly 
two important objectives to be satisfied. On the one hand, obligatory data retention 
aims to ensure that law enforcement officials have access to relevant data coherently 
throughout the EU. Particularly due to the considerable growth in the opportunities 
afforded by electronic communications, data retention became an important tool in 
the prevention, investigation, detection and prosecution of criminal offences.605 This 
suggests that the adequate legal basis is to be found in the third pillar. 
On the other hand, data retention also has an internal market dimension. While 
some Member States had data retention laws in place (e.g. Belgium, Denmark, 
Finland) other Member States did not have such laws (e.g. Austria, Germany) and 
others had voluntary regimes in place (e.g. UK).606  Where data retention regimes 
existed in Member States they substantially differed in terms of retention period and 
provisions on access to data.607 Consequently, businesses were faced which different 
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606 Council of the European Union - Answers to questionnaire on traffic data retention, Council Doc. 
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legal requirements when based in more than one Member State or when offering their 
services in more than one country. Therefore, a measure on data retention aims to 
harmonize practices across the EU and to create equal conditions for service providers 
suggesting that an instrument requires a first pillar basis. One has to note, however, 
that the telecommunication sector is not a ‘country of origin’ regime raising concerns 
in regard to the necessity of a measure due to internal market considerations.    
 The Council or more precisely, France, Ireland, Sweden and the UK initiated 
the legislative process by suggesting a framework decision (third pillar instrument) to 
the Commission.608 The obvious reason for the Council’s preference for a third pillar 
instrument is related to the perception that retention of data serves the purpose of 
having data available for the case that law enforcement agencies want to access the 
data. The Council justified this view by reference to the PNR case where the CJEU 
held that data derived from the private sector (i.e. airlines) used for law enforcement 
purposes is a third pillar matter.609 Apart from that, there is also the strategic benefit of 
diminishing the EP’s role in the legislation making process.610 A marginal influence of 
the EP implies faster adoption of the instrument and the mitigation of the risk of 
debates due to the controversial nature of the initiative.      
 The Commission did not agree with regulating data retention through a 
framework decision and issued a formal proposal to regulate data retention via a first 
pillar directive under Article 95 TEC.611 Interestingly the Commission proposal sets 
out that the increasing use of electronic communications networks generates traffic 
and location data that are useful for law enforcement purposes.612 Only towards the 
end does it mention that “[d]ifferences in the legal, regulatory, and technical 
provisions in Member States concerning the retention of traffic data present obstacles 
to the Internal Market for electronic communications as service providers are faced 
with different requirements regarding the types of data to be retained as well as the 
conditions of retention.”613 Furthermore, provisions on data retention of traffic data 
were previously also based on first-pillar instruments in Directives 2002/58/EC and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
608 Draft Framework Decision on the retention of data, Council doc. 8958/04, recital 3.  
609 See section 2.2.2 below.  
610 Article 34, TEU. 
611 Article 95 TEC is post-Lisbon Article 114, TFEU. Proposal for a Directive of the European 
Parliament and of the Council on the retention of data processed in connection with the provision of 
public electronic communication services and amending Directive 2002/58/EC, COM (2005) 438 final.  
612 Ibid., p. 2.   
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95/46/EC. The only reason why data retention was not harmonized in the former 
Directive was due to the fact that no political agreement on the actual length of 
retention was reached. 614 Therefore, any further instrument on retention on traffic data 
must be placed under the first pillar.615 The fact that the Commission mainly focused 
on other first pillar measures to justify the first pillar basis shows that the market 
angle was somehow forced.616 After Lisbon the Commission would most likely have 
chosen Article 83 TFEU in conjunction with Article 16 TFEU as legal basis being 
more in line with the Council’s interpretation.617  
In an attempt to explain why the Commission forced a market angle it was 
claimed that the Commission regarded the more democratic procedures of the first 
pillar as better suited to a topic that interferes with the right to the protection of 
personal data.618 First of all, a first pillar instrument grants the Commission the right 
of initiative and the possibility to conduct later revisions of the law through an 
administrative process (regulatory comitology committee).619 Second, other 
supranational actors such as the EP and the EDPS can exercise formal and informal 
democratic scrutiny. By having a strong stance on data protection and privacy 
safeguards they can add a valuable dimension to debates.620 Additionally, the EP in 
contrast to the Council consults a wide variety of interest groups which contributes to 
a greater extent to democratic participation and transparency.621 Furthermore, a first 
pillar instrument also ensures that Community law relating to data protection applies 
which increases the level of protection when data is processed.622  
Another reason for the Commission’s preference for a first pillar instrument 
relates to the ambition to create room for actorness by raising the profile of the 
Commission in the AFSJ field. Thus, the Commission had obviously a strategic 
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618 Bignami, F. (2006). Protecting Privacy Against the Police in the European Union: The Data 
Retention Directive. GW Law School Law and Legal Theory Paper No. 2013-43., p. 114. This 
justification was also mentioned during an interview with a EU Commission official. 
619 Articles 5 and 6, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the 
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620 De Capitani, E. (2010) The Evolving Role of the European Parliament in AFSJ. In: Monar, J. (ed.). 
The Institutional Dimension of the European Union’s Area of Freedom, Security and Justice. College 
of Europe Studies, Peter Lang, p. 125-126. 
621 Monar, J. (2010a), op. cit. 
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and Council, judgment of the Court of 10 February 2009, para. 55.  
	   132 
interest in pursuing a first pillar basis.623 This not only implies a right of initiative for 
the Commission but also generates further spaces where it can exercise influence. For 
example it allows the Commission: to monitor the evolution of data retention in the 
Member States on a yearly basis624, to evaluate the implementation of the Directive 
and its implications for various actors625, and to consider whether to propose 
amendments to the Directive.626 It is interesting to note the role of the JHA 
Commissioner Vitorino at the time. Vitorino has been labelled a ‘supranational policy 
entrepreneur’ in shaping AFSJ as a whole policy field even though it  traditionally 
lacked the involvement of EU institutional actors.627 For example, it was argued that 
Vitorino contributed greatly to the fact that the Commission was a first mover in the 
field and shaped the debate on anti-terrorism.628 Furthermore, he contributed to the 
shaping of an effective policy preparation, monitoring and implementation structure 
of DG JHA.629 Thus, Vitorino was a strong political figure which helped the 
Commission in developing a full policy–making capacity revealing the power of 
individuals in triggering institutional change.630 Given Vitorino’s strong emphasis on 
raising the profile of the Commission on AFSJ matters increasing the Commission’s 
influence on AFSJ may have also played a role when the Commission contradicted 
the Council by suggesting a first pillar instrument to regulate data retention. 
The Council ultimately gave in on the idea of a framework decision and 
supported the directive.631 The Council’s concession on the choice of the legal basis 
can be explained by the urgency of the matter. By giving up on a third pillar legal 
basis, the Council avoided a considerable delay in adopting the measure as otherwise 
the matter would have most likely ended up at the CJEU at the request of the 
Commission.632 This is an interesting illustration of how the mere threat of 
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challenging a policy proposal in front of the CJEU can steer the strategic behaviour of 
political actors.  
 
2.2.2 Cross-pillarisation and the CJEU rulings on the DRD and PNR 
 
Apart from the fact that the EU institutional actors exploited the pillar ambiguities, 
the CJEU also contributed to the cross-pillarisation of data retention. While in the 
ruling on the EU-US PNR Agreement the Court argued that PNR data transfer for law 
enforcement purposes has to be regulated on a third pillar basis,633 in the substantially 
very similar case Ireland v. Parliament and Council634 the Court ruled that data 
retention for law enforcement purposes has to be based on the first pillar. In this way 
the CJEU not only created confusion but also influenced the playing field and 
strategic preference formation of political actors.   
After the DRD has been adopted, Ireland challenged its first pillar basis. By 
referring to the PNR Agreement case, Ireland argued that the Directive should have 
been adopted on a third pillar legal basis since it regulates data retention for law 
enforcement purposes. The Court rejected the argument brought forward by Ireland 
claiming that the Directive regulates operations “which are independent of the 
implementation of any police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters. It 
harmonises neither the issue of access to data by the competent national law-
enforcement authorities nor that relating to the use and exchange of those data 
between those authorities.”635 Furthermore, “the substantive content of Directive 
2006/24 is directed essentially at the activities of service providers in the relevant 
sector of the internal market, to the exclusion of State activities coming under Title VI 
of the EU Treaty.”636 At first sight, the Court’s interpretation seems to contradict the 
findings of the PNR Agreement case. While both instruments pursue similar 
objectives, in the case of PNR the third pillar was deemed appropriate while in the 
data retention case a first pillar basis was considered to be correct.637 The CJEU 
explains the difference between the two cases by pointing out that the PNR 
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635 Ibid.  
636 Ibid., Para. 84. 
637 According to an interviewed EU Commission Official this ruling surprised many EU political 
actors.  
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Agreement concerned “the transfer of passenger data from the reservation systems of 
air carriers situated in the territory of the Member States to the United States 
Department of Homeland Security, Bureau of Customs and Border Protection 
[CBP]”638 Consequently, since the Decision regulates the data transfer of private 
companies to the public authority (namely CBP), the application of Article 3 (2) of 
Directive 95/46 is triggered stating that in cases related to law enforcement purposes, 
the Directive does not apply. In contrast, the DRD covers activities of service 
providers in the internal market and does not contain any rules governing the 
activities of public authorities.639  While this observation holds true because the DRD 
leaves it to Member States to regulate access to data, the judgment has often been 
criticised because it ignores the fact that the ultimate objective of the DRD is the 
prosecution and detection of serious crime.640 In this way, the judgment allegedly 
lacks consistency compared to the PNR Agreement case.641 Not everyone shares this 
criticism642 illustrating the weak and artificial boundary between the pillars. 
Furthermore, the fact that the Court argued for a first pillar legal basis can also be 
evaluated as a political statement in the sense that a highly debated topic such as data 
retention was regarded as better placed in the first pillar environment where more 
accountability mechanisms existed.643 Ultimately, the Court decision also set the 
course for the landmark ruling in Digital Rights Ireland which would have not been 
possible if DRD was regulated under the third pillar.  
Although DRI dealt with the same Directive as the Ireland v. Parliament and 
Council case, no reference to it is made. In contrast, the AG engages in an intensive 
dialogue with the 2009 case. He argues that the DRD has a dual functionality. It 
primarily harmonises national rules on data retention that already exist in certain 
Member States.644 The AG argues that precisely because of its harmonising function, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
638 Case C-301/06 Ireland v. Parliament and Council, para. 88.  
639 Ibid., para. 91.  
640 In DRI the CJEU criticised that the DRD does not provide any safeguards regarding ‘access’. 
641 Simitis, S. (2009) Der EuGH und die Vorratsdatenspeicherung oder die verfehlte Kehrtwende bei 
der Kompetenzregelung. Neue Juristische Wochenzeitschrift 25, pp. 1782-1786; Hijmans, H. & 
Scirocco, A. (2009) Shortcomings in EU Data Protection in the Third and the Second Pillars. Can the 
Lisbon Treaty be expected to help? Common Market Law Review, vol 46. (5), pp. 1485–1525.  
642 Other academics claim that the interpretation is not inconsistent. See: Böhm, F. (2011), op. cit., p. 
112-113. See also: Peers, S. (2011) Justice and Home Affairs Law. OUP.  
643 As case intervener in Case C-301/06 Ireland v. Parliament and Council, the EDPS argued that in 
case a third pillar instrument was chosen “the provisions of Community Law relating to data protection 
would not protect citizens in cases where the processing of their personal data would facilitate crime 
prevention“ (para. 55).  
644 AG Opinion in DRI, para. 39; emphasis added by author. 
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the CJEU was able to rule in 2009 that Article 95 EC was the correct legal basis for 
data retention. This is because the DRD ensures the proper functioning of the internal 
market by ending divergent development of existing and future rules.645 At the same 
time its secondary function is also to establish a data retention scheme or to make the 
Member State’s system compatible with the DRD.646 In this way the Directive has a 
‘creating effect’.647  
 The AG subsequently pointed out that assessing proportionality in light of 
Article 5(4) TEU is a difficult undertaking since it raises the question of whether 
reference has to be made only to the primary objective (internal market) or also to the 
secondary objective (fighting of crime).648 This is particularly problematic in the 
present case since it can be argued that the DRD is disproportionate when looking at 
its internal market dimension but might be considered proportionate when looking at 
the prevention of crime dimension: In regard to the primary objective the AG held 
that the harmonising effect of the DRD constitutes an appropriate means in 
accordance with Article 5 (4) TEU.649 Nevertheless, the intensity of interference as a 
consequence of the DRD’s creating effect is disproportionate to its primary objective 
of ensuring the functioning of the internal market.650 Consequently, the DRD “(…) 
would fail the proportionality test for the very reason which justifies its legal basis. 
The reason for its legitimacy in terms of its legal basis would, paradoxically, be the 
reason for its illegitimacy in terms of proportionality.”651 When looking at the 
secondary objective it might be possible that the DRD can be considered appropriate, 
necessary and even proportionate in the strict sense.652 However, ultimately the AG 
seems to be reluctant to have a clear stance on whether the secondary ground is 
relevant or not. Consequently, he argues that since proportionality with Article 52 (1) 
CFREU needs to be established it is not necessary to settle on whether the secondary 
objective plays a role or not.653 Although accepting Article 95 EC as legal basis, the 
AG still indicates a feeling of unease when categorising the DRD unconditionally as a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
645 AG Opinion in DRI, para. 42.   
646 Ibid., para. 45; emphasis added by author. 
647 Ibid., para. 47.  
648 Ibid., para. 94. 
649 Ibid., paras. 97 and 98.  
650 Ibid., para. 100. 
651 Ibid., para. 102.  
652 Ibid., para. 104.  
653 Ibid., para. 105.  
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first pillar instrument. Therefore, he discusses more intensively the law enforcement 
dimension of the DRD than did the CJEU.  
 In sum, the CJEU cases discussing the legal basis of the EU-US PNR 
Agreement and the DRD as well as the opinion of the AG in the Digital Rights 
Ireland case illustrate the difficulty to define the boundary between the pre-Lisbon 
pillars as well as the implication of the pillar structure on the legality of a measure. 
Furthermore, the discrepancy between the Ireland v. Commission and Council and the 
PNR Agreement case shows the relevance of the CJEU in the pre-Lisbon era in setting 
the limits for action of policy actors. It has to be noted, though, that legal basis 
controversies can still play a role post-Lisbon .654 While post-Lisbon this does not have 
any relevance for power allocation between legislative actors it has other implications 
such as whether the EU has at all a competence to act or whether opt-outs for certain 
Member States are possible.655  
2.2.3 Legislation-making process after choice of legal basis and power struggles  
 
After having illustrated that the CJEU ruling eradicated any remaining doubts on the 
first pillar legal instruments, the details of the future legislation were discussed under 
the ordinary legislation making procedure under fast track. With the aim of enhancing 
efficiency, Article 251 EC provides the possibility of an early conclusion. While the 
Treaty does not explicitly mention it, there is a certain extent of discretion to EU 
institutional actors in shaping the co-decision procedure. This was made clear in the 
IATA case where the Court ruled that the Treaty confers a wide discretion on the 
Conciliation Committee.656 While the judgment referred to the second reading 
conciliation committee, this discretion can be applies mutatis mutandis to other 
aspects of the procedure. Consequently, the EU institutional actors adopted several 
reports and agreements on the fast-track procedure, which can be regarded as a non-
constitutional extension of Article 251 TEC provisions.657 In NI terms, the fast-track 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
654 For example, also in Opinion 1/15 the AG discusses in-depth the choice of the legal basis since it 
has implications on the participation of some Member States in the measures (paras. 55 to 135). On the 
effects of opt-outs, see: Sion-Tzidkiyahu, M. (2008) Opt-Outs in the Lisbon Treaty: What direction for 
Europe à la Carte. European Journal of Law Reform, vol.10 (4). 
655 Chapter 3, section 3.2 of this thesis. 
656 C-344/04 International Air Transport Association, European Low Fares Airline Association v. 
Department for Transport, judgment of 10.1.2006, para. 57 and 58.  
657 For a list of all other relevant acts in regard to informal rules on the co-decision procedure, see: Co-
decision and Conciliation - A guide to how the European Parliament co-legislates under the ordinary 
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procedure can be considered as an informal process which is embedded in the formal 
institutional framework provided by Article 251 TEC.658 Due to the increased use of 
co-decision after the Amsterdam Treaty, scholars started to analyse the conditions for 
EU institutional actors to engage in informal discussions and the circumstances 
leading to an early agreement.659 In addition to that, it has also been assessed how 
early agreements influence the nature of the law to be adopted.660 A widely used 
example of where an early agreement had an impact on the nature of the law is the 
2008 Returns Directive.661 The Directive has often been criticised for its low standards 
of protection for migrants resulting from the fast-track procedure.662  
 
In the case of the DRD, the fast-track procedure and the newly gained EP powers 
more generally had an effect on the policy outcome by limiting the LIBE 
Committee’s influence. For example, while LIBE was successful in limiting the scope 
to ‘serious crime’663 the term was not defined in accordance with the EAW as 
demanded. LIBE also succeeded in removing ‘prevention’ from the scope of the main 
text of the directive. However, the reference to ‘prevention’ remained in the 
preamble.664 In regard to the types of data to be retained the LIBE Committee intended 
to leave it to the Member States to decide whether unsuccessful call attempts are 
regulated. However, the Council did not give in on this point and thus the directive 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
legislative procedure. Retrieved 09.01.2017 from 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/code/information/guide_en.pdf , p. 36-37. 
658 See: Reh, C. et al. (2011) The Informal Politics of Legislation: Explaining Secluded Decision 
Making in the European Union, Comparative Political Studies, vol. 46 (9), p. 1115. 
659 Rasmussen, A. (2008). Time Choices in bicameral bargaining: Evidence from the Co-Decision 
Legislative Procedure of the European Union. Paper at 4th Pan-European Conference on EU Politics, 
Riga. See also: Reh. C., Héritier, A., Bressanelli, E., & Koop, C. (2005) The Informal Politics of 
Legislation: Explaining Secluded Decision-Making in the European Union. Paper at the APSA Annual 
Convention, 2-5 September, Washington. See also: Héritier, A. and Reh, C. (2009). Co-decision 
transformed: Informal Politics, Power Shifts and Institutional Change in the European Parliament. 
Paper at UACES Conference on Exchanging Ideas on Europe, 3-5 September.  
660 See for instance: Ruiter, R. & Neuhold, C. (2012). Why is Fast Track the Way to Go? Justifications 
for Early Agreement in the Co-decision Procedure and Their Effects. European Law Journal, vol. 18 
(4), pp. 536-554.   
661 Directive 2008/115/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2008 on 
common standards and procedures in Member States for returning illegally staying third-country 
nationals, OJ 2008 L 348.   
662 Monar, J. (2010a) op. cit.; Acosta, D. (2009). The good, the bad and the ugly in EU migration law: 
is the European Parliament becoming bad and ugly? European Journal of Migration and Law, vol. 11, 
pp. 19-39 and Ripoll Servent, A. (2006). Setting priorities: functional and substantive dimensions of 
irregular immigration and data protection under co-decision. Journal of Contemporary European 
Research, vol. 5 (2), pp. 225-242. 
663 Article 1 (1), DRD.  
664 Recital 7, DRD. 
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requires its retention.665 The Council also did not agree with LIBE’s suggestion of 
introducing detailed rules on which authority has the right to access data. This area is 
thus at the discretion of Member States.666 Ultimately, the Council did not 
compromise on the retention period. Against both the LIBE Committee and the 
Commission’s suggestion, the Council doubled the period to two years.667 
Additionally, Article 12 even provides for a longer period if “particular 
circumstances” require it and if the Commission approves it.668 It can thus be argued 
that the LIBE Committee lacked assertiveness on the above-mentioned points.  
One reason for that is the fast-track procedure as it facilitated that the two 
biggest EP parties engaged in informal discussions with the Council by excluding the 
LIBE rapporteur. This is an unusual situation since the rules of the procedure stipulate 
that the rapporteur is the link between the Parliament and the Council. Furthermore, 
the two parties also ignored the substantial and procedural concerns of the rapporteur 
and the LIBE Committee.669 This is also uncommon since usually MEPs rely on the 
rapporteur’s report given his in-depth knowledge of the topic. There are different 
explanations for this untypical behaviour during the fast-track procedure and it can be 
assumed that all played a role to a greater or lesser extent. The first and simplest 
explanation is that the MEPs of the two majority parties agreed with the Council in 
regard to the way it suggested to regulate data retention. This goes hand in hand with 
the interpretation of Claude Moreas who mentioned that MEPs regarded data 
retention as a matter of urgency.670 In subsequent years, the growing use of the fast 
track procedure in AFSJ matters has been interpreted as evidence for the increase of 
common grounds and dialogue between the EU institutional actors.671 While this is 
certainly a possibility it seems to stand in contrast to most other legislative procedures 
where the EP tended to advocate more for civil liberties than the Council.  
A second explanation is related to the EP’s ‘sensitivity to failure’ implying 
that with the newly gained powers the EP felt the responsibility of being a legislator. 
More specifically, MEPs were aware of the negative publicity that the EP might have 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
665 Article 3 (2), DRD. 
666 Article 4, DRD.  
667 Article 6, DRD. 
668 Article 12, DRD. 
669 As pointed out at the beginning of section 2.2.3 above. 
670 Annual Lecture on the 17thJune 2014 of the Centre for Research Into Surveillance and Privacy 
(CRISP) ‘Mass Surveillance, EU Citizens and The State’. Lecture delivered by MEP Claude Moraes at 
London School of Economics & Political Science. 
671 De Capitani, E. (2010), op. cit. 
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experienced if it delayed an important legislation.672 Especially after the bombings in 
Madrid and London several national governments were proponents of data retention. 
Thus, it would be difficult for most MEPs ‘to sell the delay of process at home.’673 For 
example, one MEP expressed his concern that the public expects action to be taken by 
mentioning that “[p]eople are entitled to have results put in front of them without 
delay.”674  
Third, the main parties might have prioritized the EP’s current and future co-
legislative role in AFSJ matters over the substance of the Directive. Institutional 
bargaining consists of nested games where costs and benefits of on-going negotiations 
have to be analysed vis-à-vis long-term negotiations.675 Before 2005, the EP -the LIBE 
committee in particular- had already been engaged in discussions with the 
Commission and the Council on data retention. However, the EP’s efforts did not 
result in a change of the Council’s course.676 However, in 2005 the Commission 
rejected the Council’s plan for a framework decision resulting in the Council’s 
compromise to regulate data retention under the first pillar. This was a major success 
for the EP since it was for the first time a full co-legislator on public security matters. 
In light of this critical achievement the EP feared that if it delayed the process further 
the Council would have recourse to its initial plan and adopt a framework decision on 
data retention. In this way the EP would have lost its newly gained status in AFSJ 
matters by being only consulted during the legislative procedure.677 The pressure the 
EP experienced in this respect is evident in a leaked document from the Presidency to 
the Parliament678 and has been confirmed by involved stakeholders.679     
Besides the fear of being excluded, the EP also considered possible long-term 
consequences resulting from its performance in negotiating the DRD. In order to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
672 Ruiter, R. & Neuhold, C. (2012), op. cit., p. 548. 
673 Ibid.  
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  European Parliament Debate on data retention of 13 December 2005. Retrieved 09.01.2017 from  
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=CRE&reference=20051213&secondRef=ITEM-
055&format=XML&language=EN  
675 Tsebelis, G. (1990). Nested Games: Rational Choice in Comparative Politics. University of 
California Press. 
676 See for instance: Report on the existence of a global system for the interception of private and 
commercial communications (ECHELON interception system), 2001/2098(INI) final. See also: The 
EP’s involvement in respect to Regulation 45/2001. For an analysis of the EP’s role on the two before-
mentioned issues, see: De Capitani, E. (2010), op. cit., p. 129 ff.  
677 Ibid.  
678 Letter from UK Home Secretary Charles Clarke to LIBE Chairman Jean Marie Cavada of 17 
October 2005. Retrieved 09.01.2017 from http://www.statewatch.org/news/2005/oct/data-ret-clarke-to-
cavada-17-10-05.pdf  
679 Interview with EP official. 
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convince the EP to swiftly agree, the presidency promised to reach an agreement on 
data protection in the third pillar which has been a priority for the EP for many 
years.680 The presidency also promised to make use of Article 42 TEU in order to 
extend co-decision in some other AFSJ matters.681 This might have motivated the EP 
to compromise on the content of the Directive in order to not endanger its 
involvement as co-legislator in future AFSJ matters. This shows how fast-track 
negotiations increase the risk of political ‘horse-trading.’682 
2.3 Summary 
 
By applying NI, as set out in chapter 2, it has been shown that privacy and data 
protection in respect to data retention was shaped by the institutional framework of 
privacy and data protection in AFSJ and the way actors exploited and interpreted it. 
First, it has been shown that the Madrid and London bombings were  ‘windows of 
opportunity’ for the Council to suggest an instrument on data retention under its 
exceptional right of initiative. Second, policy-makers made use of cross-pillarisation 
and respective CJEU proceedings to frame data retention in a way that suited strategic 
preferences. Ultimately, the newly gained EP powers and the fast track procedure also 
influenced the way privacy and data protection was shaped in the context of data 
retention. More specifically, the procedure was marked by a security-bias of the 
Council -partially due to the UK presidency- and low level of opposition of the EP.  
3. The role of the CJEU in shaping privacy and data protection in the context of 
data retention  
 
In the years following the adoption of the DRD, its transposition triggered legal 
proceedings in multiple countries:683 Bulgaria (2010)684, Cyprus (2011)685, Czech 
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  De Hert, P., Papakonstantinou, V. & Riehle, C. (2008) Data protection in the third 
pillar: cautious pessimism. In Maik, M. (ed.), Crime, Rights and the EU: The Future of 
Police and Judicial Cooperation, Justice, p. 163. 
681 The surveillance of telecommunications in the EU (from 2004 and ongoing). Retrieved 25.01.2015 
from http://www.statewatch.org/eu-data-retention.htm. 
682 Rapporteur Alvaro feared that the discussions would end up in ‘political horse-trading’. See: 
‘Council pressures Parliament on data retention’ of 10.11.2005. Retrieved 09.01.2017 from 
http://www.euractiv.com/infosociety/council-pressures-parliament-data-retention/article-147671  
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  For an analysis, see for example: Durica, J. (2013) Directive on the Retention of Data on Electronic 
Communication in the Rulings of the Constitutional Courts of EU Member States and Efforts for its 
Renewed Implementation. The Lawyer Quarterly, vol. 3(2); or: Kosta, E. (2013) The Way to 
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684 Decision 8/2014 Bulgarian Constitutional Court Decision of 12 March 2015 
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Republic (2011)686, Germany (2010)687 and Romania (2009)688. All courts found that 
the transposition of the directive was either unconstitutional or overly intrusive.689 In 
April 2014 the CJEU declared in the landmark ruling DRI the invalidity of the DRD 
in its entirety and thereby put the practice of pre-emptive data retention as stipulated 
in the Directive on hold. The case originated from referrals from both the Irish High 
Court and the Austrian Constitutional Court. In the former case, the Irish NGO 
‘Digital Rights Ireland’ and the referring High Court asked several questions 
regarding the compatibility of the DRD with fundamental rights. It also asked whether 
the loyal cooperation principle as laid down in Article 4 (3) TEU requires a national 
court to assess the proportionality of national implementation measures with the 
protection afforded by the Charter.690 
The Austrian case concerned a “class action” brought by 11.231 Austrian 
Citizens and was led by the NGO ‘AK Vorrat’ against parts of the implementing act 
transposing the DRD. The Austrian Constitutional Court referred several questions on 
the proportionality of the DRD to the CJEU.691 The CJEU joined the two references 
for a hearing in July 2013. The ruling was published in April 2014 after Advocate 
General Cruz Villalón delivered his opinion in December 2013. In the following it is 
shown that the CJEU follows the inherency approach when assessing the legality of 
the data retention directive in light of the rights to data protection and privacy. As 
explained in Chapter 3 this approach is consistent with ECtHR and former CJEU case 
law and shows the CJEU’s path-dependence when analysing privacy and data 
protection. After assessing the substance of the ruling in accordance with the 
procedure set out in Chapter 3, its effects will be analysed by arguing that it the 
judgment reveals conditional ‘political actorness’.    
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p. 3.  
690 DRI, paras. 17 -18 (The latter question was ignored by the Court)  
691 Ibid., para. 21.  
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3.1 Digital Rights Ireland and the follow-up case Tele2 Sverige  
	  
In DRI, the CJEU focused on the question as to whether the DRD is valid in light of 
Articles 7 and 8 CFREU. It first considers the relevance of those articles with regard 
to the question of validity of the DRD. The CJEU reasons that Article 8 applies 
because the retention of data constitutes the processing of personal data.692 
Furthermore, Article 7 CFREU is affected because it requires not only the retention of 
data but also the access to this data by competent national authorities.693 Furthermore, 
the type of retained data, namely traffic and location data, allows “very precise 
conclusions to be drawn concerning the private lives of the persons whose data has 
been retained (…).”694 In a second step the Court establishes that the DRD interferes 
in a “particularly serious” way with Articles 7 and 8 CFREU.  
The CJEU states that the interference with Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter is 
justified since it follows an objective, which is of public interest, and since it does not 
interfere with the essence of the rights. However, the DRD cannot be considered to be 
proportionate due to mainly four shortcomings: (i) the purpose and scope of data 
retention is not sufficiently limited; (ii) no objective criterion exists by which to 
determine the limits of access to the retained data;695 (iii) the data retention period is 
not sufficiently limited because no differentiation is made between the different types 
of data and their usefulness. Furthermore, the choice of the retention period does not 
need to be based on objective criteria to ensure that it is strictly necessary;696 and (iv) 
no stringent rules exist on data security.697 Therefore, the CJEU concludes that the 
directive does not lay down clear and precise rules governing the extent of the 
interference with the fundamental rights. Thus, the “EU legislature has exceeded the 
limits imposed by compliance with the principle of proportionality in the light of 
Articles 7, 8 and 52 (1) of the Charter.”698 There have been debates on the 
implications of this judgement on the legality of data retention in general. On the one 
hand the Court criticised severely the indiscriminate character of the DRD hinting at 
the illegal nature of data retention without the existence of a reasonable suspicion. On 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
692 Para. 29. See also: Joined cases C-92/09 and C-93/09 Volker and Markus Schecke GbR and Hartmut 
Eifert v. Land Hessen, judgment of 9 November 2010, para. 47.   
693 DRI, para. 35.  
694 Ibid., para. 27.  
695 Ibid., para. 60.  
696 Ibid., para. 63-64.  
697 Ibid., paras 66 and 68. 
698 Ibid., para. 69. 
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the other hand, the Court mentioned several safeguards which the DRD did not 
include indicating that indiscriminate data retention can be proportionate if it includes 
those safeguards.699 
 
Not surprisingly, the uncertainty led to follow-up referrals. In December 2016 the 
CJEU published its decision in Tele2 Sverige which is a joined case resulting from 
referrals from the Swedish and UK appeal courts. The judgement deals with the 
question as to whether national legislation on access to data falls under the remit of 
Article 15 (1) of the e-privacy Directive and whether general data retention can be at 
all considered proportionate even if it includes all relevant safeguards as stipulated in 
DRI. In a first step the CJEU establishes that any national legislation stipulating the 
retention of data for public security purposes falls within the remit of Article 15 (1) of 
the e-privacy Directive.700 In addition, access to retained data also falls under Article 
15 (1) as it is the ultimate purpose of retention and thus the two aspects are 
intrinsically linked.701 The Court then interprets Article 15 (1) in light of Articles 7, 8, 
11 and 52 (1) of the Charter. After stipulating that the latter has to be interpreted 
strictly,702 the CJEU points out that retention is indiscriminate by not differentiating 
data with regard to a particular time period, geographical area or link to a serious 
crime.703 This indiscriminate nature has a particularly negative impact on privacy and 
leads to a feeling of constant surveillance.704 The Court does however not specifically 
mention that preventive data retention is per se illegal. Instead if the measure is 
exclusively aimed for the purpose of fighting serious crime and is sufficiently targeted 
it can still be regarded as legal.705 In regard to the latter aspect, two things are pointed 
out.  
First, the CJEU mentions that procedural conditions must be in place to limit 
the measure. This means that clear and precise rules must exist governing the 
circumstances and conditions of retention, access and remedies.706 These safeguards 
are closely aligned to the ones laid down in DRI, Schrems and ECtHR case law: (i) 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
699 See AG Opinion on Tele2 Sverige, para. 199.  
700 Tele2 Sverige, para. 73. 
701 Ibid., para. 79. 
702 Ibid., paras. 89 and 95. 
703 Ibid., para. 106.  
704 Ibid., para. 99 – 100. 
705 Ibid., para. 108. 
706 Ibid., para. 109, see also paras. 19 to 23.    
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the purpose and scope of data retention must be sufficiently limited;707 (ii) access to 
retained data must be subject to prior review by a court or an independent authority;708 
(iii) individuals shall be notified if data has been accessed as long as it does not put 
the investigation at risk;709 (iv) the measure must lay down specific rules on data 
security;710 (v) review by an independent authority of compliance with the level of 
protection guaranteed shall exist.711  
Second, substantive conditions must be in place meaning that there must be a 
connection between the data to be retained and the objective of fighting serious 
crime.712 While this statement implies that indiscriminate data retention is illegal, the 
Court subsequently specifies that the link has to be ‘at least an indirect one’.713 In 
practice for instance this could imply using a ‘geographical criterion’ where the 
competent national authorities consider one or more geographical areas where a high 
risk of preparation or commission of such offences could be possible. Another 
criterion could be to just focus on a particular type of communication service in case 
that evidence exists that the focus on this type of communication is more 
effective/efficient in detecting, preventing, or investigating serious criminal offences.  
Since these are just two examples and the fact that ‘an indirect link’ is eligible, the 
judgement leaves the precise limits of what counts as ‘indiscriminate’ still open and 
thus some forms of indiscriminate retention might still be legitimate.   
 
3.2 Assessing the CJEU’s approach to privacy and data protection in the context of 
data retention  
 
3.2.1 Interference with Articles 7 and 8 CFREU 
 
As a first step the CJEU focused on assessing whether the retention of traffic and 
location data as required by the DRD is an interference with Articles 7 and 8 of the 
Charter. In respect to privacy the Court reasons that “the retention of data for the 
purpose of possible access to them by the competent national authorities, as provided 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
707 Ibid., para. 119. 
708 Ibid., para. 120.  
709 Ibid., para. 121.  
710 Ibid., para. 122. 
711 Ibid., para. 123. 
712 Ibid., para. 110. 
713 Ibid., para.111. 
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for by Directive 2006/24, directly and specifically affects private life and, 
consequently the rights guaranteed by Article 7 of the Charter.” 714 Subsequently the 
Court mentions three reasons as to why privacy is not only relevant but also interfered 
with. 
First, the DRD “(…) derogates from the system of protection of the right to 
privacy established by Directives 95/46 and 2002/58 with regard to the processing of 
personal data in the electronic communications sector, directives which provided for 
the confidentiality of communications and of traffic data as well as the obligation to 
erase or make those data anonymous where they are no longer needed (…).”715 By 
framing both Directives as system of protection of the right to privacy the Court 
neglects that only Directive 2002/58 is aimed at safeguarding privacy through 
guaranteeing confidentiality of communication (independent on whether 
communication includes personal data or not).716 In contrast, Directive 95/46 is mainly 
concerned with laying down data protection principles while privacy is just one of its 
final objectives.717 For example, the CJEU stressed that data subject rights’ to erasure 
or anonymisation when data is no longer needed is a central aspect of privacy. 
However, it is rather a fair processing principle which is safeguarded under Article 8 
(2) CFREU and implemented by the DPD.718  
Second, the CJEU mentions that since interference with privacy does not 
presuppose the information to be sensitive or inconvenience the individuals,719 the 
mere obligation to retain for a certain period of time data relating to a person’s private 
life constitutes an interference with Article 7.720 The principle that interference shall 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
714 DRI, para. 29. See also: C-92/09 and C-93/09 Volker and Markus Schecke and Eifert, para. 47.   
715 DRI, para. 32; emphasis added by author.  
716 Note that in recital 3 Directive 2002/58/EC mentions generically that the Directive aims to protect 
the confidentiality of communication and in recital 12 it is mentioned that “[b]y supplementing 
Directive 95/46/EC, this Directive is aimed at protecting the fundamental rights of natural persons and 
particularly their right to privacy (…)”. Note that this is made even clearer in the current proposal to 
reform the e-privacy Directive where recitals 1 and 2 exclusively focus on the right to privacy and 
confidentiality of communication. (See: Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of 
the Council concerning the respect for private life and the protection of personal data in electronic 
communications and repealing Directive 2002/58/EC (Regulation on Privacy and Electronic 
Communications), COM(2017) 10 final.) 
717 Note that this becomes clear in the GDPR which never refers to the right to privacy. Instead 
references are exclusively made to data protection. In the DPD references are also made to privacy but 
as explained in Chapter 3 this relates to the fact that no legal basis to data protection existed at the time 
when the DPD was adopted.  
718 While only rectification is specifically mentioned in Article 8 (2) CFREU anonymisation or erasure 
can also be considered as fair processing principle.  
719 DRI, para. 33. 
720 para. 34. 
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not be measured by assessing ‘inconvenience to the data subject’ or ‘sensitivity of 
data’ stems from the Amann v. Switzerland and was subsequently re-stated in the 
CJEU ruling Österreichischer Rundfunk. Presumably, this principle has been adopted 
because it can only be “speculated” as to whether an individual has been or could 
have been inconvenienced.721 Thus, it is not a reliable parameter to determine 
interference. The reason why retention as such already constitutes an interference 
with privacy is related to the risk of abuse of the data, the feeling of surveillance it 
generates and the chilling effect it might have on the individual.722   
Ultimately, Article 7 CFREU is interfered with because the DRD stipulates that 
access of the competent national authorities to the data has to be granted. Thus, as 
soon as the public authorities have access to data, ‘a further interference’ takes 
place.723 The fact that the CJEU notes two ‘different’ interferences shows that 
retention and access are to be considered separately when establishing an interference 
and thus logically also when assessing proportionality. In Tele2 Sverige the CJEU 
clarified that although retention and access are to be treated differently in terms of 
establishing interference this does not mean that ‘access’ (unlike retention) falls 
beyond the scope of EU law. The CJEU held that the scope of the e-privacy Directive 
covers retention and access since the purpose of any retention measure is to make, if 
required, data accessible to competent national authorities. 724  
In respect to Article 8 CFREU, the CJEU mentions that “(…) such retention of 
data also falls under Article 8 of the Charter because it constitutes the processing of 
personal data within the meaning of that article and, therefore, necessarily has to 
satisfy the data protection requirements arising from that article (…)”.725 The Court 
further reasons that the DRD “(…) constitutes an interference with the fundamental 
right to the protection of personal data guaranteed by Article 8 of the Charter because 
it provides for the processing of personal data.”726 Interestingly, when assessing the 
relevance of Article 8 CFREU for the case at hand, the Court specifically points out 
the retention of data without mentioning the access granted to authorities by the DRD. 
When discussing interference, the court only generically mentions the processing of 
data. Thus, the importance of data protection in determining the legality of access is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
721 Amann v. Switzerland, para. 70.   
722 DRI, para. 28. 
723 DRI, para. 35. 
724 Tele2 Sverige, para. 79 and 80.  
725 DRI, para. 29.  
726 Ibid., para. 36. 
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not sufficiently acknowledged even though later in the judgment references to data 
protection principles are made when analysing “access”. For example, it was stated 
that no independent oversight mechanism exists to assess whether access to data shall 
be granted.727 
By merging Articles 7 and 8 CFREU the Court argues that the interference 
with both articles is wide-ranging and particularly serious.728 This is because no real 
storage requirements are laid down apart from the requirement that data shall be 
stored in such a way that it can be transmitted to the authorities without undue 
delay.729 This seems however mainly an Article 8 CFREU requirement as it refers to 
data storage which is an aspect of data security. Furthermore, the CJEU argues that 
Articles 7 and 8 CFREU are both interfered with because retention and subsequent 
use without the subscriber or registered user being informed is likely to “(…) generate 
in the minds of the persons concerned the feeling that their private lives are subject to 
constant surveillance.”730 Here it is unknown whether the Court refers to individuals 
being informed ex-ante about the indiscriminate retention of data for public security 
purposes or ex-post if the data of a specific individual has been accessed for public 
security purposes. The former can be ruled out as users of electronic communication 
services were informed about the legal requirement to retention when concluding the 
contract with their service providers.731 Thus, it is more likely that the court refers to 
ex-post notification in case the data of individuals has been accessed by law 
enforcement authorities. Since data protection law does not lay down an ex-post 
notification requirement this is exclusively a privacy argument (as established with 
Article 8 ECHR case law)732 questioning the Court’s approach to group this under 
both Articles 7 and 8 CFREU instead of only the former. The way the CJEU shapes 
the correlation of privacy and data protection when analysing the interference of both 
rights is not always consistent making it unclear how privacy and data protection shall 
be assessed in the proportionality assessment. As mentioned in Chapter 3, the CJEU’s 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
727 Ibid., para. 62. 
728 Ibid., para. 37. 
729 AG Opinion on DRI, para. 77.  
730 DRI, para. 37.  
731 While it can be argued that users are not informed due to own negligence when reading contracts 
with online service providers, in this thesis the view is taken that if the user is informed about certain 
aspects related to their contract in a transparent manner the “informed-requirement” is met.    
732 For instance in Ekimdzhiev v. Bulgaria the ECtHR ruled that individuals need to be notified when 
they have been subject to surveillance. However, in Klass and Others v. Germany the ECtHR 
mentioned that ex-post notification is not always possible and can be legitimately limited (para. 58).  
	   148 
adoption of the inherency approach shows the CJEU’s path dependence to early 
ECtHR case law. 
3.2.2 Justification of interference with Articles 7 and 8 CFREU 
 
The CJEU establishes that the interference was justified by bringing forward four 
major arguments: (i) electronic communications are a valuable tool in the prevention 
of offences and the fight against crime; (ii) the DRD pursues the legitimate goals of 
harmonising Member State practices and fighting serious crime; (iii) the essence of 
Article 8 is not interfered with; (iv) the essence of Article 7 is not interfered with.  
 To start with the first two more general points, the court stresses that fighting 
terrorism and serious crime have been acknowledged as being a matter of general 
interest since it is a matter of public security.733 The Court further underpins the 
importance of public security by stressing that the right to security is laid down in 
Article 6 CFREU.734 In addition, the Court mentions that “(…) because of the 
significant growth in the possibilities afforded by electronic communications (…) 
data relating to the use of electronic communications are particularly important and 
therefore a valuable tool in the prevention of offences and the fight against crime, in 
particular organised crime.”735 This statement is relatively weak as it emphasises the 
growth in possibilities of electronic communication in justifying its use for crime 
prevention. Instead the Court should have emphasised the advantages criminals can 
make of the growing possibilities offered by electronic communications. In a second 
step the CJEU should then have also discussed the effectiveness of using electronic 
communication in investigating crime. Another critical point is that the Court stresses 
the advantages of electronic communication for “preventing” crime. Nevertheless, it 
has to be acknowledged that prevention is only once mentioned in the preamble and is 
not listed as an objective of data retention under Article 1 DRD.  
 Turning to the third point the Court argues that the essence of Article 8 
CFREU is not interfered with. More specifically the Court mentions that the essence 
is not infringed since Article 7 DRD provides that “(…) certain principles of data 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
733 DRI, para. 42. See also: C-145/09 Tsakouridis, paras. 46 and 47.  
734 DRI, para. 42. While acknowledging Article 6 CFREU as stand-alone article when assessing the 
justification for interference, the proportionality assessment itself considers security as an exception to 
privacy/data protection rather than a sui generis fundamental right in accordance to the framework 
established in Chapter 3.  
735 DRI, para. 43. 
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protection and data security must be respected by providers of publicly available 
electronic communications services or of public communication networks.”736 Thus, 
Member States are required to ensure that appropriate technical and organisational 
measures are adopted against accidental or unlawful destruction, accidental loss or 
alteration of the data.737 By specifically pointing out Article 7 of the DRD the CJEU 
reduces data protection merely to data security. This is striking particularly since 
Article 8 CFREU does not explicitly mention data security as a core of data 
protection. Taking Article 8 CFREU as the benchmark, one would at least need to 
acknowledge fair processing principles, certain data subject rights (i.e. right to access 
and right to rectification) and independent supervision as parameters to assess 
whether the core of data protection has been interfered with.  
 Ultimately, the Court claims that although the DRD constitutes a “particularly 
serious interference” it does not adversely affect the essence of Article 7 CFREU 
since the Directive does not allow the acquisition of knowledge of the content of the 
electronic communication as such.738 This argument raises interesting questions on 
whether the clear-cut categorisation of information in ‘content’ and ‘non-content data’ 
makes sense in the contemporary context. It has been pointed out that since traffic and 
location data can reveal very specific information about the circumstances of a 
communication, it is possible to create very precise dossiers of individuals including 
an overview of their movements, their social environment and their habits and 
interests (via IP addresses).739 Directive 2002/58/EC acknowledges the special status 
of traffic740 and location741 data by laying down specific safeguards. The CJEU does 
not sufficiently elaborate on this special status and that traffic and location data can 
reveal similar information about individuals as content data.742 This approach is even 
more surprising since it seems to contradict the earlier finding of the Court where it 
mentioned that traffic and location data allows for very precise conclusions 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
736 Para. 40. 
737 ibid. 
738 Ibid., Para. 39; emphasis added by author.   
739 See for instance: Rauhofer, J. (2006) Just because you’re paranoid, doesn’t mean they’re not after 
you: Legislative developments in relation to the mandatory retention of communications data in the 
European Union. SCRIPT-ED, vol. 3 (4). 
740 Articles 6 (1) and 5, e-privacy Directive.  
741 Article 9, e-privacy Directive. 
742 Report of the United Nation High Commissioner for Human Rights on the right to privacy in the 
digital age of 30 June 2014, A/HRC/27/37, para. 19. See also: Report of Special Rapporteur (United 
Nations, General Assembly) on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms while countering terrorism of 23 September 2014, A/69/397, para. 53.  
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concerning the private lives of the persons whose data has been retained to be 
drawn.743 One interpretation of this paradox is linked to the CJEU’s ambitions to 
assess also the substance of the DRD. If the Court had found an interference with the 
essence of Article 7 due to the special nature of traffic and location data, no 
proportionality assessment of the DRD would have been necessary depriving the 
CJEU of an opportunity to establish substantive principles in relation to 
indiscriminate data retention practices.744 It furthermore shows that the Court does not 
consider data retention for public security purposes as illegal per se.   
 
3.2.3 Proportionality in light of Articles 7 and 8 CFREU 
 
Before engaging in the discussion on the safeguards against abuse of power, the Court 
first establishes the appropriateness and necessity of the measure. In regard to the 
former, the CJEU argues that since the importance of electronic communication 
increased, the DRD allows law enforcement authorities additional opportunities ‘to 
shed light on serious crime’ and it is therefore a valuable tool for criminal 
investigations.745 Consequently, the CJEU concludes that retention of traffic and 
location data may be considered to be appropriate for attaining the objective pursued 
by that directive.746 When looking at the statistics (although incomplete and 
inconsistent) on the use of data retention presented by the Commission in October 
2013 it becomes clear that law enforcement authorities indeed made use of the data 
retained under the DRD for the purposes of prosecuting crime.747 However, the 
statistics do not reveal whether the data was ultimately useful to convict suspected 
criminals.  
In respect to necessity, the CJEU argues that ensuring public security by 
fighting terrorism and serious crime may depend on modern investigation 
techniques.748 However, regardless of the extent of the usefulness of modern 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
743 DRI, para. 27. The CJEU mentions that conclusions can be drawn in regard to: habits of everyday 
life, permanent or temporary places of residence, daily or other movements, the activities carried out, 
the social relationships and social environments.  
744 Interview with EU Commission official. 
745 DRI, para. 49. 
746 ibid.  
747 Statistics on Requests for data under the Data Retention Directive. Retrieved 12.01.2016 from 
http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/police-cooperation/data-
retention/docs/statistics_on_requests_for_data_under_the_data_retention_directive_en.pdf   
748 DRI, para. 51. 
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investigation techniques in safeguarding public security, the latter is not sufficient to 
justify the measures under the DRD.749 Instead the CJEU establishes that the respect 
for private life requires that derogations and limitations to data protection must apply 
only in so far as strictly necessary.750 Subsequently the CJEU pointed out that the 
protection of personal data, especially as enshrined in Article 8 (1) CFREU, is 
especially important for safeguarding the right to respect private life.751 In this way the 
Court applies the inherency approach and reduces the compliance with privacy to the 
existence of adequate data protection principles. When looking at whether sufficient 
safeguards against abuse of power exist in three out of four arguments the Court does 
not differentiate between privacy and data protection and simply refers to “the 
fundamental rights” or to Articles 7 and 8 commonly.752  
 
(i) Scope of application  
The Court stresses that the requirement on service providers to retain location, traffic 
and subscriber data applies to all means of electronic communication and thus entails 
an interference with ‘practically the entire European population.’753 Furthermore, this 
retention takes place in a generalised manner without any differentiation, limitations 
or exceptions754 and without it being necessary that a link between the data and public 
security exists.755 While this indiscriminate nature obviously infringes the data 
protection principle of non-excessiveness756 it is not immediately clear why the mere 
application of data retention to the whole European society leads to the infringement 
of the ‘inner circle’757 of an individual’s private life. Therefore, a second step would 
have been necessary to this train of thought explaining the de facto implications of 
large-scale retention of traffic and location data on the privacy of each individual and 
the implications for the society as a whole. Since traffic and location data can reveal a 
detailed picture of an individuals habits and activities and since data is retained of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
749 Note that Member States have constantly failed to provide comprehensive evidence on the 
usefulness of data retention although this is required under Article 10 of the DRD. Nevertheless, it 
seems that the CJEU’s deliberations would not have been different if more information on the DRD’s 
usefulness would have been provided.  
750 DRI, para. 52; emphasis added by author 
751 Ibid., para. 53.  
752 Ibid., paras. 56 and 65. 
753 Ibid., para. 56.  
754 Ibid., para. 57. 
755 Ibid., paras. 58 -59. 
756 As stipulated in Article 6 1 (c) DPD and protected by Article 8 (2) CFREU.  
757 Term used in: Friedl v. Austria, Application no. 15225/89, judgment of 31 January 1995; paras. 49-
52. 
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each individual independently of whether a link or suspicion of a link to crime exists 
this could awaken the data subject’s fear that their data can be accessed maliciously, 
erroneously or because of a wrong suspicion at any time. Especially because no ex-
post notification of whether data has been accessed is provided, data subjects have to 
live with the constant suspicion/fear of their movements, social environment or habits 
being monitored. While arguably ex-post notification cannot always be provided in 
the public security context, a measure of such far-reaching scope as the DRD ought to 
include this safeguard in order to allow individuals to exercise their right to a legal 
remedy as stipulated in Article 22 of the DPD.758 Ex-post notification is also necessary 
to prevent a chilling effect on an individual’s willingness to express him/herself. 
Without ex-post notification it is within the bounds of possibility that data subjects 
will adapt their behaviours to the likelihood of being watched instead of acting freely 
without any form of interference. ‘Adapting behaviours’ could include refraining 
from searching specific information on the Internet, modifying their interaction with 
other persons in electronic communication and ultimately it could also have a chilling 
effect on how they express themselves. All of the previously mentioned aspect could 
have a negative impact on the identity, personal development and the right to 
establish and develop relationships with other human beings and the outside world.759  
This is even more relevant in a globalised world where electronic communication has 
become the main source of most individual’s interaction with the outside world. 
Consequently, generating in the minds of people the feeling of constantly being 
watched has a negative impact on an individual’s self-development and as such has a 
negative impact on a democratic society as a whole. As such, indiscriminate data 
retention can have a considerable effect on the right to privacy itself and resulting 
aspects such as freedom of expression and the development of ones personality. 
 The CJEU refrains from explaining the above-mentioned de facto implications 
of data retention on individuals weakening the argument. Furthermore, the CJEU 
indirectly provides some suggestions on how data retention could have been 
proportionate (i.e. if data pertained to a particular time period, geographic zone, or a 
person involved in one way or another in serious crime).760 Some points of this list 
seem to not definitely preclude indiscriminate retention. For example, it is not clear 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
758 Tele2 Sverige, para. 121.  
759 As protected by the right to private life. See: P.G. and J.H. v. the United Kingdom, para. 56 (with 
further references).  
760 DRI, para. 59. 
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what “data pertained to a particular time period” means. Would for instance data 
retention be proportionate if an EU government declares a state of emergency?761 In 
this case the retention would still be on a large scale and indiscriminate. Another 
example refers to the argument of a particular geographic zone. Would data retention 
be proportionate if in a particular city all data is retained because the presence of a 
terrorist suspect is assumed?762 In this case still a vast amount of data needs to be 
retained and the retention would be indiscriminate in the sense that not only the 
suspects of crime are concerned. By not having explicitly mentioned that data 
retention is only possible when data subjects are suspected of a serious crime, the 
CJEU leaves the door open for indiscriminate retention if sufficient data protection 
safeguards exist. It is thus clear that the CJEU does not engage in a discussion of the 
core of privacy which arises from the indiscriminate nature of data retention. Instead 
it discusses the indiscriminate nature mainly through a data protection paradigm by 
suggesting safeguard mechanisms that do not completely rule out indiscriminate 
retention. This approach seems to be confirmed by the Tele2 Sverige case.763   
 
(ii) Data retention period 
Article 6 of the DPD stipulates that personal data shall be retained in a way permitting 
identification of data subjects for a period that is necessary for the purposes for which 
the data were collected or for which they are further processed.764 The DRD translates 
this provision by merely stating that the retention period should be between six 
months and two years.765 The CJEU condemns the fact that this range does not 
distinguish between the usefulness of the different data sets or the usefulness of the 
data relating to specific persons. Furthermore, the DRD does not state that the period 
must be based on objective criteria to ensure that retention is limited to what is strictly 
necessary.766 This indicates that a nuanced retention regime would have been 
acceptable even if the maximum retention period of some data categories was still two 
years. One example for a more nuanced regime is to lay down a shorter retention 
period for traffic and location data than for data necessary to trace and identify the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
761 For instance, after the Paris attacks in 2015 France and Belgium declared a state of emergency.  
762 For instance, after the Paris attacks one of the suspects was presumed to be hiding in Brussels.  
763 See section 3.1 of this Chapter.  
764 Article 6 (1e), DPD. 
765 Article 6, DRD. 
766 DRI, paras. 63 and 64.  
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source and destination of a communication.767 Stricter requirements could have, 
however, been spelt out when looking at the retention period through the lens of 
privacy as was done by the AG. He argues that the retention period induces temporal 
continuity to the DRD and plays a decisive role in classifying the interference with 
the right to privacy as serious.768 He argues that a human existence is the convergence 
of present time and ‘historical time’.769 While admitting that a degree of subjectivity 
applies he argues that all electronic activity and electronic communications that go 
beyond one year can be regarded as ‘historical time’ while everything up to one year 
can be considered as ‘present time’.770 Particularly since the DRD also lays down a 
system of extending the ordinary retention period in particular circumstances,771 the 
AG is not convinced that an initial period of two years (i.e. retention of present and 
historical data) is proportionate.772 The AG’s line of argument is less vague than the 
CJEU’s ruling as it categorically rejects any retention period longer than one year. At 
the same time this approach is however arbitrary since ‘historical’ and ‘present’ time 
could vary greatly depending on the lifestyle of individuals concerned. Furthermore, it 
is one-dimensional since it does not consider the requirements of law enforcement 
authorities. For instance, from the perspective of conducting a criminal investigation, 
this period might be either too short or too long.  
 
(iii) Safeguards on accessing data    
The CJEU ruled that the DRD fails to lay down any objective criteria by which to 
specify access to the retained data.773 The Directive’s only requirement is that access 
is limited to the purpose of the “investigation, detection and prosecution of serious 
crime” as defined by Member States.774 The Court regards this limitation as 
insufficient and names three substantive and procedural criteria regulating access and 
subsequent use. First, the Court criticises the fact that the directive leaves a margin to 
Member States to define the authorities/persons accessing data. The Court states that 
the DRD “does not lay down any objective criterion by which the number of persons 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
767 For example the Council of Europe Cybercrime Convention makes a distinction between subscriber 
data (Article 18) and traffic data (Article 20). 
768 AG Opinion on DRI, para. 142.  
769 Ibid.,, para. 146.  
770 Ibid.,, para. 148.  
771 Article 12 (2), DRD. 
772 AG Opinion on DRI, para. 151.  
773 DRI, para. 60.  
774 Ibid., para. 60. (See Article 1 (1) DRD) 
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authorised to access and subsequently use the data retained is limited to what is 
strictly necessary in the light of the objective pursued.”775 This wording is quite vague 
as limiting the amount of persons just provides limitation in quantitative terms instead 
of limiting access to a particular agency. Second, the CJEU criticises the fact that 
Article 4 DRD does not expressly provide that access and the subsequent use of data 
must be strictly limited to the purpose of “(…) preventing and detecting precisely 
defined serious offences or of conducting criminal prosecutions relating thereto 
(…)”.776 Third, the CJEU criticises that the directive does not define the procedures to 
be followed in order to gain access to the retained data. In this respect, the DRD 
should have included a provision regulating that access by the competent national 
authorities to the data retained is made dependent on a prior review carried out by a 
court or by an independent administrative body.777 Respectively, supervisory bodies 
must be able to examine with complete independence whether data processing 
complies with the requirements of privacy and data protection.778  
 
(iv) Data security 
While being the only point in the proportionality test where the court exclusively 
refers to only one fundamental right (namely Article 8 CFREU) the CJEU criticises 
the lack of data security standards in the Directive. In this regard the CJEU mentions 
that the DRD fails to specify that data security needs to take the vast quantity, 
sensitive nature and the risk of unlawful access to that data into account.779 While the 
previously mentioned considerations seem to be valid, the CJEU also criticised that 
since there is not a particularly high level of protection and security required by 
service providers, they can take economic considerations into account when 
determining the level of security. This argument can however be criticized since 
economic considerations are acknowledged to be important under EU law since it is a 
matter of general interest.780  
In addition to the above-mentioned point the CJEU also criticises the fact that 
the Directive does not require that data needs to be stored in the EU. Consequently, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
775 Ibid., para. 62; emphasis added by author.  
776 Ibid., para. 61. It has to be noted that the CJEU refers to prevention although this is not explicitly 
mentioned as objective in Article 1 DRD.  
777 Ibid., para. 62.  
778 Ibid., para. 62. See also: Tele2 Sverige, para. 120 and Szabó and Vissy v. Hungary, para. 77 and 80.    
779 DRI, para. 66. 
780 As explained in Chapter 3 (section 3.1.3) of this thesis.  
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data security principles cannot be controlled.781 While this criticism seems to have 
been inspired by the political environment during which the judgement was issued 
(i.e. shortly after the Snowden revelations) it has significant implications for 
electronic communications, which had previously taken place in a largely borderless 
environment. The introduction of territorial boundaries to the flow and storage of data 
has also been reiterated in Tele2 Sverige. It was there determined that national data 
retention regimes shall ensure that data is stored within the respective national 
territory.782  
  
3.2.4 Summary  
 
The aim of Section 3 was to critically assess the CJEU Decision in Digital Rights 
Ireland and Tele2 Sverige. It has been demonstrated that the CJEU sticks to the 
interpretation of the ECtHR by correlating privacy and data protection according to 
the inherency approach. In this way the CJEU acts in a path-dependent manner in 
accordance with HI as established in Chapters 2 and 3. Particularly in the 
proportionality assessment the failure to clearly differentiate the two rights leads to 
confusion in assessing whether large-scale data retention is per se incompatible with 
CFREU or whether the DRD merely did not include sufficient data protection 
safeguards. The lack of clarity is also reflected among commentators and policy-
makers. While some academics claim that the judgment marks the end of 
indiscriminate and large-scale data retention, the Commission and Council seem to 
follow a different approach.783 The judgment in Tele2 Sverige still does not provide a 
definite answer as to whether and in which form indiscriminate data retention is 
legitimate. However, at the same time it does further elaborate on safeguards and 
controversial issues raised by the DRI judgment. This includes for example the 
clarification that indiscriminate traffic and location data retention cannot be regulated 
on national level as it falls under EU law, the reiteration of the territoriality-
requirement of storage and the introduction of notification as a safeguard against 
abuse of power.784  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
781 Ibid., DRI, para. 68. 
782 Tele2 Sverige, para. 122.  
783 As pointed out in an interview with an EU Commission official. 
784 See: Tele2 Sverige, paras. 121- 122. 
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3.3 Digital Rights Ireland as an example of ‘political actorness’ of the CJEU? 
 
The ruling has often been described as a milestone judgment both by the press and 
scholars.785 The CJEU ‘dared’ to issue a decision with far reaching consequences 
because it felt empowered by the recent adoption of the CFREU.786 At the same time 
the CJEU’s decision to annul the DRD was also driven by jurisprudence of national 
constitutional courts holding that the implementing laws of the DRD were unlawful.787 
In addition, the Snowden revelations led to increasing suspicion against measures 
facilitating mass surveillance.788 In this way, DRI can be regarded as a response to 
multiple dynamics including constitutional developments, national jurisprudence as 
well as the practical implications of data retention and access legislation.789 These 
factors certainly provided the CJEU with a justification to deliver such a ground-
breaking judgement which had considerable implications for current and future 
political landscapes.   
First of all, to a certain extent the CJEU judgement contributes to European 
integration in regard to public security. The CJEU argued that that the DRD was 
disproportionate mainly because of four different reasons: (i) the purpose and scope 
of data retention is not sufficiently limited; (ii) the Directive fails to lay down any 
objective criterion by which to determine the limits of access to the retained data; (iii) 
the data retention period is not sufficiently limited because no differentiation is made 
between the different types of data and their usefulness; and (iv) the Directive does 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
785 See for example: ‘Surveillance judgment is a victory for democracy’ Retrieved 28.01.2017 from: 
http://www.independent.ie/opinion/analysis/surveillance-judgment-is-a-victory-for-democracy-
30172786.html or: Granger, M. & Irion, K. (2014) The Court of Justice and the Data Retention 
Directive in Digital Rights Ireland: telling off the EU legislator and teaching a lesson in privacy and 
data protection. European Law Review, vol. 39 (4), pp. 835-850. 
786 Interview with EDPS official.  
787 It is worth noting that the CJEU followed the German Constitutional Court’s deliberations 
concerning the “feeling of surveillance“ generated by the data retention regime. See: BVerfG, 125 
BVerfGE 261 and DRI, para. 37).   
788 See for example: European Parliament Resolution of 12 March 2014 on the US NSA surveillance 
programme, surveillance bodies in various Member States and their impact on EU citizens’ 
fundamental rights and on transatlantic cooperation in Justice and Home Affairs, P7_TA(2014)0230.   
789 Fabbrini discusses this in terms of vertical dialogue (i.e. when the CJEU reacts directly and 
indirectly to national court judgments) and horizontal dialogue (i.e. when the CJEU takes political 
considerations into account). Fabbrini, F. (2015) The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and the Rights 
to Data Privacy: The EU Court of Justice as a Human Rights Court, iCourts Working Paper Series, no. 
15, p. 19. 
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not lay down specific rules on data security.790 Thus, any future initiatives of data 
retention will need to be negotiated on the EU level. This is because the same reasons 
justifying the adoption of the DRD still apply, namely safeguarding the functioning of 
the internal market and ending/preventing divergent rules across Member States. All 
four points stressed by the Court show that if a Directive similar to the DRD would be 
considered, its provisions need to be sufficiently clear and precise. This creates a 
dilemma since Member States mostly have an interest in minimising EU integration 
in fields such as activities related to public security. By laying down conditions for a 
potential future law, the CJEU does not only indicate ‘political actorness’ but the 
judgment might result in a more integrationist approach of future policy initiatives.791    
Second, the referrals of Austrian and Irish Court in Digital Rights Ireland can 
be regarded as providing a window of opportunity for the CJEU to increasingly shape 
public security matters and its appropriate balance with privacy and data protection. 
By putting an end to the DRD the Court did not only rule out one type of 
indiscriminate data retention (i.e. traffic and location data). Instead the ruling created 
uncertainty regarding the legitimacy of several other data retention regimes. It has to 
be noted that jurisprudence is in general indeterminate due to the “(…) tension 
between the abstract nature of the social norm on the one hand, and the concrete 
nature of human experience on the other. Any particular social situation is in a 
meaningful sense unique, whereas norms are specified in light of an existing or 
evolving typology of fact contexts (…).”792 Nonetheless, it cannot be denied that there 
are relevant parallels between the DRD and other regimes such as the PNR and 
SWIFT Agreements.793 This obviously led to discussions at the policy-making level of 
the applicability of the findings in DRI to those regimes. As a consequence the CJEU 
was soon faced with a request for an Opinion on whether the EU-Canada PNR 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
790 DRI, paras 66 and 68. 
791 While the DRI ruling does not discuss competency issues, the AG Opinion on DRI reveals a clearer 
bias towards further EU integration. In para. 120 the AG criticises that “access to data” is exclusively a 
Member State competence. Respectively the AG argues that in order to not render the provisions of 
Article 51 (1) CFREU meaningless the Union must “(...) assume its share of responsibility by defining 
at the very last the principles which govern the definition, establishment, application and review of 
observance of those guarantees [i.e. guarantees to justify the interference with Articles 7 and 8 
CFREU]”   
792 Sweet Stone, A. (2002) Path Dependence, Precedent, and Judicial Power. In: Stone Sweet, A. & 
Shapiro, M. (eds.). On Law, Politics, & Judicialization, Oxford University Press, p. 122.  
793 As shown in the subsequent two chapters of this thesis.  
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Agreement is proportionate in light of DRI.794 Furthermore, other related requests 
followed such as questions on the general compatibility of data retention for law 
enforcement with Articles 7 and 8 CFREU. The Swedish Communication Service 
Provider Tele2 Sverige stopped retaining and providing access to law enforcement 
authorities after DRI resulting in court proceedings and the referral to the CJEU. 
Furthermore, the decision of two UK parliament members to challenge the UK 
legislation DRIPA (Data Retention and Investigatory Powers Act) was founded on 
findings in DRI.795 The case can thus be evaluated as having a spill over effect by 
triggering further cases dealing with similar initiatives. Interestingly, the CJEU’s 
ruling in Tele2 Sverige still leaves the question of whether indiscriminate data 
retention is lawful partially unanswered. This hints at the CJEU’s dilemma of, on the 
one hand, doing justice to its own interpretation of the protection of privacy and, on 
the other hand, leaving some leeway to policy makers to draft legislation.   
Third, ‘political actorness’ does not only derive from the fact that the DRI 
judgement triggers cases on similar initiatives. Instead the Court’s ruling provides a 
strategic tool for EU legislative actors to steer policy-making debates according to 
their strategic preferences. For example in an interview with a Commission official it 
has been argued that although the Commission is of the view that Digital Rights 
Ireland does not rule out data retention for law enforcement purposes currently no 
follow-up instrument is proposed due to the concerns that the Parliament might 
challenge any new measure.796 In addition to that during negotiations of the recently 
adopted PNR Directive, the EP frequently referred to Digital Rights Ireland findings 
to support its arguments.797 Thus, the Court does not only on a case-by-case basis 
shape privacy and data protection in regard to public security. Instead the CJEU’s 
reasoning has been instrumentalised by legislative actors such as the EP and thus 
steers political debates. 
Conclusion  
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
794 Opinion 1/15 Request for an Opinion submitted by the European Parliament on the Draft Agreement 
between Canada and the European Union on the Transfer and Processing of Passenger Name Record 
data 
795 Both requests were combined (i.e. Tele2 Sverige judgment). 
796 Interview with EU Commission official.  
797 Second Report on the proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the 
use of Passenger Name Record data for the prevention, detection, investigation and prosecution of 
terrorist offences and serious crime; COM(2011)0032.  
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The aim of this chapter was to assess how the EU institutional framework shapes data 
protection and privacy in respect to the DRD. The chapter confirms both Hypothesis 2 
and 3 as presented in Chapter 2 of this thesis. To start with, three arguments have 
been put forward supporting the second hypothesis: “The EU institutional framework 
enables EU legislative actors to pursue strategic preferences in the legislation-
making process and thereby influences the way privacy and data protection is shaped 
in the public security context.” First, it has been illustrated that data retention 
inititatives were already discussed in the 1990s. However, terror events in conjunction 
with AFSJ-related institutional particularities functioned as a ‘window of opportunity’ 
legitimizing data retention initiatives. Second, it has been shown how the pillar 
structure encouraged policy-making actors to exploit cross-pillarisation to increase 
their influence in the legislation-making procedure. Third, it has been shown that 
granting the EP co-legislative rights led to lower data protection safeguards than 
initially expected. 
 Apart from confirming the second hypothesis, two arguments have been put 
forward to support Hypothesis 3: “The transitional nature of the EU institutional 
framework contributed to the CJEU’s evolution from a ‘legal basis arbiter’ to a 
political actor in its own right that increasingly determines substantial aspects 
relating to privacy and data protection in the public security context.” First, the pre-
Lisbon pillar structure led to an important role of the CJEU as arbiter on legal pillar 
struggles and has thus become an important strategic tool used by policy actors. 
Second, it has also been shown that post-Lisbon the CJEU shaped privacy and data 
protection by ruling on the substance rather than the legal basis of the DRD. It has 
been demonstrated that the CJEU applies the inherency approach when discussing 
data protection and privacy in the data retention context. Thus, the Court’s reasoning 
is path dependent to previous CJEU as well as ECtHR case law. This approach left 
room for interpretation in regard to the question whether pre-emptive data retention 
for public security could exist in other forms or whether the judgment ruled out 
similar practices. At the same time, it has been shown that the CJEU’s DRI ruling can 
be interpreted as example of ‘political actorness’ as it may trigger EU integration; has 
a spill-over effect on similar data retention and access regimes and is used by 
legislative actors as strategic tool in other legislative debates.
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CHAPTER 5 – THE SWIFT AGREEMENT: FROM A SECRET US 




In 1973, 239 banks from 15 different countries created the Society for Worldwide 
Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT). It is a member-owned cooperative, 
with the goal of enabling standardized and automated execution of financial 
transactions. The idea behind SWIFT is to substitute the telex798 with a more reliable 
and secure way of sending financial instructions between financial institutions. In 
practice, when a person instructs a financial institution to send money to a recipient of 
choice, SWIFT transfers this message. However, not the money but only the 
instruction is sent through SWIFT.799 To illustrate how SWIFT operates, the Belgian 
Data Privacy Commission exemplified its services with envelopes and letters.800 The 
envelope contains the customer’s information, information of the sending institution, 
the bank’s identifier code, the time and date of the scheduled transfer and information 
about the other financial institution involved in the transaction. The ‘letter’ is a 
codified message containing the amount that is transferred, the identity of the parties, 
the methods of transfer and again the participating financial institutions. The 
information from both ‘envelope’ and ‘letter’ is stored for 124 days on servers in the 
EU and on servers in the US.801  
Nowadays, almost all financial organisations use SWIFT services giving it a 
systemic character802 and making it an indispensible tool for banks and the operation 
of the worldwide financial system as a whole.803 After 9/11, SWIFT’s wealth of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
798 Telex is a network similar to a telephone network serving the purpose of sending text-based 
messages. 
799 Shea, C. (2008). A Need for Swift Change: The Struggles between the European Union’s Desire for 
Privacy in International Financial Transactions and the United States’ Need for Security from 
Terrorists as evidenced by the SWIFT Scandal. Journal of High Technology Law, vol. 8 (1), pp. 143-
168. 
800 Belgian Data Protection Authority Opinion on the transfer of personal data by the CSLR SWIFT by 
virtue of UST (OFAC) subpoenas. Opinion No. 37 / 2006 of 27 September 2006, p. 27. 
801 Ibid. The rationale of storing the information in both locations is to avoid data loss. See also: 
Information Note: EU-US agreement on the processing and transfer of financial messaging data for 
purposes of the US Terrorist Finance Tracking Programme (TFTP) of November 2009. Retrieved 
10.01.2017 from: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/jha/111559.pdf 
802 Connorton, P. (2007). Tracking Terrorist Finance through SWIFT: When U.S. Subpoenas and 
Foreign Privacy Law Collide. Fordham Law Review, vol. 76 (1), p. 288. 
803 Amicelle, A. (2011) The Great (Data) Bank Robbery: Terrorist Finance Tracking Program and the 
“SWIFT Affair”, Research Questions No. 36, May 2011, Centre d’études et de recherches 
internationales, SciencePo, p. 6. 
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personal information relating to financial transactions was discovered as useful tool 
for safeguarding public security. Newly introduced US laws required SWIFT to 
provide personal data to the CIA if administrative subpoenas were issued. While 
SWIFT had its headquarters in the EU it retains most of its data in the US. Thus, 
SWIFT was in the midst of contradictory requirements. 804  On the one hand it needed 
to comply with the obligations generated by the administrative subpoenas805 issued by 
US authorities. On the other hand it was obliged to comply with the rights to privacy 
and data protection in the EU. While SWIFT data was provided secretly to US 
authorities before 2006, an Agreement between the EU and US was negotiated in 
2009 on an interim basis. In 2010, the European Parliament rejected the Agreement 
thus requiring new negotiations. This led to a new Agreement adopted in July 2010. 
The aim of this chapter is to analyse how the EU institutional framework 
shaped data protection and privacy in relation to the SWIFT Agreement. In line with 
Hypothesis 2 it is argued that the institutional framework allowed legislators to pursue 
strategic preferences which in turn influenced how privacy and data protection was 
shaped. It is further claimed that Hypothesis 3 is partially confirmed since the second 
SWIFT Agreement does not meet the standards of applicable jurisprudence. However, 
the likelihood of ‘political actorness’ of the CJEU is limited due to institutional 
constraints.  
The chapter is structured according to four parts. First, the origins of TFTP 
and the SWIFT Agreement are explained. Second, three arguments are presented in 
respect to strategic preference formation of the EP, the Commission and the Council. 
Third, the provisions of the SWIFT Agreement will be assessed by applying the 
framework established in Chapter 3. The aim is to analyse whether and how CJEU 
jurisprudence is applicable to the SWIFT Agreement. Ultimately, it will be explained 
that timing is critical in determining ‘political actorness’ and that the chances of 
CJEU actorness are low.   
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
804 Pfisterer, V. (2010). The Second SWIFT Agreement between the European Union and the United 
States of America – An Overview. German Law Journal, vol. 11, pp.1173-1190. 
805 Amicelle, A. (2011), op. cit., p. 4: “An administrative subpoena is an order from a government 
official to a third party, instructing the recipient to produce certain information. Because the subpoena 
is issued directly by an agency official, it can be issued as quickly as the development of an 
investigation requires.”  
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1. The emergence of TFTP in the US and EU reactions  
 
The terrorist network behind the attacks on 9/11 relied on the global banking system 
to finance the execution of the attacks. All hijackers transferred large sums among 
various accounts in different countries without raising suspicion.806 Therefore, post-
9/11, two crucial laws were adopted to tackle terrorist financing in a direct and 
efficient manner.807 First, the ‘Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing 
Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism’ (PATRIOT) Act 
extended the competences of law enforcement authorities to tackle terrorist financing 
resulting in some extraterritorial powers of those authorities.808 Second, the Executive 
Order 13224 was adopted pursuing the objective of interrupting the financial flows 
from and to Al Qaeda.809 Executive Order 13224 served as legal basis for the Terrorist 
Finance Tracking Program (TFTP), which was executed by the CIA.810 The creation 
of TFTP was inspired by a discussion between a senior official of the Bush-
administration and a Wall Street executive.811 During the conversation the wealth of 
financial data contained in the SWIFT database was discussed. Once introduced, 
TFTP made use of administrative subpoenas when requesting information from 
SWIFT.812 The difference between an administrative and judicial subpoena is that the 
former does not depend on prior judicial authorization. Instead it only has to pass a 
reasonableness standard test instead of the typical probable-cause test required for 
criminal subpoenas.813 According to the judgment in United States v. Powell, 
administrative subpoenas are legal if they fulfil a four- part test814 and correspond to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
806 A Nation Challenged: Money Trail, U.S. makes Inroads in Isolating Funds of Terror Groups. 
Retrieved 10.01.2017 from http://www.nytimes.com/2001/11/05/world/nation-challenged-money-trail-
us-makes-inroads-isolating-funds-terror-groups.html  
807 Contributions by the Department of the Treasury to the financial war on terrorism, U.S. Department 
of Treasury, Fact Sheet 2 (2002). Retrieved 10.01.2017 from https://www.treasury.gov/press-
center/press-releases/Documents/2002910184556291211.pdf  
808 PATRIOT ACT: Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001), codified in 50 U.S.C. para. 1861 
809 Executive Order 13,224, 66 Fed. Reg. 49,079. 
810 Shea, C. (2008), op. cit., p. 151. 
811 Bank Data Sifted in Secret by U.S. to Block Terror, published in New York Times 23 June 2006. 
812 Santolli, J. (2008). Note: The Terrorism Financing Tracking Program: Illuminating the 
Shortcomings of The European Union’s Antiquated Data Privacy Directive. The George Washington 
International Law Review, vol. 40, pp. 553-582.  
813 For a more detailed explanation, see: Scherb, K. (1996). Administrative Subpoenas for Private 
Financial Records: What Protection for Privacy Does the Fourth Amendment Afford? Wis. L. Rev, vol. 
1075, pp. 1076-85.  
814 The four conditions that need to be fulfilled are: (i) the evidence is competent and relevant for the 
investigation, (ii) the demand for information is definite, (iii) the purpose of the investigation is 
authorized by law, (iv) proper administrative steps are followed in issuing the subpoena. 
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the purpose of the investigation.815 Since the TFTP was based on Executive Order 
13224 the justification for issuing administrative subpoenas to SWIFT of countering 
terrorism would most likely contribute to a positive test by courts in the US. 
However, none of the subpoenas has been challenged before a court. 
In October 2001, the Treasury Department issued the first administrative 
subpoena to SWIFT followed by 63 more in the following five years.816 In order to 
access the information a multi-step process takes place. First, the subpoenas were 
always issued when data has been previously sent from EU servers to US servers in 
order to ensure that the requested data was available and to avoid the applicability of 
EU data protection laws.817 Second, the information that was provided by SWIFT in 
the US was then placed in a “black box”. In order to access the information inside the 
black box the Treasury department made use of a special software. The software 
enabled the search of SWIFT data on suspicious transactions or on suspected 
individuals. This search did not take place in real time since a lag exists between 
requesting the information via a subpoena and the transfer of the information.818  In 
accordance with the overall aim of TFTP, the goal of the subpoenas was the 
investigation of terrorism. However, the definition of terrorism is very broad since 
according to US law it includes activities which “involve a violent or dangerous act 
that threatens human life, property or infrastructure; and has the goal of intimidating 
or threatening the civilian population; influencing the actions of government through 
mass destruction, kidnapping, intimidation or hostage taking.”819 The administrative 
subpoenas by the Treasury Department did not specify any individual or particular 
transaction that the State deemed to be connected to terrorism making it almost 
impossible to apply effective oversight mechanisms.820 As a consequence in 2003 
SWIFT expressed for the first time a reluctance to continue to react to Treasury 
requests.821  
The Treasury Department reacted to SWIFT’s concerns by stressing that it 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
815 United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48, 57-58 (1964). 
816 Statement released on the SWIFT legal document centre for compliance matters, retrieved 
01.10.2017 from www.swift.com.  
817 Santolli, J. (2008), op. cit.  
818 Ibid. 
819 Executive Order 13,224, 66 Fed. Reg. 49,079, Sec. 3.  
820 Prime Minister Condemns SWIFT Data Transfers to U.S. as “Illegal”, of June 2006. Retrieved 
from: http://www.privacyinternational.org/article.shtml.cmd[347]x-347-543789.  
821 Bank Data Sifted in Secret by U.S. to Block Terror, published in New York Times 23 June 2006. 
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will not monitor routine financial transactions such as using an ATM or debit card.822 
Nevertheless, these transactions do not make use of the SWIFT network and thus the 
Treasury could not get hold of this information in this manner anyways.823  The 
Treasury also attempted to provide more detailed justifications in the administrative 
subpoenas. Nevertheless they still left a large margin of appreciation. For instance, a 
request was regarded as sufficiently justified if the suspected individual is placed on a 
terrorist watch list without further investigation.824 Consequently, the newly 
introduced safeguard mechanisms can be regarded as relatively weak.  
Before 2006, the US obtained bank data from SWIFT without the knowledge 
of the EU. However, in June 2006, the newspaper The New York Times disclosed the 
existence of the secret TFTP.825 In the EU the revelations concerning TFTP led to 
sharp criticism. For instance, the Belgium data protection Commission,826 the EU 
Article 29 Working Party827 and the EP828 expressed concerns about TFTP’s violations 
of national and EU data protection legislation. Nevertheless, the EU Council was not 
reluctant to initiate negotiations with US authorities since it also benefited from the 
TFTP’s investigation results.829 Consequently, in 2009 the first SWIFT Agreement 
was concluded, followed by the second Agreement in 2010. 	  
2. Shaping privacy and data protection at the legislative level 
 
In accordance with NI, this section focuses on the dynamics between the policy-
makers in the process of negotiating the SWIFT Agreement. Three different 
institutional aspects can be observed. First of all, the role of the ECB and its 
relationship with other EU level policy actors will be explained. The latter is an 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
822 Testimony of Stuart Levey, Under Secretary Terrorism and Financial Intelligence U.S. Department 
of the Treasury Before the House Financial Services Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, 
Retrieved 10.01.2017 from: Legal Document centre for Compliance matters, www.swift.com.   
823 Ibid. 
824 Santolli, J. (2008), op. cit. 
825 Bank Data Sifted in Secret by U.S. to Block Terror, published in New York Times 23 June 2006. 
826Belgian Data Protection Authority Opinion on the transfer of personal data by the CSLR SWIFT by 
virtue of UST (OFAC) subpoenas. Opinion No. 37 / 2006 of 27 September 2006, retrieved 10.01.2017 
from http://www.privacycommission.be/communiquE9s/opinion_37-2006.pdf.   
827 Article 29 WP Press Release on the SWIFT Case following the adoption of the Article 29 Working 
Party opinion on the processing of personal data by the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial 
Telecommunication (SWIFT) of 23 November 2006. Retrieved 10.01.2017 from: 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/article-29/press-material/press-
release/art29_press_material/2006/pr_swift_affair_23_11_06_en.pdf  
828 European Parliament Resolution on SWIFT, the PNR Agreement and the transatlantic dialogue on 
these issues of 14 February 2007, B6-0042/2007 / P6_TA-PROV(2007)0039 
829 Pfisterer, V. (2010), op. cit. 
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example on how different EU actors operate in different normative paradigms leading 
to different value judgments and uncoordinated actions. More specifically, the fact 
that there was no conceptual agreement on the value of data protection and civil 
liberties more generally led to asymmetries of information before the revelation of the 
SWIFT affair in 2006. Second, the role of the EP in the legislation-making procedure 
illustrates that power aspirations were prevalent during the negotiations towards the 
first and second SWIFT Agreement. This explains why the EP agreed to the second 
Agreement even though not all of its requests were met. The third section shows how 
actors engaged in strategic transgovernmentalism in order to increase the strength of 
their mandate in the negotiations.  
2.1 Disjointedness of EU institutional frameworks 
 
As described earlier, the main EU institutional actors were not informed about the 
access of US authorities to EU financial data before 2006. Nevertheless, 
investigations by the Belgium data protection authority, the Article 29 Working Party 
and the European Data Protection Supervisor revealed that the European Central Bank 
(ECB) had been informed about the data transfer to the US from the start since it 
belonged to the SWIFT supervisory committee.830 The G10 Group established an 
oversight mechanism in order to avoid any risks to financial stability and the integrity 
of financial infrastructures.831 Although the ECB belongs to the G10 Group and was 
consequently informed about the data transfer since 2002 it did not notify any other 
European institutional actor. This non-disclosure conflicts with Article 13 (1) and (2) 
TEU respectively. Article 13 (1) TEU states that all institutional players shall aim to 
promote EU values and serve the interests of EU citizens and ensure consistency, 
effectiveness and continuity of its policies. By accepting silently the data transfer 
from EU citizens to the US the ECB failed to ensure consistency since the data 
transfer appears to conflict with the existing EU legal framework on data protection 
and privacy. Secondly, Article 13 (2) TEU establishes that “[t]he institutions shall 
practise mutual sincere cooperation.”832 By not informing other institutional actors, the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
830 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party Opinion 10/2006 on the processing of personal data by 
the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT); EDPS Opinion of 1 
February 2007 on the role of the European Central Bank in the SWIFT case. 
831 EDPS opinion of 1 February 2007 on the role of the European Central Bank in the SWIFT case. 
832 Article 13 (2), TEU.  
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ECB’s non-disclosure of the TFTP’s existence also contradicts the provisions of 
Article 13 (2) TEU.  
Justifying the non-disclosure, the ECB referred to the strict secrecy rules of 
the G10 Group’s supervisory committee.833 Furthermore, it argued that breaches of 
data protection rules were not in the mandate of the ECB’s oversight function and that 
SWIFT is not a financial institution but a communications platform. Therefore the 
overseeing function of the ECB is more directed towards moral standard-setting 
within SWIFT as well as ensuring that no risk to financial stability exists instead of 
explicitly influencing the company.834 The EDPS challenged this narrow 
interpretation.835 He claims that, the “rules of professional secrecy should not prevent 
independent scrutiny by data protection supervisory authorities, which is one of the 
basic principles of European data protection law.”836 The different views on the ECB’s 
responsibilities as a member of SWIFT’s oversight board illustrates that actors are 
guided by different institutional frameworks in their preference formation. By 
referring to merely mandate-related issues, the ECB reveals that its strategic 
preference formation relates to aspects of financial regulation rather than data 
protection. In contrast, the EDPS as well as the European Parliament are structuring 
their preferences around the institutional framework related to data protection and 
privacy. This illustrates the disjointedness of different EU institutional frameworks 
and how this impacts upon the strategic choices of actors.  
It is also interesting to note that some officials of the G10 Group decided to 
inform their governments about the existence of the TFTP.837 In addition, other 
Member States where informed about the TFTP through informal bilateral relations.838 
Nevertheless, none of the informed Member States contacted the relevant EU 
authorities. An US official argued that the Member States preferred to sideline the EU 
institutional actors because Member States benefited from the investigative results of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
833 Article 38, Protocol on the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and the European 
Central Bank annexed to the TEU and the TFEU. OJ 2010 C 83. Read in conjunction with Memoranda 
of Understanding (MoU) between the National Bank of Belgium and the central banks co-operating in 
the oversight of SWIFT. Information about MoU available at www.swift.com. 
834 EDPS Opinion of 1 February 2007 on the role of the European Central Bank in the SWIFT case. 
835 ibid.  
836 ibid.  
837 Amicelle, A. (2011), op. cit., p. 13.  
838 As indicated by the European Coordinator in the fight against terrorism during the conference: The 
exchange and storage of data, Science Po, Paris, 10-11 October 2008.  
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the TFTP programme and feared EU opposition.839 The situation illustrates that there 
is both a lack of practical coordination between Member States and EU authorities as 
well as between different EU institutional actors. This reveals the rudimentary state of 
affairs regarding EU inter-institutional cooperation and coordination in the ‘SWIFT 
affair’. Furthermore, it shows that the EU institutional actors do not have a coherent 
view on the value of data protection in the international context.     
 
2.2 Legislation-making procedure and power struggles 
 
After the existence of the TFTP has been disclosed, the US made representations to 
the EU explaining the programme’s legal basis in the US.840 Subsequently, the 
Council authorised the Presidency assisted by the Commission to enter into 
negotiations with US authorities in accordance with pre-Lisbon Article 24 (1) TEU 
and 38 TEU. The goal of these negotiations was to create a legal basis for the 
previously secretly executed bank data transfers to the US through SWIFT. Four 
months after the start of the discussions an Interim Agreement841 was concluded just 
one day before the Lisbon Treaty entered into force. The Council and Commission’s 
expedited negotiation procedure can be interpreted as a deliberate move. The pre-
Lisbon decision-making procedure did not provide the EP with the right to vote in 
external security matters as it exclusively foresees approval by the Council.842 This 
means that the Agreement was concluded under the intergovernmental process of the 
old third pillar excluding the EP.843 This changed after the implementation of the 
Lisbon Treaty entitling the EP to participate in the decision-making process.844  
Concluding the Agreement just one day before Lisbon intensified the tensions 
between the Parliament and the Commission and Council, which was expressed in 
several ways. First, the EP criticized the substance of the Agreement on various 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
839 Interview with US official.  
840  Terrorist Finance Tracking Program, Representations of the United States Department of the 
Treasury OJ 2007 C 166/18. 
841 Agreement between the European Union and the United States of America on the processing and 
transfer of Financial Messaging Data from the European Union to the United States for purposes of the 
Terrorist Finance Tracking Program OJ 2010 L 195/5	  
842 Pfisterer, V. (2010), op. cit. 
843 Although before Lisbon the EP did not have any competence in decision-making procedures of 
agreements in AFSJ, it still aimed at maximizing its power in other ways. See: Santos, J. (2013). The 
role of the European Parliament in the conclusion of the Transatlantic Agreements on the transfer of 
personal data after Lisbon. Centre for the Law of EU External Relations (CLEER) Working Papers 
2013/2, pp. 1-31. 
844 Article 218 (6) (2) (a) TFEU. 
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grounds, such as the lack of EU data protection standards, the lack of procedural 
rights granted to EU citizens, its disproportionality, and lack of reciprocity.845 Second, 
the procedure was regarded as dishonourable vis-à-vis the EP because the Council 
and Commission deliberately excluded the Parliament from the policy-making 
process.846 Third, the EP also criticized the fact that the Agreement was forwarded 
only after its conclusion with a considerable delay. Thus, the EP had less time to 
review the provisions before it was able to vote on it in February 2010.847 The lack of 
cooperation between the EU institutional actors was still a concern in 2014 –long after 
the SWIFT Agreement entered into force. In the EP Resolution of 12 March 2014 the 
Parliament requested that all relevant information and documents relating to the 
SWIFT Agreement should be made available to the Parliament. This request has been 
ignored by the Council illustrating the ongoing lack of cooperation.848 In July 2014 the 
Court ruled in Council v. In ’t Veld on transparency and access to files related to 
SWIFT and TFTP. The CJEU argued that the Council has some discretion in deciding 
whether the disclosure of a document effectively harms the public interest.849 
However, the Council must provide detailed information on why it withholds these 
documents.850 The Council provided two justifications, (i) protection of international 
relations and (ii) legal advice, which were both rejected by the Court.851 The CJEU 
mentioned that any limitations to disclosure of documents must be “reasonably 
foreseeable and not purely hypothetical.”852 Respectively, the Council failed to 
provide evidence on how the disclosure of the document would “specifically and 
actually” threaten the protection of the two interests identified by the Council.853 This 
judgment can be seen as a victory of the EP vis-à-vis the Council in the sense that the 
Court acknowledged the unjustified exclusion of the EP from the negotiation process 
and from access to information. Furthermore, it also illustrates how the CJEU is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
845 European Parliament Motion for a Resolution of 5 May 2010 on the envisaged international 
agreement to make available to the United States Treasury Department financial payment messaging 
data to prevent and combat terrorism and terrorist financing. B7-0038/2009.  
846 Pfisterer, V. (2010), op. cit. 
847 This delay was explained with translation issues by the Council and Commission. See: Monar., J. 
(2010b). Editorial Comment. The Rejection of the EU–US SWIFT Interim Agreement by the European 
Parliament: A Historic Vote and Its Implications. European Foreign Affairs Review, vol. 15, p. 143.  
848 European Parliament Resolution of 12 March 2014 on the US NSA surveillance programme, 
surveillance bodies in various Member States and their impact on EU citizens’ fundamental rights and 
on transatlantic cooperation in Justice and Home Affairs, 2013/2188(INI). 
849 Case C-350/12 P, Council v. In ’t Veld, judgment of 3 July 2014, para. 106.  
850 Ibid., para. 52. 
851 Ibid., para. 54.  
852 Ibid., para. 102. 
853 Ibid., para. 101.  
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actively involved in steering political processes as its judgements are instrumentalised 
by political actors.    
When the Interim Agreement of 2009 was due to be made permanent in 2010, 
the EP retroactively got the right to vote on it in February 2010.854 The vote resulted in 
the rejection of the Agreement with 378 in favour to 196 votes against and 31 
abstentions.855 “It did so against appeals from the Commission and the EU Presidency, 
against significant pressure from several Member States and against an unprecedented 
direct lobbying from the US side, and it did so both on grounds of protecting citizens’ 
safeguards regarding the transfer and use of personal financial data and for affirming 
its own prerogatives.”856 By flexing its muscles in this way, “[i]t is not difficult to 
conclude that the behaviour of the EP exhibits elements of a ‘turf war’ for more 
power and influence.”857 This is also reflected in the press and in political discourse. It 
was frequently mentioned that the rejection of the SWIFT Agreement is a milestone 
showing the EP’s newly gained influence in the decision-making procedure as well as 
a victory against the Council, the Commission and civil liberty-intrusive practices.858   
Subsequent to the rejection, the Parliament issued a Resolution that expressed 
its privacy and data protection concerns to the Commission and the Council.859 Based 
on this document, the Council mandated the Commission to start new negotiations 
with the US Treasury Department.860 The new negotiations led to a revised Agreement 
which was formally adopted on 13 July 2010.861  It can be argued that the Parliament 
consented to the terms of the new agreement due to two equally important reasons. 
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  Due	  to	  Article 24 (5) TEU the SWIFT Agreement was only provisional and with the entry into force 
of the Lisbon Treaty all provisional legislation automatically needed to be agreed under new 
procedures.  
855	  Debate of the European Parliament about the Agreement between the EU and the USA on the 
processing and transfer of Financial Messaging Data from the European Union to the United States for 
purposes of the Terrorist Finance Tracking Programme, CRE 10/02/2010. 
856 Monar., J. (2010b), op. cit, p. 143. 
857 Pawlak, P. (2009b). Network Politics in Transatlantic Homeland Security Cooperation. Perspectives 
on European Politics and Society, vol. 10 (4), pp. 560-581. 
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  For instance: MacKenzie, A. (2011). A US Driven Security Agenda? EU Actorness in Counter-
Terrorism Co-operation with the US. Paper presented at EUSA Twelfth Biennial International 
Conference Boston, Massachusetts. See also: MEPs say ‘no’ to SWIFT. Retrieved 10.01.2017 from 
http://www.euractiv.com/justice/meps-swift-news-258160   
859 European Parliament Resolution of 5 May 2010 on the Recommendation from the Commission to 
the Council to authorize the opening of negotiations for an Agreement between the European Union 
and the United States of America to make available to the United States Treasury Department financial 
messaging data to prevent and combat terrorism and terrorist financing. Eur. Parl. Doc. 0129. 
860 Council Decision on the conclusion of the Agreement between the European Union and the United 
States of America on the processing and transfer of Financial Messaging Data from the European 
Union to the United States for the purposes of the Terrorist Finance Tracking Program. OJ 2010 L 
195/3, recital 1.   
861 In accordance with: Articles 218 (2) and (6)(1) TFEU.  
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First, there were improvements in data protection standards and secondly, it felt fully 
informed and integrated in the negotiation process.862 However, as discussed later in 
this chapter, the second SWIFT Agreement also raises several data protection 
concerns. In this respect, it can be argued that power aspirations played a more 
important role than the actual improvement of the Agreement’s provisions.863 An 
alternative interpretation of the Parliament’s agreement to the second Agreement is 
that the EP realised that it is with its newly gained powers responsible to the Member 
States security concerns.864 This last point shows that the EP became ‘sensitive to 
failure’.865  
2.3 EU’s negotiation power and transgovernmentalism 
 
The degree of strategic and procedural coherence of EU institutional actors has a 
significant impact on the performance of the EU as an international player.866 Since 
the Lisbon Treaty entered into force, the EP is an important player in the decision-
making process. In general neither the Council nor the Commission can take the 
support of the EP for granted. While in democratic parliamentary systems the 
government is usually supported by a parliamentary majority this is not the case in the 
EU. This implies that in order to appear as a strong negotiator when discussing 
international agreements, the Commission and the Council need to have strong 
communication and consultation procedures in place in order to build a majority 
within the EP.867 However, as pointed out in the previous section in the case of 
SWIFT, struggles between EU institutional actors and conceptual disagreement have 
prevented effective communication and majority building between Council, 
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European Union. Oxford University Press. 
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Commission and the EP. Thus, the EU did not act with a coherent mandate while 
being confronted by US counterparts.868 
It has to be acknowledged that the US was naturally in a stronger negotiation 
position. This is due to the fact that US legislation stipulates the importance of high 
international standards in the fight against terrorism. In this way, the US put itself in 
the position of an agenda-setter and catalyst while the EU is more reactive and acts as 
a norm-taker.869 Additionally, the SWIFT Agreement was ‘the extended arm’ of an 
already existing US policy (i.e. TFTP) as described at the beginning of this chapter. 
Consequently, the SWIFT Agreement did not have to pass the usual legislative 
hurdles in the US as was the case in the EU. In addition to the latter situation, the US 
negotiators were also able to take advantage of the EU’s fragmentation to assert 
counter-terrorism measures that do not comply with EU data protection standards. 870  
The US took advantage of this situation in two ways. First, it built strategic 
alliances on an informal basis with actors from the Council and the Commission. 
Second, it tried to lobby members of the EP which had reservations about the SWIFT 
Agreement. In regard to the first point the US and EU established in 2004 the High-
Level Political Dialogue on Border and Transportation Security (PDBTS). The aim of 
this forum was to informally discuss new security policies that might be regarded as 
controversial by the EU or US authorities. The network is mainly composed of 
officials dealing with security on the US side (Department of Homeland Security) and 
by the relevant Council and Commission security officials (Council Presidency and 
Commission DG’s). Several discussions in the PDBTS framework provided US and 
EU actors with the opportunity to exchange information and build trusted 
relationships.871 The combination of information exchange and building trust through 
PDBTS help to “push things forward” in security cooperation.872  In addition to this 
forum, the High-Level Contact Group on data protection (HLCG)  was established by 
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a decision of the EU-US Justice and Home Affairs Ministerial Troika on 6 November 
2006. The goal of this group was to bring EU and US policy-makers together to 
achieve similar effects on data protection like those created on security by PDBTS. 
The group consisted of senior officials from the Commission, the Council presidency 
and the US Departments of Justice, Homeland Security and State.873 Both the PDBTS 
and the HLCG did not foresee the participation of Members of the EP or of the data 
protection authorities. Therefore, the emphasis in discussions was primarily on 
security and to a lesser extent on data protection and civil liberties. In this way, 
organisational homogeneity between EU and US ‘securocrats’874 was created. 
Consequently, an alliance between EU Commission and EU Council and the US 
emerged while in the EU internally the rivalries and conflicts between these EU 
institutional actors and the EP were aggravated.875 The reasons for the nature of this 
informal relationship between the US and the EU can be interpreted in two ways: (i) 
there was a natural transnational coalition building due to similar attitudes of the 
actors on security related issues; (ii) the US authorities focused on coalition building 
with the Commission and the Council since they perceived those actors as most 
relevant in the legislation-making procedure.  
A second way the US authorities dealt with fragmentation among EU 
institutional actors was its focus on lobbying the EP. When the US administration 
discovered the possible rejection of the interim Agreement, the Secretary of State 
attempted to convince the EP President of the importance of the SWIFT Agreement. 
Furthermore, the US authorities offered the LIBE Committee an in-depth briefing on 
the purpose of TFTP and the SWIFT Agreement and more intense strategies were 
applied. The US Treasury also expressed a warning to the EP that a rejection of the 
SWIFT Agreement would be a ‘tragic mistake’ and the US Ambassador to the EU 
warned the EP that the US would potentially bypass the EU via bilateral agreements 
with the EU Member States.876 In addition, the Council President and the Commission 
tried to urge the Parliament to agree to the SWIFT Agreement by attending the EP 
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plenary session. In return for agreeing to the SWIFT deal they offered the EP access 
to classified documents.877  
Notwithstanding the efforts of the US administration the Parliament ultimately 
rejected the SWIFT Agreement. However, the EP approved the second Agreement 
although it did not comply fully with EU data protection standards either. Before 
agreeing to the second Agreement the US adopted a different lobbying effort. Instead 
of urging and threatening the Parliament a “US charm offensive”878 took place. 
Among others, MEPs were invited to Washington and the US Vice-President 
delivered a speech about the SWIFT Agreement to the EP two months before the 
second Agreement was discussed in the plenary session.879 Consequently, actively 
including the EP and regarding it as an equal actor might have contributed to the 
Parliament’s more uncritical acceptance of the Agreement’s critical provisions. It can 
even be argued that the new way of lobbying led to norm internalization of US values 
by the EP.880    
In sum, it has been shown that dynamics between EU institutional actors are 
crucial for determining how the EU performs when negotiating international 
agreements. It has been demonstrated that while the US was generally in a better 
starting position, it also took advantage of EU internal power struggles and conceptual 
disagreements through alliances building and the application of strategic lobbying. 
Ultimately, this does not only affect the EU’s counter terror strategy but it might also 
harm the EU’s international credibility since third parties might question the EU’s 
status as respectable negotiation partner.881 
2.4 Summary  
 
So far this chapter has focused on how the EU institutional framework shaped data 
protection and privacy in respect to the formation stage of the SWIFT Agreement. It 
has been demonstrated that the EU institutional framework has provided space for 
strategic preference formation in three ways: (i) the fact that the principle of sincere 
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cooperation between institutional actors was not complied with before SWIFT entered 
on the agenda can be ascribed to the fact that actors were subject to different 
institutional frameworks impacting preference formation; (ii) the institutional 
framework encouraged power struggles between the EP and the Council; and (iii) the 
institutional framework led to strategic transgovernmentalism between EU and US 
actors.     
 
3. The applicability of existing case law on the SWIFT Agreement 
 
The first SWIFT Agreement has been criticised for breaching EU law882 while the 
second Agreement was often deemed to comply with EU data protection and privacy 
standards.883 In the following it will be assessed whether and at which extent CJEU 
and relevant ECtHR jurisprudence is applicable to the SWIFT Agreement. 
Subsequently, the CJEU’s political actorness will be assessed in a separate section.  
When assessing the interference with Articles 7 and 8 CFREU it is argued that 
Article 7 is interfered with since the SWIFT Agreement permits the access to 
financial messaging data by US national authorities. Furthermore, this interference is 
particularly serious since the categories of data to be transferred can reveal a detailed 
picture of a person’s private life. Article 8 CFREU is interfered with since data is 
processed under the Agreement. The interference of both rights can be justified since 
fighting terrorism has been acknowledged as being a matter of public security. 
Subsequently, a proportionality assessment is conducted in respect to both rights in 
accordance to the framework established in Chapter 3.  
3.1 Interference with Articles 7 and 8 CFREU 
	  
3.1.1 Interference with Article 7 CFREU 
 
First of all, it needs to be specified whether the data at stake can be classified as 
personal data revealing information about the private life of the data subjects. Under 
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the SWIFT Agreement, data on financial transactions may include personal 
information such as: “identifying information about the originator and/or recipient of 
the transaction, including name, account number, address and national identification 
number.”884 To establish an existence of an interference with the right to privacy, it 
does not matter whether the “(…) information in question is sensitive or whether the 
persons concerned have suffered any adverse consequences on account of that 
interference.”885 Thus, the mere fact that data is accessed by public authorities without 
allowing the individual the opportunity to refute it amounts to an interference with 
Article 7 CFREU.886 While the previous findings derive from case law in relation to 
EU acts they apply mutatis mutandis to international agreements concluded by the EU 
since the lawfulness of such agreements depends on their compliance with 
fundamental rights protected in the EU legal order.887 Based on the foregoing it can be 
concluded that since the SWIFT Agreement grants US authorities access to requested 
personal data stored in the territory of the European Union this amounts to an 
interference with Article 7 CFREU.   
On previous occasions, the Court stated that an interference is “particularly 
serious” if two conditions are met. First, if the data is retained and used without the 
knowledge of the data subject as it generates “in the minds of the persons concerned 
the feeling that their private lives are the subject of constant surveillance.”888 Through 
the publication of SWIFT Agreement in the Official Journal of the European Union 
citizens have the opportunity to be informed ex-ante about the potential use of their 
financial data when making transactions. Furthermore, Article 15 of the SWIFT 
Agreement stipulates ex-post notification by mentioning that “any person has the right 
to obtain, following requests made at reasonable intervals, without constraint and 
without excessive delay at least a confirmation (…) whether any processing of that 
person’s personal data has taken place in breach of this Agreement.”889 Persons may 
also be able to get access to their personal information processed under the 
Agreement but this might be subject to limitations to safeguard the prevention, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
884 Article 5 (7), SWIFT II Agreement.  
885 Schrems, para. 87; DRI, para. 33; Österreichischer Rundfunk and Others, para. 75.  
886 DRI, para. 35. In regard to Article 8 ECHR see also: Leander v. Sweden, para. 48; Rotaru v. 
Romania, para. 46 and Weber and Saravia v. Germany, para. 79.   
887 AG Mengozzi on Opinion 1/15, para. 171.  
888 DRI, para. 37.  
889 Article 15 (1), SWIFT II Agreement. 
	   177 
detection, investigation and prosecution of crime.890 While this allows individuals to 
obtain information on whether their data has been processed under the SWIFT 
Agreement, it is regrettable that no automatic ex-post notification takes place once it  
is no longer liable to jeopardise the investigations undertaken by authorities.891  
Second, interference is ‘particularly serious’ if it is considered to be wide-
ranging.892 On the one hand, interference is not limited to what is strictly necessary 
since SWIFT is not in a position to filter out all irrelevant data before transferring it to 
the US.893 On the other hand, interference is not wide-ranging in a sense that all data is 
transferred indiscriminately. This is because personal data needs to be requested by 
US authorities and approved by Europol before it is transferred and accessed by US 
authorities. When data is requested sufficient reasons need to be provided on why the 
data is relevant in the fight against terrorism and its financing. Consequently, it can be 
argued that interference under SWIFT does not qualify as wide-ranging in the narrow 
sense but may well be qualified as wide-ranging when considering that data has to be 
delivered in bulk due to technological reasons.   
 
3.1.2 Interference with Article 8 CFREU 
 
Article 8 CFREU is interfered with if a measure stipulates the processing of personal 
data.894 According to the GDPR “‘processing’ means any operation or set of 
operations which is performed on personal data or on sets of personal data, whether or 
not by automated means, such as collection, recording, organisation, structuring, 
storage, adaptation or alteration, retrieval, consultation, use, disclosure by 
transmission, dissemination or otherwise making available, alignment or combination, 
restriction, erasure or destruction.”895 It has to be noted that the initial ‘collection’ of 
data by SWIFT does not amount to an interference under the scope of the Agreement 
as this is related to commercial activities carried out by banks and thus does not relate 
to processing under the Agreement itself.896 However, other forms of processing are at 
stake. First, the Agreement stipulates the transfer of the data to US authorities 
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(disclosure by transmission). Second, the Agreement regulates the ‘access’ and ‘use’ 
of the data after the data has been transferred. Ultimately the SWIFT Agreement 
regulates the ‘storage’ and ‘destruction’ by US authorities.  
 
3.2 Justification for interference with Articles 7 and 8 CFREU 
 
Interference with Articles 7 and 8 CFREU can be deemed justified in accordance with 
Article 52 (1) CFREU if three conditions are met. First, it needs to be ‘provided for 
by law.’ As the Agreement was concluded according to procedures set out in Article 
218 TFEU the Agreement qualifies as an‘international agreement’ under the Treaties. 
Both ECtHR and CJEU case law have confirmed that international agreements are 
automatically incorporated into national law and an integral part of the EU legal 
order.897 Thus, the Agreement is provided for by law.  
Second, interference is justified as long as the essence of a right is not 
interfered with. Personal data collected under the SWIFT Agreement can reveal a 
detailed picture of a person’s life similar to traffic and location data. It reveals the 
location and identity of recipient and sender and the transferred amount provides 
insights in the financial status of the data subject giving a precise view on his funds 
and spending. Furthermore, it allows drawing detailed conclusions about a person’s 
social environment, activities or movements. While the special status of the data has 
to be acknowledged the essence of Article 7 CFREU is not interfered with since the 
data in question is limited to patterns in relation to financial transactions between EU 
and non-EU countries. Therefore, no precise conclusions on the essence of an 
individual’s private life can be drawn. Furthermore, the SWIFT Agreement also 
includes numerous data protection principles as explained in the next section. 
Therefore, the essence of Article 8 CFREU is not infringed either.898 
Third, the reason for interference needs to follow an objective of general 
interest. Fighting terrorism has been acknowledged as being a matter of general 
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interest since it aims to maintain international peace and security.899 Furthermore, law 
enforcement and governmental authorities found financial messaging data to be a 
useful tool to fight crime.900 Therefore, the SWIFT Agreement pursues a legitimate 
goal. Nevertheless, fighting serious crime such as terrorism ‘however fundamental it 
may be’ cannot justify general and indiscriminate access to data.901 In regard to the 
SWIFT Agreement, data access is however not indiscriminate in the narrow sense as 
outlined above. 
 
3.3 Proportionality of interference with Articles 7 and 8 CFREU  
 
Since the SWIFT Agreement does not require the company SWIFT to retain personal 
data for a time period longer than is necessary for its own business-related purposes, 
interference with the rights to privacy and data protection only arise when data is 
transferred to US authorities. Furthermore, the technological particularities of how 
transfers and subsequent storage of data take place, make it a special case when 
assessing proportionality in light of Articles 7 and 8 CFREU.  
Before analysing proportionality in terms of the existence of sufficient 
safeguards against abuse of power, the appropriateness and necessity of the SWIFT 
Agreement needs to be analysed. While the SWIFT Agreement is mainly concerned 
with sending data located in the EU to US authorities, there is a reciprocal element 
since emerging intelligence ought to be shared with the EU.902 Therefore, it can be 
argued that the SWIFT Agreement is appropriate since detecting sources of financing 
of terrorist organisations is a crucial first step in preventing and investigating 
terrorism and thus contributes to maintaining public security in both the US and the 
EU. In respect to necessity, ensuring public security by fighting terrorism and its 
financing may depend on data-driven investigation techniques. However, regardless 
of the usefulness of the latter, the threats posed to data protection and private life 
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requires that derogations and limitations thereof must apply only in so far as strictly 
necessary. In the following, it will be assessed whether the SWIFT Agreement 
includes sufficient safeguards against the abuse of power.  
 
3.3.1 Transfer and access to data 
 
Article 4 of the SWIFT Agreement explains the procedure on how requests for data 
are made. The US Treasury Department has to send a data request to SWIFT which 
has to be approved by Europol.903 The requests shall detail as clearly as possible the 
data that are relevant for the “purpose of the prevention, investigation, detection, or 
prosecution of terrorism or terrorist financing”,904 and the necessity of the data.905 
Furthermore, the data request shall be tailored as narrowly as possible in order to 
minimise the amount of data requested.906 After Europol has approved the US request, 
SWIFT is authorised and required to provide data to the US authorities on a ‘push 
basis’.907 Article 5 of the Agreement regulates the safeguards after the data has been 
sent to US authorities. First of all, data shall be processed exclusively for the purpose 
of preventing, investigating, detecting, or prosecuting terrorism or its financing.908 
Furthermore, data mining or any other type of algorithmic or automated profiling or 
computer filtering shall be prohibited and data shall not be interconnected with any 
other database.909 In addition, data security standards such as secure storage, limited 
access to data, protection from manipulation and alternation are specified in Article 
5.910  
 Given those safeguards, it seems that data transfer to the US and subsequent 
access is limited to what is strictly necessary raising the question as to why data 
transfer and access would disproportionately interfere with Articles 7 and 8 CFREU? 
The problem of the SWIFT regime is that even if US authorities are searching for 
very specific data, SWIFT is technologically not able to extract the requested data. In 
other words, one request by US authorities may result in multiple hits and SWIFT is 
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not in a position to filter out the data that is not relevant to US investigations. 
Therefore, whenever data is requested from SWIFT, the company can only send data 
in bulk to US authorities. The authorities in turn assess which of those financial 
payment messages are useful for law enforcement purposes and which are not.911 The 
inability of SWIFT to provide specific data raises concerns as to how targeted such a 
regime in fact is. While it could be argued that it would be less intrusive to let SWIFT 
do a pre-selection of the data based on an automated searching tool, such a tool does 
not yet exist. Furthermore, this would imply that intelligence work needs to be carried 
out in close cooperation with SWIFT to enable the search. This would imply a 
‘privatisation of law enforcement’ and increase the risk of unlawful processing or 
accidental loss.  
As a consequence of the bulk data transfer the US Treasury is confronted with 
a data set composed of data of innocent and suspected individuals alike. What is even 
more concerning is that the data can in exceptional circumstances also include 
sensitive data.912 While in some cases it might not be avoidable to be confronted with 
sensitive data, it would have been useful to make it explicit that sensitive information 
shall only be further processed if strictly necessary.913  The fact that personal and 
sensitive data is retained of individuals with only a weak link or suspicion of crime 
could awaken the fear of data subjects to be under constant surveillance. This is 
particularly the case since SWIFT data can provide a picture of a person’s 
movements, economic situation and social environment. As such the feeling of 
surveillance could have a negative impact on personal development and the right to 
establish and develop relationships with other human beings and the outside world.914  
This is even more relevant in a globalised world where electronic financial flows have 
become important for many individuals’ daily lives. 
Despite the concerns pointed out above, in most cases international bank 
transfers will not be as frequent and allow one to draw as many conclusions about a 
person’s personal life to come to the conclusion that a feeling of constant surveillance 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
911 Joint Review Report of the implementation of the Agreement between the European Union and the 
United States of America on the processing and transfer of Financial Messaging Data from the 
European Union to the United States for the purposes of the Terrorist Finance Tracking Program, 
COM(2014) 513 final, p. 9 
912 Article 5 (7), SWIFT II Agreement. 
913 For instance Article 7of the SWIFT II Agreement regulates onward transfer of data without 
differentiating between sensitive and non-sensitive personal data.  
914 As protected by the right to private life. See: P.G. and J.H. v. the United Kingdom, para. 56, with 
further references.  
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is generated as in the case of the DRD. Furthermore, recent case law has pointed out 
that an indirect link between a data subject and serious crime can justify 
indiscriminate data processing for public security purposes.915 It thus seems that the 
inability to pre-select only data of suspects can be offset if adequate safeguards exist.  
 
When analysing the proportionality of access to data for public security purposes, the 
five safeguards that need to apply were established in the framework set out in 
Chapter 3. First, access to data should be strictly limited to the purpose of preventing 
and detecting serious offences.916 The Agreement complies with this parameter since 
“all searches of provided data shall be based upon pre-existing information or 
evidence which demonstrates a reason to believe that the subject of the search has a 
nexus to terrorism or its financing.”917 Furthermore, it is also mentioned that each 
individual search of provided data shall be narrowly tailored and demonstrate the 
belief that a nexus to terrorism exists.918 
 Second, the nature of crime giving rise to the applicability of the legislation 
needs to be defined.919 In this respect, the Agreement improved significantly in 
comparison to its predecessor which defined terrorism only in very broad terms.920 
Article 2 of the SWIFT Agreement provides a detailed definition of terrorism which 
builds on the approach of Article 1 of Council Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA.921 
The Agreement mentions that terrorism refers to acts of “a person or entity that 
involve violence, or are otherwise dangerous to human life or create a risk of damage 
to property or infrastructure, and which, given their nature and context, are reasonably 
believed to be committed with the aim of: (i) intimidating or coercing a population; 
(ii) intimidating, compelling or coercing a government or international organization to 
act or abstain from acting; or (iii) seriously destabilizing or destroying the 
fundamental political, constitutional, economic, or social structures of a country or an 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
915 Tele2 Sverige, para. 111.  
916 DRI, para. 61 and Tele2 Sverige, para. 102. See also: Zakharov v. Russia, para. 244 (in the latter 
case the ECtHR criticised that the measure in question can be applied for minor offences.) 
917 Article 5 (5), SWIFT II Agreement. 
918 Ibid., Article 5 (6).  
919 Zakharov v. Russia, para. 244, see also: DRI, para. 60.   
920  Opinion of the European Data Protection Supervisor on the Proposal for a Council Decision on the 
conclusion of the Agreement between the European Union and the United States of America on the 
processing and transfer of Financial Messaging Data from the European Union to the United States for 
purposes of the Terrorist Finance Tracking Program (TFTP II), OJ 2010 C355/10. 
921  Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on combating terrorism, OJ L 164/3. 
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international organization.”922 Acknowledging the efforts to conceptualise the notion 
of terrorism, obviously every definition thereof is problematic due to its complex 
nature.923   
Third, the number of persons authorised to access and use data has to be 
specified.924 Article 5 of the SWIFT Agreement stipulates that “access to Provided 
Data shall be limited to analysts investigating terrorism or its financing and to persons 
involved in the technical support, management and oversight of TFTP”.925 While this 
limitation of access at least provides some guidance on who may access data, it does 
not lay down a limited range of organisations, which in fact access the data. 
Therefore, the SWIFT Agreement falls short of this requirement.  
Fourth, the target group liable to interception needs to be defined by law.926  
The Agreement stipulates that requests for data can be made upon a designated 
provider (i.e. SWIFT) present in the territory of the United States in order to obtain 
data stored in the territory of the EU. The SWIFT Agreement further stipulates that no 
data that refers to the Single Euro Payments Area (SEPA) can be sought.927 While the 
SWIFT Agreement excludes SEPA data it does not stipulate in positive terms who is 
within the scope of the Agreement. While it can be assumed that the target group 
consists of any persons who transfer money internationally with an exception of 
SEPA internal transactions, it would have been preferable if the Agreement had stated 
this in positive terms.  
Fifth, access and use of data needs to be dependent on a prior review carried 
out by a court or by an independent administrative body whose decision seeks to limit 
access to the data and their use to what is strictly necessary.928 One parameter to 
analyse whether the oversight body qualifies as independent is to analyse the legal 
status and independence of the members of the oversight committee.929 The SWIFT 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
922 Article 2 (a), SWIFT II Agreement.   
923 For an attempt of conceptualisation, see: Richards, A. (2014) Conceptualizing Terrorism. Studies in 
Conflict & Terrorism, vol. 37 (3). For a legal assessment, see: Tiefenbrun, S. (2002) A Semiotic 
Approach to a Legal Definition of Terrorism. ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law, vol. 
9, p. 357; Beckman, J. (2015) Comparative Legal Approaches to Homeland Security and Anti-
Terrorism. Roudledge.   
924 DRI, para. 62 
925 Article 5 (4c), SWIFT II Agreement.   
926 Liberty and others v. UK, para. 64; Szabó and Vissy v. Hungary, paras. 66 -67; DRI, paras. 56 to 59; 
Tele2Sverige, paras. 97 to 106. 
927 Article 4 (2) (d) SWIFT II Agreement.  
928 DRI, para. 62; Tele2 Sverige, para. 120; Szabó and Vissy v. Hungary, para. 73. 
929 Zakharov v. Russia, para. 278. See also: C-288/12 Commission v. Hungary, para. 51 including cited 
jurisprudence.   
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Agreement entitles Europol to verify US requests for access to data. Europol’s newly 
acquired oversight role is inappropriate. Being a law enforcement agency it has 
interests in the intelligence activities of the US930 and thus might be biased when 
verifying/rejecting a request. In fact, none of the requests of US authorities has been 
rejected so far. While the acceptance of all requests could simply mean that they were 
all legitimate, it is likely that Europol –being a law enforcement agency- is rather 
uncritical.931 Another option would be to entrust SWIFT with reviewing the data 
before transferring it to the US. This seems however inappropriate given SWIFT’s 
ignorance on the content of any particular investigation file.932 Thus, a less biased 
oversight mechanism would have been to task national data protection authorities 
with reviewing US requests.933 Due to their expertise they are best positioned to carry 
out the oversight. Furthermore, they can filter out sensitive or unnecessary 
information, which is technologically not possible to remove in advance.934 In 
practical terms, one representative of the national data protection authority of the 
country where the data originates could be appointed to analyse the requests of the US 
authorities. While these bodies should have full access to all relevant information on 
the investigation in question935 Europol’s inputs may still be useful given its 
experience in judging the usefulness of specific data from a law enforcement 
perspective. Therefore, national data protection authorities should be in a position to 
consult Europol.  
While the SWIFT Agreement falls short of some of the parameters pointed out 
above, it is not inconceivable that if the Agreement was equipped with effective 
safeguards, the access to SWIFT data would be proportionate since (i) no less 
intrusive measures are technologically feasible, and (ii) although data transferred to 
the US does not only include data of suspects it does neither include data of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
930 Article 1 (b), SWIFT II Agreement stipulates that “relevant information obtained through the TFTP 
is provided to law enforcement, public security or counter terrorism authorities of Member States, or 
Europol or Eurojust, for the purpose of the prevention, investigation, detection, or prosecution of 
terrorism or terrorist financing.”  
931 Joint review of the SWIFT Agreement (COM(2014) 513), Annex III shows that all requests have 
been verified.  
932 AG Opinion on Tele2 Sverige, para. 236. 
933  Particularly in Schrems the CJEU stressed the important role of national supervisory authorities in 
evaluating the proportionality of data processing (para. 40). See also: C-614/10 Commission v. Austria; 
C-518/07 Commission v. Germany; C-288/12 Commission v. Hungary.    
934 AG Opinion on Tele2 Sverige, para. 235. 
935 Zakharov v. Russia, para. 281.   
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‘practically the entire EU population’ but only data of a limited amount of persons 
who engage in international bank transfers.  
    
3.3.2 Retention period 
 
Article 6 of the SWIFT Agreement regulates the retention and deletion of data by 
differentiating between extracted (information that has been extracted from data sent 
by SWIFT) and non-extracted data (information that has not been extracted from data 
sent by SWIFT). In regard to non-extracted data it is stipulated that the Treasury 
Department shall conduct an annual evaluation and delete all non-extracted data if it 
is no longer necessary to combat terrorism and as soon as technologically feasible.936 
Furthermore, all non-extracted data received under the current agreement shall be 
deleted no later than five years from receipt.937 In regard to extracted data, the SWIFT 
Agreement does not stipulate a particular retention period but only mentions that the 
data shall be retained as long as it is necessary for specific investigations or 
prosecutions for which they are used.938 	  
Three parameters exist to analyse the proportionality of the retention period. 
First, the determination of the retention period needs to be based on objective 
criteria.939 This criterion is difficult to apply since the assessment of what retention 
period is strictly necessary obviously includes a certain level of arbitrariness since it 
requires making a judgment on the future value of data.940 A certain margin also needs 
to be granted to the legislator to determine the retention period as long as sufficient 
evidence for its usefulness can be provided. According to case law, 90 days and 6 
months retention periods have been deemed to be appropriate.941 In the last review of 
the SWIFT Agreement, the 5-years retention period of non-extracted data was 
defended since a “reduction of the TFTP data retention period to less than five years 
would result in a significant loss of insights into the funding and operations of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
936 Article 6 (1), SWIFT II Agreement.  
937 Ibid., Article 6 (4). 
938 Ibid., Article 6 (7). 
939 DRI, para. 64.  
940 The uncertainty regarding the usefulness of the retention period is evidenced by the fact that the 
Agreement stipulates that the usefulness of the 5- year retention period shall be reviewed annually 
(Article 6 (5) SWIFT II Agreement). 
941 Szabó and Vissy v. Hungary, para. 74 and Zakharov v Russia, para. 255. 
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terrorist groups.”942 While some critics have considered this period to be excessive943 it 
is necessary to grant a certain margin to Member States in determining what 
constitutes ‘objective criteria’ in determining the retention period.944 This does 
however not imply that other safeguards surrounding the retention period will not be 
thoroughly assessed as shown below.  
Second, when data is stored, the retention period shall take into account the 
usefulness of different categories of data and the usefulness of data on different 
categories of concerned persons.945 The SWIFT Agreement acknowledges a difference 
between the treatment of extracted and non-extracted data showing that a distinction 
is recognised between data that is useful for fighting terrorist and data that is less 
useful. Nevertheless, a more nuanced retention of five years of non-extracted data is 
necessary. For example, the PNR Agreement require that non-extracted data is 
depersonalised and masked (i.e. pseudonymisation) after six months and subsequently 
shifted to a dormant database.946 Given the similarity of the purpose of the PNR and 
SWIFT regimes, it is striking that the SWIFT regime does not require 
depersonalisation after six months.947   
 Third, personal data shall not be kept longer than necessary948 and it shall be 
irreversibly destroyed at the end of the prescribed data retention period.949 In regard to 
extracted data the SWIFT Agreement mentions that data shall be kept as long as 
necessary for specific investigations or prosecutions for which they are used. This 
shows that extracted data could potentially be retained even longer than five years 
which can be considered to be an ‘element prone to abuse’.950 In regard to non-
extracted data, the SWIFT Agreement meets this standard since a periodical review of 
the usefulness of the data is conducted whereas any data which is no longer necessary 
to combat terrorism and its financing needs to be deleted. 951 Furthermore, it is clearly 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
942 Joint review of the SWIFT II Agreement (COM(2014) 513), p. 16. 
943 EDPS Opinion on SWIFT II Agreement, OJ 2010 C355/10, para. 21. 
944 A margin of appreciation in adopting security measures has been granted for instance in Klass and 
Others v. Germany; and in Leander v. Sweden. 
945 DRI, para. 63.  
946 Article 8, 2012 PNR Agreement.  
947 See assessment in Chapters 4 and 6 of this thesis.  
948 Zakharov v. Russia, para. 255; Klass and Others v. Germany, para. 52; Kennedy v. United Kingdom, 
para 162. 
949 DRI, para. 67.  
950 Szabó and Vissy v. Hungary, para. 74. 
951 Article 6 (1) SWIFT II Agreement. See: Zakharov v. Russia, para. 255. 
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mentioned that all non-extracted data shall be deleted after 5 years.952 However, it is 
questionable how effective this is considering the nexus between legality and 
technological possibility. The requirement to annually delete non-extracted data 
depends on whether this is technologically feasible.953 In the 2014 review of the 
SWIFT Agreement the US authorities confirmed that the technical complexity of the 
system still poses challenges to the deletion process. 954 Since this is an inherent 
feature of the SWIFT regime it is questionable whether this feature is acceptable since 
no less intrusive alternative was available or whether the ‘pre-cautionary principle’ (in 
contrast to the evidence-based approach) should be applied.955 The AG in Tele2 
Sverige discussed the link between technology and law in regard to the filtering out of 
sensitive information. He argues that ‘it would be desirable’ if technology allowed 
automatic filtering.956 Later on, he argued that if the filtering out is technologically not 
feasible this task shall be conducted by independent data protection supervisory 
authorities. This suggests that as long as sufficient safeguards exist limitations to 
technological capabilities shall not render a regime disproportionate.   
 
3.3.3 Remedies  
 
Article 8 (2) CFREU grants a prominent role to the rights of data subjects by pointing 
out “everyone has the right of access to data which has been collected concerning him 
or her, and the right to have it rectified.”957 Furthermore, the right to the availability of 
effective remedies is also a standalone right enshrined in the CFREU. Article 47 
stipulates that “[e]veryone whose rights and freedoms guaranteed by the law of the 
Union are violated has the right to an effective remedy before a tribunal (…).”958 Case 
law further specifies that a right to legal remedy needs to be granted to individuals959 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
952 Article 6 (3) and (4), SWIFT II Agreement. 
953 Article 6 (1), SWIFT II Agreement.  
954 Joint review of the SWIFT II Agreement (COM(2014) 513), p. 15-16. 
955 Applying the pre-cautionary principle implies that the SWIFT regime as such shall not operate since 
technological uncertainties lead to a situation where protection with privacy cannot be guaranteed. For 
an elaboration of the pre-cautionary principle in the surveillance context, see: Galetta, A. & De Hert, P. 
(2014) Complementing the Surveillance Law Principles of the ECtHR with its Environmental Law 
Principles: An Integrated Technology Approach to a Human Rights Framework for Surveillance. 
Utrecht Law Review. 10(1), pp.55–75.  
956 AG Opinion on Tele2 Sverige, para. 212.  
957 Article 8 (2) CFREU. 
958 Article 47 CFREU. 
959 DRI, para. 54; Tele2 Sverige, para. 121.   
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and particularly stresses the important role of independent data protection authorities 
in safeguarding rights of individuals. 960  
While the first SWIFT Agreement only partially granted rights to data 
subjects, the second SWIFT Agreement stipulates the right to access, rectification, 
erasure or blocking.961 In order to have access to remedies it is important that the data 
subject is informed/notified about his data being processed.962 Article 15 (1) of the 
second SWIFT Agreement stipulates that “any person has the right to obtain, 
following requests made at reasonable intervals, without constraint and without 
excessive delay, at least a confirmation transmitted through his or her data protection 
authority in the European Union as to whether that person’s data protection rights 
have been respected (…) and, (…) whether any processing of that person’s personal 
data has taken place in breach of this Agreement.”963 Subsequently, Article 15 (2) 
mentions that the disclosure of data processed under the SWIFT Agreement “may be 
subject to reasonable legal limitations applicable under national law to safeguard the 
prevention, detection, investigation, or prosecution of criminal offences, and to 
protect public or national security, with due regard for the legitimate interest of the 
person concerned.”964 Article 15 leaves a margin of appreciation to the authorities as 
to whether data is made available to the data subject.965 As a consequence of denied 
access, the rights to rectification, erasure and blocking might be unavailable.966 It 
would have been preferable if the agreement provided for an automatic ex-post 
notification that does not depend on individuals requesting the data proactively. 
Furthermore, while limitations to notify individuals obviously may still apply in order 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
960 Schrems, para. 95.  
961 Article 15 and 16, SWIFT II Agreement. 
962 Ekimdzhiev v Bulgaria Application, para. 90.The ECtHR mentioned: “as soon as notification can be 
made without jeopardising the purpose of the surveillance after its termination, information should be 
provided to the persons concerned.” See also: Tele2 Sverige, para.121.  
963 Article 15 (2), SWIFT II Agreement.  
964 Article 15 (2) SWIFT II Agreement.  
965 Fahey, E. (2013). Law and Governance as Checks and Balances in Transatlantic Security: Rights, 
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966 Note that in order to exercise the right to rectification, erasure or blocking, “a precise identification 
of the record, including a description of the record, the date, and any other identifying details” needs to 
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to not harm the investigation, it would have been useful to specify that notification 
should be provided as soon as it does not harm the investigation anymore.  
 
(i) Administrative remedies 
Article 12 of the SWIFT Agreement establishes a sort of ‘overseeing authority’. 
Being composed of EU Commission and US officials, the overseeing authority relies 
on a reciprocal relationship between EU national data protection authorities as well as 
the Privacy Officer of the US Treasury Department. The authority has the power to 
monitor compliance with the strict counter terrorism purpose limitation of the 
Agreement and the safeguards on data security in Article 5 and data retention in 
Article 6. Thus, the overseeing authority has the power to block any or all searches 
that contradict the previously mentioned provisions. However, it has neither any 
power in regard to any other provisions of the agreement, nor does it have the 
authority to hear individual complaints.  
Articles 15 (3) and 16 (2) of the SWIFT Agreement lay down the procedures 
for obtaining access and requesting rectification, erasure and blocking. It is stipulated 
that the individual needs to approach its national data protection authority that then 
communicates with the Privacy Officer of the US Treasury Department. The task of 
the US Privacy Officer is to make all necessary verifications pursuant to the request. 
Subsequently, he or she shall without undue delay inform the DPA whether data may 
be disclosed, rectified, erased or blocked. The DPA is then required to communicate 
the US decision to the individual. This four-step procedure is time consuming and 
complex and thus might deter individuals to request access, rectification, erasure and 
blocking in the first place. While this administrative hazard might limit the 
effectiveness of redress mechanisms it seems to be a natural outcome of international 
legislation where two different legal systems need to be respected in the process. 
Thus, it cannot be considered to be a specific flaw of the SWIFT regime.  
However, apart from the administrative complexity, the legitimacy of the 
limited power granted to DPAs in this process is also questionable. Essentially, under 
the SWIFT Agreement EU DPAs are merely intermediaries entrusted with a 
‘communication role’ and do not possess any investigative powers or competencies to 
check the legitimacy of data processing to the US. Instead the competence of 
assessing whether access, rectification, erasure or blocking is granted rests 
exclusively within the US authorities. Since the DPAs’ control of processing is “an 
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essential component of protection”967 to the individual, EU legislation cannot 
eliminate nor reduce powers expressly accorded to DPAs under Article 8 (3) CFREU 
to examine claims of data subjects.968 Thus, the fact that DPAs do not have any real 
competences either when access is granted in the first place (this is done by Europol 
as pointed out earlier) or when a claim is lodged by data subjects contradicts the 
provisions of Article 8 (3) CFREU.969  
It could be argued that the limited competence of DPAs in investigating 
individual claims can be justified since their mandate is limited to data processing 
carried out on their own territory and thus they do not have any powers once 
processing is carried out in a third country.970 Nevertheless, since Article 15 of the 
SWIFT Agreement allows the individual to get a confirmation as to whether data has 
been processed ‘in compliance with this Agreement’ an assessment would naturally 
also include the initial transfer to the US. Thus, the territoriality requirement is met 
implying that DPAs have competence to act.971 In addition to that, it has to be noted 
that on previous occasions, the CJEU extended its rulings also to redress mechanisms 
in the US. For example, in Schrems the CJEU found that the dispute resolution 
mechanism under the former Safe Harbour Agreement provides insufficient 
protection since they are -unlike the EU national supervisory authorities- mainly 
designed to assess whether undertakings comply with Safe Harbour principles. 
Therefore, they do not guarantee effective legal protection against interference from 
the state.972 Also in the case of the SWIFT Agreement, the US authority in charge of 
assessing individual claims –the Privacy Officer within the Treasury Department- can 
be criticised. It does not seem to qualify as an independent authority as required under 
EU law since the positioning within the Treasury department does not guarantee that 
“decision-making power is independent of any direct or indirect external influence on 
the supervisory authority.973 Thus even if the limited role of EU DPAs themselves 
could be justified due to the missing territoriality link, EU case law still seems to 
apply to the analysis of US bodies in charge of reviewing individual claims. This does 
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968 Schrems, para. 53. 
969 Tele2 Sverige, para. 123.  
970 Article 28 (1) and (6) DPD and Schrems, para. 44.  
971 Schrems, para. 45. 
972 Schrems, para. 89; AG Opinion on Schrems, para. 204-206. 
973 Case C-518/07 Commission v Germany, para. 19.   
	   191 
not only illustrate the importance the EU grants to data subject rights but also shows 
the increasing extraterritorial effects of EU jurisprudence.   
 
(ii) Legal remedies 
When interference with Articles 7 and 8 CFREU takes place, individuals should have 
the option to lodge a legal complaint with a court.974 In case that data has been 
processed contrary to the SWIFT Agreement or in case that right to access, 
rectification, erasure or blocking was denied, individuals can seek administrative and 
judicial redress via Article 18 of the SWIFT Agreement.975 The article stipulates that 
redress can be requested in accordance with the laws of the EU, its Member States, 
and the United States, respectively. The Article mentions further: “(…) for this 
purpose and as regards data transferred to the United States pursuant to this 
Agreement, the U.S. Treasury Department shall treat all persons equally in the 
application of its administrative process, regardless of nationality or country of 
residence. All persons, regardless of nationality or country of residence, shall have 
available under U.S. law a process for seeking judicial redress from an adverse 
administrative action.”976 This provision is in contrast to the US FISA legislation 
which does not grant redress rights to non-US individuals.977 This shows the positive 
developments made in the second SWIFT Agreement in comparison to the first 
Agreement. Recital 12 of the SWIFT Agreement mentions a variety of laws that can 
be accessed by EU citizens seeking redress, namely: the Administrative Procedure 
Act of 1946, the Inspector General Act of 1978, the Implementing Recommendations 
of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007, the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, and the 
Freedom of Information Act. Nevertheless, the most relevant Act (Privacy Act of 
1974) is not among those laws accessible by EU citizens. A positive development is 
the entering into force of the Judicial Redress Act in 2016 providing further judicial 
redress to EU citizens.978 It is however unclear whether EU citizens can make use of 
this Act as it is not specifically mentioned in the SWIFT Agreement as a source of 
redress.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
974 E.g. Zakharov v. Russia, para. 234; see also Kennedy v. United Kingdom, para. 167.   
975 Article 18, SWIFT II Agreement.  
976 Article 18 (2), SWIFT II Agreement. 
977 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), PUBLIC LAW 95-511—OCT. 25, 1978, Sec. 110 
978 The Judicial Redress Act of 2015 (PUBLIC LAW 114–126—FEB. 24, 2016) has been adopted in 
2016. 
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3.3.4 Onward transfer 
  
The SWIFT Agreement mentions the possible onward transfer of information to third 
countries that might not fulfil the data protection requirements of the EU.979  However, 
data processing tools for public security need to include precautions when data is 
transferred to third parties.980 Article 7 of the SWIFT Agreement introduces several 
provisions for onward transfer. First, only information that is derived from an 
individualised search shall be shared.981 Second, information shall be shared only with 
law enforcement, public security, or counter terrorism authorities in the US, the EU 
Member States or third countries. Additionally, sharing data with Europol, Eurojust or 
another international body with the respective mandate is permitted.982 While this 
provision intends to limit the scope of the onward transfer, it still leaves a wide 
margin especially since there is no clear definition of institutions that deal with public 
security. Third, Article 7 stipulates that “such information shall be shared for lead 
purposes only and for exclusive purpose of the investigation, detection, prevention, or 
prosecution of terrorism or its financing.”983 This provision is confusing since “lead 
purposes” do not necessarily need to have a link to terrorism, while the second part of 
the sentence does require this link.  
Fourth, when the US Treasury Department intends to share data with a third 
country involving information of a citizen residing in an EU Member State it needs to 
ask for prior consent of the competent authority. However, the Article mentions that 
this requirement is void when “an immediate and serious threat to public security of a 
Party to this Agreement, a Member State, or a third country exists.”984 Although in 
some cases it is difficult to evaluate whether an immediate and serious threat exists, 
this provision needs to be specified in regard to which authority determines the 
existence of such a threat. Fifth, the Article also stipulates that the US Treasury 
Department shall request the third party or the third country to delete the sent data as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
979 Breach of Article 25 (1), DPD. 
980 Weber and Saravia v. Germany, para. 95. 
981 Article 7 (a), SWIFT II Agreement. 
982 Ibid., Article 7 (b). 
983 Ibid., Article 7 (c).  
984 Ibid., Article 7 (d). 
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soon as it is no longer necessary for the purpose for which it was shared.985 There are 
two major problems with this provision. First, as soon as data is transferred to a third 
party or country, the compliance with adequate data protection standards cannot be 
controlled anymore. Second, while internally the SWIFT Agreement sets a limit to 
data retention to five years, it sets no clear limit to the storage of data when it is in the 
possession of a third party. This is surprising given that data protection standards in 
other countries could potentially be lower.   
An interesting point on onward transfer was also raised in DRI. The CJEU 
argued that the DRD did not require data to be stored in the EU implying “(…) that it 
cannot be held that the control, explicitly required by Article 8 (3) of the Charter, by 
an independent authority of compliance with the requirements of protection and 
security (…) is fully ensured.”986 Further the Court argues that such a control, carried 
out on the basis of EU law, is an essential component of the protection of individuals 
with regard to processing of personal data.987 The transfer to the US under the SWIFT 
Agreement can be considered as justified since it is stipulated by the Agreement itself. 
However, onward transfer to a third country is a different matter. While the SWIFT 
Agreement does mention that prior consent is required of the competent Member 
State authorities of the data subject, this is not to apply when essential for the 
prevention of an immediate threat to public security. In the latter cases, competent 
authorities of the data subject’s Member State only need to be informed “at the 
earliest opportunity”988 depriving them of the ability to control whether the third state 
complies with the requirements of protection and security. Consequently, it can be 
argued that the ‘onward transfer’ provisions of the second SWIFT Agreement do not 
comply with standards laid down by CJEU case law.     
 
3.3.5 Data security 
 
An adequate data security strategy needs to account for: (i) the vast quantity of data 
whose retention is required; (ii) the sensitivity of the data; and (iii) the risk of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
985 Ibid., Article 7 (e). 
986 DRI, para. 68. See also: Tele2 Sverige, para. 122.  
987 Ibid.  
988 Article 7 (d), SWIFT II Agreement. 
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unlawful access to data.989 Article 5 of the SWIFT Agreement sets out data security 
standards to be complied with after the data has been transferred to the US authorities. 
Respectively, five data security standards are mentioned reflecting the previously 
mentioned CJEU criteria. First, data shall be held in a secure environment, stored 
separately from other data and maintained with high-level systems and physical 
intrusion controls. 990 Second, data shall not be interconnected with any other 
database.991 Third, access shall be limited to analysts investigating terrorism and 
persons involved in support, management and oversight of TFTP. 992  Nevertheless, 
here to further enhance the protection against unlawful access it might have been 
useful to include a requirement that all data access needs to be authorised and subject 
to record keeping. Fourth, data shall not be subject to manipulation, alteration or 
addition.993 Ultimately, no copies shall be made other than for disaster backup.994 
Overall, these five security provisions illustrate that under the Agreement SWIFT data 
should be stored in a ‘clear and distinct manner’ to ensure their full integrity and 
confidentiality and by minding the risks of unlawful access and the sensitive nature of 
the data.995  
However, it is interesting to note that recently there have been attacks on the 
SWIFT infrastructure and operations to conceal money flows from SWIFT have been 
successful.996 The attacks raise two concerns. First, the vulnerability of SWIFT 
infrastructure raises concerns about the effectiveness in practice of the company’s 
data security standards. Second, the fact that criminals managed to conduct illegal 
transactions by circumventing the SWIFT messaging system questions the quality of 
data within SWIFT for law enforcement purposes. In other words if criminals 
increasingly possess the means to circumvent the recording of financial messaging 
data via SWIFT, the usefulness of that data for law enforcement purposes seems to 
diminish.      
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
989 DRI, para. 66; Tele2 Sverige, para. 122.   
990 Article 5 (4) (a)  SWIFT II Agreement. 
991 Ibid., Article 5 (4) (b). 
992 Ibid., Article 5 (4) (c) 
993 Ibid., Article 5 (4) (d). 
994 Ibid., Article 5 (4) (e).  
995 DRI, para. 66.  
996 ‘Hacker dringen in Zahlungssystem Swift ein’. Retrieved 10.01.2017 from: 
http://www.spiegel.de/wirtschaft/service/swift-hacker-sind-zahlungssystem-eingedrungen-a-
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4. The SWIFT regime and ‘political actorness’ of the CJEU 
 
It has been demonstrated that existing jurisprudence is applicable to the SWIFT 
Agreement and has an impact on its legality. It is however also worth addressing 
whether and under which circumstances it could in fact have a spill over effect 
implying political actorness of the CJEU. It is interesting to note that the EP requested 
shortly after the DRI judgement its legal service to elaborate on the impact of the 
judgment on the PNR and SWIFT Agreements.997 As elaborated in Chapter 6, the EP 
took the opportunity to question the EU-Canada PNR Agreement in front of the CJEU 
as this has been negotiated at the time of the DRI judgment. Nevertheless, the timings 
and legislation-making procedure prevents this in the case of the SWIFT Agreement. 
Article 218 TFEU on the conclusion of international agreements stipulates that “[a] 
Member State, the European Parliament, the Council or the Commission may obtain 
the opinion of the Court of Justice as to whether an Agreement envisaged is 
compatible with the Treaties. Where the opinion of the Court is adverse, the 
agreement envisaged may not enter into force unless it is amended or the Treaties are 
revised.”998 Since the SWIFT Agreement has already been adopted no institutional 
actor could question the compatibility with the Treaties by requesting an opinion from 
the Court.  
Once an Agreement is concluded, two options remain to challenge the legal 
basis of an international Agreement. First, Article 263 TFEU stipulates that the CJEU 
shall have jurisdiction to review the legality of legislative acts that produce legal 
effects vis-à-vis third parties. Both Member States and institutional actors are eligible 
to bring actions to the CJEU on the grounds of “(…) lack of competence, 
infringement of an essential procedural requirement, infringement of the Treaties or 
of any rule of law relating to their application, or misuse of powers.”999 However, 
Article 263 TFEU also mentions that any proceedings provided for in this Article 
shall be instituted within two months of the publication of the measure. Since the 
SWIFT Agreement is already in force since 2010 the institutional actors can thus not 
invoke Article 263 TFEU. 
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April 2014 in Joined Cases C-293/12 and C-594/12, Digital Rights Ireland and Seitlinger and others - 
Directive 2006/24/EC on data retention - Consequences of the judgment, SJ-0890/H. 
998 Article 218 (11) TFEU 
999 Article 263 TFEU 
	   196 
Second, the Agreement may form the object of a reference under Article 267 
TFEU stipulating that the CJEU shall have jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings 
concerning the validity and interpretation of Union acts.1000 However, annulment of an 
Agreement via this route is more complicated for two reasons. First of all, it is 
debatable whether the CJEU has indeed jurisdiction under Article 267 TFEU. The 
Article mentions that the CJEU shall have jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings 
concerning “the validity and interpretation of acts of the institutions, bodies, offices or 
agencies of the Union”.1001 Since international treaties such as the SWIFT Agreement 
are concluded by EU institutional actors, the SWIFT Agreement can be subject to the 
CJEU’s ruling if invoked at national level. The CJEU has already accepted 
jurisdiction in those cases.1002 However, it has also been argued that strictly speaking 
international agreements are not ‘acts of the institutions’. Instead only the decision 
granting competence to conclude the Agreements can be considered as ‘acts of 
institutions’.1003 Therefore, “[i]t is obvious that the reference to the Court of Justice, by 
a court or tribunal in a Member State, of questions of interpretation of an agreement is 
useful only if (a) the Court has jurisdiction to interpret and (b) the referring court may 
or must give effect to the provisions of the agreement in the case before it.”1004     
Another Treaty-based option to suspend the Agreement without involving the 
CJEU is provided in Article 218 (9) TFEU. It is stipulated that “[t]he Council, on a 
proposal from the Commission or the High Representative of the Union for Foreign 
Affairs and Security Policy, shall adopt a decision suspending application of an 
agreement and establishing the positions to be adopted on the Union’s behalf in a 
body set up by an agreement (…).”1005 This provision provides the Commission 
theoretically with the opportunity to suspend the Agreement. In practice there are no 
indications that recent case law prompted the Commission to consider invoking 
Article 218 (9) TFEU. In an impact assessment accompanying a Commission 
Communication in 2013 it was even considered to establish an EU-internal TFTP 
regime. While the assessment concluded that such a regime was not necessary, the 
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1002 For example, Case C-181/73 Haegeman v. Belgium of 30 April 1974 
1003 Hartley, T. (1998) The Foundations of European Community Law. Oxford University Press.   
1004 Eeckhout, P. (2011) EU External Relations Law. Oxford EU Law Library, pp. 275 -76 
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reasons were mainly related to costs rather than to privacy and data protection 
considerations.1006 The Communication also evaluated the option of amending the 
current EU‐US SWIFT Agreement. However this was discarded without detailed 
assessment since amending the Agreement depends on “the consent of a third country 
[which] makes it weak.”1007 The option of terminating the Agreement was also 
mentioned but rejected since it would have a negative effect on EU intelligence 
gathering in regard to the prevention of terrorist offenses in the EU.1008 While the 
impact assessment at least briefly discusses these options, the Commission 
Communication does not even mention the possibility of terminating or amending the 
SWIFT Agreement. It is unlikely that the Commission would come to a different 
conclusion after the DRI judgement, as the reasons for not having considered them in 
2013 are still relevant. Furthermore, the Commission’s ‘institutional memory’ of the 
difficulty of negotiating the Agreement with the US counterpart would lead to its 
preference of maintaining the status quo.1009 It can thus be concluded that while some 
findings of the existing CJEU and ECtHR jurisprudence seem to apply to the SWIFT 
Agreement, political actorness is not very likely due to timing and the more limited 




The aim of this chapter was to analyse how the EU institutional framework shaped 
data protection and privacy in respect to the SWIFT Agreement. The second 
hypothesis (i.e. “The EU institutional framework enables EU legislative actors to 
pursue strategic preferences in the legislation-making process and thereby influences 
the way privacy and data protection is shaped in the public security context) has been 
confirmed. The chapter has identified three strategic preferences among EU policy 
actors at the policy formation stage which in turn shaped privacy and data protection. 
First, the lack of sincere cooperation between EU institutional actors shows that actors 
were subject to different institutional frameworks impacting their preference 
formation during the initial stages of TFTP in the US. Second, the institutional 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1006 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council - A European 
terrorist finance tracking system (EU TFTS), COM(2013) 842 final, p. 13.  
1007 Ibid., p.21. 
1008 Ibid., p.22. 
1009 See Section 2 of this Chapter.  
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framework encouraged power struggles for more legislative influence between the EP 
and the Council which led to a revision of the SWIFT Agreement and thus to the re-
shaping of privacy and data protection. Third, the institutional framework fostered 
strategic transgovernmentalism between EU and US actors which played a role in 
shaping privacy and data protection both when the first and the second Agreement 
were adopted. It has been shown that the US was in a stronger negotiation position 
than the EU due to the TFTP programme originating in the US and due to the 
complex institutional framework that existed in the EU.  
The chapter also assessed Hypothesis 3 (i.e. “The transitional nature of the 
EU institutional framework contributed to the CJEU’s evolution from a ‘legal basis 
arbiter’ to a political actor in its own right that increasingly determines substantial 
aspects relating to privacy and data protection in the public security context”).  
On the one hand, it has been shown that some provisions of the Agreement are 
not proportionate in light of the framework established in Chapter 3: (i) the 
Agreement does not strictly limit the persons who are authorised to access and use 
data under the SWIFT Agreement; (ii) while the Agreement specifies that no data that 
refers to the Single Euro Payments Area (SEPA) can be sought, it fails to define the 
actual target group liable to interception; (iii) the SWIFT Agreement falls short of the 
requirement that an independent administrative authority or a court needs to review 
access. This is because the law enforcement authority Europol is entrusted with this 
task which does not qualify as independent as it could potentially benefit from 
investigation results emerging from US analysis of SWIFT data; (iv) the Agreement 
does not sufficiently limit the retention period of non-extracted personal data since no 
requirement to depersonalise the data exists; (v) the retention period in respect to 
extracted data is not sufficiently limited since the SWIFT Agreement fails to 
explicitly require the deletion of extracted data; (vi) the Agreement does not grant 
sufficient competences to European Data Protection Authorities in assessing whether 
rights of data subjects have been infringed and in assessing the treatment of personal 
data when it was transferred to third parties; and (vii) while the adoption of the 
Judicial Redress Act has strengthened legal remedies available to EU citizens, it is 
unclear whether it could be invoked for issues relating to the SWIFT Agreement. 
 The chapter also analysed under which circumstances the CJEU case law can 
shape preference formation among policy actors and thus exhibit features of political 
actorness. It has been shown that the EP requested shortly after the DRI judgement its 
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legal service to elaborate on the impact of the judgment on the PNR and SWIFT 
Agreements. However, as shown timing and corresponding institutional rules 
determines whether a judgment can directly shape strategic preferences of policy 
makers.   
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CHAPTER 6 – PNR AGREEMENT: THE SPILL-OVER EFFECT OF A 




In 2016 the Passenger Name Record Directive was adopted which is the latest 
addition to several EU legislative tools that regulate the processing of passenger name 
records for public security purposes.1010 Apart from the PNR Directive, the EU has 
concluded PNR agreements with the United States, Canada, and Australia and 
agreements with other countries are currently under discussion.1011 This chapter 
focuses on the EU-US PNR Agreement as it introduced the practice of processing 
PNR data for security purposes to the EU and because it is the most controversial of 
its kind. To a more limited extend the chapter also assesses the PNR Directive since it 
is considered to be an example of EU norm-taking of US practices.  
The EU-US PNR Agreement is based on the US Aviation and Transportation 
Security Act (ATSA) which was introduced as a reaction to 9/11.1012 The act stipulates 
that air carriers need to provide the US Customs Service1013 access to passenger name 
records (PNR) for purposes of security screening of individuals travelling to and from 
the US. More specifically, PNR is key to the operation of the US Automated Targeted 
System (ATS) which uses a wide range of databases (e.g. law enforcement and FBI 
databases) in order to assess if travellers pose a risk by being involved in terrorism or 
criminal activities. If this is the case they can be subject to further examination before 
departure.1014 PNR is data collected through airline reservation systems for 
commercial purposes and the data includes various fields of personal information 
ranging from name and address to ‘frequent flier programmes’ and available contact 
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and payment/billing information. Although all of these fields appear inconspicuous, 
combining them in a certain way can reveal sensitive information.1015  
The US Office of Homeland Security stresses that the war on terrorism is and 
must be a global effort requiring the cooperation of nations around the world.1016 
However, the US legislators did not take potential conflicts with non-US legal 
frameworks into account when enacting ATSA. Therefore, air carriers were in the 
midst of conflicting legal obligations. On the one hand they had to comply with 
ATSA requirements while on the other hand they were subject to the DPD. 
Ultimately, the EU Commission was forced to approach the US because European 
airlines were not allowed to land on US soil without allowing US authorities access to 
PNR data. This first step towards a transatlantic agreement permitting the transfer of 
PNR data in accordance with EU law marks the beginning of the ‘EU-US PNR 
Agreement saga’. It includes a first Agreement in 2004, the CJEU’s annulment of the 
first Agreement in 2006, an interim Agreement in 2006, the second Agreement in 
2007, and the third PNR Agreement in 2012. Furthermore, the EU-US PNR 
Agreement also triggered the adoption of the PNR Directive in 2016.  
The aim of the chapter is to illustrate how the EU institutional framework 
shapes data protection and privacy in respect to the PNR Agreement. Hypothesis 2 
guides the assessment of the extent to which strategic considerations of the involved 
actors shaped privacy and data protection in the pre-Lisbon environment. It is argued 
that the Commission used the PNR negotiations as way to increase its influence in 
AFSJ matters and external relations. To do so, it made use of several institutional 
variables such as transgovernmentalism, conceptual framing through cross-
pillarisation and strategic communication with the EP. Furthermore, the EP attempted 
to increase its influence in the legislation-making procedure by making use of cross-
pillarisation (i.e. by starting legal proceedings), through venue shopping and through 
the co-decision procedure. Ultimately, it will be demonstrated that the EU policy-
makers were norm-takers since they internalised US rules to an extent that an internal 
PNR regime has been adopted. It is also assessed to what extent Hypothesis 3 is 
applicable. In this respect it is first of all assessed to what extent current ECtHR and 
CJEU jurisprudence is applicable to the EU-US Agreement and the PNR Directive. 
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To do so, the framework developed in Chapter 3 will be applied. It has to be noted 
that the currently pending Opinion 1/15 on the EU-Canada Agreement will be 
relevant for the analysis due to the Agreement’s similarity to the EU-US Agreement. 
The section therefore takes the AG Opinion into account which had already been 
published at the time of completion of this thesis. As a second step, it is then analysed 
to which extent political actorness can be identified and it will be shown that post-
Lisbon political actorness takes place but only on a conditional basis.    
 
1. The origins of the PNR regime 
 
The implementing rules of ATSA can be categorised as a ‘national solo effort’ 
disregarding the transnational dimension of PNR data.1017 The Article 29 WP 
questions whether these unilaterally adopted US measures are compatible with 
international agreements and conventions concerning air traffic and transportation, 
with national laws and with the DPD.1018 Sending EU PNR and passenger manifests to 
the US authorities may lead to four conflicts with the DPD. First, data subjects are not 
in all cases informed about the fact that data is sent to the US authorities at the point 
of data collection contradicting the principle of fair processing of data. In the case of 
PNR, the principle of fair processing cannot be limited on grounds of fighting crime 
and maintaining national security1019 since the data processing is systemic. 
Furthermore, the need to inform data subjects can only be waived in particular 
instances such as if required for in national law.1020 While PNR data transfer was 
required by US law, there was no basis for this in EU or Member State laws. Second, 
in respect to data security, the Article 29 WP claims that technical requirements 
imposed on airlines by the US are not sufficient as they might leave data exposed to 
non-authorised access by third parties. It is however not further specified why 
technical standards are not high enough and it is thus not clear on which factors this 
assumption is based. Third, the data processing to the US is not aligned to the original 
purpose for which the data is collected, namely to fulfil contractual obligations vis-à-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1017 On US ‘global unilateralism’, see: Rees, W. and Aldrich, R. (2005). Contending Cultures of 
Counterterrorism: Transatlantic Divergence or Convergence? International Affairs, vol. 81 (5), pp. 
390-406.  
1018 Article 29 WP Opinion 6/2002 of 24 October 2002 on transmission of Passenger Manifest 
Information and other data from Airlines to the United States, 11647/02/EN WP 66, p. 4.  
1019 As stipulated in Article 13, DPD. 
1020 Article 11, DPD. 
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vis the passenger. Thus, the processing does not comply with the purpose limitation 
principle.1021 However, in accordance with Article 13 DPD, the EU or Member States 
can adopt legislative measures in order to relax the purpose limitation principle for the 
sake of safeguarding public security or to investigate/prevent criminal offences. 
Fourth, the DPD also stipulates that any personal data transfer to a third country 
requires an adequate level of protection in the respective country. While the Safe 
Harbour Agreement existed at that time, its scope is limited to companies and can 
thus not apply to data transfer to government authorities.1022 Therefore, an adequacy 
decision was considered to be necessary leading to a dialogue between the EU and the 
US authorities.  
 
2. EU institutional dynamics leading to the PNR Agreement 
 
In accordance with NI, assessing how privacy and data protection is shaped in relation 
to the PNR Agreement requires the analysis of how the institutional framework 
influences the behaviour of policy actors. In the following, five strategic activities of 
legislative actors will be discussed that shaped privacy and data protection in the PNR 
context: transgovernmentalism, cross-pillarisation in regard to conceptual framing, 
cross-pillarisation in respect to legal proceedings, venue-shopping and norm-taking.    
 
2.1 Initial negotiations: EU Commission’s solo effort 
 
After the EU Commission learnt that a US law requiring PNR to be transmitted will 
enter into force in early 2003 it informed the EU Council Working Party on aviation 
during a meeting on the 28 of January 2003 about the precarious situation such a law 
would cause for EU airlines.1023 Furthermore, the Commission informed the Council 
that a meeting between US Customs officials and the Commission was planned before 
the adoption of the US law.1024 The Council suggested that national data protection 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1021 Article 6 (1) (b), DPD. 
1022 Note that the US Privacy Act which regulates data protection/privacy when data is processed by 
public authorities did not apply to non-EU citizens at that time.  
1023	  	  Aviation - New legal requirements by US on ‘Advanced Passenger Information System’ (APIS) 
and ‘Passenger Name Records’ (PNR); Council Doc. 6051/03. 
1024 New Legal Requirements by US on ‘Advanced Passenger Information System’ (APIS) and 
‘Passenger Name Records’ (PNR). Exchange of Views on the Position of the Member States. 
Discussion by Working Party on Aviation on 28 January 2003, Council Doc. 6051/03. 
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authorities should be involved in the following meetings in order to discuss various 
options.1025 In the subsequent early stages of the negotiations national data protection 
authorities did not play a role and instead the Commission managed to become the 
key player of the PNR negotiations. It achieved this status in three ways: (i) forming a 
strategic partnership with US negotiators right from the beginning (i.e. 
transgovernmentalism), (ii) marginalising the EP, and (iii) conceptually framing PNR 
as a data protection matter.  
First, right from the start the Commission did not only take the lead in the 
negotiations but also demonstrated its willingness to compromise. In 2003 a 
Commission delegation met US Customs authorities in order to discuss the 
implications of PNR transmissions from the EU to the US. Instead of being initial 
discussions, the meeting resulted in a joint statement stressing the full commitment to 
the US objective of preventing and combating terrorism and the “(…) need for 
practicable solutions that would provide legal certainty for all concerned.”1026 In 
addition to that, both sides agreed on the need to reach a bilateral arrangement (i.e. the 
adequacy decision) under Article 25 (6) DPD in due time.1027 Since it seemed unlikely 
that an adequacy decision could be reached until the US law entered into force, the 
Commission made an appeal to data protection authorities not to take enforcement 
actions against airlines complying with the US requirements until an agreement 
between the US and EU has been reached.1028 In addition to the Commission’s 
collaborative efforts towards the US, it is interesting to note that it also suggested 
multilateral agreements via the UN Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO).1029 This 
indicates that the Commission does not only readily accept the US norms but that it 
even had an interest in elevating those norms to a wider international level. After the 
conclusion of the joint statement, the Commission reported back to the Council 
Working Party on Aviation and to national experts on data protection and confronted 
them with a fait accompli.1030  
 Second, during the first phase of negotiations the relationship between the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1025 Ibid.  
1026 European Commission/US Customs Talks on PNR Transmission, Joint Statement. Brussels, 17/18 
February, para. 2. Retrieved 11.01.17 from 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/privacy/docs/adequacy/declaration_en.pdf  
1027 Ibid., para. 6. 
1028 Ibid., para. 4.  
1029 Ibid., para. 8. 
1030 How US Customs bounced the European Commission into a quick decision. Retrieved 11.01.17 
from http://www.statewatch.org/news/2003/mar/02usdata2.htm 
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Commission and the EP was marked by lack of cooperation and different views on 
the substance of how to regulate access to PNR data. The EP expressed concerns 
about the Commission’s joint statement in a Motion for a Resolution.1031 In response, 
Commission officials attended the plenary session of the EP mentioning that “[i]t [the 
Commission] had no intention to conceal. It was more a question of when to bring 
this matter to the attention of Parliament and in what form.”1032 This indicates that 
communication between the two players was linked to strategic considerations and 
did not happen by default undermining the principle of ‘sincere cooperation’.1033 The 
EP ultimately adopted a highly critical resolution ‘on transfer of personal data by 
airlines in the case of transatlantic flights’ which questions the legal basis of the joint 
statement and criticised that the statement could be understood as an “(…) indirect 
invitation to the national authorities to disregard Community law.”1034 Furthermore, 
the EP also condemned the fact that it had not been informed before signing the joint 
statement.1035 
Third, by successfully framing PNR data transfer as a first pillar matter the 
Commission also framed PNR as a data protection matter. This allowed the 
Commission to cave out competences from the Council and the EP via the comitology 
procedure. Comitology is a procedure by which a legally binding Union act identifies 
the need for uniform conditions of implementation. Thus it requires the adoption of 
implementing acts by the Commission under the supervision of the Member States.1036 
The comitology procedure under the DPD takes the form of granting the Commission 
the power to adopt “adequacy decisions”. More specifically, Article 25(6) DPD 
stipulates that the Commission may find that a third country ensures an adequate level 
of data protection enabling Member States to transfer data to that country. While the 
aim of comitology is to facilitate the implementation of Union acts and increase 
efficiency, concerns about democratic legitimacy and the balance of power between 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1031  European Parliament Motion for a Resolution further to the Commission statement pursuant to 
Rule 37(2) of the Rules of Procedure by Jorge Salvador Hernández Mollar on behalf of the Committee 
on Citizens' Freedoms and Rights, Justice and Home Affairs on transfer of personal data by airlines in 
the case of transatlantic flights, B5-0187/2003. 
1032 Ibid.  
1033 Article 13 TEU. 
1034 European Parliament Resolution on transfer of personal data by airlines in the case of transatlantic 
flights, P5_TA(2003)0097, para. 3. 
1035 Ibid., para. 1. 
1036 Regulation (EU) No 182/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 February 2011 
laying down the rules and general principles concerning mechanisms for control by Member States of 
the Commission’s exercise of implementing powers, OJ 2011 L 55. 
	   206 
EU institutional players may arise since additional legislation is adopted without the 
usual policy-making procedures. The Commission’s efforts to reach an adequacy 
decision were cumbersome. While the Commission showed on many occasions 
resistance to accept US solutions, the adopted adequacy decision still reveals that 
significant concessions had been made. During the negotiations, the EP continuously 
attempted to influence the negotiations and gain more (in)formal competences in the 
legislation-making process. One example of this is the threat of the incumbent EP 
rapporteur that if the Commission acts against the principle of loyal cooperation the 
EP would take legal action in order to “protect parliamentary prerogatives.”1037 
Disregarding the concerns of the Parliament1038 the adequacy decision was ultimately 
adopted on the 14th of May 2004.1039 Three days later, the Council signed a Council 
Decision on the Agreement.1040 Ultimately on the 28th of May the first PNR agreement 
was signed by both US and EU authorities.1041  
2.2 Adoption and annulment of the first PNR Agreement: Is the EP the victim of 
cross-pillarisation?  
 
In Chapter 4 it was claimed that EU institutional actors made use of cross-pillarisation 
at the beginning of the legislation-making procedure to maximize their influence in 
respect to the policy outcome of the DRD. Nevertheless, in the PNR case, cross-
pillarisation became apparent only after the PNR Agreement has been adopted namely 
when the EP challenged the first Agreement’s legal basis resulting in the change of 
pillars.1042 
Already before the adoption of the adequacy decision and the PNR 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1037 EU-US PNR: Council to ignore Parliament and go ahead with “deal”. Retrieved 11.01.2017 from 
http://www.statewatch.org/news/2004/may/06eu-us-nr-deal.htm  
1038 It has to be mentioned, though, that the Parliament ignored the request of the Council for an 
expedited procedure in delivering its opinion on the proposal due to the lack of all language versions. 
Thus, the Council felt legitimised to act without the EP’s opinion.   
1039 Commission Decision of 14 May 2004 on the adequate protection of personal data contained in the 
Passenger Name Record of air passengers transferred to the United States’ Bureau of Customs and 
Border Protection, OJ 2004 L 235. 
1040 Council Decision 2004/496/EC of 17 May 2004 on the conclusion of an Agreement between the 
European Community and the United States Department of Homeland Security, Bureau of Customs 
and Border Protection, OJ 2004 L183/83. 
1041 Agreement between the European Community and the United States of America on the processing 
and transfer of PNR data by air carriers to the United States Department of Homeland Security, Bureau 
of Customs and Border Protection, CE/USA/en 1.  
1042 Note that apart from the PNR, DRD and SWIFT cases, the EP does not seem to frequently engage 
in litigation: see: Fahey, E. (2015) Of One Shotters and Repeat-Hitters: A Retrospective on the Role of 
the European Parliament in the EU-US PNR Litigation. In Davies, B. and Nicola, F. (forthcoming) EU 
Law Stories, Cambridge University Press. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2605793   
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Agreement, the EP submitted a request for an opinion to the CJEU on the 
Agreement’s compatibility with the Treaty.1043 Before the Court could deliver the 
opinion, the agreement was adopted turning this request sans objet. Therefore, the EP 
took further legal actions both against the Agreement and the Commission’s adequacy 
decision after receiving the recommendation of the EP legal committee.1044 In regard 
to the adequacy decision 2004/535/EC the EP advanced four pleas for annulment.1045 
In the first the EP claimed that the decision was ultra vires because it infringes Article 
3 (2) DPD on the exclusion of activities which fall outside the scope, ratione 
materiae, of the Directive and Community law.1046 Second, the EP argues that the 
adequacy decision is a breach of the fundamental principles of Directive 95/46/EC. 
Third, it was asserted that fundamental rights are breached since the law is not 
accessible and foreseeable (accordance with law requirement of Art. 8 ECHR). 
Fourth, the EP believed that the principle of proportionality is infringed since the 
number of transferred PNR data categories and the time period of data storage is 
excessive. In regard to Decision 2004/4961047 the EP advanced six pleas for 
annulment: (i) Article 95 EC is not the correct legal basis because the Decision’s aim 
is not the establishment and functioning of the internal market but to enable 
processing of personal data for anti-terror purposes; (ii) the second subparagraph of 
Article 300 (3) EC was infringed because Directive 95/46 was amended; (iii) the right 
to protection of personal data has been infringed; (iv) the principle of proportionality 
has been breached; (v) a sufficiently precise statement of reasons for the adoption of 
the Decision was lacking;  (vi) the principle of cooperation in good faith laid down in 
Article 10 EC had been breached. 1048  Since the CJEU rejected the EP’s request for an 
expedited procedure the court ruling was only published in 2006. 1049 
The Court ignored all EP pleas besides the ones on the legal basis. The Court 
mentions that recitals 6 and 7 of the adequacy decision make references to the US law 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1043 Joined Cases C-317/04 and C-318/04, European Parliament v Council of the European Union and 
Commission of the European Communities of 30 May 2006, para. 39. 
1044 Ibid. 
1045 Ibid., para. 50. The adequacy decision contains the assurances of the US to the EU on how data is 
adequately protected in the US.  
1046 Ibid., para. 51. 
1047 The Decision lays down the modus operandi of the Agreement.  
1048 Joined Cases C-317/04 and C-318/04, European Parliament v Council of the European Union and 
Commission of the European Communities. 
1049 Ordonnance du Président de la Cour 21 Septembre 2004 ‘Procédure accélérée’ Dans l'affaire C-
317/04, ayant pour objet un recours en annulation au titre de l'article 230 CE, introduit le 27 juillet 
2004. 
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requiring PNR transfer1050 and stipulate that the legislation concerns the enhancement 
of security and the conditions under which persons my enter and leave the country. 
Recitals 8 and 15 stipulate that the EU is fully committed to support the US in the 
fight against terror and that PNR data is strictly used for preventing and combatting 
terrorism, related crimes and other serious crimes.1051 Thus, the Court concluded that 
PNR data transfer to CBP “(…) constitutes processing operations concerning public 
security and the activities of the State in areas of criminal law.”1052 The CJEU 
acknowledges that the initial collection of data takes place under Community law 
since the sale of airline tickets is a matter of supply of services. Nevertheless, data 
processing regulated by the adequacy decision concerns safeguarding public security 
and serves law enforcement purposes.1053 In addition to that, the CJEU also reverses 
the Commission’s argument that Article 3 (2) DPD only applies to activities 
conducted by the state.1054 In fact, it does not play a role that data is collected and 
transferred by private actors (i.e. airlines). Instead the purpose of the transfer is 
decisive namely the safeguarding of public security.1055 As a consequence the Court 
determines that the adequacy decision does not fall within the scope of the DPD and 
must be annulled.1056 In regard to the EP’s plea for annulling the Council Decision 
2004/496 the Court also exclusively focused on the EP’s argument that Article 95 EC 
was chosen as an incorrect legal basis. The Council defended the legal basis by 
arguing that a measure was necessary to avoid distortions of competition since some 
airlines decided to comply with US requirements while some did not.1057 The 
Commission made a more trivial argument by complaining that the EP has not 
suggested an appropriate legal basis during the legislation-making procedure.1058 By 
keeping its reasoning very short, the Court argued that “[a]rticle 95 EC, read in 
conjunction with Article 25 of the Directive, cannot justify Community competence 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1050 Title 49, United States Code, section 44909 (c) (3) and Title 19, Code of Federal Regulations, 
section 122.49b.  
1051 Joined Cases C-317/04 and C-318/04, European Parliament v Council of the European Union and 
Commission of the European Communities, para. 55 
1052 Ibid., Para. 56.  
1053 Ibid., Para. 57.  
1054 The Commission relies on C-101/01, Lindqvist, para. 43. 
1055 Joined Cases C-317/04 and C-318/04, European Parliament v Council of the European Union and 
Commission of the European Communities, para. 58. 
1056 Ibid., paras. 59 and 61. 
1057 Ibid., para. 64. 
1058 Ibid., para. 65. 
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to conclude the Agreement.”1059 It further mentions that the Agreement relates to the 
same transfer of data as the adequacy decision and is thus excluded from the scope of 
DPD.1060 Therefore, the Court also annulled Decision 2004/496.1061 The annulment 
took effect after 90 days as stipulated under paragraph 7 of the Agreement.1062   
 
The ruling has been described as ‘failure for the European Parliament’1063 or as 
‘pyrrhic victory’.1064 This argument was mainly advanced because in the aftermath of 
the Decision the PNR Agreement had to be re-negotiated under the third pillar 
excluding the EP from the decision-making process. In the case that the EP’s legal 
action against the Commission and Council was an attempt to show ‘actorness’1065 and 
to show its intention to influence how data protection and privacy is shaped in the 
context of PNR, it failed.1066 Obviously, the EP manoeuvred itself in to this precarious 
situation since it questioned the legal basis in one of its pleas in front of the CJEU. 
Thus, the EP proactively took the risk that the Court would find that the legal basis of 
the Agreement is wrong leading to its exclusion from the policy-making procedure. 
This raises the question of why the EP challenged the legal basis instead of relying 
exclusively on the other numerous pleas it advanced? It has been argued that the 
ideological rationale was the strongest driving force behind the EP decision to take 
legal action.1067 The EP found that adequate data protection safeguards were missing 
and that the US executive branch exercised too much influence on EU internal 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1059 Ibid., para. 67. 
1060 Ibid., para. 68. 
1061 Ibid., para. 70. 
1062 For reasons of legal certainty the adequacy decision will thus also be valid for the subsequent 90 
days.  
1063 De Hert, P & De Schutter, B. (2008). International Transfers of Data in the Field of JHA: The 
Lessons of Europol, PNR and Swift. In Martenczuk, B. & Van Tiehl, S. (2008). Justice, Liberty, 
Security. New Challenges for EU External Relations. Brussels University Press, p. 304. 
1064 Mitsilegas, V. (2015). The Transformation of Privacy in an Era of Pre-emptive Surveillance. 
Tilburg Law Review, vol 20 (2015), p.39; Monar, J. (2010a), op. cit., p. 36. See also: Gilmore, G. and 
Rijpma, J. (2007). Joined cases C-317/04 and C-318/04. Common Market Law Review, vol. 44 (4), pp. 
1081-1099.    
1065 ‘Actorness’ for this purpose means having a tangible influence on the nature of a policy or a policy 
field. The term ‘actorness’ originally stems from research on the stance of the EU on the global level 
and the role it plays. For a detailed analysis, see: Bretherton, C. & Vogler, J. (2006). The European 
Union as a Global Actor, Routledge; Smith, H. (2002) European Union Foreign Policy: What it is and 
what it does. Pluto Press; Smith, K. E. (2003) European Union Foreign Policy in a Changing World. 
Polity Press.  
1066 The fact that actors litigate to gain influence has been raised in: Barros, X. (2012) The external 
dimension of EU counter-terrorism: the challenges of the European Parliament in front of the European 
Court of Justice, European Security, vol. 21 (4), pp. 518-536. 
1067 Ibid., p. 525. 
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affairs.1068 This shows that normative principles can in fact play a role in the policy-
making process.  
Nevertheless, while the EP might have been partially guided by normative 
aspirations, the EP did not achieve its objective of safeguarding privacy and data 
protection. The judgment created a loophole in the protection of European citizens 
because under the third pillar passenger data is used without being protected by the 
DPD.1069 It is worth mentioning that at that time Council Framework Decision 
2008/977/JHA on the protection of personal data in the third pillar did not yet exist 
and thus the judgement indeed created a lacuna legis.1070 Furthermore, the EP also 
argued that transfer based on a ‘pull’ system cannot be defined as transfer within the 
meaning of Article 25 DPD. Both the EDPS and the AG argued that restricting the 
concept of transfer to one based on a ‘push system’ makes it easy to evade conditions 
laid down by Article 25 DPD and thus impairs data protection provided for in the 
article.1071 Since the EP either failed to foresee or ignored these consequences, it can 
be doubted that ideological concerns were the key driver when the EP challenged the 
PNR Agreement. Instead the pleas submitted to the CJEU suggest that the EP 
indiscriminately advanced various arguments in order to maximise the possibility of 
the Court annulling the Agreement. Another likely explanation is thus that the 
struggles between EU institutional actors before the adoption of the Agreement 
seemed to have motivated the EP to give the Council and the Commission a warning 
at all costs to not exclude the EP in the future. A similar strategy of balancing current 
loss with future gains has also been observed in the negotiations on the DRD.1072 Thus, 
overall the EP might have still achieved a long-term strategic goal with the Court 
decision.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1068 Ibid. 
1069 EDPS first reaction to the Court of Justice judgment of 30 May 2006, retrieved 11.01.2017 from 
https://secure.edps.europa.eu. See also: Hatzopoulos, V. (2008) With or without you... Judging 
politically in the field of area of freedom, security and justice. European Law Review, vol. 33 (1), p. 
52; Kosta, E.. Coudert, F. & Dumortier, J. (2007) Data Protection in the Third Pillar: In the Aftermath 
of the ECJ Decision on PNR Data and the Data Retention Directive, International Review of Law, 
Computers & Technology, vol. 21 (3), pp. 347-362. 
1070 It has however been argued that, once adopted, the Framework Decision did not substantially 
improve the situation. See for instance: De Hert, P. & Papakonstantinou, V. (2009) The data protection 
framework decision of 27 November 2008 regarding police and judicial cooperation in criminal 
matters – A modest achievement however not the improvement some have hoped for. Computer Law & 
Security Review, vol. 25 (5), pp. 403–414. 
1071 AG Opinion on Joined Cases C-317/04 and C-318/04, European Parliament v Council of the 
European Union and Commission of the European Communities, paras. 79 and 91. 
1072 See: Chapter 4 (section 2.2.3) of this thesis. 
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2.3 The interim and second PNR Agreement: third pillar procedures and venue 
shopping 
 
The negotiations for the new PNR Agreement started in July 2006 under Article 24 
TEU implying that the Council presidency led the negotiations assisted by the 
Commission “as appropriate”.1073 Although Article 24 TEU excludes the EP from the 
new legislation making procedure, the EP made several attempts to convince the 
Council and the Commission of the need for close cooperation - a strategy which can 
be considered as a type of venue shopping.1074 First, the former EP president 
approached both the Council and the Commission to stress the importance of acting 
jointly in accordance with the principle of loyal cooperation between the EU 
institutional players. He urged both actors to keep the Parliament informed about any 
new developments and to take its views into consideration.1075 Subsequently, the LIBE 
Committee adopted a draft recommendation on the new PNR Agreement containing 
suggestions on the adequate negotiation procedure and substantial aspects of the 
agreement.1076  
Second, the EP requested full co-decision rights on PNR when the interim 
agreement was due to be reviewed in 2007. Legally this would be possible if the 
‘passerelle’ clause was invoked allowing the Council by unanimous decision, to move 
policy areas from one decision-making procedure to another (i.e. in this case to the 
co-decision procedure).1077  Notwithstanding the EP’s efforts, the Council strictly 
applied third pillar proceedings leading to the adoption of an interim agreement in 
2006. 
Third, when the second PNR Agreement was negotiated there was still no 
third pillar data protection framework in place. Consequently, this legislative vacuum 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1073 Article 24 TEU. 
1074 The term venue shopping was coined by Guiraudon, V. (2000) European Integration and Migration 
Policy: Vertical Policy Making as Venue Shopping, Journal of Common Market Studies, vol. 38 (2), 
pp. 241-271. Guiraudon originally used the term to explain how national actors used policy venues at 
EU level to circumvent national opposition to a certain policy initiative. However, ‘venue shopping’ 
can also take place exclusively on EU level when actors frame issues in a certain way in order to 
trigger the application of a specific policy making procedure.  
1075 Letters from Josep Borrell Fontelles (former EP President) to Mr. José Manuel Barroso (former 
Commission President) and to Wolfgang Schüssel (former President of the European Council). 
09.06.2006, Brussels, retrieved 11.01.17 from: http://www.statewatch.org/news/2006/jun/eu-usa-pnr-
borrell-letter2.pdf and http://www.statewatch.org/news/2006/jun/eu-usa-pnr-borrell-letter1.pdf.   
1076 European Parliament Report of 19 July 2006 with a Proposal for a European Parliament 
recommendation to the Council on the negotiations for an agreement with the United States of America 
on the use of passenger name records (PNR) data to prevent and combat terrorism and transnational 
crime, including organised crime, A6-0252/2006. 
1077 Article 48, TEU. 
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in the third pillar was informally ‘filled’ by first pillar actors. For instance, the EP 
demanded access to all documents related to the EU-US PNR negotiations and the 
EU-US High Level Contact Group on Data Protection.1078 Furthermore, it adopted a 
resolution on how PNR should be regulated, for instance by enabling the EP to enter 
into a dialogue with the US Congress. 1079 Other stakeholders were aware that the EP’s 
views had to be factored in to avoid new legal actions. For example US authorities 
aimed to influence MEPs1080 and the US Undersecretary of Homeland Security 
visiting the EP LIBE Committee in the midst of the negotiations.1081 The EP took this 
opportunity to communicate its concerns to the US side and to stress the necessity of 
greater involvement of the EP in the discussions on the second PNR Agreement and 
the High-Level Contact Group on Data Protection.1082  
2.4 Towards the third PNR Agreement: EP power aspirations and sensitivity to 
failure  
 
Besides the EP’s fierce criticism on the second PNR Agreement no legal actions 
followed this time, clearly because the EP waited until it was granted a retroactive say 
after the Treaty of Lisbon has been adopted. In 2010 the Council asked the EP to 
approve the PNR Agreement in accordance to post-Lisbon procedures.1083 The EP 
immediately made use of its newly acquired powers and postponed its vote.1084 Before 
voting on the Agreement the EP requested the Commission to establish a single set of 
model principles to serve as a basis for agreements with third countries.1085 The 
Parliament set out seven principles that should be included in the model, such as the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1078 Letter from ALDE MEPs to the Council and the Commission, retrieved 11.01.2017 from 
http://www.statewatch.org/news/2007/sep/eu-pnr-alde-info-request.pdf   
1079	  European Parliament resolution on SWIFT, the PNR agreement and the transatlantic dialogue on 
these issues, P6_TA(2007)0039.  
1080 US authorities met with several MEPs and other relevant stakeholders on a mission at the 
beginning of May to discuss the PNR Agreement, See for instance: “Chief U.S. Data Privacy Officers 
reach out to EU”, retrieved 11.01.2017 from http://useu.usmission.gov/may0707_horvath_teufel.html   
1081 European Parliament Press Release on US Secretary of Homeland Security Michael Chertoff 
debates data protection with MEPs. Retrieved 11.01.2017 from 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=IM-
PRESS&reference=20070514IPR06625&language=SV  
1082 European Parliament Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs Transatlantic 
Dialogue of 14 May 2007. Retrieved 11.01.2017 from http://www.statewatch.org/news/2007/may/ep-
us-pnr-chertoff.pdf  
1083 The retroactive consent of the EP was necessary since the 2007 Agreement was just in place on a 
provisional basis as not all national parliaments had ratified the Agreement by 2009. See explanations 
in Chapter 3 of this thesis.  
1084 European Parliament Resolution of 5 May 2010 on the launch of negotiations for Passenger Name 
Record (PNR) agreements with the United States, Australia and Canada, P7_TA(2010)0144. 
1085 ibid, para. 7.   
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general principle that data shall be pushed instead of pulled and that sufficient data 
protection safeguards should apply.  
When the EP finally voted on the new Agreement the Rapporteur Sophie in’t 
Veld recommended the Parliament not to accept the draft in its current form since the 
seven principles outlined in the EP’s resolution in 2010 had not been fully respected 
in the draft Agreement.1086 A considerable number of LIBE Committee members 
shared this point of view. However the majority was of the opinion that it was better 
to have a partially satisfactory agreement than no agreement at all.1087 As a 
consequence LIBE as well as the plenary accepted the draft PNR Agreement which 
entered into force on 1 July 2012.1088  
While from the beginnings of the PNR saga the EP continuously demanded 
stricter data protection safeguards it now accepted an agreement that still did not 
match its own demands. This naturally raises the question of what triggered the EP’s 
change of opinion. Although granting the EP more powers the ordinary legislation 
making procedure could have partially led to the consent to the new PNR 
Agreement.1089 As has been argued in the data retention chapter the fact that the EP 
was now able to influence the outcome of negotiations made it more sensitive to 
failure. This means that as soon as the EP became the ‘co-legislator’ it shared 
legislative responsibility. As a consequence, a failure in the negotiations could have 
resulted in diminished trust between the EP and national government/the electorate.1090 
Additionally, the EP has an integrationist bias underpinning its sensitivity to 
failure and supporting the preference for a sub-optimal outcome instead of no 
outcome at all.1091 In regard to sensitivity to failure, scholars have observed that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1086	  European Parliament Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs Draft 
Recommendation of 01 February 2012 on the Draft Council decision on the conclusion of the 
Agreement between the United States of America and the European Union on the use and transfer of 
Passenger Name Records to the United States Department of Homeland Security; 17433/2011–C7-
0511/2011– 2011/0382(NLE). 
1087 Santos Vara, J. (2013). The role of the European Parliament in the conclusion of the Transatlantic 
Agreements on the transfer of personal data after Lisbon. CLEER Working Papers 2013/2.,p. 26.  
1088 Agreement between the United States of America and the European Union on the use and transfer 
of passenger name records to the United States Department of Homeland Security OJ 2012 L 215. 
1089 Other reasons such as a changed threat perception seems to not have played a role.  
1090	  Ripoll Servent, A. (2013) Holding the European Parliament responsible: policy shift in the Data 
Retention Directive from consultation to codecision. Journal of European Public Policy, vol. 20(7), p. 
977.   
1091 Ibid.; With reference to: Hörl, B., Warntjen, A. and Wonka, A. (2005). Built on quicksand? A 
decade of procedural spatial models on EU legislative decision-making. Journal of European Public 
Policy, vol. 12(3), pp. 592–606; Kreppel, A. and Hix, S. (2003). From “grand coalition” to left–right 
confrontation: explaining the shifting structure of party competition in the European Parliament, 
Comparative Political Studies, vol. 36(1–2), pp. 75–96. 
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legislative bodies revert very rarely to the status quo. First, this is due to the policy-
maker’s assumption that the current situation in respect to a given policy field needs 
to be changed by all means. Second, by analysing EU politics through the lens of 
game theory another explanation is that failure to reach a policy outcome damages 
relationships with other parties and actors. Thus, there is the risk that “hard feelings 
carry over into other, unrelated issues.”1092 Furthermore, empirical studies revealed 
that the two big EP parties form a grand coalition on institutional and integration 
issues and internal procedural issues with the mandate to foster EU integration.1093 The 
reasons for the overall pro- integrationist attitude of the two big parties can be 
ascribed to the collective institutional interest to increase the influence of the EP as a 
whole. Since the EP was traditionally the weakest institutional actor it had to act 
collectively to strengthen its role vis-à-vis the Council and the Commission.1094  
Applying the notion of sensitivity to failure to the PNR Agreement, it can be 
argued that until being more actively involved in the negotiations the EP 
underestimated the limited room of manoeuvre due to the strict mandate of US 
authorities. Thus, without deviating from its original position it was likely that no 
agreement would have been achieved. The likely consequences of no agreement 
would have been a legal vacuum for airlines and data subjects and a cumbersome 
process of concluding bilateral agreements between the EU Member States and the 
US. This would not only have been perceived badly by national authorities and the 
electorate but also undermined the legitimacy of the EU as a global actor. 
Consequently the EP was pressured into more pragmatic decision making in order to 
prevent being the cause of a potential failure.   
 
2.5 Proposal for a EU-internal PNR regime and norm-taking? 
 
Already in 2003 the Commission stressed that the “(…) EU's approach cannot be 
limited to responding to the initiatives of others.” 1095 Thus, the Commission suggested 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1092 Achen, H.C. (2006) Institutional realism and bargaining models In: Thomson, R., Stokman, F.N., 
Achen, C.H. and König, T. (eds) The European Union Decides. Cambridge University Press, p. 101-2. 
1093 Hix, S., Kreppel, A. and Noury, A. (2003) The party system in the European Parliament: collusive 
or competitive? Journal of Common Market Studies, vol. 41(3), p. 318.  
1094 Ibid.  
1095 European Commission Communication on Transfer of Air Passenger Name Record (PNR) Data: A 
Global EU Approach, COM(2003) 826 final, p. 4.  
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the adoption of a framework decision in 2007.1096 The proposal suggested obliging 
airlines flying to and from EU territory to share private data on their passengers with 
so-called ‘Passenger Information Unit’ (PIU) that are established in each MS.1097 The 
legislation-making procedure subsequent to the issuance of the proposal coincided 
with the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty.1098 Consequently, framework decisions as 
legislative instruments ceased to exist resulting in the proposal’s withdrawal.1099 
Afterwards, it took the Commission a further three years to issue a new proposal.1100 
When the proposal for a directive was finally issued, the EP rejected it.1101 
Nevertheless in 2015, the threat posed by ‘foreign terrorist fighters’ and the Paris 
terror attacks initiated new discussions.1102 Therefore, the EP and the Council urged 
the Commission to revise the PNR proposal by taking the Court findings of the 
Digital Rights Ireland case into consideration.1103 In this context, the LIBE Committee 
presented a proposal on how to modify the original Commission proposal for a 
Directive.1104 Based on this proposal the PNR Directive was adopted in April 2016.1105 
The adoption of the PNR Directive is an example of how the EU internalises 
US norms. For instance, an involved Commission official has mentioned that the “EU 
thinks a PNR Directive is useful only because the US does.”1106 However, the fact that 
an EU measure has only recently been approved after more than nine years of being 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1096 European Commission proposal for a draft Framework Decision on the use of Passenger Name 
Record for law enforcement purposes of 6 November 2007, COM (2007) 654 final. 
1097 Ibid., Article 3. 
1098 The latest results of the negotiations before the 2007 proposal lapsed are documented in: Council of 
the European Union Proposal for a Council Framework Decision on the use of Passenger Name Record 
(PNR) for law enforcement purposes, Council document 5618/2/09 REV 2.  
1099 European Commission Communication on Consequences of the entry into force of the Treaty of 
Lisbon for ongoing inter-institutional decision-making procedures, COM(2009) 665 final, para. 1(4). 
1100 European Commission Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
the use of Passenger Name Record data for the prevention, detection, investigation and prosecution of 
terrorist offences and serious crime, COM (2011) 32 final.  
1101 European Parliament Report on the proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on the use of Passenger Name Record data for the prevention, detection, investigation and 
prosecution of terrorist offences and serious crime, COM(2011)0032 – C7-0039/2011-
2011/0023(COD). 
1102 In an interview with an EU Commission official it was mentioned that the terror attacks in Paris 
triggered the adoption.  
1103 European Parliament Resolution of 11 February 2015 on anti-terrorism measures. 2015/2530(RSP). 
See also: European Council “Follow-up to the statement of the Members of the European Council of 12 
February 2015 on counter-terrorism: Report on implementation of measures Report on implementation 
of measures by the EU Counter-Terrorism Coordinator”, Council Doc. 9422/1/15. 
1104 European Parliament Draft Legislative Resolution on the proposal for a directive of the European 
Parliament and of the Council on the use of Passenger Name Record data for the prevention, detection, 
investigation and prosecution of terrorist offences and serious crime, COM(2011)0032 – C7-0039/2011 
– 2011/0023(COD). 
1105 Directive (EU) 2016/681, op.cit. 
1106 Interview with EU Commission official. 
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on the agenda shows that “norm-taking” is not a linear process. There are three 
reasons explaining why the US emerged as a catalyst while the EU was rather a 
recipient of norms. First of all, the institutional architecture to fight terrorism has been 
revised and strengthened in the US after 9/11 while this has not been the case in the 
EU due to the lack of supranational power.1107 Second, the US is in general known for 
its unilateral and extraterritorial approach which takes little account of the views of 
others.1108 Third, the fragmentation of the EU was an advantage for US actors as the 
US could apply strategic lobbying with a more critical EP and it could build alliances 
with more sympathetic forums such as Council working groups or Commission 
officials.1109  
The process of “norm-taking” in the PNR case happened in three stages: (i) 
initial forceful norm advocacy by the US, (ii) bargaining leading to norm acceptance 
and (iii) norm incorporation accompanied by mirroring and imitation.”1110 The initial 
forceful norm advocacy by the US took place in the form of imposition of 
requirements on EU airlines without discussing with EU authorities the practicalities 
of this new requirement. Subsequently, the discussions leading to the PNR 
Agreements were crucial to set the scene and convince EU actors on the details when 
accepting norms imposed by US authorities. In this respect, it is interesting to note 
that other EU institutional players tried to convince MEPs of the adequacy and 
advantages of adopting the US approach.1111 Ultimately, the mirroring and imitation 
took place by incrementally introducing internal measures on PNR. On the one hand, 
the Commission launched a project to incentivise Member States to adopt national 
PNR schemes.1112 Through this initiative more Member States started testing PNR 
regimes contributing to a lack of harmonisation between Member State laws. On this 
basis, the PNR Directive is merely a EU response to a situation created by the EU 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1107 Argomaniz, J. (2009) When the EU is the ‘Norm-taker: The Passenger Name Records Agreement 
and the EUs Internalization of US Border Security Norms. Journal of European Integration, vol. 31 
(1), p. 127. 
1108 Ibid. 
1109 See Chapter 5 of this thesis.   
1110 Argomaniz (2009), op. cit., p. 124. 
1111 Interview with EP official.  
1112	  The Commission awarded 50 million EUR to 14 Member States who replied to the Commission’s 
call for proposals on national PNR schemes. See: European Commission, list of awarded projects. 
Retrieved 01.04.2017 from: http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/financing/fundings/pdf/isec/isec-
grants-awarded- 2012_en.pdf. 
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itself instead of a requirement due to diverging laws.1113 One the other hand, imitation 
becomes clear when comparing the recently adopted PNR Directive with the EU-US 
PNR Agreement.1114 Whilst similar, the PNR Directive includes several more 
safeguards showing that even if norms are imported from external actors, the 
interaction of those norms with internal EU standards prevents a full assimilation.  
 
The effect of establishing EU-internal legislation that formerly only existed in respect 
to EU external relations raises interesting concerns about the EU’s role as an 
international actor in AFSJ. EU institutional actors are concerned with expressing the 
importance of strict standards of fundamental rights in external relations. Article 3(5) 
TEU confirms that “in its relations with the wider world, the Union shall uphold and 
promote its values and interests and contribute to the protection of its citizens.”1115 
Moreover, the Commission has stressed that “[w]e need to strengthen the EU’s stance 
in protecting the personal data of the individual in the context of all EU policies, 
including law enforcement and crime prevention as well as in our international 
relations.”1116 Consequently, scholars have claimed that the EU is a normative power 
or a ‘force of good’ that respects and promotes human rights in its foreign policy.1117 
However, in the case of PNR a different trend can be observed. Instead of pro-
actively promoting and enforcing internal EU standards on data protection and 
privacy in relations with the US, the relevant EU stakeholders did not do justice to its 
own discourse. Even an adverse effect can be observed where norms and standards 
that were formerly refused as too low have turned into EU internal tools. 
Consequently, the aspiration of EU actors to spread high standards of data protection 
and privacy in international relations remains unfulfilled. Further, an adverse effect 
can be observed where international relations even lower EU internal standards on 
data protection and privacy through norm internalisation.    
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1113 European Data Protection Supervisor, Second Opinion on the Proposal for a Directive of the 
European Parliament and of the Council on the use of Passenger Name Record data for the prevention, 
detection, investigation and prosecution of terrorist offences and serious crime, Opinion 5/2015, para. 
15. 
1114 Further explanations follow later this Chapter (section 3.6).  
1115 The importance of values when acting on an international level is further stressed in Articles 21 (1) 
and 21 (2) TEU and Article 205 TFEU.  
1116 Communication from the European Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the 
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions - Delivering an area of 
freedom, security and justice for Europe's citizens - Action Plan Implementing the Stockholm 
Programme, COM(2010) 0171 final.  
1117 See for example: Manners, I. (2006). Normative power Europe reconsidered: beyond the 
crossroads. Journal of European Public Policy, vol. 13(2), pp. 182–99. 
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2.6 Summary  
 
Different dynamics during the legislation-making procedure are relevant to 
understand how data protection and privacy are shaped in regard to the PNR 
Agreement. First, EU institutional actors attempt to maximize their power during the 
process of concluding the PNR agreements. For instance, at the initial stage the 
Commission asserted itself as the main actor through transgovernmentalism and 
conceptual framing. Second, the EP made use of cross-pillarisation by challenging the 
legal basis of the first PNR agreement. Third, the EP abandoned some of its principles 
after it became a co-legislator due to sensitivity to failure and an integrationist bias. 
Fourth, the adoption of the PNR Directive is an example of norm-taking as it was 
triggered by the EU-US PNR Agreement.   
3. The applicability of existing jurisprudence on the PNR Agreement  
 
The aim of this section is to assess the PNR Agreement in light of the framework 
established in Chapter 3. After summarising AG Mengozzi’s Opinion on the EU-
Canada PNR Agreement, it is argued that Article 7 CFREU is interfered with since 
the PNR Agreement permits the transfer of PNR data to US authorities. Article 8 
CFREU is interfered with since personal data is processed in accordance with the 
Agreement. The interference of both rights can be justified since fighting serious 
crime has been acknowledged as being a matter of public security. Subsequently, a 
proportionality assessment is conducted in respect to both rights. The section also 
analyses the proportionality of the PNR Directive since it is an example of norm-
taking from the EU-US Agreement. Last but not least, the section assesses the 
political actorness of the CJEU in regard to PNR.  
 
3.1 AG Mengozzi on Opinion 1/15 Request for an Opinion submitted by the 
European Parliament  
 
In September 2016 AG Mengozzi published his opinion on the request for an opinion 
submitted by the European Parliament (Opinion 1/15). The EP had requested the 
CJEU opinion in 2014 before approving the EU-Canada PNR Agreement. The EP 
posed two questions to the Court: First, do Articles 82(1)(d) and 87(2)(a) TFEU 
constitute the correct legal basis for the Council Act concluding the Agreement or 
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must the act be based on Article 16 TFEU? Second, is the Agreement compatible with 
the provisions of the Treaties and the Charter of Fundamental Rights? The CJEU has 
previously held that CJEU’s assessments exclusively refer to the measure under 
scrutiny and do not impact the legality of other measures displaying similar 
characteristics.1118 Nonetheless, Opinion 1/15 will necessarily have implications for 
the PNR Agreement with the US as well as the PNR Directive due to the striking 
similarity of the instruments.1119 Therefore, it is analysed in the following.   
The AG assessed first whether the draft agreement is based on the correct 
legal basis. The choice of the legal basis has ‘constitutional significance’ as well as 
‘practical implications’. The former refers to complications in the international legal 
order in case that the Agreement has to be invalidated at a later stage due to the choice 
of the wrong legal basis. In regard to ‘practical implications’, the choice between a 
Title V and another legal basis (i.e. Article 16 TFEU) has implications for the 
participation of Denmark, Ireland and the UK. The AG continues by providing 
examples illustrating that the purpose of the Agreement is both to maintain security as 
well as data protection. For instance, Article 1(1) of the Agreement mentions that the 
use of PNR Data is “to ensure security and safety of the public and prescribe the 
means by which the data is protected.”1120 Furthermore, Article 82(1)(d) TFEU is 
considered not to be a correct legal basis since the PNR Agreement does not promote 
(at least not in the first place) cooperation between judicial authorities of the Member 
States.1121 Therefore, the correct legal basis should be Article 16 (2) TFEU and Article 
87 (2)(a). 
The AG also provides an exhaustive explanation of the proportionality of the 
PNR Agreement. More specifically, he mentions that the Agreement can only be 
considered as being in line with the Treaties and the Charter if it: (i) lists clearly and 
precisely the data to be transferred in the annex by excluding sensitive data, (ii) 
contains in an annex an exhaustive list of crimes covered by the agreement, (iii) 
identifies clearly who is in charge of processing PNR data; (iv) specifies principles 
and rules applicable to the databases PNR is compared with in the context of 
automated processing; (v) lays down objective criteria to facilitate that the number of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1118 In regard to the review of the legal basis, see: C-94/03 Commission v Council of 10 January 2006, 
para. 50; C-658/11 Parliament v Council, of 24 June 2014, para. 48. 
1119 AG Opinion on Opinion 1/15, para. 4.  
1120 Para. 70. 
1121 Para. 108. 
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officials that can access PNR data can be specified; (vi) states reasons for the 
necessity of a particular data retention period, (vii) mentions that directly identifiable 
information has to be masked; (viii) stipulates that onward transfer needs to be subject 
to ex-ante notification to EU DPAs; (ix) an independent authority reviews the respect 
for private life and data protection; (x) passengers that are not present in Canada can 
submit an administrative appeal to independent authorities.1122 
3.2 Interference with Articles 7 and 8 CFREU 
 
3.2.1 Interference with Article 7 CFREU 
 
‘Passenger name records’ refer to sets of personal data which are generated when 
persons book, pay and engage in a journey to the US.1123 The PNR Agreement requires 
that PNR are made available to DHS “(…) to the extent they are collected and 
contained in the air carrier’s automated reservation/departure control systems 
(…).”1124  Thus, the PNR Agreement does not require airlines to collect data they 
would not do for their own purposes. More specifically, “[t]he number and nature of 
the fields of information in a PNR will vary [among airlines] depending on the 
reservation system used during the initial booking.”1125 Rather than requiring 
collection of data the Agreement obliges airlines to create the PNR ‘data dossier’ 
from potentially different airline internal databases.1126 Due to the foregoing, it can be 
concluded that the collection of data does not amount to interference under the remit 
of the Agreement.   
The PNR Agreement requires carriers to transfer the PNR data contained in 
their reservation systems to the Department of Homeland Security. As pointed out on 
earlier occasions in this thesis, to establish interference persons concerned do not have 
to suffer any adverse consequences on account of that interference and data does not 
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1123 Annex, 2012 PNR Agreement.  
1124 Preamble, 2012 PNR Agreement.  
1125 ICAO Guidelines on Passenger Name Record (PNR) Data, Doc 9944 of 2010, retrieved 08.01.2017 
from: https://www.iata.org/iata/passenger-data-toolkit/assets/doc_library/04-
pnr/New%20Doc%209944%201st%20Edition%20PNR.pdf, para. 2.1.8. 
1126 For example, the ICAO guidelines mention that data generated during the booking procedure of an 
airline ticket (as required under point 2, Annex of PNR Agreement) is often stored in a different 
database as the information on check-in (as required under point 13, Annex of PNR Agreement).  
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have to be sensitive.1127 Thus, the mere fact that public authorities receive data without 
allowing the individual the opportunity to refute it amounts to an interference with 
Article 7 CFREU.1128 Consequently, by stipulating the transfer, access, use, storage 
and potentially further transfer by public authorities for security purposes, the PNR 
Agreement triggers an interference with Articles 7 and 8 CFREU. 1129   
Having clarified that interference takes place it is necessary to establish 
whether the interference is ‘particularly serious’. One parameter to assess the 
seriousness of interference is whether individuals are informed about the data 
processing.1130 Under PNR, interference does not happen without the knowledge of the 
data subject since the individuals are informed about the processing by carriers when 
buying the airline ticket and the requirements are published on the Federal Register 
and the DHS website.1131 Furthermore, ex-post the individual has the chance to request 
his or her PNR from DHS.1132 A second parameter to assess the seriousness of 
interference is the examination on whether it is wide-ranging.1133 This parameter can 
be considered to be met since: (i) a wide variety of data –possibly including sensitive 
data- is transferred to US authorities;1134 (ii) the transfer has a systemic character since 
all travellers to the US are covered without exception1135 and (iii) data is processed 
“(…) without the persons whose data are retained being, even indirectly, in a situation 
which is liable to give rise to criminal prosecutions.”1136 
  
3.2.2 Interference with Article 8 CFREU 
 
In addition to Article 7, Article 8 CFREU has also been interfered with because the 
transfer of data and subsequent access, to data constitutes ‘processing of personal 
data’.1137 In addition to that, Article 8 CFREU is interfered with since the PNR 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1127 Schrems, para. 87; DRI, para. 33; Österreichischer Rundfunk and Others, para. 75.  
1128 DRI, para. 34. In regard to Article 8 ECHR see also: Leander v. Sweden, para 48; Rotaru v. 
Romania, para. 46 and Weber and Saravia v. Germany, para. 79.   
1129 AG Opinion on Opinion 1/15, para. 170.   
1130 DRI, para. 37.  
1131 Article 10, 2012 PNR Agreement.   
1132 Article 11, 2012 PNR Agreement.  
1133 DRI, para. 37.  
1134 See in analogy: Tele2 Sverige, para. 97. 
1135 Ibid.  
1136 DRI, para. 58; see also Tele2 Sverige, para. 105; and AG Opinion on Opinion 1/15, para. 176. 
1137 DRI, para. 29. See also: C-92/09 and C-93/09 Volker and Markus Schecke and Eifert, para. 47.   
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Agreement regulates how data has to be stored, destroyed and possibly further 
transferred once it has been sent to US authorities.1138    
 
3.3 Justification for interference with Articles 7 and 8 CFREU 
 
This section assesses whether data processing under the PNR regime is justified in 
line with Article 52 (1) CFREU. First, it can be argued that the agreement is ‘provided 
for in law’. Since the Agreement was concluded according to procedures set out in 
Article 218 TFEU the Agreement qualifies as an ‘international agreement’ under the 
Treaties. Both ECtHR and CJEU case law have confirmed that international 
agreements are automatically incorporated into national law and an are integral part of 
the EU legal order.1139  
Second, interference can only be justified if legislation in question respects the 
essence of the rights that are concerned.1140 It can be argued that the essence of Article 
8 CFREU1141 is not interfered with because several data protection principles are in 
place, such as data security provisions which aim to protect personal data against 
accidental, unlawful or unauthorised destruction, loss, disclosure, alternation, access, 
processing and use.1142 Furthermore, mechanisms are in place to allow individuals to 
access their data (Article 11, PNR), and if necessary to have it rectified (Article 12, 
PNR). Ultimately, oversight mechanisms are in place (Article 14, PNR).   
Whether the essence of Article 7 CFREU is interfered with is more difficult to 
assess. The 19 data categories transferred to US authorities include a wide variety of 
personal information such as address, contact details and travel patterns. Furthermore, 
they may include sensitive data which is not even necessary for the purpose of the 
agreement.1143 For instance, SSR data  (i.e. data inserted in fields called: ‘general 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1138 Articles 5, 8, 16 and 17, 2012 PNR Agreement. 
1139 Neulinger and Shuruk v. Switzerland, para.99; Fernández Martínez v. Spain, para. 118; See also: C-
308/06, Intertanko and Others, para. 42 and C-401/12 Council and Others v Vereniging Milieudefensie 
and Stichting Stop Luchtverontreiniging Utrecht, para. 52. 
1140 Article 52(1) CFREU. 
1141 In DRI it has been argued that the essence of Article 8 CFREU would be infringed if no data 
protection or data security principles would be applied to the processing of personal data (para. 40). 
1142 Article 5, 2012 PNR Agreement. See: AG Opinion on Opinion 1/15, para. 187.  
1143 Opinion 4/2003 of the Article 29 Data Protection Working Party on the Level of Protection ensured 
in the US for the Transfer of Passengers’ Data, WP 78, adopted 13 June 2003. The Article 29 WP 
argues that only the following fields should be processed: “PNR record locator code, date of 
reservation, date(s) of intended travel, passenger name, other names on PNR, all travel itinerary, 
identifiers for free tickets, one-way tickets, ticketing field information, ATFQ (Automatic Ticket Fare 
Quote) data, ticket number, date of ticket issuance, no show history, number of bags, bag tag numbers, 
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remarks’) is concerning, in particular since a special remark on a meal request can 
reveal information on religious beliefs (e.g. halal food).1144 In addition to that, OSI 
(Other Service-Related Information) and information concerning frequent-flyers is 
not relevant for the purposes pursued by the Agreement especially since it can also 
reveal sensitive data. For instance, a request for a special airport service could reveal 
information on health conditions.1145 Thus, while the data categories include personal 
data (e.g. name) and non-personal data (e.g. information on baggage) they can also in 
specific circumstances include sensitive data if passengers or a travel agency on the 
passenger’s behalf fill out the SSR and OSI data fields. Apart from the detailed 
picture this information reveals about a passenger, information requested does still 
mainly relate to the circumstances of the journey (e.g. information on tickets, selected 
route, baggage, frequent-flyer programme etc.).1146 Furthermore, a number of 
guarantees are available to ensure that data is gradually depersonalised after a 
relatively short period of six months.1147 Therefore, the essence of the right is not 
interfered with.  
Third, as mentioned in articles 1 and 4 of the PNR Agreement, an objective of 
general interest is pursued within the meaning of Article 52 (1) CFREU namely that 
of maintaining public security through the fight against terrorism and serious 
transnational crime.1148 In the joint review conducted in 2013 the review team stated 
that the “various ways in which PNR is used follows an approach allowing it to 
maximize the added value of using PNR for law enforcement purposes.”1149 More 
specifically, PNR data was used in a number of cases to prevent flying and to conduct 
more targeted searches once certain passengers arrived in the US.1150 Furthermore, the 
added value of PNR data is that it allows authorities to identify passengers that are not 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
go show information, number of bags on each segment, voluntary/involuntary upgrades, historical 
changes to PNR data with regard to the aforementioned items.”  
1144 As noted in: ICAO Guidelines on Passenger Name Record (PNR) Data, Doc 9944 of 2010, 
retrieved 03.08.2016 from: https://www.iata.org/iata/passenger-data-toolkit/assets/doc_library/04-
pnr/New%20Doc%209944%201st%20Edition%20PNR.pdf, para. 2.1.10. 
1145 Article 29 Working Party, Opinion 4/2003, op. cit., p. 7.  
1146 AG Opinion on Opinion 1/15, para. 186.  
1147 The AG on DRI indicated that retention periods under one year seem to be justified (para. 149).  
1148 DRI, para. 42. 
1149 Report from the European Commission on the Review of the implementation of the Agreement 
between the European Union and the United States of America on the processing and transfer of 
passenger name records to the United States Department of Homeland Security, COM(2013) 844 final, 
p. 8.  
1150 ibid., p. 7-8.  
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yet suspected of a crime.1151 Due to the foregoing it can be concluded that the PNR 
Agreement is indeed a valuable tool in fighting serious crime.1152 
3.4 Proportionality of interference with Articles 7 and 8 CFREU  
 
Before engaging in the discussion on the PNR Agreement’s safeguards against abuse 
of power, it needs to be assessed whether the PNR Agreement is appropriate and 
necessary in regard to the legitimate objectives pursued. First it needs to be pointed 
out that the PNR Agreement is of a reciprocal nature since any analytical information 
resulting from the PNR data transfer shall be shared with EU and Member State 
authorities.1153 In this way, the effects of the Agreement concern both the EU and the 
US. The Agreement enables authorities to shed light on terrorism and serious crime in 
the context of international transport and thereby ensures public security in the EU 
and the US. Furthermore, the indiscriminate nature of the transfer allows law 
enforcement authorities to identify passengers that have previously not been 
suspected of being involved in a terrorist network or in serious crime.1154  
Consequently, the Agreement can be considered to be appropriate for attaining the 
objective pursued. In respect to necessity, the fight against terrorism –however 
fundamental it may be- cannot in itself justify the indiscriminate nature of data 
transfer under the PNR Agreement.1155 Instead limitations to the respect for privacy 
and data protection must apply only in so far as strictly necessary.1156  
3.4.1 Indiscriminate transfer and access to data 
 
Four parameters need to be taken into account to examine whether access of 
competent authorities to data and their subsequent use can be considered to be 
proportionate. First, transfer and access to data should be strictly limited to the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1151 AG Opinion on Opinion 1/15, para. 205. 
1152 Note that the last joint review took place in 2013. However, in 2015 the Department of Homeland 
Security Privacy Office conducted an assessment of the functioning of the PNR Agreement. See: 
United States Department of Homeland Security Privacy Office Report on the use and transfer of 
passenger name records between the European Union and the United States.” Retrieved 12.01.2017 
from: https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/privacy_pcr_pnr_review_06262015.pdf. The 
report does however not discuss the usefulness of PNR for the purpose of fighting crime.  
1153 Article 18, 2012 PNR Agreement. 
1154 AG Opinion on Opinion 1/15, para. 205. 
1155 See in analogy: Tele2 Sverige, para. 103.   
1156 See in analogy: DRI, para. 52. 
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purpose of preventing and detecting serious offences.1157 The PNR Agreement sets out 
that the US ‘collects, uses and processes PNR data for the purposes of preventing, 
detecting, investigating, and prosecuting’ terrorism, related and other crimes 
punishable by a sentence of imprisonment for three years or more.1158 Furthermore, on 
a case-by-case basis data can be used and processed where necessary if ordered by a 
court.1159 There are two concerns in relation to these provisions. On the one hand, the 
article does not mention that data transfer and access is ‘strictly’ limited to the aim 
pursued. On the other hand, the Agreement expressly allows further processing if 
ordered by a court without specifying the purpose for which the data might be used by 
the court.1160 Therefore, the agreement can be considered to be not strictly limited to 
the purpose it pursues.1161  
 Second, the nature of crimes triggering the applicability of the Agreement 
needs to be precisely defined.1162 Article 4 of the PNR Agreement provides a relatively 
precise explanation of what qualifies as a terrorist offence. It also refers to 
international conventions relating to terrorism and it sets out what counts as crimes 
relating to terrorism.1163 The Agreement does however also apply to other crimes that 
are punishable by a sentence of imprisonment of three years or more and which are 
transnational. The meaning of ‘transnational’ is also further specified.1164 While the 
Agreement does not explicitly refer to ‘serious’ crime1165 it lays down objective 
criteria in relation to the nature and degree of seriousness of the offences in which 
cases US authorities are entitled to process PNR data.1166 Nonetheless, it is concerning 
that no list containing the specific crimes has been included in this provision.1167 For 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1157 DRI, para. 61; Tele2 Sverige, para. 111; Kennedy v. United Kingdom, para. 159; Zakharov v. 
Russia, para. 244.  
1158 Article 4, 2012 PNR Agreement.  
1159 Article 4 (2), 2012 PNR Agreement.  
1160 European Commission Legal Service Note for the Attention of Mr Stefano Manservisi Director 
General DG HOME on the Draft Agreement on the Use of Passenger Name Records (PNR) between 
the EU and the United States. Retrieved 12.01.2017 from: 
http://www.statewatch.org/news/2011/jun/eu-usa-pnr-com-ls-opinion-11.pdf  
1161 AG Opinion on Opinion 1/15, para. 237.  
1162 Zakharov v. Russia, para. 248. 
1163 Article 4 (1) (a), 2012 PNR Agreement. 
1164 Article 4 (1) (b), 2012 PNR Agreement. 
1165 AG Opinion on Tele2 Sverige, para. 229 and DRI, paras. 61 and 62.  
1166 AG Opinion on Opinion 1/15, para. 231.  
1167 The inclusion of a list on specific crimes has already been requested by the EDPS before the 2012 
Agreement has been adopted. See: Opinion of the European Data Protection Supervisor on the 
Proposal for a Council Decision on the conclusion of the Agreement between the United States of 
America and the European Union on the use and transfer of Passenger Name Records to the United 
States Department of Homeland Security. Brussels, 09.12.2011.   
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instance, the list of crimes annexed to the PNR Directive shows that there is the 
possibility to define crimes more precisely on the supranational level.1168  In 
transatlantic relations the incorporation of such a list would prevent that a party to the 
Agreement takes a unilateral decisions to criminalise a certain action and thus 
indirectly extends the scope of the Agreement.   
Third, access to data shall be limited to a small number of authorised 
persons.1169 Article 3 of the PNR Agreement mentions that PNR data shall be provided 
to the DHS. Furthermore, Article 5 sets out technical and organisational measures to 
prevent unauthorised access. For example, all access shall be logged and documented 
by DHS. Nevertheless, on some occasions, the Agreement makes reference to the 
United States more generically instead of mentioning DHS. For instance, Article 17 
mentions that the “United States may transfer PNR to competent government 
authorities of third countries.” Also in Article 4 it is mentioned that “the United States 
collects, uses, processes PNR (…)” Furthermore, it can be criticised that no objective 
criteria are laid down to make known the number of officials that have access to PNR 
data.1170 It can thus be concluded that the authority responsible for the processing is 
not sufficiently limited to a small number of authorised persons.1171  Whether this 
vagueness was intentional or not, it is an aspect prone to abuse. 
Fourth, the target group liable to interception should be defined by law and 
limited to what is necessary.1172 PNR data is exclusively collected from persons 
travelling to the US. Thus, data subjects take a deliberate decision to subject 
themselves to the legal requirements of the PNR regime when travelling to a US 
destination.1173 In paragraph 59 of the DRI judgment, the CJEU criticises that data 
collection is (amongst others) not sufficiently limited to a particular geographical 
zone.1174 Reverting to this criticism, it is thus conceivable that PNR data processing is 
sufficiently limited ratione personae due to its restricted geographical scope. 
Furthermore, the primary purpose of the broad scope of the Agreement is to allow law 
enforcement authorities to identify individuals which were previously not known to 
the authorities. Thus, limiting the scope ratione personae would render the purpose of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1168 PNR Directive, Annex II. See also: AG Opinion on Opinion 1/15, para. 235. 
1169 DRI, para. 62. 
1170 See AG Opinion on Opinion 1/15, para. 273. 
1171 See: AG Opinion on Opinion 1/15, paras. 246 to 251.  
1172 See: Liberty and others v. UK, para. 64 or Szabó and Vissy v. Hungary, para. 66 -67. 
1173 See also: AG Opinion on Opinion 1/15, para. 242. 
1174 DRI, para. 59; emphasis added by author. Reiterated in Tele2 Sverige, para. 111.  
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the agreement meaningless.1175  In addition to that, although transfer of PNR data is 
systemic and indiscriminate, it cannot necessarily be regarded as ‘pre-emptive’ since 
all data is immediately used by linking it to other databases. In this regard it has been 
argued that it is a similar control mechanism to physical security controls at 
airports.1176 A positive effect of that is that physical controls at airports can be more 
targeted increasing efficiency and preventing unwarranted suspicion.1177  
Fifth, access and use of data needs to be conditional upon prior review carried 
out by a court or by an independent administrative body whose decision seeks to limit 
access to the data and their use to what is strictly necessary.1178 The Agreement does 
not provide for prior review before data is accessed. However, given the high volume 
of PNR data that is provided to and accessed by US authorities in the first place, it is 
for the sake of efficiency as well as resource-wise not feasible to make the transfer of 
every passenger’s data subject to review by a court or an independent administrative 
body. Therefore, the requirement of ex-ante review of the transfer can be waived as 
long as sufficient ex-post judicial oversight is guaranteed.1179  
 
3.4.2 Data retention period 
 
There are three parameters to assess whether the retention period is proportionate. 
First, data retention periods shall be strictly limited according to the usefulness of the 
data for the purposes pursued both in terms of data categories as well as persons 
concerned.1180 The data retention period under the 2012 Agreement can reach a 
maximum of 15 years. However, Article 8 of the Agreement lays down a complex 
and nuanced retention period in active and dormant databases. First of all, all 
categories of PNR data will be retained in an active database for five years. However, 
the data is depersonalised and masked already after six months and it is only 
accessible by a limited number of specifically authorised officials.1181 
Depersonalisation means that names, contact information, other supplementary 
information, special service information, special service request and APIS 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1175 See: AG Opinion on Opinion 1/15, para. 244. 
1176 Interview with EU Commission official. 
1177 Ibid.  
1178 DRI, para. 60; Szabó and Vissy v. Hungary, para. 73. 
1179 Szabó and Vissy v. Hungary, para. 77 and Tele2 Sverige, para. 120.  
1180 DRI, para. 63.  
1181 Article 8 (1), 2012 PNR Agreement. 
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information needs to be masked.1182 In this way all information that could reveal 
sensitive and personal information are pseudoymised. Subsequent to the five-year 
period in an active database, PNR data shall be transferred to a dormant database for a 
period up to ten years. This dormant database shall be subject to even further controls 
by restricting the number of authorised personnel, as well as a higher level of 
supervisory approval being required before access.1183 Dormant data can be re-
personalised if needed for law enforcement operations and in connection to an 
identifiable case, threat or risk.1184 While it is difficult to clearly define the notion of 
‘threat’ it is concerning that ‘identifiable case, threat or risk’ is not explicitly related 
to the purpose of the Agreement. It has to be noted that the nuanced retention period, 
applies equally to all persons that fall under the remit of the PNR Agreement. The 
only differentiation that is made is that data related to a specific investigation can be 
kept in the active database for an unspecified period of time until the investigation is 
over. The nuanced data retention period does also not differentiate between the 
usefulness of certain types of data. For instance, it is not entirely clear why all 19 data 
sets are treated equally when considering the long storage time.1185 Therefore, the PNR 
Agreement does not meet this requirement.   
Second, any data retention period ‘must be based on objective criteria in order 
to ensure that it is limited to what is strictly necessary’.1186 The Agreement falls short 
of this requirement, since it does not explicitly mention that the retention period is 
necessary for the purposes of the Agreement.1187 However, in practice, this criterion is 
difficult to apply since the assessment of what retention period is strictly necessary 
obviously includes a certain level of discretion as long as necessary evidence for the 
appropriateness can be provided. Article 8 (6) of the PNR Agreement reflects this 
concern since it mentions the need to assess the necessity of the 10-year dormant 
period in the next PNR Agreement evaluation. While it is questionable why the 
evaluation shall not include an assessment of the five-year active retention period it 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1182 Ibid., Article 8 (2).  
1183 Ibid., Article 8 (3). 
1184 Ibid. 
1185 AG Opinion on Opinion 1/15, para. 284. 
1186 DRI, para. 64.  
1187 Ibid., para. 63. 
	   229 
shows that policy-makers acknowledge the difficulty in determining a period based on 
objective criteria.1188  
One might wonder why data needs to be retained at all for such a long period 
if it merely serves the purpose of screening for a potential threat when passengers 
travel to the US. The justification for long retention periods is to detect long-term 
patterns of suspected criminals. 1189 Respectively, suspicion in some cases only arises 
when specific travel patterns exist (i.e. by taking unnecessarily expensive routes or 
flying multiple times to certain countries) or when the journey is booked via specific 
travel agencies or with specific credit cards. Thus, in some cases the data of suspects 
needs to be crosschecked with earlier travel patterns in order to corroborate or reject 
suspicion. This in turn is only possible if data is available over a longer period of 
time.1190 Furthermore, the average lifetime of criminal networks and the investigation 
of those take up several years.1191 While this is a valid justification for opting for a 
longer retention period, it is difficult to assess whether this period is also 
‘objective’.1192 Especially in respect to terrorism and serious crime it is very difficult 
to detect overall patterns and as such any time period carries a certain amount of 
arbitrariness with it.  
Third, irreversible destruction of the data at the end of the prescribed data 
retention period shall be ensured.1193 The Agreement also falls short of this 
requirement since nowhere it is specifically mentioned that data shall be irreversible 
destructed. The reference to destruction is made in Article 8 (4) stipulating that 
“following the dormant period, data retained must be rendered fully anonymised by 
deleting all data types which could serve to identify the passenger to whom PNR 
relate without the possibility of repersonalisation”.1194 This provision only refers to 
anonymisation and not irreversible deletion. Since ‘anonymisation’ techniques -such 
as randomisation or generalisation- is fraught with technical difficulties, full 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1188 While the evaluation of the PNR Agreement is an important safeguard against arbitrariness, the 
review as such can be criticised. For instance, neither the 2005 nor the 2010 joint review report states 
reasons for the need to prologue the initial 3.5 years period. 
1189 Interview with EU Commission official. 
1190 Ibid. 
1191 AG Opinion on Opinion 1/15, para. 279.  
1192 This period would probably qualify as ‘objective’ if statistics reveal the usefulness of data after 
such long time periods in a number of cases. However, this type of statistics is often not publicly 
available.   
1193 DRI, para. 67., Zakharov v. Russia, para. 255. See also: Klass and Others v. Germany, para. 52 or 
Kennedy v. United Kindom, para 162; Tele 2 Sverige, para. 122. 
1194 Article 8 (4), 2012 PNR Agreement.  
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destruction is not guaranteed.1195 In addition to that, Article 8 (5) of the PNR 
Agreement mentions that data related to a specific case or investigation may remain in 
the active PNR database until the case or investigation is archived.1196 Thus data that 
falls into this category is not subject to any specified retention period. The 2015 report 
of the DHS Privacy Office acknowledges deficiencies on this particular point. The 
report finds that “during the course of this review, the DHS Privacy Office found that 
there might be a high percentage of PNRs that are inaccurately linked to a law 
enforcement event and therefore not depersonalized after six months.”1197 Thus, 
compliance due to technological capabilities poses another challenge to the PNR 
Agreement’s compliance with data retention safeguards.    
 
3.4.3 Onward transfer of PNR data 
	  
Any public security legislation needs to include precautions when data is transferred 
to third parties.1198 Furthermore, an adequate level of data protection cannot be 
circumvented when transferring data to third countries.1199 If those principles are 
interpreted sensu stricto in relation the  PNR Agreement it would be illegitimate to 
further transfer data under the PNR agreement to a US authority other than DHS and 
to a third country if the EU did not establish adequacy first or if an independent EU 
authority has oversight of how data is processed in that third country or institution. In 
the following the different types of onward transfer are assessed.  
Onward transfer is possible for the purposes of the agreement under articles 16 
and 171200 and has three dimensions. First, US-internal transfer of data to other US 
agencies is possible if equivalent or comparable safeguards exist in those agencies.1201  
It is concerning that no list has been provided of agencies that are eligible to receive 
PNR data. Furthermore, since the agencies only have to prove ‘comparable’ data 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1195 An overview of these shortcomings can be found in: Opinion 05/2014 of the Article 29 Data 
Protection Working Party on Anonymisation Techniques, WP216, adopted on 10 April 2014. 
1196 Article 8 (5), 2012 PNR Agreement.  
1197 United States Department of Homeland Security Privacy Office report on the use and transfer of 
passenger name records between the European Union and the united states of 26 June 2015. Retrieved 
12.01.2017 from: 
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/privacy_pcr_pnr_review_06262015.pdf  
1198 Weber and Saravia v. Germany, para. 95. 
1199 Schrems, para. 73. 
1200 Article 16 and 17, 2012 PNR Agreement. 
1201 Ibid., Article 16 (1). 
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protection safeguards (instead of equal), one could speak of a standard that is a 
‘derivative of the EU derivate’. While Article 16 ensures that other agencies can only 
make use of the data for purposes which fall within the ambit of the agreement1202 the 
fact that data protection standards might be lower raises the risk of misuse or loss of 
data.  
Second, onward transfer can also concern the sending of data to third 
countries. Respectively, Article 17 stipulates that apart from emergency 
circumstances, any transfer shall occur pursuant to express understandings that data 
protection standards comparable to those applied to PNR by DHS shall be 
incorporated.1203 One concern is that emergency circumstances have not been closely 
defined leaving it unclear whether it refers to an imminent threat through terrorism or 
whether it also includes other situations (such as to protect the vital interest of the data 
subject or others). Furthermore, the third country needs to demonstrate a comparable 
data protection level by way of ‘express understanding’ whereas it is not clear what 
legal status this would have. In addition, Article 17 (4) stipulates that “where DHS is 
aware that PNR of a citizen or a resident of an EU Member State is transferred, the 
competent authorities of the concerned Member State shall be informed of the matter 
at the earliest appropriate opportunity.”1204 While the notification to competent 
authorities in the Member State of the citizen is a step forward in terms of 
transparency, it is not clear why it is linked to the condition that DHS is aware of a 
data transfer as there should be no reason for it to not be aware of a transfer.1205  
The third dimension of onward transfer is a re-transfer of intelligence derived 
from PNR data to EU law enforcement agencies. It is mentioned that “(…) DHS shall 
provide competent police, other specialised law enforcement or judicial authorities of 
the EU Member States and Europol and Eurojust within the remit of their respective 
mandates, as soon as practicable, relevant, and appropriate, analytical information 
obtained from PNR in those cases under examination or investigation to prevent, 
detect, investigate, or prosecute within the European Union terrorist offences and 
related crimes (…).”1206 In this way the PNR data exchange between the EU and US 
goes beyond the exchange of raw data and extends the aim of the agreement to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1202 Article 16 (1a), 2012 PNR Agreement. 
1203 Ibid., Article 17 (2).  
1204 Ibid., Article 17 (4).  
1205 EDPS Opinion of 9 December 2011, para. 27. The EDPS mentioned that DHS should always be 
aware of data transfers.  
1206 Ibid., para. IX 
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exchanging intelligence.   
While in the case of the third dimension of onward transfer Member States are 
directly bound by the EU Charter when processing personal information, there are 
concerns in regard to the first two dimensions. On the one hand, transfer is only 
dependent on the DHS assessment. Prior authorisation is neither needed from a 
judicial authority nor from an independent administrative authority.1207 On the other 
hand, the Agreement neither requires that the competent national authority of the 
Member State of the data subject nor the Commission is notified in advance of the 
transfer.1208 Instead it is only mentioned that this shall happen if DHS is aware of the 
transfer and at the earliest opportunity. The mere post factum review cannot ensure a 





According to the Charter everyone has the right of access to data which has been 
collected concerning him or her, and the right to have it rectified.1210 Articles 11 and 
12 of the PNR Agreement regulate the rights for access, correction and rectification 
by mentioning that any individual regardless of nationality, country of origin or place 
of residence is entitled to request his or her PNR from DHS and/or may seek the 
correction or rectification (including the possibility of erasure or blocking) of his/her 
PNR by DHS.1211  Furthermore, Article 8 (3) CFREU mentions that an independent 
authority shall monitor compliance with these rights. Respectively, the Agreement 
establishes an ‘oversight authority’ which is in charge of monitoring the safeguards 
included in the Agreement and which is entitled to receive, investigate, respond and 
redress complaints in relation to non-compliance with the Agreement.1212 
Nevertheless, it is nowhere explicitly spelt out that this authority can receive, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1207 Opinion of the European Data Protection Supervisor on the Communication from the Commission 
to the European Parliament and the Council on “Rebuilding Trust in EU-US Data Flows” and on the 
Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on “the Functioning 
of the Safe Harbour from the Perspective of EU Citizens and Companies Established in the EU” of 9 
December 2011, para. 26. See also: AG Opinion on Opinion 1/15, para. 300 and Tele2 Sverige, para. 
123.  
1208 AG Opinion on Opinion 1/15, para. 300. 
1209 AG Opinion on Opinion 1/15, para. 302. See also: Szabó and Vissy v. Hungary, para. 77.  
1210 Article 8 (2), CFREU. 
1211 Article 11 (1) and 12 (1), 2012 PNR Agreement.  
1212 Article 14 (1), 2012 PNR Agreement.  
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investigate and respond to complaints lodged by an individual concerning their 
request for access, correction or rectification of their PNR data. Furthermore, the 
independence of the oversight authority is questionable.1213 The PNR Agreement 
stipulates that oversight over data protection safeguards shall be carried out by the 
DHS Chief Privacy Officer.1214 Entrusting the oversight role to a DHS- internal 
privacy officer is critical since he/she is subject to influence of the responsible 
minister and thus independence in accordance to Article 8 (3) CFREU is not fully 
guaranteed.1215 
The Agreement also mentions the availability of administrative and judicial 
redress. In regard to the former, Article 13 (4) points to the DHS Traveller Redress 
Inquiry Program (DHS TRIP). It has been introduced to resolve all travel-related 
inquiries including those related to the use of PNR. It provides a redress process for 
individuals who believe that they have been delayed or prohibited from boarding 
because they were wrongly identified as a threat.1216 While this simplified 
administrative procedure is a step in the right direction, there has been criticism in 
regard to its functioning in practice. Particularly in regard to no-fly lists travellers are 
often not notified of why they are being denied boarding or are subjected to additional 
screening.1217 The fact that remedies should not only be mentioned in the legislation 
but be effective in practice was also stressed in DRI. The CJEU mentioned that the 
law in question must impose “(…) minimum safeguards so that the persons whose 
data have been retained have sufficient guarantees to effectively protect their personal 
data (…).”1218 
If administrative remedies have been exhausted, data subjects should in light 
of Article 47 CFREU be able to access judicial remedies enabling him/her to 
challenge an adverse decision before national courts.1219 Every individual can request 
judicial review under provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act and in 
accordance with relevant provisions of (i) the Freedom of Information Act, (ii) the 
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, (iii) the Electronic Communications Privacy Act and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1213 See: Zakharov v. Russia, para. 278 and 279. See also: Case C-518/07, Commission v Germany; 
Case C-614/10l Commission v Austria and Case C-288/12 Commission v Hungary.  
1214 Article 14, 2012 PNR Agreement.   
1215 See: AG Opinion on Opinion 1/15, para. 315.  
1216 Article 13 (4), 2012 PNR Agreement.  
1217 Ramsey, M. (2014). A Return Flight for Due Process? An Argument for Judicial Oversight of the 
No-Fly List. Retrieved 12.01.2017 from http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2414659, p. 11 
1218 DRI, para. 54 (emphasis added by author); Schrems, para. 95.  
1219 Schrems, para. 64 
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(iv) other applicable provisions of US law.1220 It is however interesting to note that 
judicial review can only be requested “of any final agency action by DHS” it is thus 
not clear what happens if data has been shared with other US agencies. Apart from the 
laws mentioned, it is also worth pointing out that both Article 11 on access for 
individuals and Article 12 on correction and rectification explicitly mention that any 
refusal shall inform individuals of the options available under US law for seeking 
redress. The recently adopted judicial redress act shall also apply to any non-US 
citizens. However, in the last PNR review its application to the PNR Agreement was 
not yet entirely clear.1221 
 
3.4.5 Data security 
	  
An adequate data security strategy needs to account for: (i) the vast quantity of data 
whose retention is required; (ii) the sensitivity of the data; (iii) the risk of unlawful 
access to data requiring data integrity and confidentiality.1222 The 2012 PNR 
Agreement includes detailed provisions on how to ensure appropriate technical 
measures and organisational arrangements to protect data.1223 For example, the 
Agreement mentions that appropriate use of technology is made to ensure data 
protection, security, confidentiality and integrity. More specifically, data shall be held 
in a secure physical environment and encryption mechanisms should exist.1224 
Moreover, the Agreement mentions that after six months data shall be masked and 
pseudonymised.1225 Ultimately, breach notifications in case of a privacy incident shall 
be issued. It is however not clear, what qualifies as a ‘significant privacy incident’ 
and which information needs to be contained in a breach notification to the 
individual.1226 However, generally the PNR Agreement accounts for the vast quantity 
of data, the sensitivity of the data and the risk of unlawful access through adequate 
technological and organisational means. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1220 Article 13 (3), 2012 PNR Agreement. 
1221 European Commission Report on the joint review of the implementation of the Agreement between 
the European Union and the United States of America on the processing and transfer of passenger 
name records to the United States Department of Homeland Security, SWD(2017) 14 final, p. 16.  
1222 DRI, para. 66; Tele2 Sverige, para. 122. 
1223 Article 5, 2012 PNR Agreement. 
1224 Ibid.  
1225 Article 8, 2012 PNR Agreement. 
1226 EDPS Opinion of 9 December 2011 op.cit, para. 21. 
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In DRI the Court ruled that the data security safeguards of the DRD were not 
adequate because providers can take economic considerations into account when 
determining the level of data security. The repealed DRD mentioned that “the data 
shall be subject to appropriate technical and organisational measures to protect the 
data against accidental or unlawful destruction, accidental loss or alternation, or 
unauthorised or unlawful storage, processing, access or disclosure.”1227 The data 
security provision in the PNR Agreement is very similar: “DHS shall ensure that 
appropriate technical measures and organisational arrangements are implemented to 
protect personal data and personal information contained in PNR against accidental, 
unlawful or unauthorised destruction, loss, disclosure, alteration, access, processing or 
use.”1228 Given the similarity of the provisions, it can be assumed that the 2012 
Agreement does not comply with the standards established by DRI. Nevertheless it is 
necessary to take one major difference into account. In DRI the Court focused its 
reasoning mainly on the nature of traffic and location data when discussing data 
security standards. Accordingly, the judges criticised the fact that the DRD did not 
sufficiently take the vast quantity of data and the sensitive nature of that data and into 
account.1229 While both under the PNR Agreement and the DRD a vast quantity of 
data is processed, the data under the DRD (traffic and location data) is considered as a 
sensitive category of data which is not the case for categories of PNR data. However, 
as stated earlier, PNR data can include sensitive data which is also a special category 
of data.   
 
3.5 Applicability of jurisprudence to the PNR Directive 
 
As explained earlier in this chapter, one effect of the EU-US PNR Agreement has 
been ‘norm-internalisation’ leading to the adoption of the PNR Directive. Thus, it is 
necessary to also assess what effect case law could have on the EU internal PNR 
regime. In regard to the interference with Articles 7 and 8 CFREU and the 
justification for this interference the same findings apply as those stated above in 
sections 3.2 and 3.3. Although the substance of the PNR Directive is similar to the 
PNR Agreement it is still necessary to assess proportionality separately. First of all 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1227 Article 7 (b), DRD. 
1228 Article 5 (1), 2012 PNR Agreement. 
1229 DRI, para. 66.  
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this is due to the fact that an “assessment depends on all the circumstances of the case, 
such as the nature, scope duration of the possible measures, the grounds required for 
ordering them, the authorities competent to authorise, carry out and supervise them, 
and the kind of remedy provided by national law.”1230 Second, since the EU internal 
PNR regime is an EU Directive instead of an international Agreement, it is not only 
bound by the Charter but also by EU secondary law. The proportionality assessment 
also needs to take into account that in contrast to the PNR Agreement no compromise 
with a non-EU country was necessary.1231     
 
3.5.1 Proportionality of interference with Articles 7 and 8 CFREU  
	  
(i) Indiscriminate transfer and access to data 
First, transfer and access to data should be strictly limited to the purpose of preventing 
and detecting serious offences.1232 The Directive sets out that the purpose of PNR data 
processing is the prevention, detection, investigation and prosecution of terrorist 
offences and serious crime.1233 Article 6 further specifies the purpose by mentioning 
three instances in which processing is allowed: (i) carrying out an assessment of 
passengers prior to their scheduled arrival in or departure from the Member State to 
identify persons who require further examination by the competent authorities or by 
Europol in regard to terrorism or serious crime; (ii) responding to requests from the 
competent authorities to provide and process PNR data in specific cases when 
necessary to address terrorism and serious crime; (iii) analysing PNR data for the 
purpose of updating or creating new criteria to be used in the assessments to identify 
any persons who may be involved in a terrorist offence or serious crime.1234 All of 
these points support the overarching purpose of preventing, detecting, investigating 
and prosecuting terrorism and serious crime.    
Second, the Directive also precisely defines the nature of the crimes 
covered.1235 A detailed account is provided in regard to the meaning of terrorism by 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1230 Kennedy v. United Kingdom, para. 153.  
1231 AG Opinion on Opinion 1/15, para. 7.  
1232 DRI, para. 61; Tele2 Sverige, para. 111.  
1233 Article 1 (2), PNR Directive. 
1234 Ibid., Article 6.  
1235 Zakharov v. Russia, para. 248; DRI, para. 61. 
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referring to Articles 1 to 4 of Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA.1236 Furthermore, a 
list of offences qualifying as ‘serious crime’ is annexed to the Directive.1237   
Third, access to data shall be limited to a small number of authorised 
persons.1238 The PNR Directive requires Member States to sets up Passenger 
Information Units (PIUs) which are in charge of  “collecting PNR data from air 
carriers, storing and processing those data and transferring those data or the result of 
processing them to the competent authorities.”1239 Furthermore, PIUs are in charge of 
exchanging both PNR data and the results of processing those data with the PIUs of 
other Member States and with Europol in accordance with Articles 9 and 10.1240 Thus, 
PIUs have the authority to both access data in the first place and to transfer data to 
authorities within the Member State or to other Member States. While this shows that 
the Directive clearly designates PIUs as bodies in charge of accessing PNR data, the 
Directive leaves the composition of PIUs very broad since Member States can decide 
to designate an authority. For example, it could either be an already existing authority 
in charge of fighting terrorism and serious crime or it could be a newly established 
body. In both cases it is also not clearly stated that the size of PIU’s needs to be 
strictly limited to what is necessary for the purpose of complying with the Directive. 
While this may be justified to account for the differences in the Member States’ 
criminal justice systems, the differences may make some PNR regimes more 
vulnerable to risks of abuse than others.  
Fourth, the Directive defines the target group liable to interception1241 by 
mentioning that PNR data is collected from passengers of extra-EU flights.1242 
Nevertheless, it is at the Member State’s discretion to also apply the Directive to all or 
selected intra-EU flights. This means that the ratione personae scope potentially 
extends to all passengers landing on EU soil. While this implies a massive scope 
which goes even beyond the one of the EU-US PNR Agreement, it has been argued 
earlier that the purpose of the broad scope of PNR regimes is to allow law 
enforcement authorities to identify individuals who were previously not known to the 
authorities. Thus, limiting the scope ratione personae to suspects or only to a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1236 Article 3 (8), PNR Directive. 
1237 Annex II, PNR Directive.  
1238 DRI, para. 62. 
1239 Article 4 (2) (a), PNR Directive.  
1240 Ibid., Article 4 (2) (b). 
1241 Liberty and others v. UK, para. 64 or Szabó and Vissy v. Hungary, para. 66 -67. 
1242 Article 1 (1) (a), 2012 PNR Directive.  
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particular region would render the purpose of the agreement meaningless in this 
respect.1243  
Fifth, according to case law, access and use of data needs to be dependent on a 
prior review carried out by a court or by an independent administrative body whose 
decision seeks to limit access to the data and their use to what is strictly necessary.1244 
As stated earlier it is possible to wave the requirement of ex-ante review as long as 
sufficient ex-post judicial oversight is guaranteed.1245 Due to the considerably high 
amount of transfers and access this seems to apply in this case.  
 
(ii) Retention period 
As mentioned before there are three parameters to assess the retention period. First, 
data retention periods shall be strictly limited according to the usefulness of the data 
for the purposes pursued.1246 The data retention period under the PNR Directive is five 
years in total while depersonalisation of all data that could reveal the identity of a 
passenger is required after six months.1247 The information to be depersonalised is 
explicitly mentioned in the form of an exhaustive list and seems to cover all 
categories from Annex I that could indeed reveal a person’s identity.1248 The 5-year 
retention period does not differentiate between the usefulness of the different PNR 
data categories nor between the persons concerned.1249 Nevertheless, additional 
safeguards have been added since disclosure of depersonalised data can only be 
permitted if approved by a judicial authority or a national authority competent under 
national law.1250 While this adds an additional safeguard, the Directive does not 
specifically point out to whom data shall be disclosed.   
Second, the CJEU also held that any data retention period ‘must be based on 
objective criteria in order to ensure that it is limited to what is strictly necessary’.1251  
The Directive falls short of this requirement, since it does not explicitly mention that 
the retention period is necessary for the objectives pursued in the Directive.1252  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1243 See: AG Opinion on Opinion 1/15, para. 244. 
1244 DRI, para. 60; Szabó and Vissy v. Hungary, para. 73. 
1245 Szabó and Vissy v. Hungary, para. 77 and case law cited.  
1246 DRI, para. 63; AG Opinion on Tele 2 Sverige, para. 242. 
1247 Article 12 (1) and (2), PNR Directive.  
1248 Note that it covers frequent flyer information in Article 12 (2) (d) which was not included in the 
EU-Canada PNR Agreement and explicitly criticised by the AG in his Opinion on Opinion 1/15.   
1249 DRI, para. 63.  
1250 Article 12 (3) (b), PNR Directive.  
1251 DRI, para. 64. AG Opinion on Tele2 Sverige, para. 242. 
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Third, irreversible destruction of the data at the end of the prescribed data 
retention period has to be provided for.1253 The Directive mentions that all PNR data 
has to be permanently deleted after the expiry of the maximum retention period of 
five years.1254 Nevertheless, this requirement does not apply where specific PNR data 
has been transferred to competent authorities in the context of specific cases for 
fighting terrorism and serious crime.1255 In those situations retention has to be 
regulated by national law. While it can be argued that handling of data during national 
criminal procedures goes beyond the competences of the EU, it has to be 
acknowledged that EU action on PNR triggered interference with Article 7 and 8 
CFREU. Therefore, establishing core guarantees such as the irreversible destruction 
of data cannot be left to Member States alone.1256    
 
(iii) Onward transfer of PNR data 
Under the PNR Directive onward transfer of PNR data has four dimensions. First, 
within a Member States onward transfer happens between PIUs and ‘competent 
authorities’.1257 Article 6 (2) (a) of the Directive mentions that PIUs shall be in charge 
of assessing all PNR data in order to detect passengers who need to be further 
examined by competent authorities. Thus it is clear that PIUs are tasked with filtering 
out targeted data for competent authorities. Nevertheless, when mentioning the 
circumstances in which PIUs can transfer data to competent authorities it is 
mentioned that PIUs shall transfer data received from air carriers or the results of 
those data to the competent authorities.1258 It is not clear why this provision keeps 
onward transfer to competent authorities so broad without explicitly mentioning that it 
should be restricted to specific cases where a suspicion exists or where appropriate 
actions for fighting serious crime and terrorism need to be taken. This does not meet 
the standard of the DRI judgement mentioning that objective criteria should exist by 
which to determine the limits of the access of the competent national authorities to the 
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1254 Article 12 (4) of the PNR Directive. 
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1257 Article 4 (2) (a), PNR Directive. Competent authorities are those authorities in charge of fighting 
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data and their subsequent use.1259 
Second, the Directive also regulates the transfer between Member States. On 
the one hand, PIUs shall be in a position to exchange and request PNR data among 
themselves. For example if one PIU identifies a suspicious person via PNR data all 
other PIUs shall be informed so that they can take appropriate actions in case the 
person travels to another Member State. 1260 Furthermore, PIUs can request data 
elements from other PIUs if it is duly reasoned.1261 The Directive requires independent 
review of such data exchange only after data is depersonalised after six months. 
However, all such requests should be subject to authorisation by a judicial or 
independent administrative authority in case it is transferred to other authorities. On 
the other hand the competent authority of one Member State shall also be in a position 
to request data from a PIU in another Member State in emergency cases.1262  In this 
case, the competent authority shall still channel their request through the PIU of its 
Member State.  
Third, the Directive also regulates the onward transfer to Europol by 
stipulating that it can request data from PIUs on a case-by-case basis if the data lies 
within its competences and is necessary for the performance of its tasks.1263 While it is 
mentioned that Europol needs to notify its data protection officer of each exchange1264 
it is not mentioned that PIUs can either refuse to transfer data to Europol or that it 
should depend on authorisation by a judicial or independent administrative authority. 
It is surprising that such a safeguard mechanism exists in respect to requests by 
national competent authorities (at least after the initial 6 months) but not in regard to 
Europol.1265    
The fourth dimension is the onward transfer to third countries. Member States 
can transfer either PNR data or the results of processing to third countries on a case-
by-case basis. There are several safeguards in regard to the transfer. First of all, it is 
explicitly mentioned that transfer can only take place for the purposes of the 
Directive.1266 Second, transfer has to comply with Decision 2008/977/JHA which 
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1260 Article 9 (1), PNR Directive.  
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1262 Ibid., Article 9 (3).  
1263 Ibid., Article 10 (1).  
1264 Ibid., Article 10 (3).  
1265 For national competent authorities, see Article 9 (2) PNR Directive. 
1266 Article 11 (1) (b), PNR Directive.  
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among others mentions that the third country shall have an adequate level of 
protection.1267 Third, the transfer shall happen with the consent of the Member State 
from which the data originates1268 and in case this is not possible due to exceptional 
circumstances ex-post verification shall take place.1269 Fourth, after an initial six 
months the transfer has to be authorised by a judicial authority or an independent 
administrative authority.1270 While these safeguards have to be positively 
acknowledged, it can be criticised that it is not specified which Member State 
authority can conduct the onward transfer (i.e. the PIUs or competent authorities).    
In sum, several safeguards are included in respect to onward transfer of PNR 
data on national, EU and international levels. However, it is concerning that in some 
cases the nature and purpose of PNR data to be transferred is not sufficiently 
specified. Furthermore, prior authorisation is not always needed from either a judicial 
authority or from an independent authority.1271  While in exceptional situations the 
lack of ex-ante authorisation can be justified if sufficient ex-post review measures are 
present, no or only mere post factum review in some of the instances mentioned above 
might not be able to ensure a potentially wrong assessment of the level of protection 
afforded nor restore privacy if needed.1272  
 
(iv) Remedies 
In accordance with Article 8 (2) CFREU, the Directive specifies that each passenger 
shall have the same right to protection of their personal data, rights of access, 
rectification, erasure and restriction.1273 The Directive further refers to the provisions 
of Framework	  Decision 2008/977/JHA as well as its implementing measures in 
national law in regard to the availability of these rights.1274 Passengers are entitled to 
send a request to access, rectification or erasure to the data protection officer in the 
PIU of each Member State who function as a single point of contact for all processing 
of PNR data.1275  
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In accordance with Article 8 (3) CFREU and relevant case law1276 the 
Directive also stipulates that a national supervisory authority -as specified in 
Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA- shall monitor compliance with data subject 
rights.1277 Each national supervisory authority shall receive and investigate complaints 
lodged by individuals, verify the lawfulness of data processing, and advise data 
subjects on the exercise of their rights under the Directive.1278 Furthermore, the 
Framework Decision also specifies that national supervisory authorities shall have 
access to all relevant information, shall be able to order the blocking, erasure or 
destruction of data and shall have the power to engage in legal proceedings.1279 
Ultimately, in light of Article 47 CFREU data subjects shall also be able to access 
judicial remedies enabling him/her to challenge an adverse decision before national 
courts.1280 The Directive regulates judicial remedies as well as compensation by 
reference to Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA.1281  
It can be concluded that the Directive in accordance with Framework Decision 
2008/977/JHA offers sufficient safeguards for individuals in respect to the rights to 
access, rectification and erasure, the right to lodge a claim before a national 
supervisory authority and to access judicial remedies.   
 
(v) Data security 
It is stipulated that the PIUs shall implement “appropriate technical and organisational 
measures and procedures to ensure a high level of security appropriate to the risks 
represented by the processing and the nature of the PNR data.”1282 The Directive also 
includes some other provisions on data security for instance when discussing 
depersonalisation of data after six months or when discussing data protection 
principles in general.1283 In accordance with CJEU jurisprudence, the Directive also 
states that storage of data shall take place in a secure location within the territory of 
the EU.1284 Ultimately, the Directive also makes explicit references to the DPD and the 
2008 Framework Decision which both contain detailed provisions on data security. 
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For example, the PNR Directive explicitly refers to Article 22 of the 2008 Framework 
Decision which establishes that the controller and the processor shall take into 
account “(…) the state of the art and the cost of their implementation, [and] such 
measures shall ensure a level of security appropriate to the risks represented by the 
processing and the nature of the data to be protected.”1285 
 
4. The PNR Agreement and ‘political actorness’ of the CJEU 
 
As outlined in the previous section relevant ECtHR and CJEU jurisprudence is at least 
partially applicable to the EU-US PNR Agreement. This raises the question as to 
whether and under which circumstances the CJEU can exhibit political actorness in 
relation to further regulation of PNR. First of all, the fact that the EU-Canada PNR 
Agreement is currently under scrutiny by the CJEU already demonstrates a certain 
degree of political actorness of the CJEU since it is in a position to influence 
developments on PNR. A factor facilitating the EP’s decision to question the Canada 
PNR Agreement was obviously timing as the DRI judgement was published just in 
time when the EP was asked to consent to the PNR Canada Agreement.1286 Moreover, 
the EP mentioned that the reason for referring the matter to the CJEU is not solely the 
uncertainty about whether the findings of the DRI judgment might also apply to other 
existing instruments but also to obtain guidance on the legitimacy of potential future 
PNR regimes. Respectively, a MEP mentioned: “Russia, Mexico, Korea and other 
countries with weaker data protection rules are collecting passenger flight information 
and might want to negotiate their own agreements soon. It should be clear that any 
agreement, present or future, must be compatible with EU treaties and fundamental 
rights and must not be used as a means to lower European data protection standards 
via the back door.”1287 This statement provides an indication of how for instance the 
EP can exploit the CJEU’s findings in steering future legislative initiatives. 
Nevertheless, the political actorness of the CJEU is limited which has been 
demonstrated with the recently adopted PNR Directive. While the EP stressed during 
the negotiation phase that the findings of DRI need to be accounted for, the adopted 
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text still does not comply with CJEU-generated principles. It can thus be argued that 
political actorness depends heavily on the acceptance of court-generated principles by 
political actors.    
Turning to the question how likely it is that the EU-US PNR Agreement will 
be affected obviously depends on the CJEU’s deliberations when providing its 
judgment on the Canada Agreement. In contrast to what has been found in regard to 
the SWIFT Agreement (see Chapter 6 above) the Commission would be under much 
higher pressure to terminate/amend the EU-US PNR Agreement due to the almost 
identical purpose and similar nature of the two agreements. Furthermore, it would be 
difficult to justify upholding the EU-US PNR Agreement if subsequent regimes with 
other countries were based on different conditions.   
                
Conclusion  
 
The aim of this chapter was to assess how the EU institutional framework shaped data 
protection and privacy in regard to the EU-US PNR Agreement. Hypothesis two (i.e. 
the EU institutional framework enables EU legislative actors to pursue strategic 
preferences in the legislation-making process and thereby influences the way privacy 
and data protection is shaped in the public security context) has been confirmed since 
the EU institutional framework fostered strategic preference formation of institutional 
actors which influenced the way data protection and privacy was framed in the 
context of the PNR Agreement. Five key observations have been made in this respect. 
First, the EU Commission emerged as the key driver of the initial negotiations due to 
transnationalism, the exclusion of the EP and by framing PNR as a data protection 
matter. Second, the EP exploited the cross-pillar nature of PNR to instrumentalise the 
CJEU for its strategic purposes and thereby triggered the annulment of the first PNR 
Agreement. Third, after the annulment of the first Agreement, the EP continued 
attempting to influence the way privacy and data protection was shaped through 
venue shopping. Fourth, when the EP got the right to retroactively vote on the second 
PNR Agreement, the EP’s sensitivity to failure shaped privacy and data protection in 
a sense that the EP accepted policy outcomes with lower standards than it originally 
postulated. Fifth, it has also been illustrated that norm-taking played a role in 
initiating the development of an EU internal PNR regime. While norm-taking is not 
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considered a strategic preference per se, it has been shown that after the norm taking 
took place, strategic preferences were formed.  
The chapter also analysed and confirmed Hypothesis 3 (i.e. the transitional 
nature of the EU institutional framework contributed to the CJEU’s evolution from a 
‘legal basis arbiter’ to a political actor in its own right that increasingly determines 
substantial aspects relating to privacy and data protection in the public security 
context). It has been shown that while pre-Lisbon the CJEU’s role was limited to 
ruling on the legal basis of the PNR Agreement, post-Lisbon CJEU principles have 
had an impact on data protection and privacy in relation to the EU-US PNR 
Agreement. By applying the framework established in Chapter 3 it was shown that the 
Agreement infringes Articles 7 and 8 CFREU. First, transfer and access to data is not 
strictly limited to the purpose of preventing and detecting serious offences since on a 
case-by-case basis data can be used and processed where necessary if ordered by a 
court. Second, the nature of crime giving rise to the agreement is not precisely defined 
and only the degree of seriousness of the offences in which cases US authorities are 
entitled to process PNR data is mentioned. Third, the authority responsible for 
accessing and processing PNR data is not sufficiently limited since the Agreement 
does not consistently refer to one designated authority. Fourth, the data retention 
period is not sufficiently limited. While a nuanced data retention period exists the 
Agreement fails to differentiate between the usefulness of certain types of data. 
Furthermore, the retention period is not limited based on objective criteria and 
irreversible destruction of the data is not explicitly required. Fifth, safeguards in 
relation to onward transfer are limited to a post factum review which might not be 
sufficient in all cases. Sixth, the Agreement fails to define the competences of the data 
protection oversight body and does not sufficiently ensure its independence. 
Furthermore, the effectiveness of administrative and judicial remedies can be 
doubted. In regard to the PNR Directive, requirements are stricter in than the case of 
the PNR Agreement but some aspects still raise concerns. Last but not least, it has 
also been shown that the CJEU has been given the opportunity to exercise political 
actorness in regard to determining privacy and data protection in the PNR context. 
However, it is rather a conditional political actorness since the PNR Directive still 
does not live up to all CJEU-generated principles.     












PART III – CONCLUDING REMARKS AND FUTURE 
PERSPECTIVES 
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CHAPTER 7 – CONCLUSION 
 
1. Summary of findings  
	  
As highlighted in the introduction, there are two dynamics which can be understood 
as the wider context in which the research of this thesis took place.1288 On the one 
hand, the omnipresence of personal data in the digital age has transformed the modus 
operandi of public security bodies, raising concerns about a nation’s ability to 
conduct mass surveillance. On the other hand, this new modus operandi gains 
legitimisation from real threats as well as threat perceptions. Thus, reconciling 
privacy and data protection with public security concerns is highly context dependent 
and fluctuating depending on events and related discourse. While bearing in mind this 
wider context, the aim of this thesis was to understand how the EU institutional 
framework shapes data protection and privacy in regard to data retention and access 
measures. Three case studies were scrutinised for that purpose: the Data Retention 
Directive and the PNR and SWIFT regimes. In Chapter 2, three hypotheses in 
accordance to NI were presented in an attempt to answer the overarching research 
question. In the following, conclusions in respect to each hypothesis will be drawn.  
   
Hypothesis 1: ‘Privacy and Data Protection in AFSJ’ is an institutional 
framework in transition implying that both established as well as new 
institutional features co-exist and commonly determine how data protection and 
privacy is shaped in relation to public security.  
 
The thesis has confirmed the first hypothesis since the institutional framework is 
marked by incremental transformation where some aspects exhibit features of ‘old 
paths’ while others exhibit new structures. Turning points or so-called ‘critical 
junctures’ and institution-internal uncertainties have contributed to the transitional 
character of the institutional framework while path-dependence led to the stickiness to 
the institutional status quo. Two key ‘critical junctures’ have been identified which in 
many respects triggered change: the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty and the 
adoption of the CFREU. It is also relevant to assess the underlying causes for 
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institutional change. While more generally it can be argued that the Treaty of Lisbon 
and the adoption of CFREU are the outcome of European integration, in the particular 
case of privacy and data protection in AFSJ the role of events and processes should 
not be underestimated in triggering institutional change. For example, the attacks on 
9/11 and the Snowden revelations had a particular impact on determining the paths of 
EU-US relations and led to a political prioritisation at EU level. In addition, 
technological change and the transnational nature of data flows and its implications 
for data protection and privacy are underlying factors that led to change.  
Chapter 2 of this thesis provided insights into the meaning of the term 
‘institution’ and/or ‘institutional framework’ in accordance with NI. These terms refer 
to the ‘operating framework’ that organises actions of institutional actors into 
predictable and reliable patterns. In the context of the thesis, the legal framework that 
structures privacy and data protection for public security purposes is considered to be 
the relevant ‘institutional framework’. Respectively, a holistic view has been taken by 
including constitutional rules on privacy and data protection; secondary legislation 
laying down more practice-oriented rules; procedural rules applicable to legislation-
making when data protection and privacy for public security purposes is at stake; and 
CJEU and ECtHR case law.  
In a further step, Chapter 3 examined the institutional framework on privacy 
and data protection in AFSJ from a HI perspective. On a constitutional level, a 
particularity of the institutional framework is the fact that both the ECHR and CFREU 
play a role in shaping privacy and data protection in the public security context. 
However, while the ECHR only recognises the right to privacy as a fundamental right, 
the CFREU distinguishes between the right to privacy and the right to data protection. 
It has been demonstrated that there are multiple interpretations aiming to explain the 
deviation from the constitutional path laid down by the ECHR such as the drafters’ 
attempt to provide more legitimacy to the EU data protection framework; the attempt 
to address problems that emerged due to technological developments; the attempt to 
extend the application of data protection principles to former third pillar areas and to 
international relations; and the fact that the EU could not easily accede to other 
international instruments such as the Council of Europe Convention 108. It has also 
been shown that by granting data protection the status of a fundamental right, CFREU 
– in theory- represents a significant deviation from institutional traditions developed 
mainly by the ECHR and respective jurisprudence. However -in practice- by entering 
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into judicial dialogue with the ECtHR, the CJEU adheres to the ECtHR 
conceptualisation of privacy and its correlation to data protection. Consequently, 
CFREU’s constitutional innovation was to date not able to function as critical 
juncture and path-dependence can be observed in respect to the conceptualisation of 
privacy, data protection and their correlation. This could change however in the 
future. For instance, in Tele2 Sverige the Court for the first time mentioned explicitly 
that the two rights are distinct but without explaining this in further detail.      
Although the conceptualisation of privacy and data protection is to date path- 
dependent, it has been illustrated that the entry into force of CFREU provided the 
CJEU with an opportunity to emerge as the primary actor in shaping data protection 
and privacy in the public security context. Respectively, the thesis first established a 
toolkit illustrating how recent CJEU case law – by being founded on ECtHR 
principles– assesses the legality of data processing measures in light of privacy and 
data protection.1289 In a second step it is shown that while ECtHR jurisprudence 
continues to play a role, the CJEU seems to be the new trendsetter due to institutional 
reasons such as the integrationist bias of CJEU jurisprudence and the more agile 
structure of CJEU offering more and speedier venues for litigation. The changing 
relevance of ECtHR and CJEU jurisprudence has been illustrated with the recent 
ECtHR’s reference to CJEU case law in Zakahrov v. Russia. From a HI perspective, a 
slow transition to a new paradigm can be detected where the growing importance of 
CJEU jurisprudence vis-à-vis ECtHR jurisprudence deviates from existing paths.  
Transition towards a new path has also been detected in respect to privacy and 
data protection in AFSJ as laid down by the treaties and secondary legislation. It has 
been shown that although over the years AFSJ matters were increasingly regulated on 
EU level until the adoption of the Treaty of Lisbon the institutional framework for 
AFSJ was complex and fragmented. In this environment data protection and privacy 
were mainly regulated in regard to specific sectors and thus multiple data protection 
regimes co-existed in an autonomous manner. The lack of consistency can be ascribed 
to the inherent paradox of AFSJ cooperation on EU level. On the one hand, Member 
States consider public security to be a matter at the heart of national sovereignty. On 
the other hand, Member States increasingly realised that EU integration of some 
aspects such as free movement cannot be seen in isolation from security. Finally, the 
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adoption of the Lisbon Treaty can be regarded as a ‘critical juncture’ in the sense that 
it harmonised many of the previously fragmented areas. While even after Lisbon the 
autonomous data protection regimes still continue to exist, the adoption of the Police 
and Criminal Justice Directive at least establishes EU-wide standards when data is 
processed for law enforcement and public security purposes. This shows that existing 
complexities are the results of a previously established path while at the same time the 
Lisbon Treaty resulted in a new, more unified approach.   
The external dimension of AFSJ is also an example of the incremental 
transition towards a new path. Chapter 3 explained that the Lisbon Treaty contributed 
to a more consistent approach to the external relations of AFSJ. This is also evident in 
regard to EU-US relations where a paradigm change over time can be observed. 
While EU-US relations on public security matters began to institutionalise shortly 
after 9/11 the initial phase of this cooperation was marked by US supremacy and it 
can even been argued that the EU had a reactive and norm-taking role. However, 
several ‘critical junctures’ resulted partially in more ‘actorness’ of the EU: (i) the 
adoption of the Lisbon Treaty resulted in more consistency in EU external relations, 
allowing the EU to be more assertive in negotiations; (ii) the Snowden revelations led 
to more reluctance among EU institutional actors to uncritically tolerate public 
security practices that interfere with the rights to privacy and data protection and (iii) 
the increasing role of the CJEU in determining how privacy and data protection ought 
to be treated in the public security context had a direct impact on the relationship.  
In sum, the core argument under Hypothesis 1 was that privacy and data 
protection in AFSJ is a transitional institutional framework as reflected in 
constitutional, competence-related and legislative modifications. This transitional 
nature can be traced back to multiple dynamics but this thesis treated European 
integration in form of the Lisbon Treaty and the adoption of the CFREU as the two 
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Hypothesis 2: The EU institutional framework enables EU legislative actors to 
pursue strategic preferences in the legislation-making process and thereby 
influences the way privacy and data protection is shaped in the public security 
context.  
 
In regard to the overarching research question how the EU institutional framework 
shapes data protection and privacy in respect to the data retention and access regimes, 
the thesis analysed the way stakeholders interacted with the institutional framework in 
the policy formation stage and in the further stages of the DRD, the PNR and SWIFT 
regimes. Seven aspects have been identified revealing that strategic preferences have 
guided the behaviours of legislative actors confirming Hypothesis 2. Each of those 
aspects are summarised below.  
 
(i) Cross-pillarisation and power struggles 
Due to the shift from pre- to post-Lisbon procedures, a core dynamic in relation to all 
three regimes is cross-pillarisation and corresponding power struggles. As has been 
shown in Chapter 2 as well as the case study chapters, the term refers to the 
institutional complexity of AFSJ measures and the corresponding questions it raises 
about what constitutes an appropriate legal basis and what are the adequate decision-
making procedures. Policy actors have in all three cases exploited the blurriness of the 
EU pillar structure in order to pursue strategic preferences.  
In respect to the DRD it has been shown that policy-making actors exploited 
cross-pillarisation to increase their influence in the legislation-making procedure. 
Data retention has an internal market dimension by harmonising legal requirements 
imposed on service providers in the EU. However, the ultimate aim of any data 
retention measure is to make retained data available to competent authorities if 
requested for the investigation, detection or prosecution of serious crime. This 
ambiguity obviously invited actors to advocate for the legal basis that grants them 
more benefits. The Council advocated for a framework decision excluding the EP 
from the legislation-making process and thereby speeding up the process and 
circumventing opposition. Contrarily, the Commission preferred a directive in order 
to maximise its own influence in potential follow-up processes and to increase 
democratic accountability and transparency. Determining the legal basis was not only 
crucial for the power allocation among legislative actors but determines the legal 
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safeguards applicable to privacy and data protection as during the negotiations for the 
DRD no data protection instrument existed in the third pillar.   
In regard to the SWIFT Agreement it has been shown that the institutional 
framework encouraged power struggles for more legislative influence between the EP 
and the Council which led to a revision of the SWIFT Agreement and thus to the re-
shaping of privacy and data protection. The first SWIFT Agreement was adopted after 
only four months of EU-US negotiations and just one day before the adoption of the 
Lisbon Treaty, which would have granted the EP co-decision rights. As a 
consequence the Agreement was heavily criticised for two reasons. First, the 
provisions on safeguarding the rights to privacy and data protection were considered 
insufficient. Second, the EP was deliberately excluded from the policy-making 
process and was not granted access to relevant documentation. In this context the EP 
exploited the legislative framework to maximise its future influence on shaping data 
protection and privacy. First, it instrumentalised the CJEU by demanding access to all 
relevant TFTP information held by the Council in Council v. In’t Veld. Second, the 
EP made use of its retroactive right to vote on the SWIFT Agreement in 2010 to reject 
the Agreement which can be considered to be a demonstration of power vis-à-vis 
other policy-making actors but at the same time had a positive impact on the 
protection of the rights to privacy and data protection.   
In respect to the PNR Agreement, the EP exploited the cross-pillar nature of 
PNR and instrumentalised the CJEU for strategic purposes and thereby triggered the 
annulment of the first PNR Agreement. It has been described how the EP took legal 
actions both against the Agreement and the Commission’s Adequacy Decision shortly 
after it had been adopted. Among others the EP argued that the first pillar is not the 
correct legal basis because the Decision’s aim is not the establishment and 
functioning of the internal market but to make data processing of personal data lawful 
in line with US legislation. Furthermore, the EP also argued that the Agreement 
infringes the right to protection of personal data. The CJEU only reacted to the EP’s 
plea on the legal basis and decided that a third pillar legal basis would have been the 
correct one. Since this deprived the EP of its co-legislative rights the annulment plea 
can be regarded as a warning at all costs to the Council and the Commission to not 
exclude the EP in the future. While it has been argued that normative considerations 
were the key driver of the EPs actions, the fact that the annulment resulted in a lower 
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level of protection of individuals’ rights to privacy and data protection contradicts this 
assumption. 
 
(ii) Legislation-making procedures and sensitivity to failure  
The co-decision procedure was introduced with the Maastricht Treaty (1992) but only 
with the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty the co-decision procedure –which was 
renamed to ordinary legislative procedure-1290 was applied to former third pillar 
topics. Given the EP’s strong opposition to all three data retention and access regimes 
it seemed logical that privacy and data protection standards would improve as soon as 
the EP had a say in the legislation-making procedure. Nevertheless, this expectations 
was not fully met and the EP frequently agreed to measures which it criticised sharply 
on previous occasions. It has been demonstrated that the legislation-making procedure 
(especially the fast-track procedure) contributed to strategic preference formation and 
sensitivity to failure which ultimately determined policy outcomes. 
 In respect to the DRD, it has been shown that under the fast-track procedure – 
an expedited version of co-decision- expected positive outcomes in respect to 
safeguards on privacy and data protection did not materialise. Since the fast-track 
procedure leaves more room for informal discussions than the traditional co-decision 
procedure it facilitates ‘political horse trading’ and in the case of the DRD to lower 
than expected data protection and privacy safeguards. The two majority parties were 
able to side-line the rapporteur and the LIBE committee by reaching a deal with the 
Council under the fast-track procedure. This behaviour does not reflect the usual 
critical stance of the EP and the rationale for this behaviour can be explained with 
‘sensitivity to failure’, long term strategic considerations or simply shared beliefs. 
In regard to PNR, the EP got the right to retroactively vote on the second PNR 
Agreement. Against expectations, the EP’s sensitivity to failure led to lower privacy 
and data protection safeguards. It has been shown that the EP set out several data 
protection principles that should be included in the new Agreement. However, the EP 
ultimately accepted the Agreement although not all of those principles had been taken 
on board. In Chapter 6 it has been argued that after becoming a co-legislator and thus 
sharing legislative responsibility the EP became more sensitive to failure. This is 
linked to the EP having an integrationist bias implying that deviation from the original 
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mandate is always considered more favourably than maintaining the status quo. 
 
(iii) Transgovernmentalism 
Another relevant strategy revealing power maximization techniques is 
transgovernmentalism. The idea of transgovernmentalism refers to a mode of 
governance where sub-national actors intensively interact with each other, sometimes 
by circumventing their own national governments and in order to gain power. The 
term ‘sub-national actors’ can refer to a wide range of actors who are below the level 
of heads of state and government, such as ministerial officials or law enforcement 
agencies. Originally, transnationalism was applied to assess the interaction between 
sub-national actors within the EU in the AFSJ field.1291 Nevertheless, this thesis 
applies transgovernmentalism by analysing how actors such as the European 
Commission or the European Parliament build strategic transatlantic networks in 
order to enhance their chances to achieve their strategic preferences in the EU 
context. 
In regard to the SWIFT Agreement, the institutional framework fostered 
strategic transgovernmentalism between EU and US actors which played a role in 
shaping privacy and data protection both when the first and the second Agreement 
were adopted. It has been shown that the US was in a stronger position than the EU 
due to the TFTP programme originating in the US and due to the fragmented EU legal 
framework. In this context the involved actors framed negotiations in two ways.  
First, the US built strategic alliances on an informal basis with actors from the 
Council and the Commission by establishing forums such as the High-Level Political 
Dialogue on Border and Transportation Security and the High-Level Contact Group 
on data protection. It has been shown that these channels of informal cooperation 
excluded the EP and contributed to a mutual understanding between the 
Commission/Council and US actors on how privacy and data protection should be 
shaped. The second aspect was lobbying efforts towards the EP. When the US 
administration became aware of the possible rejection of the Interim Agreement 
efforts were made to pressure the EP into acceptance of the Agreement. After those 
efforts failed the US changed its ‘strategy of deterrence’ into a ‘strategy of inclusion’. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1291 Lavenex, S. (2009). Transgovernmentalism in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice. In: 
Tömmel, I. & Verdun, A. (eds.) Innovative Governance in the European Union. The Politics of 
Multilevel Policymaking, Boulder: Lynne Rienner.  
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This contributed to the Parliament’s more uncritical acceptance of the second SWIFT 
Agreement even though the provisions on privacy and data protection did not match 
the EP’s original expectations.  
 In respect to the PNR Agreement, the EU Commission emerged as the key 
actor in the initial negotiations due to intensive transnational cooperation. The 
Commission led initial discussions with the US where it stressed full solidarity with 
the US policies on the prevention and combat of terrorism and with the need to find 
practicable solutions on PNR transfers. By signing a joint statement -without the 
Council’s approval- right after the first round of negotiations, the Commission 
revealed its ambitions to remain the main negotiator on the matter. The Commission 
also managed to exclude the EP from participating in the initial negotiations. For 
example, the Commission neither shared updates on the progress of the negotiations 
with the Parliament nor did it take the EP’s concerns into consideration. Ultimately, 
by framing PNR transfer as a data protection matter the Commission further carved 
out competences from the Council and the EP. The Commission was a key actor in 
negotiating the adequacy decision between the EU and the US which is foreseen 
under the Article 25 (6) DPD. It has to be noted that this exclusive role did not remain 
undisputed. The responsible EP rapporteur threatened the Commission to 
instrumentalise the CJEU if it did not allow a greater role for the EP in the 
negotiations.  
 
(iv) Other aspects revealing strategic preferences 
Besides the three main institutional variables, there are at least three other institutional 
dynamics that can be detected when analysing the three data retention and access 
regimes.  
First, if a significant event takes place some policy actors are able to exploit 
the consequences of the event in order to make their strategic preferences seem to be a 
collectively superior outcome. Policy formation depends on the intersection of three 
different streams (the problem, policy and politics streams). When the three streams 
intersect, i.e. when a problem is recognized while simultaneously a solution is 
available, and the political climate is providing the right context for change, a window 
of opportunity emerges enabling policy change.1292  In respect to the DRD many 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1292 See: Kingdon J. W. (1995) Agendas, Alternatives and Public Policies. London: Longman. 
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scholars regarded the London and Madrid bombings as the main driver of the 
adoption of the DRD. However it has been illustrated how the ambition of introducing 
data retention measures had already developed in the 1990s. The two before-
mentioned terror events were merely a ‘window of opportunity’ legitimizing the 
initiative. The public security concerns arising from the bombings allowed the 
Council to make use of an AFSJ-related institutional particularity which grants 
Member States the right of initiative on AFSJ policy matters in case where the 
proposal is put forward by a quarter of the Member States.1293 In this way, the DRD’s 
appearance on the agenda is an outcome of the Council’s long-term objective to 
regulate data retention on the EU level rather than being exclusively the reaction to 
terror events. 
Second, venue shopping takes place when policy actors explore all formal and 
informal (even unusual or innovative) venues to maximize their influence in the 
legislation-making process. After the annulment of the first PNR Agreement, the EP 
continued attempting to influence the way privacy and data protection was shaped 
through venue shopping. By stressing the principle of loyal cooperation between the 
EU institutional players the EP President urged the Council and Commission to keep 
the Parliament informed about any new developments and to take its views into 
account. Furthermore, the EP requested full co-decision rights on PNR with the help 
of the ‘passerelle’ clause. Ultimately, since no instrument on data protection in the 
third pillar yet existed, the EP continued to provide guidelines and opinions on how 
the PNR Agreement should safeguard data protection. It has to be noted though that 
none of these attempts have been successful.  
Third, strategic preference formation also determines the willingness to 
initiate regulatory debates. In the case of the SWIFT Agreement, the fact that the 
TFTP was initially carried out in secret meant that safeguards on rights to privacy and 
data protection were non-existent. This can partially be ascribed to the lack of sincere 
cooperation between EU institutional actors. It has been shown that the ECB had been 
informed about the data transfers to the US since the TFTP’s beginning in 2001 
because it belonged to the SWIFT supervisory committee. The non-disclosure of the 
data transfers to the US conflicts with the principle of sincere cooperation as 
stipulated in Article 13 (1) and (2) TEU. The ECB explained non-disclosure with the 
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fact that its mandate in the supervisory committee was restricted to detecting and 
advising on risks to financial stability and the integrity of financial infrastructures. 
This shows that that ECB was subject to a different institutional framework impacting 
its preference formation when deciding not to act or initiate discussions on future 
legislation with other EU institutional actors.  
 Ultimately, it has been illustrated that norm-taking played a role in initiating 
legislative discussions in respect to the PNR regime. Right from the beginning of the 
PNR negotiations, particularly the Council and the Commission were persuaded of 
the usefulness of PNR data for public security purposes. Furthermore, the 
Commission scented the opportunity for actorness by stating that the EU’s approach 
cannot be limited to responding to the initiatives of others. In subsequent years, the 
Commission’s ambition was to develop an internal PNR regime which failed however 
due to institutional changes triggered by the Lisbon Treaty and due to the opposition 
of the EP. Only through the threats posed by ‘foreign terrorist fighters’ did a window 
of opportunity allow the adoption of the PNR Directive in 2016. While norm-taking is 
not a strategic preference per se, it has been shown that after the norm-taking took 
place, strategic preferences were formed at EU level. 
 
Hypothesis 3: The transitional nature of the EU institutional framework 
contributed to the CJEU’s evolution from a ‘legal basis arbiter’ to a political 
actor in its own right that increasingly determines substantial aspects relating to 
privacy and data protection in the public security context. 
 
It has been shown that pre-Lisbon the CJEU’s role in respect to the case studies was 
confined to ruling on the legal basis and in one case on access to information. In this 
way the CJEU was primarily a ‘legal basis arbiter’ determining power allocations 
between policy makers whilst they shaped privacy and data protection in relation to 
the data retention and access regimes. The changes of the institutional framework in 
the post-Lisbon era provided the CJEU with the necessary tools to increasingly 
litigate on substantive terms and thus proactively shape data protection and privacy in 
the public security context. For example, spill-over judgments emerged giving the 
CJEU the opportunity to further develop previously established principles; CJEU 
decisions have been instrumentalised in legislative debates and have been used to 
support the mandate of legislative actors; and the integration bias of judgments reveal 
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the overarching direction ‘political actorness’ is taking. Nevertheless, the extent of 
political actorness is not unconditional. Several aspects have been detected which 
limit the extent of political actorness in the policymaking process. For example, path-
dependence to previous ECtHR and CJEU case law limits the degree of novelty 
applied by the Court. Furthermore, timing and related institutional and behavioural 
constraints limit the de facto effects of CJEU’s decisions. Ultimately, also strategic 
preferences of policy makers are decisive in a sense that they can either further 
encourage that court-generated principles are reflected in legislation or they can limit 
the influence thereof. Consequently, referring back to the continuum between the 
constrained and dynamic view on Courts described in Chapter 2, the findings of the 
thesis can be described as a ‘conditional dynamic’ view.1294  
 
(i) CJEU’s role as a ‘legal basis arbiter’ 
In regard to all three case studies the CJEU played an important role as a ‘legal basis 
arbiter’ before the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty. Furthermore, the Court was 
instrumentalised by legislators with a view to allocate and rectify competences during 
the legislation-making process.  
In respect to the PNR Agreement, pre-Lisbon the CJEU was instrumentalised 
by the EP since it asked the CJEU to rule on the first PNR Agreement. It has been 
shown that although the EP put arguments on the substance of the Agreement to the 
CJEU, the Court decided to only rule on the legal basis without making any reference 
to the PNR Agreement’s impact on fundamental rights. The Court held that the first 
pillar was the wrong legal basis for both the Commission’s adequacy decision and the 
subsequent Council decision legitimising the transfer of PNR data to US authorities. 
The CJEU claimed that the PNR regime entails elements that concern the functioning 
of the internal market by harmonizing requirements for airline companies. However, 
the primary concern of the regime is to protect public security by combatting 
terrorism. Hence, the Court annulled both acts, implying that any re-negotiation 
needed to take place under third pillar procedures. The CJEU ruling created a lacuna 
legis in regard to the protection on privacy and data protection since at the time of 
annulment no EU legal instrument on data protection in the third pillar existed. The 
CJEU’s reluctance to extend its reasoning beyond legal basis considerations could be 
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related to the fact that the CJEU felt that in the absence of fundamental rights 
enshrined in the EU legal order, it would interfere disproportionality with EU policy 
decisions involving third countries.1295  
Based on the Court’s findings in respect to the PNR Agreement, Ireland 
challenged the legal basis of the DRD. Here, the Court came to a different conclusion 
by rejecting the argument that the instrument had to be based on the third pillar. 
Instead the Court argued that the minimum harmonisation approach adopted by the 
legislator implies that the Directive exclusively harmonises practices taking place 
under the first pillar. All data processing that relates to the activities of law 
enforcement authorities is beyond the remit of the Directive. The CJEU’s arguments 
seem appropriate when purely focusing on the reach of the Directive. However, it 
nonetheless fails to take the DRD’s purpose and its wider implications into account. 
In terms of implications, the CJEU’s DRD judgment has contributed to further 
legislative development since the EP had for the first time legislative influence in 
regard to an instrument which has third pillar implications. In this way the CJEU 
shaped privacy and data protection in the public security context since it prevented the 
emergence of a lacuna legis as was the case in regard to the PNR Agreement. The 
CJEU seemed to prefer the first pillar legal basis to claim authority on potential future 
requests dealing with proportionality, especially in light of the upcoming Lisbon 
Treaty. 
In respect to the SWIFT Agreement the CJEU did not play a role in regard to 
determining the legal basis of the instrument. Instead, the Court contributed to the 
power allocation between the legislative actors with its ruling on access to 
information. The Dutch MEP Sophie in’t Veld sought access to a Council document 
containing an opinion of the Council’s legal service on the legal basis of the SWIFT 
Agreement. The Council refused access since it claimed that secrecy in respect to the 
negotiations between the Council and US counterparts outweighed the public interest 
of disclosure. The Court rejected the Council’s arguments by stressing that the 
existence of a disagreement between the EP and the Council on the powers of the 
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institutional actors does not justify secrecy for the sake of credibility in negotiations 
for an international agreement. The judgment can be considered to follow the trend 
set by previous ‘access to information’ rulings.1296 In this way the CJEU seems to 
encourage openness and transparency in international negotiations. However, above 
all, ruling in favour of transparency also re-balances the institutional power allocation 
between the EP and the Council.  
 
(ii) CJEU and political actorness post-Lisbon 
After the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty the importance of legal basis 
considerations ceased due to the abolition of the pillar structure. Furthermore, the 
extended competences granted to the CJEU and the adoption of CFREU resulted in a 
shifting role of the CJEU on privacy and data protection in AFSJ. In order to analyse 
‘political actorness’ of the CJEU the thesis adopted a two-fold approach. The first 
step consisted of analysing the legality of the measure in accordance to the framework 
established in Chapter 3. This helped in understanding whether there is any room for 
‘political actorness’. The second step involved the assessment of whether CJEU-
generated principles do or have the potential to influence the way privacy and data 
protection is shaped in the respective policy field. In the following both steps are 
summarised. 
 
Chapter 3 established a framework to analyse the legality of the DRD, the SWIFT and 
PNR Agreement by laying down three criteria. First, it needs to be assessed whether 
the measure is accessible, foreseeable and respects the essence of the rights to privacy 
and data protection. Second, proportionality in terms of necessity with regard to 
legitimate objectives pursued needs to be analysed. Third, it needs to be analysed 
whether the measure is proportionate in terms of laying down sufficient safeguards 
against the abuse of power. Under this point various parameters are discussed such as 
scope of application, grounds for access to data, oversight on access to data, remedies, 
data retention period, data security and onward transfer.  
The assessment of the DRD mainly focused on assessing and critiquing DRI 
and Tele2 Sverige but also took other relevant cases into account. It has been shown 
that the DRD did not meet the criteria established by CJEU and ECtHR jurisprudence 
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in multiple ways: (i) the purpose and scope of data retention was not sufficiently 
limited; (ii) no objective criterion existed by which to determine the limits of access 
to the retained data; (iii) access to retained data was not subject to prior review by a 
court or an independent authority; (iv) the data retention period was not sufficiently 
limited because no differentiation is made between the different types of data and 
their usefulness; and (iv) no stringent rules on data security were in place. It has also 
been demonstrated that the CJEU applies a path-dependent conceptualisation of 
privacy and data protection whilst having a strong stance on safeguards applicable to 
Articles 7 and 8 CFREU in the context of data retention. 
In respect to the SWIFT Agreement it has been demonstrated that in light of 
recent case law, some aspects of the SWIFT Agreement are disproportionate. For 
example, the Agreement does not strictly limit the persons who are eligible to access 
and use data under the SWIFT Agreement. This is because the agreement only 
mentions that persons who investigate terrorism or its financing can access data 
without specifically determining the organisations that can access data. Further, the 
SWIFT Agreement falls short of the requirement that an independent administrative 
authority or a court needs to review access since the law enforcement authority 
Europol is entrusted with this task. Another aspect is that the Agreement does not 
sufficiently limit the retention period of non-extracted personal data since no 
requirement to depersonalise data exists.  
In respect to the PNR Agreement several arguments have been put forward 
showing that the Agreement is not proportionate in light of Articles 7 and 8 CFREU. 
For instance, the nature of crimes giving rise to the Agreement is not precisely 
defined and instead only the degree of seriousness of the offences entitling US 
authorities to process PNR data is mentioned. A further example is that the 
Agreement fails to define the competences of the data protection oversight body and 
does not sufficiently ensure its independence. In regard to the PNR Directive, 
requirements are stricter than the case of the PNR Agreement but some aspects still 
raise concerns such as the fact that the scope of PIUs who are in charge of accessing 
PNR data are not sufficiently limited.  
 
Having illustrated how none of the measures pass the legality assessment, the second 
step of the analysis was to analyse whether CJEU-generated principles which do or 
can influence the way privacy and data protection is shaped in regard to SWIFT, PNR 
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or DRD.  In regard to the DRD, it has been argued that the CJEU’s annulment of the 
DRD can be interpreted as example of ‘political actorness’ for three reasons. First, the 
judgment left the crucial question on whether indiscriminate data retention can at all 
be proportionate unanswered which resulted in a lack of legal certainty on the 
political level. The uncertainty of the judgment triggered a spill-over effect on similar 
data retention and access regimes on the EU level by having triggered follow-up cases 
such as Opinion 1/15 and Tele2 Sverige. A second aspect indicating the CJEU’s 
actorness is the fact that the judgement was used by legislative actors as strategic tool. 
For example, the EP used the findings of DRI in the negotiations of the PNR 
Directive and it has already been indicated that any future PNR regime needs to 
comply with the CJEU-generated principles. Ultimately, political actorness can be 
detected since the nature of the judgment reveals an integrationist bias. By making 
more specific safeguards a pre-condition for proportionality of any potential future 
measure the CJEU indirectly required stronger harmonisation at EU level.  
In regard to the SWIFT Agreement it has been shown that the EP requested 
shortly after the DRI judgement its legal service to elaborate on the impact of the 
judgment on the SWIFT Agreement and as shown earlier case law has implications 
for the legality of the SWIFT Agreement. However, no further action has been taken 
by political actors due to institutional reasons. On the one hand, requesting an opinion 
on an agreement can only happen either before the adoption of the agreement (as was 
the case for the EU-Canada PNR Agreement) or within two months after adoption. 
On the other hand, the Commission’s willingness to take action was also limited due 
to institutional memory relating to the difficulty to reach the current Agreement. To 
conclude, it has been shown that timing and institutional memory are relevant factors 
in limiting the degree to which a judgment can directly shape the strategic preferences 
of policy makers in respect to related policy areas.   
In regard to PNR, it has been shown that the timing was favourable since the 
EP’s consent to the EU-Canada PNR Agreement coincided with the aftermath of the 
DRI judgment. It remains to be seen which conclusion the CJEU will reach in respect 
to the legality of the Agreement. If the CJEU follows the AG by declaring the 
Agreement void the next question will be how far these findings will translate into 
real changes of the EU-US PNR Agreement and potentially even the PNR Directive. 
As established in the thesis, the EU-US PNR Agreement and the PNR Directive do 
not comply with existing jurisprudence showing that CJEU generated principles only 
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influenced subsequent legislation to a limited extent. However, if the CJEU 
invalidates the EU-Canada PNR Agreement the pressure to reconsider the EU-US 
Agreement is potentially much higher not least due to the danger of follow-up 
requests to the CJEU.  
2. Relevance and future perspectives    
 
As summarised in the previous section, this thesis focused on analysing the evolution 
of data protection and privacy in the public security context and on how EU 
institutional actors exercised influence within this transitional context. The core of the 
research focused on three regimes that emerged in the past but which have been 
continuously modified and which are still controversial at present. The added value of 
the approach chosen in this thesis lies in its interdisciplinary and holistic nature. By 
applying New Institutionalism the thesis went beyond a legal assessment on how 
privacy and data protection is or ought to be safeguarded. Instead the thesis also 
analysed the wider constitutional and legislative landscape as well as the behaviours 
of EU institutional stakeholders involved in all stages of the policy-making cycle. In 
this way the importance of political factors in determining, interpreting and applying 
the law has been illustrated. This has ultimately helped to unravel and understand the 
complexities involved in reconciling the rights to privacy and data protection with 
public security considerations.   
The holistic nature of the thesis’ approach might be beneficial for other 
research. For example, it can be applied to study similar regimes such as the EU-
Canada and EU-Australia PNR Agreements or the future EU PNR Agreements with 
third countries. It could also be applied to study other regimes which fall under the 
AFSJ umbrella, such as migration databases (e.g. SIS II, VIS, EURODAC). 
Respectively, the approach should add value to the existing academic debate by 
providing a holistic account of how legal and political factors shape privacy and data 
protection in the case of migration databases. In this way, it could make a contribution 
by uniting literature from political science and legal research camps. 
 
The findings of this thesis can also help to identify possible future trends in relation to 
privacy and data protection in the public security context. The thesis has shown that 
‘privacy and data protection in AFSJ’ is an institutional framework in evolution 
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wherein new and old features coexist. It can be expected that rather than ongoing 
transformation and volatility the changes that have already occurred will further 
‘institutionalise’ in the near future leading to more institutional stability or 
‘normalisation’. On the one hand this is due to the fact that CFREU and new 
legislation are more cautiously designed to factor in underlying disruptions such as 
technological change and the transformative nature of public security threats. On the 
other hand this is due to pragmatic considerations. Since major transformations as 
evident in respect to privacy and data protection in AFSJ take multiple years to be 
planned and to ultimately materialise it is unlikely that the institutional framework 
will be subject to major changes soon. 
Therefore, evaluating the future of privacy and data protection in the public 
security context will focus mainly on how actors will interact with the new 
institutional framework. As pointed out earlier, the abolition of the pillar structure 
reduces the leeway granted to EU institutional actors to exploit institutional intricacy 
to pursue strategic interests whilst choosing or disputing the legal basis of an 
instrument. Therefore, post-Lisbon it will be more important to assess strategic 
preference formation and tools (such as transnationalism or sensitivity to failure) 
during the ordinary or fast track legislation-making procedure or to study why certain 
initiatives are politically prioritised (e.g. due to window of opportunity or norm-
taking). The previous aspects might be worth testing when future initiatives emerge or 
when the current regimes are amended. However, as soon as full legislative powers 
were granted to the EP, the mandates of the EP, the Commission and the Council 
converged at the expense of a vivid discussion on how to safeguard privacy and data 
protection. In this context, it could be argued that the CJEU superseded the European 
Parliament in being the ‘champion of privacy and data protection’. Thus in the near 
future the new competences as well as the more antagonistic approach of the CJEU 
will render it even more important in shaping data protection and privacy in the public 
security context. Respectively, in the following some ideas are provided on where 
CJEU input might be crucial in the future.   
First, the CJEU ought to clarify the correlation between privacy and data 
protection. Traditionally the CJEU has followed ECtHR jurisprudence by adopting 
the inherency approach and thus has not taken the constitutionalisation of data 
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protection in CFREU into account.1297 In Tele2 Sverige the CJEU has for the first time 
explicitly expressed the distinctiveness of Articles 7 and 8 CFREU.1298 However, the 
proportionality assessment still does not acknowledge this distinction. The reason for 
the CJEU’s hesitations is at least partially related to the complex interaction between 
CJEU and ECtHR jurisprudence. Maintaining consistency between the two legal 
orders is crucial for legal certainty of Member States falling within the remit of both 
jurisdictions and for the continuous legitimacy of both courts.1299 At the same time 
however, it is crucial to elaborate more extensively on the conceptual correlation 
particularly since the statement in Tele2 Sverige stands in contrast to previous CJEU 
conceptualisations.  
Second, the CJEU should also elaborate more extensively on the implications 
of declaring that public security is a fundamental right stipulated in Article 6 
CFREU.1300 This statement was made in DRI and stands in contrast to earlier 
interpretations of both Article 6 CFREU and its ECHR equivalent Article 5 which 
only stress the liberty dimension of the articles. While substantially deviating from 
earlier interpretations, the Court did not analyse this point further. Instead it 
subsequently treats public security only as a legitimate ground for limiting Articles 7 
and 8 CFREU. This raises the question as to whether a proportionality assessment 
balancing Article 6 CFREU with Articles 7 and 8 CFREU would result in a different 
conclusion favouring arguments advocating for safeguarding Article 6 CFREU? This 
aspect might be an interesting subject for future CJEU litigation as well as future 
research in general.    
Third, post-Lisbon the discussion is likely to shift from the question on “which 
pillar is the adequate legal basis?” to the question of whether a measure falls at all 
under EU law. While Tele2 Sverige clarified that retention and access of traffic and 
location data for public security purposes falls under the remit of the e-privacy 
Directive this might be different for other data categories.1301 This loophole has to be 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1297 Chapter 3, section 2.5.  
1298 Tele2 Sverige, para. 129. 
1299 Chapter 3, section 2.5. 
1300 DRI, para. 42. 
1301 If the GDPR or the Directive do not apply to national processing, the latter must still respect the 
essence of Articles 7 and 8 CFREU which essentially extends the level of protection where EU does 
not apply (see: C-300/11 ZZ v Secretary of State for the Home Department of 4 June 2013 where the 
CJEU held that provisions of the Charter also apply in cases where national (or state) security is 
concerned.) However, the fact that national measures are not subject to CJEU oversight could limit the 
effectiveness of this safeguard. 
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considered particularly in the context of the current political environment where 
discourse in some EU Member State governments is marked by security concerns and 
anti-EU sentiments.  
Fourth, future developments in respect to EU-US relations will also be subject 
to further CJEU intervention. Most relevantly for this thesis, Opinion 1/15 is still 
outstanding. If the CJEU follows the AG Opinion this would most likely imply yet 
another re-negotiation of the EU-US PNR Agreement to introduce currently lacking 
safeguards.1302 In addition, the new Privacy Shield has been challenged in front of the 
Irish High Court and depending on the outcome further amendments to the Shield 
might be necessary.1303 These two cases demonstrate the increasing importance of the 
CJEU in upholding European values -including human rights- in EU external 
relations. Article 21 (1) TEU stresses that EU international relations shall be guided 
by principles that have inspired the EU’s own creation including the rule of law and 
fundamental rights. However, as illustrated in this thesis, transatlantic cooperation 
mechanisms do not always live up to those EU values. In this context, the CJEU is 
faced with the challenging task of ensuring that the rights of EU citizens and residents 
are protected in line with CFREU while simultaneously acknowledging that 
international agreements are the outcome of a compromise between the EU and 
another jurisdiction. While recent case law has put a particular emphasis on the 
former consideration, it will be interesting to analyse how far upcoming jurisprudence 
will translate into substantial changes on the legislative level. The current political 
climate and the strong security bias of the Trump administration might prevent the 
incorporation of CJEU-generated principles in legislative outcomes. For instance, 
recently an Executive Order was enacted which arguably has negative implications on 
data protection safeguards for EU citizens that have been established laboriously over 
the last two decades and particularly as a result of recent CJEU rulings.1304 In this 
context, EU legislators might increasingly move away from a principle-based to a 
‘realpolitik’ approach.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1302 While Opinion 1/15 refers to the EU-Canada Agreement, it would most likely imply renegotiations 
of the EU-US Agreement (see Chapter 6, sections 3 and 4).  
1303 Data Protection Commissioner v. Facebook Ireland Limited & Maxmilian Schrems, 2016/4809P. 
1304 Executive Order Enhancing Public Safety in the Interior of the United States of 25th of January, sec. 
14. While this Executive Order does not directly invalidate any arrangements under SWIFT, PNR, the 
Umbrella Agreement or the Privacy Shield, it represents a shift in how the US authorities deal with 
personal information collected on non-citizens.  
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While the four points above provide an idea on where CJEU inputs might be 
most crucial in the near future, other relevant questions on how to interpret EU law 
might arise once the GDPR and the Police and Criminal Justice Data Protection 
Directive become operational in 2018. To conclude on a positive note, the future of 
privacy and data protection in the public security context will probably be more stable 
from an institutional and legislative perspective than it has been before the Treaty of 
Lisbon has been adopted. At the same time, many questions regarding the 
interpretation of the new institutional framework are still open showing that privacy 
and data protection in the public security context remains an exciting topic to 
research.   
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